BEASLEY ROOME v. NEWARK PUBLIC SCHOOLS

Filing 31

OPINION. Signed by Magistrate Judge Joseph A. Dickson on 9/20/13. (DD, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

MARVIN JEAN BEASLEY ROOME,

Plaintiff,

Civil Action No. 2:12-cv-04484
(CCC)(JAD)

v.
OPINION
NEWARK PUBLIC SCHOOLS, et al.,

Defendants.

JOSEPH A. DICKSON, U.S.M.J.
This matter comes before the Court on the second application of plaintiff Marvin J<: 1m
Beasley Roome ("Plaintiff') for the appointment of pro bono counsel (the "Second Application ).
(ECF No. 24). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78, no oral argument was heard. Af er
carefully considering the submissions, and based upon the following, Plaintiffs Seco ~d
Application is GRANTED for the limited purposes set forth below.
I.

BACKGROUND.

This matter involves a prose litigant's second application for appointment of pro bo ~o
counsel. This Court previously declined to appoint pro bono counsel to Plaintiff in an Opini bn
dated June 15, 2013. (Opinion, ECF No. 16). The facts underlying Plaintiff's initial request pr
pro bono counsel are largely identical to those asserted in this renewed application, with c pe

exception. In the renewed application, Plaintiff asserted that due to various difficulties she fac ~s
litigating her claims, she attempted to obtain legal representation from legal clinics at certain Nc IW
Jersey law schools; however, her requests for representation were declined.
Plaintiff alleged that on January 23, 2012, she was terminated from her employment pr
excessive absenteeism and chronic tardiness. (Compl. 7, ECF No. 1). On July 18, 2012, Plain1 ff
filed a complaint and an application to proceed in forma pauperis. (Compl., ECF No. 1). Plaint ff
alleged that her employer, defendant Newark Public Schools (the "District"), discriminated agai iSt
her on the basis of age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 9
U.S.C. § 621 et seq., disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 2
U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and retaliation in violation ofTitle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 2
U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Id.). On December 4, 2012, Plaintiffs application to proceed infon a

pauperis was granted. (Order, ECF No.2). Subsequently, on December 12, 2012, Plaintifffi

~d

an Amended Complaint to name as defendants the District's Risk Manager, Ron Hale, and 1 er
former supervisor, Wali Thomas (collectively, the "Defendants"). (Am. Compl., ECF No.7).
In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that she was discriminated against on the ba is
of her age. Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that Mr. Thomas "[spoke] to [her] in a loud voice. .
lie[d] [about her], ... sp[ied] on [her], [and] ha[d] other coworkers spy on [her] and report to hin ."
(Compl. ECF No. 1). Plaintiff also alleged that Mr. Thomas threatened to retaliate against 1 ~
after she made a complaint to the District's Superintendent. (Id.). In addition, Plaintiff alleg d
that she was discriminated against on the basis of her disability in that her supervisor failed o
make accommodations following her surgery. (Id.)
In her initial application for pro bono counsel, Plaintiff cited her indigent status as them, n

factor for appointment. (Appl. for Pro Bono Counsel, ECF No. 10). In the Second Applicati< n,

2

filed on August 1, 2013, Plaintiff cited to the difficulties she faces litigating her claims and
unsuccessful attempts to obtain legal representation as her basis for requesting the appointment f
counsel. (Second Appl. for Pro Bono Counsel, ECF No. 24). Defendants filed a brief in oppositi n
to Plaintiffs renewed application on August, 8, 2013. (Defs.' Br., ECF No. 25).
II.

LEGAL STANDARD.

