MCRAE v. CITY OF NUTLEY et al
Filing
54
OPINION fld. Signed by Judge William H. Walls on 10/28/15. (sr, )
NOT F OR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
ANTOINE MCRAE,
Plaintiff,
OPINION
Cv. No. 12-60 1 1
v.
CITY Of NUTLEY, NUTLEY POLICE
DEPARTMENT, ANDREW BASSETT, I$AAH
CARDINALE, and DAVID $TRUS,
Defendants.
Walls, Senior District Jud2e
Plaintiff Antoine McRae claims that his arrest by the Nutley Police Department for
violation of a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) was unlawful because he was not served with
the TRO and seeks relief under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Defendants the Township of Nutley,’ the
Nutley Police Department, Andrew Bassett, Isaah Cardinale, and David Strus all move for
summary judgment under federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. The Court decides this motion
without oral argument. fed. R. Civ. P. 78. The motion is granted with respect to Plaintiffs
claims against the Township of Nutley, Nutley Police Department, Cardinale, and $trus and
Plaintiffs Fourteenth Amendment claim against Defendant Bassett, and it is denied with respect
to Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment claim against Defendant Bassett.
‘Plaintiff refers to the Defendant as the “City of Nutley” in his amended complaint, ECF No. 6,
and the case is captioned “McRae v. City ofNutley, et al,” but the entity is actually the Township
of Nutley and is referred to as such in Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 41,
and Plaintiffs opposition, ECF No. 42. The Court will refer to the Defendant as the “Township
of Nutley” in this opinion.
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The following facts are uncontested except where noted. On March 7, 2009, a TRO was
issued against Plaintiff McRae in reference to a domestic violence incident (the “2009 TRO”).
Am. Compi., ECF No. 6
¶ 9; Def.
Statement of Material Facts not in Dispute, ECF No. 41 at 5;
P. Counter Statement of Material Facts not in Dispute, ECF No. 42-1 at 3. Sergeant Tiene of the
Nutley Police Department certified that he served Plaintiff McRae with the 2009 TRO on April
8, 2009, but the TRO does not bear McRae’s signature acknowledging receipt. Def. Mot. Summ.
J, ECF No. 41
—
Ex. C. The parties disagree about a significant fact: Plaintiff McRae alleges that
he was not served with the 2009 TRO until over two years later, ECF No. 42-1 at 3, but
Defendants claim that Sergeant Tiene did serve McRae with the TRO but failed to obtain his
signature. ECF No. 41 at 5-6. The criminal charges arising out of the March 7, 2009 incident
were ultimately dismissed. Id. at 6; ECF No. 42-1 at 4.
On August 5, 2011, the Nutley Police responded to another domestic violence incident
involving Plaintiff McRae and the same complainant. ECF No. 41 at 6; ECF No. 42-1 at 4.
Defendant Cardinale, an officer for the Nutley Police Department, advised the complainant to go
to Essex County Superior Court, Chancery Division, Family Part to seek a restraining order,
where she was informed that a TRO was already in effect against McRae. ECF No. 41 Ex. K
—
Deposition transcript of Officer Isaah Cardinale 16:1-18, 23:4-24:4; Plaintiff Opp. Mot.
Summary Judgment Ex. H
—
Deposition transcript of Officer Isaah Cardinale, ECF No. 43 16:1-
17. The complainant returned to the Nutley Police Department and informed Defendant
Cardinale of the existing TRO. Cardinale then asked another Nutley police officer, not named as
a party in this action, to check a computer system and a “book” of TROs kept by the Nutley
Police Department, and the officer confirmed to Defendant Cardinale that the 2009 TRO was in
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effect against Plaintiff McRae. ECF No. 41 Ex. K 23 :4-25:6; ECF No. 43 23 :4-25:6. Defendant
Cardinale then obtained an arrest warrant for McRae’s alleged violation of the 2009 TRO based
on the August 5, 2011 incident. ECF No. 41 at 6; ECF No. 42-1 at 4. That same day, Defendant
Officer Strus, also of the Nutley Police Department, faxed a copy of the warrant to the Linden
Police Department and Jersey City Police Department, sent a Speedy Bail Request to the Essex
County Sheriffs Office, and placed all “related documents and information” into an evidence
bag. ECF No. 41 Ex. M
—
Ptlrn. David Strus Supplemental Investigation Report.
