THE PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA v. BRIMBERRY et al

Filing 45

OPINION. Signed by Magistrate Judge Joseph A. Dickson on 9/20/2012. (nr, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
THE PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE
COMPANY OF AMERICA,
Civil Action No. 13-0018 (CCC) (JAD)
Plaintiff,
OPINION

v.
P. KELLIE BRIMBERRY; FIDUCIARY
TRUST COMPANY INTERNATIONAL;
FIDUCIARY TRUST COMPANY
INTERNATIONAL OF CALIFORNIA;
and FRANKLIN TEMPLETON
COMPANIES, LLC,
Defendants.

JOSEPH A. DICKSON, U.S.M.J.
This matter comes before the Court upon Defendants Fiduciary Trust Comp y
International, Fiduciary Trust Company International of Florida and Franklin Temple n
Companies, LLC's (collectively, the "Entity Defendants") Motion to Transfer Venue Pursuant o
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).

(ECF No. 13).

Pursuant to Rule 78 of the Federal Rules of Ci il

Procedure, no oral argument was heard. Upon consideration of the parties' submissions, and

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the reasons stated below, the Entity Defendants' Motion is GRANTED and this matter will e
transferred to the United States District Court for the Central District of California. 1

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Defendant P Kellie C Brimberry has also filed a separate motion to transfer this matter to e
Central District of California. (ECF No. 18). As the Court has already decided to transfer t is
matter in the context of the Entity Defendants' motion, Defendant Brimberry's motion will e
denied as moot.

I.

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Kurt Brimberry, now deceased, was formerly an employee of Defendant Frank n

Templeton Companies, LLC. ("Franklin Templeton") (Am. Compl., ECF No. 29,

mf 7-8).

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virtue of his employment with Franklin Templeton, Mr. Brimberry was, at all times relevant n
this matter, eligible for coverage under a group life insurance policy, number G-50408-CA (t e
"Policy"), issued by Plaintiff Prudential Insurance Company of America ("Prudential"). (Id ,-r ).
The Policy provided Basic Term Life Coverage in the amount of $375,000 and Optional T
Life Coverage in the amount of $625,000. (Id. ,-r 12). The Policy also afforded Mr. Brimb
Basic Accidental Death Coverage, the amount of which is in dispute. (Compare ECF No. 32-1
9 (claiming that the Policy provided $375,000 in such coverage) with ECF No. 34 at 3
(contending that the accidental death benefit is actually $1,000,000)).
Mr. Brimberry died on August 29, 2012. (Am. Compl. ,-r 8). On September 25, 20

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Mr. Brimberry's widow, Defendant P. Kellie Brimberry ("Mrs. Brimberry"), submitted a cia
form to Prudential, along with a copy of Mr. Brimberry's death certificate. (Id. ,-r 17). Wh e
Prudential was investigating the cause and manner of Mr. Brimberry's death and, in turn,
extent of coverage under the Policy, counsel for Fiduciary Trust Company notified Pruden
that Fiduciary Trust Company was asserting a competing claim to any insurance benefits. (Id.
20-23). Specifically, Fiduciary Trust Company asserted that it was entitled to a constructive
over any Policy benefits because Mr. Brimberry allegedly misappropriated certain funds wh e
employed by Franklin Templeton. (Id ,-r 23).
On November 20, 2012, after review of the materials submitted by Mrs. Brimberry
Fiduciary Trust Company, Prudential notified Mrs. Brimberry of its intention to file
interpleader action regarding any benefits payable under the Policy. (Id. ,-r 26-27). On Decem

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7, 2012, Mrs. Brimberry filed an action against Prudential in the Superior Court of the State f
California, which Prudential later removed to the United States District Court for the Cent 1
District of California (the "California Action"). (Pl. Br., ECF No. 22, at 4). On January 2, 201 ,
Prudential commenced this interpleader action, seeking to deposit the Basic Term Life
Optional Term Life benefits under the Policy (a total of$1,000,000) in the Court, but remaini g
silent with regard to the Policy's Basic Accidental Death Coverage. (ECF No. 1). On March ,
2013, Prudential filed an Amended Interpleader Complaint seeking, among other things, o
include the Policy's Basic Accidental Death Coverage (which Prudential claims totals $375,0
in its deposit to the Court. (ECF No. 29). Prudential also filed motions seeking interplea
relief in connection with each of its pleadings in this matter. (ECF Nos. 11 and 32). Th e
motions are currently pending.
On February 8, 2013, Fiduciary Trust Company filed the instant motion to transfer.
No. 13). The parties have advised that, after this motion was fully briefed, the United Sta s
District Court for the Central District of California dismissed the California Action, pursuant o
the comity doctrine, in favor of this case. (ECF Nos. 37, 39).
II.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

