BEJARANO v. RADISSON HOTELS INTERNATIONAL INC. et al

Filing 114

ORDER denying 109 Motion for Default Judgment. Signed by Judge John Michael Vazquez on 5/26/16. (rg, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT Of NEW JERSEY

CLAUDIA BEJARANO,

Plain tiff
V.

Civil Action No. 12-778 1
RADISSON HOTELS INTERNATIONAL INC,
ET AL,

ORDER

Defendants.

John Michael Vazguez, U.S.D.J.
THIS MATTER comes before the Court by way of Plaintiff Claudia Bejarano’s
unopposed Motion for Default Judgment as to Defendant Mayank Ray, D.E. 109; and it
APPEARING that even when a party is actually in default “the other side is not entitled
to the entry of default judgment as of right, and the entry of such a judgment is left primarily to
the discretion of the district court.” Sanchez v. Franzzano, No. 15-2316 (KSK)(CLW), 2016 WL
2892551, at *1 (D.N.J. May 12, 2016); and it further
APPEARING that in evaluating whether to enter default judgment pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 55(b), the court must determine whether (1) it has subject matter jurisdiction over the matter
and personal jurisdiction over the parties, (2) the parties have properly been served, (3) the
complaint sufficiently pleads a cause of action,1 and (4) the plaintiff has proven damages. Days

In this context, courts use the Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)6) motion to dismiss standard to determine
whether there is a legitimate cause of action. See Mineo v. iVicfachern, No. 12-1950, 2014 WL
2197032, at *2 (D.N.J. May 27, 2014) (denying motion for default judgment and vacating Clerkts
entry of default because plaintiff failed to pled a sufficient federal RICO claim pursuant to Rule

Inn

Worldwide, Inc. v. Tulsipooja Hospitality, LLC, No. 15-5576, 2016 WL 2605989, at *2 (D.N.J.

May 6, 2016). The Court must also consider “(1) whether the party subject to default has a
meritorious defense, (2) the prejudice suffered by the party seeking default, and (3) the culpability
of the party subject to default.” Animal Science Prods., Inc. v. China Nat ‘1 Metals & Minerals

Import & Export Corp., 596 F. Supp. 2d 842, 849 (D.N.J. 200$); and it further
APPEARING that the Court must accept all well-pleaded facts in the pleadings as true,

except as to damages. Chanel, Inc. v. Gordashevsky, 558 F. Supp. 2d 532, 535-36 (D.N.J. 2008);
see also Int’l Union of Operating Eng ‘rs ofE. Pa. & Del. Benefit Pension Fttnd. v. N. Abbonizio

Contractors, Inc., 134 F. Supp. 3d $62, $65 (E.D. Pa. 2015). If damages are not mathematically
computable or liquidated, a plaintiff must prove the damages sought. A court has discretion to
hold a hearing to establish the plaintiffs damages or to rely on documentary evidence. See Rainey
i’.

Diamond State Port Corp., 354 F. App’x 722, 724 (3d Cir. 2009); Comdvne I, Inc. v. Corbin,

908 F.2d 1142, 1149 (3d Cir. 1990); Ma/ike. Hannah, 661 F. Supp. 2d 485, 490 (D.N.J. 2009);
and it further
APPEARING that “[i]f a default is entered against some defendants in a multi-party case,

the preferred practice is for the court to withhold granting default judgment until the action is
resolved on its merits against the non-defaulting defendants.” Animal Science Prods., Inc., 596 F.
$upp. 2d at $49; see also 1OA Charles A. Wright et al, Fed. Prac. & Proc.

§ 2690 (3d ed. 2015)

(when several defendants have closely related defenses “entry of judgment also should await an
adjudication of the liability of non[-]defaulting defendants”). This is because courts do not want

12(b)(6)); Budge v. Arrianna Holding Co., LLC, No. 13-56, 2014 WL 1705830, at *5 (D.N.J. Apr.
29, 2014) (“A court will deny a default judgment if the complaint fails to state a claim under the
motion to dismiss standard.”). The Court is not deciding this issue, whether Plaintiff has
sufficiently pled legitimate causes of action, at this time and this Order is not to be construed to
the contrary.

to “create the risk of potentially inconsistent judgments.” Eteam, Inc. v. Hilton Worldwide
Holdings, Inc., No. 15-5057 (WHW)(CLW), 2016 WL 54676, at *3 (D.N.J. Jan. 5, 2016) (denying
motion for default judgment where allegations against defaulting and non-defaulting defendants
were identical); and it further
APPEARING that Plaintiff seeks a default judgment for $90,000 of compensatory

damages, $90,000 of liquidated damages, and an additional, undetermined amount that includes
attorneys’ fees and civil penalties. See Proposed Order for Default Judgment, D.E. 109-6. How
Plaintiff arrived at the amount of her compensatory and liquidated damages, however, is not clear.
It does not appear that the amount was ascertained through mathematical calculations, and Plaintiff
fails to provide any documentary evidence to substantiate the amount. Before the Court enters
judgment against Ray, Plaintiff must provide competent evidence to support her allegations as to
damages. See, e.g., IBEW Local 35] Pension fttnd v. George Sparks, Inc., No. 14-2149, 2015

WL 778795, at *2 (D.N.J. Feb. 24, 2015) (denying motion for default judgment and ordering
plaintiff to submit “additional evidence in support of the calculation of damages”); Mancuso v.
Tyler Dane, LLC, No. 08-5311 (JHR), 2012 WL 1536210, at *3 (D.N.J. May 1,2012) (reserving
decision on damages “because Plaintiffs lack sufficient evidentiary support to justify their
damages); and it further
APPEARING that this matter involves multiple defendants. Default judgment has only

been requested as to Ray, and the remaining defendants appear to be actively litigating this case.
See, e.g. D.E. 113 (scheduling a settlement conference in June 2016). Moreover, it appears that

Ray is somehow affiliated with the litigating defendants because Plaintiff alleges that Ray was an
officer, director, member, owner, and/or shareholder of Defendants Hotel Executives Suites, Muer
Management, Inc., and/or Compsolutions. SAC

¶ 28.

Plaintiff also makes substantially similar

allegations as to all defendants. Consequently, even if Plaintiff had provided sufficient proof of
her damages, entering a default judgment at this time would not be prudent due to the risk of
potentially inconsistent judgments.

Plaintiff should wait and re-file her motion for default

judgment afier this matter is resolved on the merits; therefore
For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown
IT IS on this 26th day of May, 2016, hereby

ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion for Default Judgment as to Mayank Ray, D.E. 109, is
DENIED without prejudice.

John 4ichael Vazq9U.3.J.