According to Plaintiff McRae, he was served with the 2009 TRO on August 10, 2011.
ECF No. 42-1 at 4. Later that day, McRae went to the Nutley Police Department headquarters to
discuss the TRO and was arrested by Defendant Officer Bassett for violation of the TRO. ECF
No. 41 at 6; ECF No. 42-1 at 4. Plaintiff alleges, and Defendants deny, that he presented
Defendant Bassett with a copy of the 2009 TRO demonstrating that he was first served on
August 10, 2011, but that Defendant Basset refused to review the copy. ECF No. 42-1 at 4; Def.
Rule 56-1 Response to Plaintiffs Supplemental Statement of Disputed Material Fact, ECF No.
53 at 16. The criminal charges based on the TRO violation were subsequently dropped. ECF No.
41-1 at4.
On August 8, 2012, Plaintiff McRae filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against the
Township of Nutley, Nutley Police Department, Andrew Bassett, Isaah Cardinale, David Strus,
and Municipal Prosecutor (“John Doe”) in the Superior Court of Hudson County, alleging that
the Defendants violated his right under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
to be free from unreasonable arrest and his right under the Fourteenth Amendment to due process
of law by arresting him without probable cause. The complaint also alleged that the arrest was
the result of either an improper policy or custom of the Defendants or a failure to train or
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improper training of the Defendant police officers. Compi., Notice of Removal Ex. A., ECF No.
1
¶ 13-14.
Defendants filed a notice of removal on the grounds that the complaint alleged damages
subject to 42 U.S.C.
§
1983, and the matter was removed to this Court in September 2012. ECF
No. 1. Plaintiff McRae filed an amended complaint on December 17, 2012 removing Municipal
Prosecutor (“John Doe”) as a defendant and adding the County of Essex (Essex Correctional
Facility) as an additional party for allegedly violating McRae’s constitutional rights while he was
detained after his arrest. ECF No. 6. Defendant County of Essex filed a motion to dismiss in lieu
of answer on January 15, 2013, ECF No. 10, Plaintiff McRae filed an opposition brief on
February 5 2013, ECF No. 12, and Defendant County of Essex filed a reply brief on February 7,
2013. On April 2, 2013, the Court granted the motion to dismiss and dismissed Count II of the
amended complaint (deliberate indifference to medical needs) with prejudice, Count III (false
imprisonment under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments) without prejudice, and Count V
(improper policy or custom or failure to properly train employees under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments) without prejudice with regard to the alleged Fourteenth Amendment
violation and with prejudice with regard to the Fourth Amendment violation. ECF No. 19.
Plaintiff McRae filed a second amended complaint on April 2, 2014, but Magistrate Judge
Waldor indicated in a subsequent teleconference with parties that the April 2, 2013 order of
dismissal did not permit the filing of an amended complaint one year later.
The remaining Defendants now move for summary judgment with respect to the
remaining claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. ECF No. 41.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dispute between the parties must be both genuine and material to defeat a
motion for summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). A
disputed fact is material where it would affect the outcome of the suit under the relevant
substantive law. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). A dispute is genuine where a rational
trier of fact could return a verdict for the non-movant. Id.
The movant bears the initial burden to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact for trial. Beard v. Banks, 54$ U.S. 521, 529 (2006). Once the movant has carried
this burden, the non-movant “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts” in question. Scott, 550 U.S. at 380 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)). Each party must support its position by
“citing to particular parts of materials in the record.. or showing that the materials cited do not
.
establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce
admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). At this stage, “the judge’s
function is not.
.
.
to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter.” Anderson, 477
U.S. at 249. When there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact, the court must view that fact in
the light most favorable to the non-movant. Scott, 550 U.S. at 380. A “district court c[an] dismiss
for failure to state a claim upon motion for summary judgment, but a motion so decided is
functionally equivalent to a motion to dismiss.” Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 444
(3d Cir. 1977) (citing Schwartz v. Compagnie General Transatlantique, 405 F.2d 270, 273 (2d
Cir. 1968)). See also Melo v. Hafer, 912 F.2d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1990), affd, 502 U.S. 21(1991)
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(court may “dismiss[] an action for failure to state a claim on the face of the pleadings on a
motion for summary judgment,” which is “equivalent to a motion to dismiss”).