The Entity Defendants ask the Court to transfer this action to the United States Dist
Court for the Central District of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The decision
whether to transfer a case is committed to the trial court's sound discretion. Cada ult Gra
Sys. v. Tektronix. Inc., 98 F. Supp. 2d 560, 564 (D.N.J. 2000); Da s Inns Worldwide Inc.
RAM Lodging, LLC, No. 09-2275, 2010 WL 1540926, at *2 (D.N.J. April 14, 2010). Pursu
to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), the Court may transfer a case to any venue where it may have be n
brought "[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice." 28 U.S.C §
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1404(a). "The purpose of§ 1404(a) is to avoid the waste of time, energy and money and, in
addition, to safeguard litigants, witnesses, and the public against avoidable inconvenience
expense." Rappoport v. Steven Spielberg, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 481, 497 (D.N.J. 1998).
In determining whether to transfer a matter pursuant to § 1404(a), a court must consid

( 1) the convenience of the parties, (2) the convenience of the witnesses, and (3) the interests
justice. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit also requires that co
examine various private and public interests:
The private interests have included: plaintiff's forum preference as
manifested in the original choice; the defendant's preference;
whether the claim arose elsewhere; the convenience of the parties
as indicated by their relative physical and financial condition; the
convenience of the witnesses-but only to the extent that the
witnesses may actually be unavailable for trial in one of the fora;
and the location of books and records (similarly limited to the
extent that the files could not be produced in the alternative
forum).
The public interests have included: the enforceability of the
judgment; practical considerations that could make the trial easy,
expeditious, or inexpensive; the relative administrative difficulty in
the two fora resulting from court congestion; the local interest in
deciding local controversies at home; the public policies of the
fora; and the familiarity of the trial judge with the applicable state
law in diversity cases.
Johnson v. RiteAid, No. 10-2012, 2011 WL 2580375, at *2-3 (D.N.J. June 28, 2011) (cif g
Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 879-80 (3d Cir. 1995)).
The Court must, therefore, engage in a two part analysis to determine whether any mof n
to transfer venue should be granted. As a threshold matter, the Court must decide whether
transferee district has proper jurisdiction and venue, such that the case could have been brou t
in the transferee district in the first instance. Lawrence v. Xerox Corp., 56 F. Supp. 2d 442,
(D.N.J. 1999). The Court must then conduct an "individualized, case-by-case consideration f

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convenience and fairness" regarding which forum is most appropriate to consider the case.

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"There is no rigid rule governing a court's determination; 'each case turns on its facts."'

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(citing Lacey v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 862 F.2d 38, 43 (3d Cir. 1988) (internal citations omitted ).
The Court is also mindful of the Third Circuit's admonition against any court considering t e
merits of a case during the pendency of a transfer application. McDonnell Douglas Coro. v.
Polin, 429 F.2d 30 (3d Cir. 1970) ("Judicial economy requires that another district court shm d
not burden itself with the merits of the action until it is decided that a transfer should be effect d
and such consideration additionally requires that the court which ultimately decides the merits pf
the action should also decide the various questions which arise during the pendency of the s it
instead of considering it in two courts.")

a.

Prudential Could Have Filed This Action in the Central District of Califor11 a

The Entity Defendants contend that Prudential could have filed this interpleader action n
the United States District Court for the Central District of California. (ECF No. 13-1 at ).
Prudential does not challenge this point. Indeed, the Court finds that venue would be appropri e
in the Central District of California pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2).
Prudential brought this interpleader action in federal court pursuant to Section 502(a)l

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of ERISA, which permits a fiduciary such as Prudential to seek, among other things, "ott er
appropriate equitable relief." 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3). The Third Circuit has recognized that Ul
interpleader action seeking "to enforce the provisions of ERISA and the plan by ensuring tl ~t
funds are disbursed to the proper beneficiary" qualifies as "other appropriate equitable reli~ P•
and is therefore a valid claim under Section 502(a)(3). Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Price, 501 F. d
271, 277 (3d Cir. 2007). 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2) provides, in part, that such a claim "may e
brought in the district where the plan is administered, where the breach took place, or when a

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defendant resides or may be found." Here, the record reflects that Defendants Mrs. Brimbe
and Fiduciary Trust International of California both reside in Los Angeles County, which is
within the Central District of California. (See ECF No. 13-1 at 4). Prudential could ha e,
therefore, originally filed its interpleader claim in that District. The Court must now exam e
whether the § 1404(a) factors, as well as the relevant private and public interest factors set fo
in Jumara, weigh in favor of transfer.
b.

On Balance, the§ 1404(a) and Jumara Factors Weigh in Favor of Transfer

As an initial matter, the Court must address the fact that, in analyzing the propriety o a
transfer under § 1404(a), the parties have each focused on different stages of this interplea er
litigation.

