MAHER TERMINALS, LLC V. THE PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY, et al
Filing
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LETTER OPINION AND ORDER denying defts' request for a stay of discovery pending disposition of the motion to dismiss. The parties shall file a joint discovery plan on or before 6/18/13. The Pretrial Scheduling Conference shall resume on 6/20/13 at 12:00 p.m.; etc. Signed by Magistrate Judge Michael A. Hammer on 5/22/13. (sr, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
Chambers of
M artin Luther King Jr, Federal Bldg.
& U.S. Courthouse
50 W alnut Street, Room 3053
Newark, NJ 07102
(973) 776-7858
Michael A. Hammer
United States M agistrate Judge
May 22, 2013
LETTER OPINION AND ORDER
All Counsel of Record, via CM/ECF
RE:
Maher Terminals, LLC v. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey,
et al.
Civil Action No. 12-6090 (KM)
Dear Litigants:
Presently before the Court is a joint letter (“Letter”) presenting each party’s position on
defendants’ request for a stay of discovery in this matter pending disposition of defendants’
motion to dismiss (Mot. Dismiss, Nov. 8, 2012, ECF No. 12). Letter, May 8, 2013, ECF No. 38.
Plaintiff Maher Terminals, LLC (“plaintiff”) opposes defendants’ request for a stay of discovery.
For the reasons set forth below, defendants’ request is denied.
Background
On September 28, 2012, plaintiff filed a complaint against the Port Authority of New
York and New Jersey and Patrick J. Foye, in his official capacity as Executive Director of the
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (collectively, “defendants”), alleging that
defendants’ “port charges and fees, including marine terminal charges and fees, and increases in
marine terminal charges and fees, for [plaintiff’s] marine container terminal operations are
unlawful” and violate various federal statutes. Compl. ¶ 1, Sept. 28, 2012, ECF No. 1.
Accordingly, plaintiff seeks both monetary damages and equitable relief, including a declaratory
judgment that defendants’ marine terminal charges and fees are unlawful. Id. ¶ 3.
On November 8, 2012, defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Mot. Dismiss, Nov. 8, 2012, ECF No.
12. Pursuant to a Consent Order, that motion was made returnable on January 22, 2013, and it is
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presently pending before the Honorable Kevin McNulty, U.S.D.J. See Consent Order ¶ 3, Nov.
28, 2012, ECF No. 25. On December 21, 2012, plaintiff timely filed a brief in opposition to
defendants’ motion to dismiss (Opp’n Br., Dec. 21, 2012, ECF No. 26), and defendants filed a
reply brief in further support of their motion to dismiss on January 18, 2013 (Reply Br., Jan. 18,
2013, ECF No. 31). On April 26, 2013, defendants filed a letter requesting oral argument before
Judge McNulty on the pending motion to dismiss. Letter, Apr. 26, 2013, ECF No. 36. To date,
that request has been neither granted nor denied.
In a Letter Order dated January 7, 2013, the Court directed the parties to abide by the
early disclosure requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 and to submit to the Court a
joint discovery plan, including a proposed schedule for the completion of fact and expert
discovery. Letter Order, Jan. 7, 2013, ECF No. 27, at 1. The Court also ordered the parties to
“immediately serve interrogatories, limited to twenty-five (25) single questions, and requests for
production of documents (no limit).” Id. at 2. The Court also set an in-person initial scheduling
conference for February 27, 2013. Id. at 1.
In a letter dated January 9, 2013, defendants requested that the Court hold in abeyance its
direction to commence immediate disclosure and discovery until the determination of
defendants’ pending motion to dismiss. Defs.’ Letter, Jan. 9, 2013, ECF No. 28. In support of
their request, defendants asserted that the costs attendant to disclosure and discovery would be
avoided if the Court granted their motion to dismiss. Id. at 2. On the other hand, even if the
Court denied their motion to dismiss, defendants submitted that “because litigation with
overlapping facts has already taken place between the parties, the parties are in a position to
conduct discovery expeditiously thereafter.” Id. On January 10, 2013, the Court ordered the
parties to “exchange only initial disclosures pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a) before the
Scheduling Conference. The Court will address interrogatories, document production and other
fact discovery at the conference.” Order, Jan. 10, 2013, ECF No. 29.
After the Court granted multiple requests to adjourn the initial scheduling conference, the
parties appeared before the Undersigned for a Rule 16 conference on April 18, 2013. See Tr. of
Proceedings, ECF No. 37. On that same date, the Court issued an Order, which instructed the
parties to file a joint letter “presenting their respective positions regarding whether the Court
should stay discovery in this matter pending disposition of defendants’ motion to dismiss.”
Order ¶ 1, Apr. 18, 2013, ECF No. 35. Thereafter, on May 8, 2013, the parties jointly filed the
instant Letter, which sets forth each party’s position on defendants’ request to stay discovery
pending disposition of their motion to dismiss. Letter, May 8, 2013, ECF No. 38.
Discussion
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), the Court may stay discovery pending
determination of a motion to dismiss only on a showing of “good cause” by the party requesting
the stay. Gerald Chamales Corp. v. Oki Data Americas, Inc., et al., 247 F.R.D. 453, 454 (D.N.J.
Dec. 11, 2007) (“A protective order pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) may only be issued if ‘good
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cause’ is shown.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1) (establishing that the court may issue a protective
order with respect to discovery only for “good cause”); see Perelman v. Perelman, Civ. No. 105622, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85470, at *2–3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 2011) (“The burden is on the
party seeking the stay [of discovery] to show ‘good cause.’”) (citations omitted). It is well settled
that “the mere filing of a dispositive motion does not constitute ‘good cause’ for the issuance of a
discovery stay.” Chamales, 247 F.R.D. at 454; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(2)(A) (“[M]ethods of
discovery may be used in any sequence . . . .”).
