FERGUSON v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Filing
15
OPINION. Signed by Judge William H. Walls on 10/18/2016. (JB, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
AL-KHALIQ SANTANA FERGUSON,
HONORABLE WILLIAM H.
WALLS
Petitioner,
Civil Action
No. 13—0845 (WHW)
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
OPINION
Respondent.
APPEARANCES:
AL-KHALIQ SANTANA FERGUSON,
#62983—050
US? Beaumont
P.O. Box 26030
Beaumont, Texas 77720
Petitioner pro se
DARA AQUILA GOVAN, Esq.
OFFICE OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
970 Broad Street
Suite 700
Newark, New Jersey 07102
WALLS,
I.
Senior District Judge:
INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is Petitioner A1-Khaliq Santana Ferguson’s
(“Petitioner”)
Motion to Vacate,
sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
reasons stated herein,
Correct,
§ 2255.
or Set Aside his
Docket Entry 1.
the motion is denied.
appealability will issue.
For the
No certificate of
II.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner was arrested on August 20,
2010 in Newark,
New
Jersey after police officers responded to complaints of a group
of men engaging in “open-air drug sales.” Pre-Sentence Report
f”PSR”)
¶ 6.
Upon the officers’
arrival,
Petitioner attempted to
leave the area by walking away from the other men.
of leaving the scene,
In the course
he removed a black backpack from his neck,
placed it on a nearby fence,
Id.
pocket onto the ground.
and dropped items from his pants
The items were recovered after the
officers detained Petitioner. A handgun was found in the black
bag,
and the items dropped onto the ground were later determined
to be nine glassine envelopes containing heroin.
Id.
¶T 7—8. A
federal grand jury indicted Petitioner on a charge of unlawful
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon,
922 (g) (1)
.
Indictment,
(D.N.J. Nov.
29,
United States v.
18 U.S.C.
Ferguson,
No.
§
10—cr—821
2010)
Petitioner thereafter entered into a plea agreement with
the United States.
Plea Agreement,
Respondent’s Exhibit B.
The
plea agreement contained a provision waiving “the right to file
any appeal,
any collateral attack,
or any other writ or motion,
including but not limited to an appeal under 18 U.S.C.
a motion under 28 U.S.C.
§ 3742 or
which challenges the sentence
§ 2255,
imposed by the sentencing court if that sentence falls within or
below the Guidelines range that results from the agreed total
2
Guidelines offense level of 21.” Id.
at 7.
Petitioner signed the
agreement and acknowledged that trial counsel had reviewed the
agreement with him,
the agreement,
he understood the terms and conditions of
and that he wanted to plead guilty in accordance
with the agreement’s terms.
Id.
at 5.
The Court conducted a change of plea hearing on August 10,
2011. After Petitioner was sworn,
the following colloquy took
place:
COURT:
Mr. Ferguson, have you had any medication
or drugs of any kind in the last 48 hours?
PETITIONER:
Yes.
COURT:
Have they affected your ability to think
clearly?
PETITIONER:
No.
COURT:
And are you able to think clearly at this time?
PETITIONER:
Yes.
COURT:
May I
had?
PETITIONER:
Psych medicines.
COURT:
What does that do?
PETITIONER:
Relaxing,
COURT:
I’m sorry?
PETITIONER:
I’m relaxed and controlled.
Plea Transcript,
ask
what
type
of
medication
you
control.
Respondent’s Exhibit C at 2:16 to 3:5.
The
Court then questioned Petitioner as to his education and work
3
history,
and Petitioner gave relevant,
at 3:6 to 4:10.
coherent responses.
Id.
Based on its observations and listening to
Petitioner’s responses and manner of speaking,
the Court was
satisfied that Petitioner was “someone who’s able,
intellectually,
to understand what’s going on
•“
.
.
Id.
at
4:17-20. The Court then proceeded to explain the rights that
Petitioner would be waiving and the maximum sentence to which he
was exposed as a result of his plea,
and Petitioner indicated he
understood the Court’s explanation and still wished to plead
guilty.
Id.
at 4:21 to 7:2.
