MARYBETH MORAN v. NORTHWEST ESSEX COMMUNITY HEALTHCARE NETWORK, INC et al

Filing 11

OPINION & ORDER ADOPTING 8 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: re 3 MOTION to Remand filed by MARYBETH MORAN ***CIVIL CASE TERMINATED. Signed by Judge Jose L. Linares on 2/20/13. (sr, )

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CLOSED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

MARYBETH MORAN,

Civil Action No. 12-6591 (iLL)

Plaintiff,
OPINION AND ORDER
V.

NORTHWEST ESSEX COMMUNITY
HEALTHCARE NETWORK, INC, et al.
Defendants.
-

LINARES, District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court by way of Plaintiff Marybeth Moran’s (“Plaintiff’)’s
motion to remand this action to the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1447. This Court referred Plaintiffs motion to the Honorable Michael

A. Hammer, United States Magistrate Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636 (b)(l)(B). Magistrate

Judge Hammer filed a Report and Recommendation in connection with this motion on Januar
y
18, 2013. In his Report and Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Hammer recommended that
Plaintiff’s motion be granted, and that this matter be remanded to the Superior Court of
New
Jersey, Law Division, Essex County.

On February 4, 2013, Defendants Northwest Essex

Community Healthcare Network, Inc. (“Northwest”) and Elizabeth Callahan (“Callahan”)
filed
an objection to Magistrate Judge Hammer’s Report and Recommendation.
The Court has considered the submissions in support of and in opposition to Plaintiffs
motion, and decides this matter without oral argument pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78.
For the
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reasons set forth below, the Court adopts Magistrate Judge Hammer’s Report and
Recommendation, grants Plaintiffs motion to remand, and directs the Clerk of the Court to close
the Court’s file in this matter.
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is employed by Northwest as a special education teacher. (Dkt. No. 1-5,

Compi.

¶J 1, 2.) The crux of Plaintiffs allegations is that Defendants took retaliatory actions

against her because of her union activities, and her disability for depression and anxiety. (See
generally Dkt. No. 1-5, Compl.)
Plaintiff originally commenced this litigation in federal court with the filing of a
complaint on May 16, 2011. (See Civ. No. 11-2802, Dkt. No.1.) This Court allowed Plaintiff to
amend this complaint twice—once, after granting a motion for a more definite statement, and
another time after granting a motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs second amended complaint asserted
the following causes of action: (1) a claim under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C.

§ § 2611 et seq.; (2) violation of the Conscientious Employee Protection Act, N.J.S.A. § § 34:19-1
et seq.; (3) employment discrimination in violation of the New Jersey Law Against
Discrimination, N.J.S.A.

§ 10:5-1 et seq.; and (4) breach of contract. (Civ. No. 11-2802, Dkt.

No. 22.)

On April 18, 2012, this Court dismissed Plaintiffs FMLA claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 1 2(b)(6), upon finding that Plaintiff had “failed to provide any details that demonstrate her
right to relief under the

.

.

.

[FMLA].” (Civ. No. 11-2802, Dkt. No. 27.) Having dismissed

Plaintiffs sole federal claim, this Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
remaining New Jersey state law claims, and dismissed Plaintiffs second amended complaint
with prejudice. (Id.)

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Subsequently, Plaintiff filed this action on September 14, 2012 in the New Jersey
Superior Court, Law Division, Essex County, alleging only the three state claims she had
previously alleged in the second amended complaint filed in Civ. No. 11-2802.
removed this action to this Court on October 19, 2012, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

Defendants

§ 1447. In their

Notice of Removal, Defendants claim that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C.

§ 1331 because Plaintiff’s claims arise under the laws of the United States, and are