DISCUSSION
The New Jersey Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1991, codified in part at Title
2C, Chapter 25 of the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice, states that “a municipal court judge
or judge of the family Part of the Chancery Division of the Superior Court may enter” an ex
parte temporary restraining order “when necessary to protect the life, health or well-being of a
victim on whose behalf the relief is sought.” N.J.S.A. 2C:25-2$(f). “If it appears that the plaintiff
is in danger of domestic violence, the judge shall.
.
.
order emergency ex parte relief, in the
nature of a temporary restraining order.” N.J.S.A. 2C:25-28(g). Once a judge has issued a TRO,
the statute provides that the TRO, “together with the complaint or complaints, shall immediately
be forwarded to the appropriate law enforcement agency for service on the defendant, and to the
police of the municipality in which the plaintiff resides or is sheltered, and shall immediately be
served upon the defendant by the police.
.
.
.
“N.J.S.A. 2C:25-28(l) (emphasis added).
When a defendant knowingly violates a temporary restraining order issued under the
Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1991, the defendant is guilty of the crime of contempt in
the fourth degree. N.J.S.A. 2C 25-30, 2C:29-9. “Where a law enforcement officer finds that there
is probable cause that a defendant has committed contempt of an order entered pursuant to the
provisions of tthe Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1991], the defendant shall be arrested
and taken into custody by a law enforcement officer.” N.J.S.A. 2C:25-3 1.
A contempt action for violation of a TRO may proceed against a defendant who was “not
regularly served” under N.J.S.A. 2C:25-28(l), but the defendant must have had “actual
knowledge of the restraints imposed” by the TRO at the time he violated it. State v. liernar, 345
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N.J. Super. 591, 594 (N.J. App. Div. 2001) (citation omitted); see also State v. E.R., 2015 WL
2464746, at *3.4 (N.J. App. Div. June 1, 2015) (affirming dismissal of indictment for contempt
for violation of TRO because government presented no evidence to the grand jury that defendant
either (a) was served with the TRO or (b) “had actual knowledge of the specific restraints against
him”).
I.
Summary judgment is granted for Defendants with respect to Plaintiffs Fourteenth
Amendment claims because this action is properly brought under the Fourth
Amendment.
As an initial matter, the Court will grant summary judgment in favor of all Defendants
with respect to Plaintiff McRae’s fourteenth Amendment due process claims because these
claims are based on the same allegedly unconstitutional arrest that serves as the basis for his
Fourth Amendment claims.
42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 provides private citizens with a means to redress violations of federal
law committed by state officials. To state a claim under
§ 1983, a plaintiff “must establish that
she was deprived of a federal constitutional or statutory right by a state actor.” Kach v. Hose, 589
F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Benn v. Universal Health Sys., 371 f.3d 165, 169-70 (3d
Cir. 2004). Plaintiff McRae brings
§ 1983 claims against the Defendants under both the Fourth
and the Fourteenth Amendments, alleging that his arrest for violating the 2009 TRO was both an
unlawful seizure and a violation of his right to due process “Broadly stated, the Fourth
Amendment prohibits a police officer from arresting a citizen except upon probable cause.”
Orsatti v. New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 482 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Papachristou v. City
ofJacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 169 (1972)).
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“[W]hen government behavior is governed by a specific constitutional amendment, due
process analysis is inappropriate.” Berg v. County ofAllegheny, 219 f.3d 261, 268 (3d Cir.
2000). “Although not all actions by police officers are governed by the fourth Amendment...
the constitutionality of arrests by state officials is governed by the Fourth Amendment rather
than due process analysis.” Id. at 268-69 (citing Count ofSacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833,
842-43 (1998); United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997); Graham v. Connor, 490
U.S. 386, 394 (1989); Blackwell v. Barton, 34 f.3d 298, 302 (5th Cir. 1994)); see also
Washington v. Hanshaw, 552 F. App’x 169, 172-73 (3d Cir. 2014) (plaintiff alleging
unconstitutional arrest was required to bring
§ 1983 claim under the Fourth Amendment, not the
Fourteenth) (citation omitted); Bergdoll v. City of York, 515 F. App’x 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2013)
(affirming grant of summary judgement to defendant on plaintiffs claims under Due Process
Clauses of Fiflh and Fourteenth Amendments because plaintiffs “claims of excessive force,
false arrest, and malicious prosecution are cognizable under the Fourth Amendment.