Having explained to Petitioner the consequences of entering
a guilty plea,
the Court next discussed the plea agreement and
its appellate waiver provision:
COURT:
Has Mr. Carlucci worked out a plea
deal on your behalf with the Government?
PETITIONER:
Yes.
COURT:
All right.
Has he done
knowledge and consent?
PETITIONER:
Yes,
COURT:
Now,
as
a matter of
fact
the
next
paragraph, 7, circumstances where you are
giving them what we call, a defendant,
unrestricted
or
unlimited
right
of
appeal. Normally, Mr. Ferguson, when a
person is sentenced by a Judge,
that
person has a right to challenge the
sentence by making appeal to a higher
court. In this case the Circuit Court of
[]
so
with
your
sir.
4
Appeals
coming back before
the
same
judge, argue if the sentence was wrong,
incorrect, should be modified, correct,
or even thrown out, and that’s what we
call nonrestricted right of appeal. He
can argue that before the circuit court.
He can argue that to file motions or writ
of habeas corpus,
sentence is wrong.
You’re giving up that unrestricted right
of appeal. You’re saying in paragraph 7,
provided you
you’re giving up any
attempt to appeal such a sentence. Do you
understand that?
—
PETITIONER:
COURT:
And you know what you’re doing?
PETITIONER:
Yes.
COURT:
Do you need time to think it over?
PETITIONER:
Id.
Yes.
No.
at 7:11-16,
agreement,
12:7-25. After completing a review of the plea
the Court asked Petitioner if anyone had threatened
him or had made him any other promises in order to induce to him
plead guilty,
and he answered “no” to both questions.
Id.
at
14:21 to 15:2.
Trial counsel informed the Court he was satisfied with the
colloquy and revisited the subject of Petitioner’s medications,
noting:
“I would just add that he has been diagnosed as
schizophrenic.
He is taking medication,
medication for many years.
to proceed.” Id.
and he has taken
I have no doubt as to his competence
at 15:8-11.
The Court proceeded to elicit a
factual basis and thereafter accepted the guilty plea.
5
Petitioner indicated he was satisfied with his counsel’s
representation and had no further questions about his plea
agreement.
Id.
at 18:13-25.
Petitioner next appeared before the
Court for sentencing on November 15,
2011.
He was sentenced to a
term of 80-months imprisonment followed by 3—years of supervised
release.
Judgment of Conviction,
Respondent’s Exhibit E.
He
thereafter filed a notice of appeal in the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit.
Cir.
filed Nov.
On March 2,
20,
United States v.
Ferguson,
No.
11—4433
(3d
2011)
2012,
the United States moved to dismiss the
appeal based on the appellate waiver provision of the plea
agreement.
In response,
Petitioner filed a motion for a
diminished capacity hearing,
arguing that the sentencing court
erred by accepting his guilty plea as it was “made without the
requisite intelligence and also voluntariness.
Likewise with
sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences.” Motion for Diminished Capacity Hearing,
Respondent’s Exhibit G.
“Defendant in this motion,
argues since
the District Court was provided information by the Defendant at
the Rule 11 hearing that he had recently taken antipsychotics
and anti-depressant drugs,
and that the Court failed to inquire
further or even acknowledge that it was aware of this evidence.”
Id.
at 2.
The Court of Appeals granted the United States’ motion
to dismiss the appeal based on the waiver provision and denied
6
Petitioner’s motion for a diminished capacity hearing on May 25,
2012.
Order Dismissing Appeal,
Respondent’s Exhibit H.
Petitioner thereafter filed this § 2255 motion raising
three grounds for relief:’
(1)
trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to “suppress evidence and also failure to investigate
mitigating factors”;
(2)
his guilty plea was involuntary as he
was under the influence of drugs at the time of his plea;
(3)
and
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a
mental health evaluation.
The Court advised Petitioner of his rights and consequences
of filing a § 2255 motion pursuant to United States v. Miller,
197 F.3d 644
(3d Cir.
1999),
and ordered him to advise the Court
within 45 days as whether he wanted to proceed with his motion
as filed or withdraw his petition and file a new petition
subject to the one year statute of limitations. Miller Order,
Docket Entry 4. As Petitioner did not respond to the Miller
Order,
the Court reviewed the petition as filed and ordered
Respondent to answer.
answer on May 22,
Docket Entry 5.