Specifically, Prudential focuses its analysis exclusively on the "first stage" (i .,

whether Prudential should be permitted to pay certain funds into the Court in exchange fo a
release of its liability under the Policy), (see Pl. Br., ECF No. 22, at 10-13), while Fiduci
Trust Company focuses on the "second stage" (i.e., the dispute between Mrs. Brimberry
Fiduciary Trust Company over entitlement to the Policy benefits). (See Def. Br., ECF No. 1
at 3-8). Neither of those stages occurs in a vacuum and neither party has submitted any case 1 w
suggesting that the Court may, let alone must, focus on only one stage of the case w n
conducting a §1404(a) analysis. The Court declines to do so and will instead consider
entirety of this action in determining the propriety of a transfer.
i.

The Convenience of the Parties

The parties' views regarding their relative convenience are diametrically oppos d.
Prudential is a New Jersey corporation with its principal place of business in Newark, N w
Jersey. (Am. Compl. -,rt). Three of the four defendants are located in California. (Id. -,r-,r 2- ).
While Defendant Fiduciary Trust Company International is based in New York, (id. -,r3),

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record reflects that "it is the indirect parent company of [California-based] Fiduciary T
International of California and uses that entity's Los Angeles office as a representative offi "
(Def. Br., ECF No. 13-1, at 4, n.2).
The Entity Defendants contend that, because nearly all of the parties, witnesses
evidence connected to the underlying dispute over the Policy proceeds (i.e., the second stage f
this interpleader matter) are located in California, it would be more convenient for them o
litigate the case in the Central District of California. (Id. at 3-4). Focusing on the first stage f
this litigation, Prudential contends, in part, that the only information relevant to that issue ·s
located in New Jersey and, therefore, the Court should reject any convenience argum

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regarding Mrs. Brimberry's and Fiduciary Trust Company's competing claims. (Pl. Br., ECF

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22, at 10-11 ). While, at first blush, this factor appears to be neutral, the Court finds that it
actually favors transfer. Specifically, Prudential itself has argued that the first stage oft s
interpleader litigation "can be decided by the Court on Prudential's motion[s]," which
currently pending and fully briefed. (Id. at 12). Prudential has also acknowledged that "a
on [the first stage] is more than likely not necessary." (Id.).

In short, it is not clear t

Prudential will have to do anything else with regard to its pending application for interplea
relief. Conversely, Defendants will have to take discovery and actively litigate the competi g
claims to the proceeds of the Policy. The Court therefore finds that "convenience of the parti "
factor weighs rather heavily in favor of transfer.
ii.

The Convenience of Potential Witnesses

In addition to balancing the relative convenience of the parties, courts conductio a
§1404(a) analysis must consider "the convenience of the witnesses-- but only to the extent t t
the witnesses may actually be unavailable for trial in one of the fora." Jumara, 55 F.3d at 8

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Here, both this District and the Central District of California would be able to compel the part s
and, as applicable, their employee witnesses, to appear for trial. Moreover, nothing in the rec
suggests that either Prudential or the Entity Defendants would be unable to produce th ir
representatives for trial in either New Jersey or California.
This Court is concerned, however, about the availability of non-party witnesses.

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noted above, the bulk of this litigation will focus on the dispute between Mrs. Brimberry
Fiduciary Trust Company over the Policy benefits. The facts relevant to that dispute occurred ·n
California, and any non-party witnesses are likely to reside there. Any such witnesses wo d
therefore be outside of this Court's subpoena power and the Court would be unable to com el
them to appear for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(3).
It does not appear that the Central District of California would face a similar dil

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with regard to Prudential's applications for interpleader relief, despite the fact that th e
individuals with knowledge of Prudential's administration of the Policy are located in N w
Jersey. (Pl. Br., ECF No. 22, at 11). In its candor with the Court, Prudential recognized that i is
unlikely that any court will need to conduct a trial on those applications. (Id. at 12). The Co
agrees. Even if a trial did become necessary, it is unclear how a non-party fact witness co
offer relevant testimony regarding Prudential's rights and obligations under the Policy.
Court therefore finds that this factor weighs in favor of transfer.
iii.

Location of Documents

The Court must also consider the location of the relevant books and documents, to

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extent that those materials may be unavailable in one fora or the other. Jumara, 55 F.3d at 8 9.
Here, nothing in the record suggests that the relevant evidentiary materials would be unavaila le

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in either New Jersey or California. This factor, therefore, remains neutral to the Court's §
1404(a) analysis.
iv.

