SPADACCINI v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
Filing
15
OPINION. Signed by Judge William J. Martini on 11/15/13. (gh, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
Civ. No. 2:12-06246 (WJM)
STEPHEN SPADACCINI,
Plaintiff,
OPINION
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J.:
Plaintiff Stephen Spadaccini brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g)
and 1383(c)(3), seeking review of a final determination by the Commissioner of Social
Security (the “Commissioner”) denying in part his application for a period of disability,
Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”)
Benefits. For the reasons that follow, the Commissioner’s decision is VACATED and
REMANDED for reconsideration consistent with this opinion.
I.
LEGAL STANDARDS
A. The Five-Step Sequential Analysis
Under the authority of the Social Security Act, the Social Security Administration
has established a five-step evaluation process for determining whether a claimant is
entitled to benefits. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. In the first step, the Commissioner
determines whether the claimant has engaged in substantial gainful activity since the
onset date of the alleged disability. Id. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If not, the
Commissioner moves to step two to determine if the claimant’s alleged impairment, or
combination of impairments, is “severe.” Id. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If the claimant
has a severe impairment, the Commissioner inquires in step three as to whether the
impairment meets or equals the criteria of any impairment found in the Listing of
Impairments. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, Part A. If so, the claimant is
automatically eligible to receive benefits (and the analysis ends); if not, the
Commissioner moves on to step four. Id. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). In the fourth step,
the Commissioner decides whether, despite any severe impairment, the claimant retains
the Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) to perform past relevant work. Id. §§
404.1520(e)-(f), 416.920(e)-(f). The claimant bears the burden of proof at each of these
first four steps. At step five, the burden shifts to the Social Security Administration to
1
demonstrate that the claimant is capable of performing other jobs that exist in significant
numbers in the national economy in light of the claimant’s age, education, work
experience and RFC. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g); see Poulos v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 474 F.3d 88, 91-92 (3d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).
B. Standard of Review
For the purpose of this appeal, the court conducts a plenary review of the legal
issues. See Schaudeck v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d Cir. 1999).
The factual findings of the ALJ are reviewed “only to determine whether the
administrative record contains substantial evidence supporting the findings.” Sykes v.
Apfel, 228 F.3d 259, 262 (3d Cir. 2000). Substantial evidence is “less than a
preponderance of the evidence but more than a mere scintilla.” Jones v. Barnhart, 364
F.3d 501, 503 (3d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). “It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. When
substantial evidence exists to support the ALJ’s factual findings, this Court must abide by
the ALJ’s determinations. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)).
II.
BACKGROUND
On July 22, 2008, Plaintiff filed an application for a period of disability, DIB and
SSI. The filings alleged that Plaintiff had a disability with an onset date of September 1,
2007, due to conditions including chronic heart failure, ischemic heart disease, recurrent
arrhythmias, cardiomyopathy, coronary heart disease, stroke, arthritis and depression.
Plaintiff’s claim was denied initially on January 23, 2008 and on reconsideration on June
26, 2009. On October 19, 2012, Plaintiff testified at a hearing before Administrative Law
Judge Richard West (the “ALJ”). The ALJ then sent interrogatories regarding the case to
a medical expert, Dr. Fechner. At Plaintiff’s request, on February 15, 2011, the ALJ held
a supplemental hearing, so that Plaintiff could question Dr. Fechner about the
interrogatories. On April 15, 2011, the ALJ issued a partially favorable decision, finding
Plaintiff disabled starting on March 6, 2011. Accordingly, the ALJ awarded SSI from
that date. However, because Plaintiff’s insured status had expired on December 31,
2008, the ALJ denied Title II benefits. The ALJ recognized that Plaintiff had several
severe impairments, but found that, prior to March 6, 2011, those impairments did not
meet or equal the impairments found in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, Part
A. The ALJ also found that, prior to March 6, 2011, Plaintiff had the residual functional
capacity (“RFC”) to perform sedentary work.
Plaintiff filed a request for review of the ALJ’s decision, which the Appeals
Council denied on August 9, 2012. Plaintiff now brings the instant appeal, challenging
the ALJ’s determination that he was not disabled from September 1, 2007 through March
5, 2011.
III.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s determination that he was “not disabled” from
September 1, 2007 through March 5, 2011. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed the
2
following errors: (1) finding that, prior to March 6, 2011, Plaintiff failed to demonstrate a
listing-level impairment; (2) finding that, prior to March 6, 2011, Plaintiff retained the
RFC to perform sedentary work; and (3) failing to obtain vocational expert testimony.