.
.
.
(citing Berg, 219 F.3d at 268-69).
Because Plaintiff McRae’s “due process claim is predicated on damages resulting from
an unconstitutional seizure,” Washington, 552 F. App’x at 173, the claim is properly considered
as an alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment, and “due process analysis is inappropriate.”
Berg, 219 F.3d at 268. The Court will grant summary judgment in favor of Defendants for all
fourteenth Amendment claims.
II.
Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment claims against the Township of Nutley and the
Nutley Police must be dismissed because Plaintiff does not allege a basis for
imposing municipal entity liability.
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Plaintiff McRae seeks to hold the Township of Nutley and the Nutley Police Department
liable for violating his Fourth Amendment rights. McRae alleges that the Defendant police
officers’ “failure to properly verify whether service [of the 2009 TRO] had been effectuated,”
which led to his allegedly unlawful arrest, either was the result of “an improper policy or custom
of the Defendants, the City of Nutley and/or the Nutley Police Department, or resulted from a
failure to train or improper training of the Defendant police officers.” ECF No. 10-1
To state a claim under
¶ 33-37.
§ 1983, a plaintiff “must establish that she was deprived of a
federal constitutional or statutory right by a state actor.” Kach, 589 F.3d at 646. A “municipality
cannot be held liable under
§ 1983 on a respondeat superior theory” for the actions of an officer,
Monell v. Dept. ofSocial Services of City ofNew York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978), but a
municipality can be held liable for unconstitutionally implementing or enforcing “a policy
statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by” the officers
of that municipality that violated a plaintiffs rights. Id. at 690. A plaintiff challenging a policy
under Monelt must “identify the challenged policy, attribute it to the city itself, and show a
causal link between execution of the policy and the injury suffered.” Losch v. Borough of
Parkesburg, Pa., 736 F.2d 903, 910 (3d Cir. 1984) (citation omitted). A municipality can be held
liable under
§ 1983 and Monelt for its failure to train police officers adequately if that failure
“amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into
contact.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). A plaintiff must demonstrate that
the “need for more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in
the violation of constitutional rights, that the policy makers of the City can reasonably be said to
have been deliberately indifferent to the need.” Id. at 390. “[D]eliberately indifferent failure to
train is not established by (1) presenting evidence of the shortcomings of an individual; (2)
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proving that an otherwise sound training program was negligently administered; or (3) showing,
without more, that better training would have enabled an officer to avoid the injury-causing
conduct.” Simmons v. City ofPhiladelphia, 947 f.2d 1042, 1060 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing City of
Canton, 489 U.S. at 1206) (emphasis in original).
Summary judgment is appropriate here because, despite Plaintiff McRae’s assertion that a
“fact issue exists as to the failure to comply with proper procedure and the failure to correct
erroneous information,” ECF No. 42-1 at 12, there are no material facts in dispute regarding the
Township of Nutley or the Nutley Police Department’s liability. Plaintiff brings a cause of action
under two separate Monell theories
—
“improper policy or custom,” and “failure to train”
—
but he
offers almost nothing in the way of factual allegations or evidence to support either theory.
To prevail under the theory that his constitutional rights were violated as a result of an
“improper policy or custom,” Plaintiff McRae must identify an official policy, attribute it to
Nutley, and show a “causal link between the policy and the injury suffered.” Losch, 736 F.2d at
910. McRae does not identify any policy, instead merely alleging that Nutley officers
demonstrated a general “failure to comply with proper procedure” by “fail[ing] to properly serve
the TRO on Plaintiff’ and “subsequently fail[ing] to notice this error in August 2011.
.
.
.
“ECF
No. 42-1 at 12. Whether Plaintiff McRae was properly served with the TRO in 2009 is a disputed
fact, but it is not material to this claim. Even assuming that the non-Defendant Officer Teine did
not properly serve him in 2009, Plaintiff McRae does not offer any evidence that the alleged
failure to comply with procedure extended beyond the individual Defendants and incidents
described in the complaint. “A policy cannot ordinarily be inferred from a single instance of
illegality such as a first arrest without probable cause.” Losch, 736 f.2d at 911 (citations
omitted). Because Plaintiff McRae does not identify any policy that he can attribute to the Nutley
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Defendants or causally link with the injury claimed, his “improper policy or custom” theory fails
as a matter of law.
