BRANCH v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
Filing
23
OPINION. Signed by Judge William J. Martini on 3/7/14. (gh, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
SHIRLEY BRANCH,
Civ. No. 2:12-04346 (WJM)
Plaintiff,
OPINION
V.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J.:
Plaintiff Shirley Branch brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2 16(i) and
223, seeking review of a final determination by the Commissioner of Social Security (the
“Commissioner”) denying in part his application for a period of disability and Disability
Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). For the reasons set forth below, the Commissioner’s
decision is AFFIRMED.
I. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. The Five-Step Sequential Analysis
Under the authority of the Social Security Act (“The Act”), the Social Security
Administration has established a five-step evaluation process for determining whether a
claimant is entitled to benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520, 416.920. In the first step, the
Commissioner determines whether the claimant has engaged in substantial gainful
activity since the onset date of the alleged disability. Id. § 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If
not, the Commissioner moves to step two to determine if the claimant’s alleged
impairment, or combination of impairments, is “severe.” Id. § § 404.1520(c), 41 6.920(c).
If the claimant has a severe impairment, the Commissioner inquires in step three as to
whether the impairment meets or equals the criteria of any impairment found in the
Listing of Impairments. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, Part A. If so, the
claimant is automatically eligible to receive benefits (and the analysis ends); if not, the
Commissioner moves on to step four. Id. § 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). In the fourth step,
the Commissioner decides whether, despite any severe impairment, the claimant retains
the Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) to perform past relevant work. Id. §
404. 1520(e)-(f), 416.920(e)-(f). The claimant bears the burden of proof at each of these
first four steps. At step five, the burden shifts to the Social Security Administration to
demonstrate that the claimant is capable of performing other jobs that exist in significant
numbers in the national economy in light of the claimant’s age, education, work
experience and RFC. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g), 416.920(g); see Poulos v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 474 F.3d 88, 91-92 (3d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).
B. Standard of Review
For the purpose of this appeal, the court conducts a plenary review of the legal
issues. See Schaudeck v. Comm ‘r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d Cir. 1999).
The factual findings of the AU are reviewed “only to determine whether the
administrative record contains substantial evidence supporting the findings.” Sykes v
Apfel, 228 F.3d 259, 262 (3d Cir. 2000). Substantial evidence is “less than a
preponderance of the evidence but more than a mere scintilla.” Jones v. Barnhart, 364
F.3d 501, 503 (3d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). “It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. When
substantial evidence exists to support the AU’s factual findings, this Court must abide by
the AU’s determinations. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)).
II. BACKGROUND
On May 27, 2008, Plaintiff filed an application for a period of disability and DIB.
The filings alleged that Plaintiff had a disability with an onset date of May 6, 2008, due
to conditions including coronary artery disease, the residual effects of coronary artery
bypass surgery, keloids of the chest, and lumbar disc disease with facet joint arthropathy.
Plaintiff’s claim was denied initially on November 24, 2008 and on reconsideration on
May 26, 2009.
On September 7, 2010, Plaintiff testified at a hearing before
Administrative Law Judge Richard L. De Steno (the “AU”).
On October i, 2010, the AU issued a decision finding that the Plaintiff was not
disabled. The AU found that the Plaintiff met the insured status requirements under The
Act, had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since May 6, 2008, and had severe
impairments involving coronary artery disease, the residual effects of coronary artery
bypass surgery, keloids of the chest, and lumbar disc disease with facet joint arthropathy.
However, the Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that
met or medically equaled any impairment listed in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix
1(20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525 and 404.1526). Furthermore, the AU determined that
the Plaintiff had the RFC for the full range of sedentary work and had no significant non
exertional limitations. Thus, the AU concluded that the Plaintiff was capable of
performing her past relevant work and had not been under a disability as defined by The
Act. On October 1, 2010, the appeals council denied Plaintiffs request for review.
Plaintiff now brings the instant appeal.
III.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff challenges the AU’s determination that she was “not disabled.” Plaintiff
argues that the AU erred as a matter of law in applying the Third Circuit’s pain standard,
evaluating the Plaintiffs credibility, and in determining that the Plaintiffs RFC was
sufficient to permit her to return to work.
