BEJARANO v. RADISSON HOTELS INTERNATIONAL INC. et al

Filing 149

ORDER, that for purposes of entering this order, the Court directs the Clerk of the Court to reopen this matter; Plaintiff's 148 Motion for Default Judgment as to Mayank Ray is DENIED without prejudice; If plaintiff chooses to file a success ive motion for default judgment against Mayank Ray, she must (1) sufficiently indicate how she calculated the amount of damages sought; and (2) wait until this matter is resolved as to all other remaining defendants; and the Clerk of the Court shall close this matter; etc. Signed by Judge John Michael Vazquez on 06/01/2018. (sms)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CLAUDIA BEJARANO,

Plaint ff
V.

Civil Action No. 12-778 1

RADISSON HOTELS INTERNATIONAL
INC., etat.,

ORDER

Defendants.

John Michael Vazguez, U.S.D.J.
THIS MATTER comes before the Court by way of Plaintiff Claudia Bejarano’s
(“Plaintiff’) unopposed motion for default judgment as to Defendant Mayank Ray (“Defendant”),
D.E. 148; and it
APPEARING that even when a party is actually in default “the other side is not entitled
to the entry of default judgment as of right, and the entry of such a judgment is left primarily to
the discretion of the district court.” Sanchez v. Franzzano, No. 15-2316, 2016 WL 2892551, at *1
(D.N.J. May 12, 2016); and it further
APPEARING that in evaluating whether to enter default judgment pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 55(b), the court must determine whether (1) it has subject matterjurisdiction over the matter
and personal jurisdiction over the parties, (2) the parties have properly been served, (3) the
complaint sufficiently pleads a cause of action, and (4) the plaintiff has proven damages. Days

Inn Worldwide, Inc. v. Tulsipooja Hospitality, LLC, No. 15-5576, 2016 WL 2605989, at *2 (D.N.J.
May 6, 2016). The Court must also consider “(1) whether the party subject to default has a
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meritorious defense, (2) the prejudice suffered by the party seeking default, and (3) the culpability
of the party subject to default.” Animal Science Prods., Inc. v. China Nat ‘1 Metals & Minerals

Import & Export Corp., 596 F. Supp. 2d $42, $49 (D.N.J. 200$); and it further
APPEARING that the Court must accept all well-pleaded facts in the pleadings as true,
except as to damages. Chanel, Inc. v. Gordashevslc’, 55$ F. Supp. 2d 532, 53 5-36 (D.N.J. 2008);
see also Int’l Union of Operating Eng ‘rs ofE. Pa. & Del. Benefit Pension fund. v. N. Abbonizio

Contractors, Inc., 134 F. Supp. 3d 862, $65 (E.D. Pa. 2015). If damages are not mathematically
computable or liquidated, a plaintiff must prove the damages sought. A court has discretion to
hold a hearing to establish the plaintiffs damages or to rely on documentary evidence. See Rainey
v. Diamond State Port Corp., 354 F. App’x 722, 724 (3d Cir. 2009); Comdyne I, Inc. v. Corbin,

908 F.2d 1142, 1149 (3d Cir. 1990); Malik v. Hannah, 661 F. Supp. 2d 485, 490 (D.N.J. 2009);
and it further
APPEARING that “[i]f a default is entered against some defendants in a multi-party case,

the preferred practice is for the court to withhold granting default judgment until the action is
resolved on its merits against the non-defaulting defendants.” Animal Science Prods., Inc., 596 F.
Supp. 2d at 849; see also 1OA Charles A. Wright et al, Fed. Prac. & Proc.

§ 2690 (3d ed. 2015)

(when several defendants have closely related defenses “entry of judgment also should await an
adjudication of the liability of nondefaulting defendants”). This is because courts do not want to
“create the risk of potentially inconsistent judgments.” Eteam, Inc. v. Hilton Worldwide Holdings,
Inc., No. 15-5057 (WHW)(CLW), 2016 WL 54676, at *3 (D.N.J. Jan. 5, 2016) (denying motion
for default judgment where allegations against defaulting and nondefaulting defendants were
identical); and it further

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APPEARING that Plaintiff seeks a default judgment for $45,000 of compensatory

damages, $45,000 of liquidated damages, and an additional, undetermined amount that includes
attorneys’ fees and civil penalties. See Proposed Order for Default Judgment, D.E. 148-6. How
Plaintiff arrived at the amount of her compensatory and liquidated damages, however, is not clear.
It does not appear that the amount was ascertained through mathematical calculations, and Plaintiff
fails to provide any documentary evidence to substantiate the amount. While Plaintiff attaches a
substantial amount of information regarding her income during the term of her employment, such
information, on its face, does not explain the amount of damages sought. Before the Court enters
judgment against Ray, Plaintiff must provide evidence to support her allegations as to damages.
See, e.g., IBEWLoca1 351 Pension fitnd v. George Sparks,Inc., No. 14-2149, 2015 WL 778795,

at *2 (D.N.J. Feb. 24, 2015) (denying motion for default judgment and ordering plaintiff to submit
“additional evidence in support of the calculation of damages”); Mancuso v. Tyler Dane, LLC, No.
08-5311, 2012 WL 1536210, at *3 (D.N.J. May 1, 2012) (reserving decision on damages “because
Plaintiffs lack sufficient evidentiary support to justify their damages”). Moreover, the Court raised
this exact concern in addressing Plaintiffs prior motion for default judgment against Ray. See
May 26, 2016 Order (D.E. 114) (finding that Plaintiff seeks “a default judgment for $90,000 of
compensatory damages, $90,000 of liquidated damages” without explaining how she calculated
that amount); and it further
APPEARING that this matter involves multiple defendants. Yet, Plaintiff only requests

default judgment as to Ray, despite that Michele Melario and other unknown defendants (John
Does 1-5, and ABC Corporations 1-5) appear to remain defendants in this case. Critically, Plaintiff
alleges that Melario was her (Plaintiffs) supervisor at one/multiple of these companies, and it
appears that Melario allegedly denied Plaintiffs request for medical leave and then terminated her

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employment. Id.

¶

29.

Consequently, even if Plaintiff had provided sufficient proof of her

damages, entering a default judgment at this time would not be prudent due to the risk of potentially
inconsistent judgments. Plaintiff may re-file her motion for default judgment afier this matter is
resolved as to all other remaining defendants; therefore
For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown
IT IS on this 1st day of June, 2018, hereby
ORDERED that for purposes of entering this order, the Court directs the Clerk of the Court

to reopen this matter; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiffs motion for default judgment as to Mayank Ray, D.E. 14$, is
DENIED without prejudice; and it is further

ORDERED that if Plaintiff chooses to file a successive motion for default judgment
against Mayank Ray, she must (1) sufficiently indicate how she calculated the amount of damages
sought; and (2) wait until this matter is resolved as to all other remaining defendants; and it is
further
ORDERED the Clerk of the Court shall close this matter.

John l4ichae1 Vazqu,

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U1n.j.