Plaintiff McRae’s claim also fails under the “failure to train” theory. McRae does not
allege that the Nutley Police Department failed to train the Defendant officers in any particular
matter. In fact, he does not discuss the Nutley Police Department’s training practices at all. The
only support he offers for this theory is the claim that Defendant Cardinale “admitted that he was
unaware of many of the crime information systems used by the law enforcement community,”
including the National Crime Information Center (NCIC), the State Crime Information Center
(SCIC), and the New Jersey Crime Justice Information System (NJCJIS) (collectively, the
“crime information systems”). ECF No. 42-1 at 9, 12.2 Plaintiff McRae presumably implies
does not actually argue
—
—
but
that Defendant Cardinale was not trained about the crime information
systems, that he would have checked the crime information systems if he had been properly
trained, that these systems would have contained information about the 2009 TRO not in the
Department’s TRO book or computer system, and that this information would have caused
Cardinale not to seek an arrest warrant. But even if Plaintiff McRae were to make any of these
arguments and present any evidence to support them, a “mere showing that a particular officer
violated policy, or that better training would have enabled the officer to avoid the injury-causing
conduct, is insufficient to establish a municipality’s liability under
§ 1983 for failure to train.”
Marable v. West Pottsgrove Tp., 176 F. App’x 275, 283 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Simmons, 947
F.2d at 1060). Plaintiff McRae does not establish an “obvious” need for “more or different
2
The deposition transcript cited by Plaintiff McRae actually reflects that, while Defendant
Cardinale said he did not know what the acronym “NCIC” stands for, he did know what it is and
accurately described it as “basically a database that can be used statewide to look up information
such as license plates and, you know, criminal information and stuff like that for police to use.”
ECF No.43 at 33:4-14.
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training” and fails as a matter of law to demonstrate that the Township of Nutley or Nutley
Police Department were deliberately indifferent to his rights. Both of his claims must be
dismissed.
III.
Defendant Cardinale is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs Fourth
Amendment Claim.
a. Summary judgment is appropriate for this claim.
Summary judgment is appropriate with respect to Plaintiff McRae’ s claim against
Defendant Cardinale because there are no material facts in dispute. McRae argues that one
disputed fact is material: whether he was served with the 2009 TRO before Defendant Cardinale
applied for an arrest warrant on August 5, 2011. ECF No. 42-1 at 8. Plaintiff McRae is correct
that if he was not served with the TRO in 2009, as Defendants claim he was, and if he did not
have actual notice of the TRO when he allegedly violated it in 2011, he should not have been
arrested for contempt. E.R., 2015 WL 2464746, at *3.4; N.J.S.A. 2C:25-28, 25-31. This issue is
immaterial to the claim against Defendant Cardinale, however. Cardinale is entitled to qualified
immunity because he acted in an objectively reasonable manner in requesting the arrest warrant.3
“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,
As a threshold matter, Defendants argue that Cardinale is entitled to summary judgment
because he “had no interaction with plaintiff and therefore, plaintiffs argument that Cardinale
somehow has responsibility for the fact that McRae protested his August 11 [sic], 2011 arrest
makes no sense.” ECF No. 53 at 8. But courts have long recognized § 1983 liability for officers
that prepare warrant affidavits even if they play no part in the subsequent arrest. See, e.g., Maltey
v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 339 (1986); Berg, 219 f.3d at 272 (“As a general rule, a government
official’s liability for causing an arrest is the same as for carrying it out”).
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231(2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). “Where a defendant
asserts a qualified immunity defense in a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff bears the
initial burden of showing that the defendant’s conduct violated some clearly established statutory
or constitutional right.” Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 1997) (citations
omitted). “Only if the plaintiff carries this initial burden must the defendant then demonstrate
that no genuine issue of material fact remains as to the ‘objective reasonableness’ of the
defendant’s belief in the lawfulness of his actions.” Id. (citation omitted). “Qualified immunity
‘gives ample room for mistaken judgments by protecting all but the plainly incompetent or those
who knowingly violate the law.” Monteiro v. City ofElizabeth, 436 f.3d 397, 404 (3d Cir.
2006) (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991)).
For a defendant officer who applied for an allegedly unlawful arrest warrant, the question
is “whether a reasonably well-trained officer in petitioner’s position would have known that his
affidavit failed to establish probable cause and that he should not have applied for the warrant.”