2
A.
The AU correctly applied the pain standard.
Plaintiff first argues that the AU failed to properly analyze the Plaintiff under the
second step of the two-step pain analysis by failing to discuss all factors provided under
SSR 96-7P and 20 CFR 404.1529(c). However, the Plaintiff fails to mention any specific
evidence corresponding to a factor that the AU failed to discuss. See Canales v.
Barnhart, 308 F. Supp. 2d 523, 527 (E.D. Pa. 2004). Furthermore, SSR 96-7P does not
mandate an exhaustive recitation of each of the seven pain factors, but rather requires that
the AU “consider” all of these factors in making his determination. Id. The record
demonstrates that the AU thoroughly considered all relevant factors including “the
intensity, persistence, and limiting effects” of the Plaintiff’s medical conditions. See (R.
26). Accordingly, the AU properly applied the two-step pain analysis.
B.
The AU correctly assessed the Plaintiff’s credibility.
Plaintiff argues that the AU improperly assessed her credibility. (Pl.’s Br. 10).
Pursuant to SSR 96-7P, the Plaintiff’s credibility must be assessed in consideration with
all evidence present in the record. See Christy v. Astrue, CIV.A. lO-289J, 2012 WL
967869 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2012). The Plaintiff asserts that the AU’s credibility
assessment was made in a cursory statement and is therefore insufficient. (Pl.’s Br. 11).
However, the AU properly considered, and cited to, several portions of the medical
record, all of which contradict the Plaintiff’s testimony. (R. 27).
When making a credibility assessment the AU is required to consider “all relevant
evidence” as well as “give some indication of the evidence which he rejects and his
reason(s) for discounting such evidence.” See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529; see also Burnett v.
Comm ‘r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 121 (3d Cir. 2000). The AU specifically
mentioned the Plaintiff’s work history, the requirements of that work, and the Plaintiff’s
subjective pain testimony regarding work-related activities. (R. 26). The AU then
concluded that the Plaintiff’s statements regarding the “intensity, persistence and limiting
effects” of her symptoms were not credible because they were inconsistent with the
record evidence. (R. 26). In doing so, the AU specifically cited to several medical
reports. See (R. 27, 466-473, 475). First, Dr. Saric’s report found that the Plaintiff
“revealed no angina, shortness of breath, lower extremity edema or any cardiovascular
sign or symptoms.” (R. 27). Additionally, the AU cited the Physical RFC Assessment
conducted by Dr. Ibrahim Housri which found that the Plaintiff had no postural
limitations, no manipulative limitations, and no exertional limitations that would preclude
Plaintiff from engaging in light work. See (R. 27, 466-473). Furthermore, the Medical
Evaluation/Case Analysis conducted by Dr. Raymond Briski affirmed that the Plaintiff
possessed the RFC for performing light work. (R. 475). Accordingly, the AU properly
assessed Plaintiff’s credibility and this Court will not disturb his findings. See (R. 26,
28).
3
C.
The AU correctly assessed the Plaintiff’s RFC and determined she
could perform her past relevant work.
Plaintiff argues that the AU incorrectly assessed her RFC. (Pl.’s Br. 5). Plaintiff
contends that the AU failed to consider the opinions of Dr. Schwartz and Dr. Kaufman in
determining her RFC. (Pl.’s Br. 14). However, the opinion of Dr. Kaufman is ultimately
supportive of the AU’s final determination. Dr. Kaufman’s examination and relatively
minor recommendations of physical therapy and over-the-counter Motrin support the
AU’s ultimate determination that the Plaintiff is not disabled. See (R. 490). Thus, even
if the AU did not consider Dr. Kaufman’s report, it would have no effect on the outcome
of this case and therefore remand is not required here. See Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399
F.3d 546, 553 (3d Cir. 2005). Likewise, the report of Dr. Schwartz, a dennatologist, does
not establish any significant functional limitations for the Plaintiff to perform sedentary
work. See (R. 455).