Civil litigants possess neither a constitutional nor statutory right to appointed coun
Parham v. Johnson, 126 F.3d 454, 456-57 (3d Cir. 1997). However, in some instances then
for representation is great and district courts are granted broad discretion to request
appointment of attorneys to represent indigent civil litigants. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (d), (e)(1).
Third Circuit has directed that district courts should first determine whether a plaintiffs claim" s
arguable merit in fact and law." Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 1993), cert denied, 5
U.S. 1996 (1994). Assuming plaintiffs claims have merit, the Third Circuit promulgated anum
of factors to be considered by district courts in the exercise oftheir discretion under§ 1915(e)( ).
These factors include: (1) the plaintiffs ability to present his case; (2) the complexity of the le
issues; (3) the extent of factual discovery and the plaintiffs ability to investigate and to com
with complex discovery rules; (4) the extent to which the case may tum on credibil
determinations; (5) whether expert testimony will be required; and (6) whether the plaintiff
afford counsel on his own behalf. Id. at 156.
The Third Circuit further emphasized that the "volunteer lawyer[s'] time is extrem
valuable" and for that reason, "district courts should not request counsel under § 1915[( )]
indiscriminately." Id. at 157. Finally, the court must take note of "the significant practi
restraints on the district courts' ability to appoint counsel; the ever-growing number of priso r
civil rights actions filed each year in the federal court; the lack of funding to pay appointed couns 1;

3

and the limited supply of competent lawyers who are willing to undertake such representati

"

without pay. Id.
III.

DISCUSSION.

This Court denied Plaintiffs initial request for the appointment of pro bono coun
finding that the only information provided by Plaintiff in support of her application was
assertion that she had been unable to obtain an attorney because she could not afford o
(Opinion, ECF No. 16). The Court found Plaintiffhad, to that point, shown herself to be liter e
and articulate enough to litigate her claims. (Id.). Indeed, Plaintiff successfully amended
Complaint to name two additional defendants. (Order, ECF No.7). Further, although the Co
acknowledged Plaintiffs argument that the legal complexity of this action may be beyond
capabilities, it found that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the legal issues involved are o
complex that the appointment of counsel is required. (Opinion, ECF No. 16). Finally, the Co
found that, with respect to the extent of factual discovery and Plaintiffs ability to investigate
to comply with complex discovery rules, there was nothing to suggest that Plaintiff would e
hindered or unable to investigate her claims. (Id. ).
In the Second Application, Plaintiff again requested appointment of pro bono counsel

d

cited to the difficulties she faces litigating her claims. Specifically, Plaintiff claimed that "New k
Public School Lawyers are sending me papers ... some I understand and some I don't understan "
(Appl. for Pro Bono Counsel, ECF No. 24). In addition, Plaintiff submitted information detaili g
her unsuccessful attempts to obtain legal representation. (Id.)
The status of this case has changed little since this Court's June 15, 2013 denial of
Plaintiffs request for pro bono counsel. Moreover, as the Defendants attempt to have the case
proceed, Plaintiffs inability to present her case and supply discovery has caused the case to ha

4

and hindered settlement negotiations. Plaintiff has not yet responded to the interrogatories or
document demands served by Defendants. 1 In this situation, a settlement conference with the
assistance of counsel for the Plaintiff, may yield an amicable result between .n.e parties.
This Court has concluded that the appointment of pro bono counsel for the limited
purpose of advising and consulting Plaintiff on the strengths and weaknesses of her case, as we
as for the purpose of attending a settlement conference on Plaintiff's behalf is necessary. If the
settlement conference is unsuccessful and after Plaintiff has had the benefit of advice from
competent counsel on the strengths and weaknesses of her case, pro bono counsel has satisfied
his/her obligations pursuant to this Opinion and Order and will be permitted to withdraw if he<
she so elects.

IV.

CONCLUSION.

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Second Application for the appointment of pro bo o
counsel, (ECF No. 24), is GRANTED for the limited purposes discussed within this Opini n

and Order.
SO ORDERED

JOSEfH ;'l. DICKSON, U.S.M.J

cc:

Hon. Claire C. Cecchi, U.S.D.J.

1
Plaintiff requested additional time to respond to these interrogatories while she attempted to obtain an attorney, a d
Defendants consented to the extension. (ECF No. 26).

5