preempted by Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. (Civ. No. 12-6591, Dkt. No.
1 at2-3.)
In her motion to remand, Plaintiff asserts that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
because (1) “the lawsuit does not involve a federal question,” and (2) the parties are not diverse.
(Civ. No. 12-659 1 Dkt. No. 3-1 at 2.) In response, Defendants argue that this Court has subject
matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff’s claims are “completely preempted by federal law.” (Civ.
No. 12-6591, Dkt. No.6 at 2.)
In his Report and Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Hammer observed that “it is
procedurally improper” for Defendants to raise their preemption argument now because they
should have raised this argument in a motion for reconsideration following this Court’s dismissal
of Plaintiff’s second amended complaint in Civil Action No. 11-2802. (See Civ. No. 12-6591,
Dkt. No. 8 at 5.) Magistrate Judge Hammer further observed that “[t]o allow [D]efendants to
remove the case would nullify Judge Linares’ prior Order, and create subject-matter jurisdiction
after Judge Linares already declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.” (Id.)
Defendants have raised the following specific objections to Magistrate Judge Hammer’s
Report and Recommendation: (1) that Magistrate Judge Hammer did not take “into consideration
that Plaintiff’s second amended complaint [in Civ. No. 11-2802] was dismissed with prejudice;”
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and (2) Magistrate Judge Hammer’s failure to address the merits of Defendants’ preemption
argument. (Civ. No. 12-6591, Dkt. No. 9 at 4.)
II.

LEGAL STANDARD

When a magistrate judge addresses motions that are considered “dispositive,” such as a
motion to remand, a magistrate judge will submit a Report and Recommendation to the district
court. 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. p. 72; L. Civ. R. 72.1(a)(2). The district court may

then “accept, reject or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the
magistrate. The judge may also receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate
with instructions.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1)(c); see also L. Civ. R. 72.1(c)(2). Unlike an Opinion

and Order issued by a magistrate judge, a Report and Recommendation does not have the force
of law unless and until the district court enters an order accepting or rejecting it. See United
Steelworkers ofAm. v. Ni Zinc Co., Inc., 828 F.2d 1001, 1005 (3d Cir. 1987).
The standard of review of a magistrate judge’s determination depends upon whether the
motion is dispositive or non-dispositive. For dispositive motions, the district court must make a
de novo determination of those portions of the magistrate judge’s Report to which a litigant has
filed an objection. 28 U.S.C.
Under 28 U.S.C

§ 636(b)(1) (c); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); L. Civ. R. 72.1(c)(2).

§ 1441 and 1446, a party may remove a civil action from state court to

federal court if the district court has original jurisdiction over the action and the party removing
the action does so within thirty days after receipt of the initial pleading. Removal statutes “are to
be strictly construed against removal and all doubts should be resolved in favor of remand.” Steel
Valley Auth. v. Union Switch and Signal Div., 809 F.2d 1006, 1010 (3d Cir. 1987). As the party
invoking federal subject matter jurisdiction, a removing party bears the burden of proving that
jurisdiction exists. Samuel-Basset v. KIA Motors Am., Inc.., 357 F.3d 392, 396 (3d Cir. 2004).
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III.

DISCUSSION
At the outset, the Court notes that Defendants have failed to explain how this Court could

allow them to remove Plaintiff’s three state claims without overruling its April 18, 2012 Order
declining to exercise jurisdiction over these claims. Notably, Defendants have not speciJIcally
objected to the following portion of Magistrate Judge Hammer’s Report and Recommendation:
To allow [D]efendants to remove the case would nullify Judge
Linares’ prior Order, and create subject matter jurisdiction after
Judge Linares already declined to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction.
(See CM/ECF No. 8 at

5)1

Furthermore, Defendants have not cited any legal authority supporting the proposition
that this Court should overrule its April 18, 2012 Order declining to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state claims.
To the extent that Defendants believed that this Court relied on a flawed legal premise in
dismissing Plaintiff’s second amended complaint in Civ. No. 11-2802, they should have moved
for reconsideration within fourteen days of entry of that Order. See Local Civ. R. 7.1(i). That is,
if Defendants believed that this Court should have addressed the merits of their preemption
argument when it declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state claims in
Civ. No. 11-2802, they should have filed a motion for reconsideration.

It is procedurally

improper, however, for Defendants now to request that this Court effectively overturn its April
18, 2012 Order, and exercise jurisdiction over claims over which it previously declined to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Accordingly,
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Under Local Civ. R. 72. l(c)(2), a party objecting to a magistrate judge’s findings, recommendations,
or report
“shall specifically identify the [objectionable] portions,” and provide “the basis” for objecting.
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The Court will not address the merits of Defendants’ preemption argument, as that defense is more
appropriately
raised in state court.

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IT IS on this Xday of February, 2013

ORDERED that Magistrate Judge Hammer’s Report and Recommendation is adopted in
its entirety; and it is further
ORDERED that this action is remanded to the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Essex County; and it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall close the Court’s file in this matter.

U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

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