Indeed, courts generally do not favor granting motions to stay discovery “because when
discovery is delayed or prolonged it can create case management problems which impede the
court’s responsibility to expedite discovery and cause unnecessary litigation expenses and
problems.” Coyle v. Hornell Brewing Co., Civ. No. 08-2797 (JBS), 2009 WL 1652399, at *3
(D.N.J. June 9, 2009) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Nonetheless, this Court
maintains wide discretion to manage discovery issues and enter stays where good cause has been
shown. See Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936); Coyle, 2009 WL 1652399, at *3
(“In discovery disputes, the Magistrate Judge exercises broad discretion and is entitled to great
deference.”) (citations omitted); Chamales, 247 F.R.D. at 454 (“Magistrate Judges have broad
discretion to manage their docket and to decide discovery issues, including whether to stay
discovery pending a decision on a dispositive motion.”) (citations omitted).
Here, defendants argue that granting the temporary stay of discovery will not prejudice
plaintiff because plaintiff “is challenging fees and charges that were virtually all set forth in its
October 2000 lease and waited some twelve years before commencing this action.” Letter, ECF
No. 38, at 2. Defendants contend further that plaintiff would suffer no prejudice because plaintiff
has already taken “extensive discovery” of defendants in a similar action. Id. Defendants assert
that, by staying discovery until Judge McNulty decides their motion to dismiss, “discovery may
never be needed at all or at least be substantially narrowed.” Id. They suggest that the Court
should enter a stay of discovery pending Judge McNulty’s determination of their “highly
meritorious motion to dismiss” because that motion will most likely be granted, and discovery
will therefore be rendered unnecessary. Id. Defendants submit that allowing discovery to
proceed immediately “would impose a substantial burden” on defendants, whose resources “are
and should be prudently spent in ways that benefit the public.” Id.
The Court finds that defendants have failed to satisfy their burden of showing good cause
sufficient to justify granting a stay of discovery pending disposition of defendants’ motion to
dismiss. Upon a review of the parties’ briefs with respect to the pending motion to dismiss, the
Court here cannot conclude that “only one result [] could be reached. In the absence of a clear
and unmistak[]able result, this Court does not believe the issuance of a protective order should
depend upon its prediction of how the District Judge will decide defendants’ dispositive motion.”
Chamales, 247 F.R.D. at 454. For example, plaintiff asserts that questions of fact exist regarding
whether defendants’ challenged port fees are within the scope of certain federal statutes, and
whether those fees “operate to impose a charge for the privilege of entering, trading in, or lying
in a port and [whether plaintiff] is injured.” Letter, ECF No. 38, at 10. In either event, it is clear
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to this Court upon its review of the motion to dismiss that the motion does not dictate a “clear
and unmistakable result” for either party; consequently, this Court cannot justify granting a stay
of discovery.
In addition, defendants fail to satisfy the good cause standard because they provide no
evidence that proceeding with discovery will be “unduly” burdensome. In any case where a
dispositive motion is filed in the early stages of the litigation, the parties might incur discovery
costs that ultimately may be rendered unnecessary if the pending dispositive motion is granted.
Defendants, however, do not explain with any specificity why the instant matter is different than
any other case in which a dispositive motion has been filed early, and thus, why the Court should
grant its request to stay discovery. See Coyle, 2009 WL 1652399, at *3 (“The party seeking a
stay must make out a clear case of hardship or inequity in being required to go forward, if there is
even a fair possibility that the stay . . . will work damage to some one else.”) (internal citation
and quotation marks omitted). Again, the burden rests squarely on defendants to make such a
showing because a stay of discovery is “not preferred.” Id. Here, defendants have failed to carry
that burden, and accordingly, the Court denies their request for a temporary stay of discovery.1
See Chamales, 247 F.R.D. at 455 (“[I]f the Court accepts defendants’ argument that all
depositions should be stayed pending the decision on its dispositive motion, then it would in
effect be ruling that every time a request to compel arbitration is filed good cause exists to issue a
protective order to stop depositions while the request is pending. This is not the law.”) (citations
omitted). The Court denies defendants’ request without reaching the question of whether
plaintiff would suffer prejudice as a result of a potential stay of discovery. That issue is
tangential to the good cause analysis, and it does not affect the Court’s determination that
defendants have failed to show good cause sufficient to grant a stay of discovery. See generally,
In re Plastics Additives Antitrust Litig., Civ. No. 03-2038, 2004 WL 2743591, at *7 (E.D. Pa.
Nov. 29, 2004) (determining that the Court has a responsibility to “keep its docket moving to
provide litigants with a timely and effective resolution of their claims,” and granting a stay would
hinder the Court’s responsibility to control the disposition of the matter).
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies defendants’ request for a stay of discovery
pending disposition of the motion to dismiss. Any party seeking to serve interrogatories (limited
to twenty-five single questions) and requests for production of documents, shall do so on or
before June 14, 2013. The parties shall file a joint discovery plan on or before June 18, 2013.
The Pretrial Scheduling Conference shall resume before the Undersigned on June 20, 2013, at
12:00 p.m.
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Additionally, the defendants’ concern regarding “Maher’s appetite for burdensome
discovery” are misplaced. See Letter, May 18, 2013, ECF No. 38, at 4. Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 26 and 37 vest this Court with the substantial authority to limit discovery in
accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26.
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So Ordered,
s/Michael A. Hammer
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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