Each of these challenges will be addressed in turn.
A. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff does not
have a listing-level impairment.
Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ failed to properly analyze whether his
impairments met or equaled one of the listings at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1. While he appears to agree with the ALJ that none of his impairments
independently are of listing-level severity, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to consider
his impairments in combination. Specifically, Plaintiff believes that the combination of
his “near misses” in the orthopedic listings and the cardiovascular listings create a
medically-equivalent impairment. (Pl’s Br. 20.)
At step three, an ALJ must consider each of the claimant's individual conditions
and determine whether they meet or equal any listed impairment. Where the claimant has
“a combination of impairments, no one of which meets a listing ... [the ALJ] will
compare [the claimant's] findings with those for closely analogous listed impairments.”
20 C.F.R. § 404.1526(b)(3). For a combination of impairments to be medically
equivalent to one in the listings, it must be “at least of equal medical significance.” Id.
Plaintiff’s assertion that the ALJ did not consider his impairments in combination
is incorrect. The ALJ specifically found that Plaintiff “did not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments
. . . .” (R. at 22.) “[W]here the ALJ has indicated that the impairments have been
considered in combination, there is ‘no reason not to believe’ that the ALJ did so.”
Gainey v. Astrue, Civ. No. 10-1912, 2011 WL 1560865, at *12 (D.N.J. Apr. 25, 2011)
(citing Morrison v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 268 Fed. App’x 186, 189 (3rd Cir. 2008)).
In addition, after reviewing the decision as a whole, the Court finds that the ALJ’s
development of the record and explanation of findings at step three is sufficient to allow
for meaningful review, as required under Burnett. See Burnett, 220 F.3d at 120. Burnett
“does not require the ALJ to use particular language or adhere to a particular format in
conducting his analysis.” Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 2004). Instead, a
reviewing court should look at the decision as a whole to determine whether the ALJ
considered the appropriate factors. Id. Here, the ALJ’s analysis of the medical evidence
in light of the cardiovascular, musculoskeletal and mental disorder listings was
comprehensive enough for meaningful review. The ALJ considered the medical evidence
regarding Plaintiff’s cardiovascular impairments throughout the opinion, finding that
Plaintiff did not meet the criteria for Listing 4.04, 4.05 or, before March 6, 2011, 4.02.
(See, e.g., R. at 22, 28.) The ALJ also considered Plaintiff’s lower back pain and the
record evidence revealing degenerative joint disease in Plaintiff’s lumbar spine, finding
that he did not meet Listing 1.04. (R. at 22, 24-25.) Further, the ALJ discussed the
3
limitations in functioning created by Plaintiff’s mental impairments, finding those
impairments did not meet any mental disorder listing. (R. at 22.)
Finally, the record contains substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s
determination that the so-called “near misses” do not equal a listing-level impairment. At
the supplemental hearing, Dr. Fechner specifically opined on whether Plaintiff’s
impairments in combination met or were medically equivalent to any listing. (R. at 7677.) His answer was no. (Id.) And the administrative record contains numerous reports
supporting the ALJ’s findings at step three. (See R. at 189, 250, 352, 368, 397.)
Accordingly, the Court affirms this determination.
B. The ALJ failed to adequately consider Dr. Brabston’s testimony.
Regarding step four, the ALJ found that, prior to March 6, 2011, Plaintiff retained
the RFC to perform sedentary work. Sedentary work requires the capacity to lift up to
ten pounds, and during an eight-hour workday, sit for six hours and stand and/or walk for
two hours. Social Security Ruling 96-9p, 1996 WL 374185, at *6. At issue are three
differing medical opinions regarding Plaintiff’s ability to perform sedentary work.
Consistent with the requirements of sedentary work, Dr. Fechner opined that Plaintiff
could occasionally lift and carry up to ten pounds, and during an eight-hour work day, sit
for six hours and stand and/or walk for two hours. (R. at 25.) Dr. Ahmed’s assessment,
which was authored by his office manager, indicated that Plaintiff was completely
disabled. (R. at 397-405.) Dr. Brabston opined that Plaintiff could lift and carry five
pounds, sit for less than six hours in an eight-hour day, and stand and/or walk for six
hours in an eight-hour day. (R. at 382.)
Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ erred by giving great weight to Dr. Fechner’s
assessment and little weight to opinion of Dr. Ahmed, who was Plaintiff’s treating
physician. An ALJ is free to choose one medical opinion over another where the ALJ
considers all of the evidence and gives some reason for discounting the evidence he
rejects. See Diaz v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 577 F.3d 500, 505-06 (3d Cir. 2009);
Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999) (“An ALJ . . . may afford a treating
physician’s opinion more or less weight depending upon the extent to which supporting
explanations are provided.”). In this case, the ALJ detailed his reasons for discounting
Dr. Ahmed’s opinion. He noted that Dr. Ahmed is not a cardiologist. (R. at 27.) He
found that Dr. Ahmed’s own notes did not support the conclusion that Plaintiff was
completely disabled – the notes offered no explanation for why Plaintiff would be unable
to perform either prolonged sitting or even occasional standing or walking. (Id.) The
ALJ also found Dr. Ahmed’s assertion that Plaintiff could not lift or carry any weight to
be implausible. (Id.) Finally, the ALJ noted that Dr. Ahmad’s conclusion was
inconsistent with other evidence in the case, including objective clinical findings and Dr.
Fechner’s opinion. (Id.) Accordingly, the ALJ did not err by affording greater weight to
Dr. Fletcher’s opinion than to Dr. Ahmed’s assessment.
Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ failed to adequately consider Dr. Brabston’s
assessment. The Court agrees. The ALJ must set forth the basis for his decision,
4
including his reasons for discounting probative evidence in the record that contradicts his
findings. Cosby v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 231 Fed. App’x 140, 146 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing
Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981). The ALJ’s opinion must allow the
reviewing court to determine if “significant probative evidence was not credited or
simply ignored.” Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at 42; see also Burnett, 220 F.3d at 121 (finding
that the ALJ had not properly fulfilled his duty where he failed to “consider and explain
his reasons for discounting all of the pertinent evidence before him in making his [RFC]
determination”). Here, the ALJ’s decision notes Dr. Brabston’s opinion, but the ALJ did
not indicate what weight he gave to that assessment. (R. at 24.) The ALJ’s lack of
analysis regarding Dr. Brabston’s assessment leaves the Court wondering if “he
considered and rejected [it], considered and discounted [it] or failed to consider [it] at
all.” Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at 43-44. His “failure to explain his implicit rejection of this
evidence” was error. Id. (quoting Cotter, 642 F.2d at 707). Accordingly, because the
ALJ did not sufficiently explain his RFC findings, the Court cannot determine whether
the RFC determination was supported by the substantial evidence. Thus, the Court
vacates the ALJ’s findings at step four and remands this issue for reconsideration in light
of this opinion.
C. Without further findings, the Court cannot evaluate whether a
vocational expert was necessary.
Finally, without knowing the weight afforded to Dr. Brabston’s testimony, the
Court is unable to assess whether the ALJ should have obtained a vocational expert at
step five. SSR 96-9P, on which the ALJ relied in this case, states:
If an individual is unable to lift 10 pounds or occasionally lift and carry items like
docket files, ledgers, and small tools throughout the workday, the unskilled
sedentary occupational base will be eroded. The extent of erosion will depend on
the extent of the limitations. For example, if it can be determined that the
individual has an ability to lift or carry slightly less than 10 pounds, with no other
limitations or restrictions in the ability to perform the requirements of sedentary
work, the unskilled sedentary occupational base would not be significantly eroded;
however, an inability to lift or carry more than 1 or 2 pounds would erode the
unskilled sedentary occupational base significantly. For individuals with
limitations in lifting or carrying weights between these amounts, consultation with
a vocational resource may be appropriate.
1996 WL 374185, at *6 (1996) (emphasis added). SSR 96-9p also provides that “[i]f an
individual is unable to sit for a total of [six] hours in an [eight]-hour work day, the
unskilled sedentary occupational base will be eroded.” Dr. Brabston opined that Plaintiff
could lift and carry a maximum of five pounds and sit for less than six hours per day. (R.
at 382.) Accordingly, depending on the weight afforded to Dr. Brabston’s opinion,
consultation with a vocational expert may have been necessary. The Court therefore also
vacates the ALJ’s step five determination and remands this issue for reconsideration in
accordance with this opinion.
5
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Commissioner’s decision is VACATED and
REMANDED for reconsideration consistent with this opinion. An appropriate order
follows.
/s/ William J. Martini
WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J.
Date: November 15, 2013
6
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?