The Claims at Issue In This Case Arose in California

The Court must next examine where the claims at issue in this case "arose." Jumara, 5
F.3d at 879. Prudential contends that "since all claims made under the [Policy], including t e
claims asserted in this action, are administered and handled in New Jersey, the claim arose n
New Jersey, not California." (Pl. Br., ECF No. 22, at 10). The Entity Defendants, in contr
argue that, because the events underlying Mrs. Brimberry's and Fiduciary Trust Compan s
competing claims to the Policy benefits occurred in California, the claims at issue in this c e
arose in that state. (Def. Br., ECF No. 13-1, at 3-4). The Court finds that the Entity Defend
have the better argument. Specifically, Prudential would not have had any grounds to commen e
an interpleader claim if not for the Brimberry/Fiduciary Trust Company dispute, which cle
arose in California.

This case has no connection to New Jersey, other than the fact t t

Prudential performed its administrative functions here. As the claims at issue in this case ar e
in California, this factor therefore weighs in favor of transfer.
v.

Prudential's Choice of Forum

The Court must also consider "plaintiffs forum preference as manifested in the origi 1
choice." Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879. Here, Prudential opted to commence this interpleader action n
the District ofNew Jersey, where it is incorporated and has its principal place ofbusiness.
this factor weighs against transfer, the weight accorded to Prudential's choice of forum
mitigated where, as here, the facts central to the lawsuit occurred elsewhere. In re Consolida
Parlodel Litig., 22 F. Supp. 2d 320, 323-24 (D.N.J. 1998) ("The plaintiff's interest decrea s

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even further where 'the central facts of a lawsuit occur outside the chosen forum."') (int

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citations omitted).

vi.

The Entity Defendants' Choice of Forum

The Court must next examine the movants' preferred choice of forum. Jumara, 55 F. d
at 879. Here, the Entity Defendants would prefer to litigate this case in the Central District f
California. This factor therefore weighs in favor of transfer.

vii.

The "Public Interest" Factors

In Jumara, the Third Circuit recognized six "public interest" factors germane to a trans
analysis. Id. at 879-80. The Court will address each in turn.
The first "public interest" factor concerns whether the parties would have difficu y
enforcing a judgment in either of the fora.

Id. at 879.

As neither party has raised

enforceability issue, the Court finds that this factor is neutral to the analysis.
The second public interest factor requires the Court to examine "practical considerati

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that could make the trial easy, expeditious, or inexpensive." Id. As set forth above, the Co
believes that the central dispute in this case is Mrs. Brimberry's and Fiduciary Trust Compan
competing claims to the Policy proceeds. Most, if not all, of the witnesses and evidence rela
to that dispute are located in California. Moreover, as Prudential recognizes, it is not likely t
any court will need to conduct a trial on Prudential's applications for interpleader relief. (Pl.
ECF No. 22, at 12). The Court is not, therefore, concerned that Prudential may have to prod

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witnesses and documents for a trial in California. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds th
would be both easier and less expensive for the parties to conduct any trial in this matter in
California, and that this factor therefore weighs in favor of transfer.

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The third public interest factor pertains to "the relative administrative difficulty in t e
two fora resulting from court congestion." Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879. Only the Entity Defend
have addressed the congestion issue, arguing that "[a]ccording to recent statistics, it takes ne
twice as long for a case to reach final disposition in the District ofNew Jersey as in the Cen
District of California." (Def. Br., ECF No. 13-1, at 7). Prudential simply argues that it would e
inexpedient to re-file its interpleader applications in the Central District of California. (Pl.
ECF No. 22 at 12). There is no indication, however, that Prudential would have to do
Rather, if transferred, this matter would proceed "as-is" in the Central District of Californ
Based on the limited information submitted by the parties, the Court finds that this factor a o
favors transfer.
The fourth and fifth public interest factors concern each fora's "local interest"
applicable public policies. Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879. Neither party has identified any pub 'c
policies relevant to this litigation.

Moreover, the Court finds that both New Jersey

California have the same competing "local interest" regarding the affairs of their citizens
resident corporations. This factor is, therefore, neutral to the Court's analysis.
The sixth and final public interest factor requires the Court to examine "the familiarity
the trial judge with the applicable state law in diversity cases." Id. at 879-80. As an init
matter, this is not a "diversity case". Rather, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction beca e
Prudential's claim arises under Section 502(a)(3) of ERISA. To the extent that California 1
would apply to the underlying dispute between Mrs. Brimberry and Fiduciary Trust Comp
this Court is confident in the District Judge's ability to interpret and apply it.
this factor to be neutral in its analysis.

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III.

CONCLUSION

Taking the foregoing findings into consideration, this Court concludes that the Ent y
Defendants have met their burden in demonstrating that a transfer is appropriate under 28 U.S.
§1404(a).

Their motion, (ECF No. 13), will therefore be granted and this matter will

transferred to the United States District Court for the Central District of California. Defendant
Kellie Brimberry's separate motion to transfer, (ECF No. 18), will be denied as moot.

cc: Hon. Claire C. Cecchi, U.S.D.J.

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