Malley, 475 U.S. at 345. “Defendants will not be immune if, on an objective basis, it is obvious
that no reasonably competent officer would have concluded that a warrant should issue; but if
officers of reasonable competence could disagree on this issue, immunity should be recognized.”
Id. at 341. Whether an officer requesting a warrant “conducted the investigation negligently is
not a material fact.” Orsatti v. New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 484 (3d Cir. 1995). “[T]he
issue is not whether the information on which police officers base their request for an arrest
warrant resulted from a professionally executed investigation; rather, the issue is whether that
information would warrant a reasonable person to believe that an offense has been or is being
committed by the person to be arrested.” Id.
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In this case, Defendant Cardinale reasonably believed he had probable cause to request a
warrant for contempt. He was informed by the complainant that a TRO issued by the Essex
County Superior Court, Chancery Division, Family Part was in effect against Plaintiff McRae at
the time McRae was allegedly involved in the August 5, 2011 domestic disturbance incident. He
asked another member of the Nutley Police Department to confirm on the Department’s “TRO
book” and “computer system” that the TRO was “in effect,” and the officer did so. Defendant
Cardinale stated in his deposition that a TRO’s listing as “in effect” meant that the TRO had (a)
been issued by a court and (b) served on the defendant. ECF No. 43 at 24:1-9. Because the
complainant had reported that Plaintiff McRae was harassing her and Defendant Cardinale
believed, based on multiple sources of information, that the 2009 TRO had been issued and
served on McRae, he had probable cause to believe that McRae had violated the TRO.
Plaintiff McRae suggests that Defendant Cardinale should not have relied on the
complainant or his fellow officer’s reports that the 2009 TRO was in effect. But Mr. McRae does
not explain why Defendant Cardinale would have any reason to doubt the accuracy of these
reports. And, as Defendants argue, the Essex County court file did indicate that the TRO was in
effect against McRae, even if it should not have been. ECF No. 41 at 12. An officer may rely on
a facially valid court order, even if it turns out to be based on a false premise. See Wolfe v. City
ofPittsburgh, 140 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Turney v. O’Toole, 898 F.2d 1470,
1472-73 (10th Cir. 1990) to explain that even an “erroneous order can be valid”). Here,
Defendant Cardinale was entitled to rely on the Essex County court’s file and his Department’s
own records, even if all of those records mistakenly indicated that the TRO had been served in
2009.
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Plaintiff also argues that Defendant Cardinale acted objectively unreasonably by failing
to investigate the case properly. He argues that Defendant Cardinale should have reviewed the
2009 TRO when the complainant initially indicated that she was “unaware of the existence of
any TRO.” ECF No. 42-1 at 13. But Defendant Cardinale could not have reviewed the TRO at
that moment because he was also unaware of its existence. And, as Defendants argue, the “fact
that [the complainant] had apparently forgotten about the TRO simply does not create a question
as to service.” ECF No. 53 at 8. Defendant Cardinale had no reason to doubt the TRO’s validity.
Plaintiff also argues that Defendant Cardinale’ s actions were objectively unreasonable
because he was unaware of the crime information systems. ECF No. 42-1 at 13. Courts have
found arrests objectively unreasonable where an officer had access to law enforcement databases
and failed to use them to confirm the legitimacy of a warrant. See, e.g., Blassengdale v. City of
Philadelphia, 2012 WL 4510875, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2012) (denying motion to dismiss
claim for false arrest where arresting officer “had access to law enforcement databases and in the
three month interval between the indictment and arrest.. may have inquired further” and
.
discovered that defendant was incarcerated when the crime he was charged with occurred and
therefore could not have been responsible). As discussed, though, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate
the relevance of the crime information systems. He does not allege (a) that a reasonable officer
would have checked these systems, (b) that the systems contained any additional information
about the TRO, or (c) that this information would have led Cardinale to believe that McRae did
not have actual notice of the TRO’s protections. Even if Plaintiff made all these arguments and
presented adequate evidence to support them, Defendant Cardinale’ s actions would not
necessarily be unreasonable. See Adams v. Officer Eric Selhorst, 449 F. App’x 198, 203 (3d Cir.
2011) (defendant arresting officer entitled to qualified immunity even though he was aware of
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and had access to CJIS, which would have indicated that warrant had already been executed and
plaintiff had been arrested once earlier that day).
