SIERRA v. CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, INC. et al

Filing 12

OPINION. Signed by Judge Dennis M. Cavanaugh on 3/22/2013. (nr, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

WILMA I SIERRA,
Plaintiff,

Hon. Dennis M. Cavanaugh

v.

OPINION

CONTINENTAL AIRLTNES, INC., et
a!.

:

Civil Action No. 2:1 2-cv-4368(DMC)(MF)

Defendants.

DENNIS M. CAVANAUGH, U,S.D.J,:
This matter comes before the Court upon Motion of Defendants Continental Airlines, Inc.
(“Continental”), United Airlines, Inc. (improperly named as “UAL, Inc.”), and United Continental
Holdings. Inc. (collectively ‘Defendants”) to Dismiss the Complaint of Plaintili Wilma Sierra pursuant
to FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(l).(Aug. 3. 2012. ECF No. 5). Pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 78. no oral argument
was heard. After carefully considering the submissions of the parties. and based upon the following. it
is the finding of this Court that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is granted with prejudice.

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I. BACKGROUND
In her Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that she was employed as a pushback operator for Continental,
which merged with UAL, Inc. to form United Continental Holdings. Inc. Plaintiff states that she was
terminated from this position on or about May 27, 2010 due to alleged unsafe operation of a pushhack
The facts in the Background section have been taken from the Complaint (Jul. 13, 2012.
ECF No. 1, Exhibit A). On this Motion to Dismiss, the Court will accept the factual allegations
in the Complaint as true and construe all facts in Plaintiffs’ favor.

tractor which caused damage to the aircraft and the gate and put other employees and passengers in
danger. Plaintiff further asserts that per Continental’s policy, the pushback operator must be in a seated
position when operating the pushback tractor, However, Plaintiff alleges that she was trained and it was
customary for employees to operate the pushback tractor from a standing position. Plaintiff avers that on
May 12, 2012, when she was operating pushback tractor #1 13106 from a standing position, the brakes
and emergency brake on the tractor failed, and the tractor caused damage to the plane and gate. Plaintiff
further alleges that on May 12, 2010, an investigatory meeting was held, during which Plaintiff allegedly
explained that all brakes had failed and Defendants had knowledge that the tractor was not functioning
properly due to maintenance one week earlier,
Count One of Plaintiffs Complaint is for wrongful termination and a “breach of contracL”
Plaintiff alleges that the termination of her employment was wrongful because it was “without mention
of the operational failures the [sic] existed within the pushback tractor that the Plaintiff was operating
at the date of the incident. Similarly, Count Three of Plaintiffs Complaint sounds in breach of contract.
Plaintiffalleges that she entered into an employment agreement with Defendant Continental, and pursuant
to this agreement, was to perform all duties which were expected of her as an employee of Continental.
Plaintiff further alleges that Continental, “without just cause terminated the Plaintiff’ and failed to
perform all of its obligations pursuant to the employment agreement.
Count Two of Plaintiffs Complaint sounds in defamation. Plaintiff alleges that Continental had
written to her regarding her termination, and alleged that her operation of the pushback tractor was the
cause of damage to the plane and the gate, and placed other employees and passengers in danger.
Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss and an accompanying Moving Brief (“Def. Mov.
Bi “)on August 3, 2012 (ECF No 5) Plaintiff filed an Opposition Bnet (“P1 Opp Br ) on SeptemhLr

27, 20132, (ECF No. 9). Defendants filed a Reply (Def. Rep. Br.) on October 4, 2012. (ECF No. 10). The

matter is now before this Court.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(i)

Upon a Rule 12(b)(l) motion addressing the existence of subject matter jurisdiction over a
plaintiffs complaint,’ no piesumptive truthfulness attaches to a plaintiff’s allegations” Martmezv U S
Post Office, 875 F Supp 1067 1070 (D N J 1995) (citing Mortensen v First Fed Say and Loan Ass’n,
549 F,2d 884, 891 (3d Cir, 1977)). “Accordingly, unlike a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, consideration of a Rule
12(b)(1) jurisdiction-type motion need not be limited; conflicting written and oral evidence may be
considered and a court may ‘decide for itselfthe factual issues which determine jurisdiction.” içi. (citing
Williamson v Tucker 645 F 2d 404, 413 (5th Cir ) Cert denied, 454 U S 897 (1981)) ‘When icsolving
a factual challenge, the court may consult materials outside the pleadings, and the burden of proving
jurisdiction rests with the plaintiff” Med Soc’y of N T v Herr, 191 F Supp 2d 574 578 (D N 3 2002)
(citing Gould Elecs Inc v U S 220 F 3d 169, 176, 178 (3d Cir 2000)) Howevei, “[wjheie an attack
,

on jurisdiction implicates the merits of plaintiffs [F]ederal cause of action, the district court’s role in
judging the facts may be more limited,” Martinez, 875 F. Supp. at 1071 (citing Williamson, 645 F.2d
at 413 n.6).
III. DISCUSSION
Defendants argue that all three Counts of Plaintiffs Complaint must be dismissed because each

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The Court notes that Plaintiffs opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss was due
on September 17, 2012. Without seeking further extension or offering any explanation for the
delay, Plaintiff filed his reply 10 days late, on September 27, 2012.
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claim is preempted by the Railway Labor Act (RLA”). 45 U.S.C.