Furthermore, Plaintiff is incorrect in asserting that the determinations of Dr.
Kaufman and the state agency medical consultant necessitate the conclusion that Plaintiff
is “incapable of performing the full range of sedentary work either as she performed it, or
as performed in the national economy.” (Pl.’s Br. 8). Conversely, as mentioned above,
Dr. Kaufman’s examination report and treatment recommendations support the AU’s
ultimate determination that the Plaintiff is not disabled. See (R. 490). Additionally, the
conclusions of the state agency medical consultant unequivocally provide that the
Plaintiff has no functional limitations preventing her from engaging in light work. See
(R. 27, 466-473, 475).
There is no basis in the Plaintiffs contention that the AU did not adequately
explain his finding that Plaintiffs ability to perform light work equated to her being able
to perform sedentary work as well. See (P1’s Br. 14). The physical exertion requirements
state that, “If someone can do light work, we determine that he or she can also do
sedentary work, unless there are additional limiting factors such as loss of fine dexterity
or inability to sit for long periods of time.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567. As mentioned above,
there is adequate medical evidence set forth in the record supporting the AU’s
conclusion that the Plaintiff can perfonn light work and therefore can perform sedentary
work. (R. 27, 466-473, 475). The record states that the Plaintiffs surgery follow-up
examination at UMDNJ “revealed no angina, shortness of breath, lower extremity edema
or any cardiovascular sign or symptoms.” (R. 27). Additionally, Dr. Kaufman’s medical
report describes Plaintiff as “a female in no acute distress”, with a lumbar spine showing
“no obvious paraspinous muscle spasm or pain to palpitation”, and having “lateral
rotation within normal limits.” (R.490). Thus, the AU correctly determined that the
Plaintiff could perform sedentary work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567.
The Plaintiff is also incorrect in asserting that the AU erred in failing to give
“controlling weight” to the opinions of Dr. Cantey and that no negative implications for
the Plaintiff exist in those opinions. “Controlling weight” is only afforded a medical
4
opinion when that opinion is “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial
evidence in [the] case record.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. The AU correctly found the
opinions of Dr. Cantey to lack the requisite support which would afford them controlling
weight. (R. 27). The testimony of Dr. Kaufman and the state agency medical consultant
mentioned above, along with additional reports of Dr. Saric, are inconsistent with the
opinion of Dr. Cantey and therefore do not afford Dr. Cantey’s opinion controlling
weight. See (R. 27, 449, 466-473).
Finally, the Plaintiff argues that the AU inadequately compared her RFC to her
past relevant work and therefore incorrectly determined that the Plaintiff has the
capability to perform her past relevant work. (P1’s Br. 12). Specifically, the Plaintiff
argues that the AU did not note the requirements of the Plaintiff’s past work and did not
compare those requirements to her RFC. (P1’s Br. 14). This is not the case. The AU
specifically discussed the Plaintiff’s job requirements as a secretary at UMDNJ, stating
that she worked at a desk utilizing a phone and a computer, assisted with people who had
to sign-in to the building, and lifted and carried folders of medical records. (R. 26).
Furthermore, the AU compared the above stated requirements of the Plaintiff’s job to the
description of secretarial duties included in the Department of Labor’s Dictionary of
Occupational Titles which defines secretarial duties as requiring sedentary work. (R. 26,
28). The statutory requirements of sedentary work are described as follows:
(a) Sedentary work. Sedentary work involves lifting no more than 10
pounds at a time and occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket
files, ledgers, and small tools. Although a sedentary job is defmed as one
which involves sitting, a certain amount of walking and standing is often
necessary in carrying out job duties. Jobs are sedentary if walking and
standing are required occasionally and other sedentary criteria are met.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1567. Having determined that Plaintiff could perform sedentary work
and that her prior work was sedentary, the AU appropriately determined that the Plaintiff
is capable of performing her past relevant work pursuant to 20 CFR 401.1565.
5
IV.CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, the AU’s decision is AFFIRMED. An appropriate order
follows.
J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J.
Date: March , 2014
6
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?