Defendant Cardinale might have seen the missing return of service signature if he had
conducted a more extensive investigation and reviewed a copy of the 2009 TRO himself. But,
because “actual knowledge of the restraints imposed,” and not “regular service,” is required for a
criminal defendant to be arrested and convicted for contempt, Mernar, 345 N.J. Super. at 594,
Defendant Cardinale’s search warrant application would not necessarily have been unreasonable
even if he had seen the missing return of service signature. See State v. Huttman, 2006 WL
3053501, at *2 (N.J. App. Div. Oct. 30, 2006) (affirming defendant’s contempt conviction for
violating Final Restraining Order (“FRO”) even though “the ‘return of service’ section of the
FRO was blank at the time of trial, and.. there was no specific testimony that he had been
.
served with the FRO before his.
.
.
encounter with [the complainant].”) (citing Mernar, 345 N.J.
Super. At 594). In any event, even if Defendant Cardinale failed to conduct a “professionally
executed investigation” of Plaintiff, Cardinale reasonably believed he had probable cause to seek
an arrest warrant based on the Essex County court and Nutley Police Department records. He
requested the warrant based on “information [that] would warrant a reasonable person to believe
that an offense has been.
.
.
committed,” Orsatti, 71 F.3d at 484, so he is immune from suit.
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IV.
Defendant Bassett is not entitled to Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s Fourth
Amendment Claim.
Summary judgment is not appropriate with respect to the Fourth Amendment claim
against Defendant Bassett because a material fact remains in dispute: whether Plaintiff presented
Defendant Bassett with evidence that he had first been served with the TRO on August 10, 2011
before he was arrested that day.
Courts “have generally extended immunity to an officer who makes an arrest based on an
objectively reasonable belief that there is a valid warrant.” Berg, 219 F.3d at 273 (citation
omitted). A facially valid warrant establishes probable cause for an arrest and indicates that
officer’s arrest was objectively reasonable. See generally Young v. City ofHackensack, 17$ F.
App’x 169, 171-72 (3d Cir. 2006) (affirming grant of summary judgment to defendants in false
arrest
§ 1983 case on basis of probable cause and qualified immunity where warrant “appears on
its face to be valid”); see also Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1245 (2012)
(“Where the alleged Fourth Amendment violation involves a search or seizure pursuant to a
warrant, the fact that a neutral magistrate has issued a warrant is the clearest indication that the
officers acted in an objectively reasonable manner or, as we have sometimes put it, in ‘objective
good faith.”) (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922-23 (1984)); Illinois v. Krull, 480
U.S. 340, 367 (1987) (“Leon.
.
.
instructs courts that police officers may rely upon a facially
valid search warrant.”).
Plaintiff McRae does not dispute that Defendant Bassett relied on a warrant to arrest him,
nor does he argue that the warrant was facially invalid. As discussed, Defendant Cardinale had
probable cause to seek the warrant, and Plaintiff does not dispute that a judge reviewed
Cardinale’s complaint and found probable cause to issue the warrant. See ECF No. 41 Ex. J.
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Complaint-Warrant. Defendants also argue, and Plaintiff McRae does not deny, that Defendant
Bassett confirmed that McRae was listed as a New Jersey Wanted Person before making the
arrest. ECF No. 41 at 16. It is clear that Defendant Bassett initially had probable cause to arrest
Mr. McRae.
But Defendants do not address a material fact raised by the Plaintiff: that McRae
allegedly arrived at the Nutley Police Department on August 10 carrying a copy of the TRO
served upon him earlier that day, and that McRae allegedly told Defendant Bassett he had just
been served with the TRO for the first time. ECF No. 42-1 at 4.
Plaintiff argues that he cast Defendant Bassett’s probable cause into question by
presenting Bassett with evidence that he had just been served with the TRO, and that Bassett was
“grossly unprofessional and unreasonable and fell below proper standards of conduct” by
arresting him anyway. ECF No. 42-1 at 4; Ex. F
—
Dep. Antoine McRae, ECF No. 46 at 152:15-
154: 19.
Ordinarily, a police officer is not required to look beyond a facially valid warrant to
confirm probable cause, even if the target of the warrant protests the arrest. Baker v. McCollan,
443 U.S. 137, 145-46 (1979) (“[W]e do not think a sheriff executing an arrest warrant is required
by the Constitution to investigate independently every claim of innocence.
