MANCE v. QUEST DIAGNOSTICS INCORPORATED VOLUNTARY SEPARATION PLAN et al

Filing 26

OPINION fld. Signed by Judge Dennis M. Cavanaugh on 9/11/13. (sr, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

ZOE MANCE, on behalf of herself and all:
others similarly situated

Hon. Dennis M. Cavanaugh
OPINION

Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 2:12-cv-07361 (DMC)(MF)
V.

QUEST DiAGNOSTICS
[NC’ORPORATED VOLUNTARY
S1 PFRA I ION P AN AND QUES F
DIAGNOSTICS INCOROPRATED, as
PLAN ADMINISTRATOR,
Defendants.

DENNIS M. CAVANAUGH. U.S.D.J.:
This matter comes before the Court upon the motion of Defendants Quest Diagnostics
Incorporated Voluntary Separation Plan (“VSA Plan”), and Quest Diagnostics incorporated, as
Plan Administrator (“Quest”) (collectively “Defendants”) to dismiss the Complaint of’ Zoe
Mance (“Plaintiff’), pursuant to FED. R. Civ, P. 12(b)(6). Pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P 78, no oral
argument was heard. Based on the following and for the reasons expressed herein, Defendant’s
Motion is granted.
L

1
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff began working at Quest on November 18. 2002 as a member ol its sales force.

She later became a District Sales Manager in the Physician Sales Organization until she was

The facts from this section are taken from the parties’ pleadings.

involuntarily terminated on September 12, 2009. Plaintiff alleges that Quest has a longstanding,
company-wide pattern and practice of providing severance benefits through its VSA Plan to
qualified employees with job titles of District Sales Manager or higher as an alternative to being
terminated or placed on a Performance Improvement Plan under its performance management
policy. Plaintiff claims that the plan is administered in Madison, New Jersey and that the benefits
must be approved by a local human resources manager, a business unit managing director or
functional leader, a regional vice president, a regional sales

vice

president or corporate functional

leader, and a human resources vice president. Plaintiff alleges that local human resources
managers are responsible for collecting signatures necessary for approval and for completing an
“Approvals Form” which provides the types of benefits that the employee is eligible for.
Plaintiff claims that payments are made from Quest’s general account, and she lists in her
Complaint a number of employees who were offered benefits, as well as a number of employees
who were not approved for benefits.
Plaintiff alleges that she was eligible to receive benefits under the VSA Plan because she
was subject to Quest’s performance manage policy and was an employee who management
intended to terminate for poor performance. She claims that the VSA Plan qualities as an
employment benefit plan under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1 974
(“ERISA”) 29 U.S.C.

§

1102 and that the decision to deny her benefits is a violation of ERISA

§

11 32(a)( I )(B).
Plaintiff filed the instant complaint against Defendants on November 30, 2012 on behalf
of herself and other similarly situated former employees of Quest (“Compi.,” ECF No. 1).
Defendants filed this Motion to Dismiss on Februrary 6, 20i3 (Def.’s Mot..” ECF No. 12).
Plaintiffs (lied a Briel an Opposition on Match 4 2013 (‘P1 s Opp’n’ ECF No 19) DJendants

filed a Reply Brief on March 11, 2013 (“Def.’s Reply,” ECF No. 20).
II

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In deciding a motion under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the District Court is “required to
accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all inferences in the facts alleged
in the light most favorable to the [plaintiff].” Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228
(3d Cir. 2008). “[A] complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need
detailed factual allegations.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). However,
the plaintiffs “obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief requires more
than labels and conclusions and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.” Id. On a motion to dismiss, courts are “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion
couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). Plaintiffs
complaint is subject to the heightened pleading standard set forth in Ashcroft v. Iqbal:
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.
Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will. be a contextspecific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense. But where the well pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more
than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged but it has not
“show[n]” “that the pleader is entitled to relief”
.

.

-

-

Ashcroft v. Icjbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-679 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 750).
IlL

DISCUSSION

To bring a claim under ERISA, a plaintiff must have statutory standing.
v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 636 F.3d 69, 74 (3d Cir. 2011). Under

Baldwin

§ 502(a) of ERISA,

“only ‘a participant or beneficiary’ [can] institute a civil action for benefits against a plan
administrator.” Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C.

§ 1132(a)). In analyzing whether a plaintiff has standing

under ERISA. the Third Circuit uses a “zone of interests” analysis, which asks whether the
plaintiffs complaint falls into the zone of interests protected by the statute. Id. at 74-75, In the
context of claims to benefits, the inquiry is “inexorably tied to the question of whether a plaintiff
can meet the definitions of either a participant or a beneficiary.” j4, at 75 (quoting Miller v. RiteAid Corp., 334 F.3d 335, 340-41 (3rd Cir. 2003)). A participant is defined under ERISA as “any
employee or former employee of an employer.

.

.

who is or may become eligible to receive a

benefit of any type from an employee benefit plan which covers employees of such employer.”
29 U.S.C.

§

1 002(7). A beneficiary is defined as “a person designed by a participant. or h the

terms of an employee benefit plan, who is or may become entitled to a benefit thereunder.” 29
U.S.C.

§

1002(8). A plaintiff who claims to be a participant or beneficiary must show that he has

a colorable claim in a suit to recover benefits. Leuthner v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of
Northeastern Pennsylvania, 454 F.3d 120, 124 (3rd Cir. 2006). An employee who “might have”
become eligible under an ERISA plan but who never actually became eligible does not have
standing. See Miller, 334 F.3d at 342 (dismissing the plaintiffs claim because he resigned fIom
his employment and the terms of his employer’s benefits plan required him to be laid off in order
to receive benefits). 1-lowever. the Third Circuit has stated that “[a] plan administrator’s alleged
ERISA violation should not be the means by which the plan is able to insulate itself from suits
arising from the alleged violation.” Leuthner, 454 F.3d at 129. Therefore, if an employee claims
that his employer’s wrongdoing deprived him of his status as a participant or beneficiary, he has
standing if he can show that ‘he would still be [a participant or beneficiary] but for the alleged
malfeasance of a plan fiduciary.” Id.
In the present case, Plaintiff claims that benefits under the VSA plan were offered to
Quest employees “in exchange for oluntary termination (Compl

¶

12) Howevei, Plaintiff also

admits that she was involuntarily terminated (Compl,

¶ 6). Nonetheless, Plaintiff contends that

she is entitled to benefits because she “was eligible for benefits under Quest’s VSA Plan. but did
not receive the benefits because Defendants decided not to offer them to her and terminated her
employment instead” (Pl.’s

Opp’n

at 18). Although Plaintiff argues that she is not subjeci. to the

“but for” test set out in Leuthner, she admits in her Complaint that benefits were only available
to employees who were voluntarily terminated. Therefore, she is essentially arguing that she

would have been a beneficiary, but she was deprived of this opportunity because she was
involuntarily terminated instead of offered voluntary termination in exchange for benefits. Thus,
Plaintiff must show that she would have been a beneficiary but for” the malfeasance of a plan
fiduciary at Quest. Plaintiff has made no allegation of a breach of fiduciary duty, and therefore
her claim must be dismissed for lack of standing.
I\

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is granted. An appropriate

order follows this Opinion.

M. Cavanaugh,
Date:
Original:
cc:

September//_, 2013
Clerks Office
Hon. Joseph A. Dickson, U.S.M.J.
All Counsel of Record
File

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