§

15 1 et seq. The RLA was enacted
3

“to promote stability in labor—management relations by providing a comprehensive framework lr
resolving labor disputes.” Hawaiian Airlines. Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 252 (1994). Defendants
contend that Plaintiffs termination constitutes a “minor dispute” under the RLA. Further, Defendants
state that the RLA provides an appeals process for resolving minor disputes, which Plaintiff has not
exhausted here.
Defendants maintain that as a pushback operator for Continental. Plaintiff was considered a fleet
service agent and was represented by the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (“113T”). a labor union
recognized on February 16, 2010 to represent the fleet service employees with Continental Airlines. Inc.

(,

ECF No. 5, Declaration of William Baldwin, Exh. A). Defendants further assert that on or about

March 22, 2010, Continental and the IBT entered into an “Interim Agreement” pending negotiation of
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a final collective bargaining agreement in accordance with the Railway Labor Act. The interim
Agreement includes a provision that Continental’s “decision to impose discipline or discharge will not
be arbitrary. capricious, or discriminatory.”(Decl. of William Baldwin. Ex. A. 2.

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4), The Interim

Agreement includes a grievance procedure by which employees like Plaintiff are bound to pursue
grievances related to termination warning level of discipline” and discharge.

(RI.

at 2-4,

5-6). The

procedure first provides for a two-level grievance process, and then appeal to a System Board of
Adjustment, which expressly has jurisdiction over disputes involving these grievances related to
termination level discipline and discharge.

(RI.

at 2-3).

The
3 RLA was made applicable to the nation’s airlines by 45 U.S.C.l8l.

ci seq.

The Interim Agreement is attached as Exhibit B to the Declaration of William Baldwin.
submitted in support of the instant motion. (ECF No. 5).
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First, the Court agrees with Defendants, that under the RLA, this grievance is properly
characterized as a minor dispute. Section Three of the RLA provides that disputes between an employee
and an airline “growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements
concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions.

.

.

shall be handled [internally by the carrier1 hut,

failing to reach an adjustment in this manner, the disputes may be reffed” to mandatory arbitration before
an adjustment board or an arbitration panel of coordinate jurisdiction established by the parties.
U.S.C.

§

.

45

153 First (i), Second; Consol. Rail Corp. v. Ry. Labor Exec, Ass’n, 491 U.S. 299, 307-8 (1989).

Here, in the Interim Agreement between IBT and Continental, the parties expressly agreed to establish
an arbitration panel called a “System Board of Adjustment”. (Exh. A, 3-4). The Third Circuit has stated.
‘if the basic injury was [an empIoyeesj wrongful discharge, the complaint involves a minor dispute
which must be arbitrated following the procedures of the RLA,... Artful pleading cannot conceal the
reality that the gravamen of the complaint is a wrongful discharge.” Capraro v, United Parcel Serv.
Co., 993 F.2d 328, 333 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting, Magnuson v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 576 F.2d
1367, 1369 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 930, 99 S.Ct. 318, 58 L.Ed.2d 323 (1978)). Here, Counts
I and III both sound in wrongful termination, and the defamation claims asserted by Plaintiff in Count
II stem from allegedly defamatory statements that were made in the context of the grievance
proceedings and pertain to the circumstances surrounding her termination.
District Courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction over there minor disputes. Instead, the
Adjustment Board established by the parties has exclusive jurisdiction over such disputes, and the
dispute “must be resolved only through the RLA mechanisms.” Consol. Rail Corp. v. Ry. Labor Exec.
Ass’n, 491 U.S. at 303-4; Gen. Comm. of Adj., United Transp. Union v. CSX R.R. Corp., 893 F.2d
584, 592-3 (3d Cir. 1990). Federal courts generally become involved in these disputes only in limited

circumstances, none of which have been raised by the Plaintiff in the instant matter, such as to
compel arbitration or to enforce awards resulting from arbitration.

Capraro v. United Parcel

Serv., 993 F.2d at 331 (citing Union Pac. R.R. v. Co. v. Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89. 94 (1978) (‘Congress
considered it essential to keep these so-called ‘minor’ disputes withing the Adjustment Board and out

of courts.”)).
Second, Plaintiff has failed to exhaust the grievance and appeal process set forth in the
Interim Agreement. In the Complaint, Plaintiff states that she appealed the termination decision. a
hearing was held on June 17, 2010. and that she was informed on July 13, 2010 that the termination
decision was upheld. (Compl.

¶

15). According to William Baldwin’s Declaration. Plaintiff, with her

union, pursued a first level grievance and a meeting was held on June 17, 2010. Mr Baldwin upheld

the termination decision by letter dated June 23, 2010. (Dccl. of William Baldwin, Exh. C). Plaintiff,
with her union, then pursued a second level appeal to Stefan Mayden, then the Senior Director,
Terminal Operations, who upheld the termination decision by letter dated July 13, 2010. Stefan
Mavden advised Plaintiff of her further appeal rights to a System Board of Adjustment. (Dccl. of
William Baldwin. Exh. D). There is no indication here, that Plaintiff appealed the termination to the
System Board of Adjustment, as required by the Interim Agreement.
Accordingly, Plaintifrs Complaint is dismissed as it is preempted by the RLA.

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IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants Motion to Dismiss the Complaint is granted with
prejudice. An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.

Date:
Original:
cc:

Dc nis M. Cavanaugh

I

March’’, 2013
Clerk
Hon. Joseph A. Dickson, U.S,M.J.
All Counsel of Record
File

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,S,DJ,