.
.
.
But “an apparently valid warrant does not render an officer immune from suit if his
reliance on it is unreasonable in light of the relevant circumstances.” Berg, 219 F.3d at 273.
These circumstances include “other information that the officer possesses or to which he has
reasonable access, and whether failing to make an immediate arrest creates a public threat or
danger of flight.” Id. (remanding to district court for consideration of qualified immunity issue
and noting that arresting constable refused to look at release documents demonstrating that
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arrestee [for violating parole] was no longer on parole); see also Peña-Borrero v. Estremeda, 365
F.3d 7, 13 (1st Cir. 2004) (“While the officers arguably were simply negligent in failing to check
on the warrant before they acted on it, following through on the arrest and detention once
confronted with appellant’s documents [showing that he had already been arrested and released
on the same warrant earlier that day] reflected a much more deliberate disregard for whether the
warrant remained valid.”); Gonzalez v. Cape May County, 2015 WL 1471814, at *9 (D.N.J.
March 31, 2015) (whether arresting officer’s conduct was objectively reasonable despite facially
valid warrant was genuine issue of material fact because plaintiffs family gave arresting officer
information that contradicted warrant and there were no “exigent circumstances” preventing
officer from checking the inconsistencies before making an arrest).
Because a defendant cannot be arrested for violating a TRO without having “actual
knowledge of the restraints imposed” by the TRO, Mernar, 345 N.J. Super. at 594, Plaintiff
McRae’s August 10 copy of the TRO and claim that he had just been served for the first time
would both contradict the validity of Defendant Bassett’s warrant and render an arrest, without at
least “tak[ing] additional time to investigate Plaintiffs claims,” Gonzalez, 2015 WL 1471814, at
*9, potentially unreasonable. Nor do Defendants argue that any “exigent circumstances” required
Defendant Bassett to arrest Plaintiff McRae immediately without investigating further. Berg, 219
F.3d at 273.
Whether Plaintiff McRae told Defendant Bassett that he had just been served with the
TRO and attempted to show him the August 10 copy is an issue of material fact, and summary
judgment is inappropriate for this claim. Harris, 550 U.S. at 380.
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V.
Defendant Strus is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment
claim.
Defendant $trus is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff McRae’s fourth
Amendment claim against him. There are no material facts in dispute regarding Defendant
Strus’s actions. He neither applied for the allegedly invalid warrant nor arrested Plaintiff McRae.
Instead, a report cited by both Plaintiff and Defendants indicates that, on August 8, 2011,
Defendant Strus faxed a copy of the warrant and complaint to the Linden and Jersey City Police
Departments, sent a Speedy Bail request to the Essex County Sherriffs Office, and placed “[a]ll
related documents and information” into an evidence bag. ECF No. 41 Ex. M
—
Supp.
Investigation Report.
Plaintiff McRae does not allege that any of these actions directly violated his
constitutional rights or led to his arrest in any way. Instead, he argues that it “would appear from
that report that the documents would be subject to at least a tertiary review by the office for
purpose of preparing the evidence bag,” ECF No. 42-1 at 17. McRae apparently suggests that
Defendant Strus was obligated to review the 2009 TRO, discover it had not been properly
served, and report the error. Plaintiff McRae does not allege that the “related documents and
information” in the evidence bag included a copy of the TRO that Defendant Strus could have
reviewed, nor does he give any basis for his claim that the documents “would be subject to at
least a tertiary review.” Id.
Regardless, to repeat, a police officer is entitled to rely on a facially valid warrant in the
absence of information that renders reliance unreasonable. Krutl, 480 U.S. at 367; Young, 178 F.
App’x. at 171-72. Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Strus had any reason to doubt the
validity of the warrant he faxed to the other police departments. It follows that Defendant Strus’s
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actions, to the extent they caused any violation of Plaintiffs rights, are objectively reasonable
and entitled to qualified immunity.
CONCLUSION
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part. Because
Plaintiff McRae alleges an unlawful arrest under the Fourth Amendment, due process analysis is
inappropriate and summary judgment is granted for Defendants on all Fourteenth Amendment
claims. With respect to Plaintiffs fourth Amendment claims, Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment is granted for the Township of Nutley, the Nutley Police Department, Isaah Cardinale,
and David Strus and denied for Andrew Bassett. An
DATE:
District Court Judge
21
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