2013,
Respondent filed its
Docket Entry 7,
and Petitioner submitted
a two-part traverse on July 28,
2014 after being granted an
extension of time by the Court,
Docket Entries 12 and 13.
‘
The motion lists four grounds for relief; however, Grounds One
and Two both allege trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
investigate and present mitigating factors at sentencing. Motion
¶ 12(a)—(b).
7
III.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Section 2255 provides in relevant part that:
prisoner in custody under sentence of a court
[a]
established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be
released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed
in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United
may move the court which imposed the sentence
States
to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
...
28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(a).
Petitioner brings this motion as a pro se litigant. A pro
se pleading is held to less stringent standards than more formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.
106
(1976);
Haines v.
Kerner,
Estelle v.
404 U.S.
429 U.S.
Gamble,
519,
520
(1972)
.
97,
A pro se
habeas petition and any supporting submissions must be construed
liberally and with a measure of tolerance.
151 F.3d 116,
118
F.2d 714,
721—22
F.2d 552,
555
IV.
(3d Cir.
(3d Cir.
(3d Cir.
1998);
cert.
denied,
Hahn,
878
Attorney General,
United States v.
1989);
1969),
Lewis v.
See Royce v.
Brierley,
399 U.S.
912
414
(1970)
ANALYSIS
Respondent argues the motion should be dismissed as
Petitioner waived his right to appeal and collaterally attack
his sentence in his plea agreement.
Petitioner responds his plea
was not knowingly and voluntarily entered, making his appellate
waiver invalid. After reviewing the submissions of the parties
and the record of the Rule 11 hearing,
8
the Court finds that the
claims raised by Petitioner do not fall within the waiver
provision of the plea agreement.
Section 2255 requires a district court to conduct an
evidentiary hearing on the claims “[u]nless the motion and the
files and records of the case conclusively show that the
prisoner is entitled to no relief
.
.
.
.“
28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(5).
The court finds that no evidentiary hearing is warranted as the
record conclusively demonstrates Petitioner is not entitled to
relief.
The motion will therefore be denied and dismissed with
prejudice.
A. Waiver of Appellate and Collateral Attack Rights
“Criminal defendants may waive both constitutional and
statutory rights,
provided they do so voluntarily and with
knowledge of the nature and consequences of the waiver.
The
right to appeal in a criminal case is among those rights that
may be waived.” United States v. Mabry,
Cir.
2008),
cert.
denied,
557 U.s.
903
536 F.3d 231,
(2009).
236
(3d
“[W]aivers of
appeals should be strictly construed” and “if entered into
knowingly and voluntarily,
273 F.3d 557,
562
(3d cir.
are valid.” United States v. Khattak,
2001)
.
As Respondent argues the
motion should be dismissed under the waiver in the plea
agreement,
the court will not review the merits if:
“(1)
the
issues raised fall within the scope of the appellate waiver;
(2)
[Petitioner]
knowingly and voluntarily agreed to the
9
and
appellate waiver; unless
(3)
enforcing the waiver would
miscarriage of justice.’” United States v.
225
(3d Cir.
125,
128—19
2014)
Erwin,
(quoting United States v.
(3d Cir.
2014)),
cert.
765 F.3d 219,
Grimes,
136 S.
denied,
‘work a
739 F.3d
Ct.
400
(2015)
Petitioner waived his right to file an appeal or collateral
attack motion “including but not limited to an appeal under 18
U.S.C.
§ 3742 or a motion under 28 U.S.C.
Agreement at 3.
that waiver,
§ 2255.” Plea
Schedule A of the plea agreement expanded on
noting that he agreed to waive
the right to file any appeal, any collateral attack, or
any other writ or motion, including but not limited to
an appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 or a motion under 28
U.S.C. § 2255, which challenges the sentence imposed by
the sentencing court if that sentence falls within or
below the Guidelines range that results from the agreed
total Guidelines offense level of 21.
.
Both parties reserve the right to oppose or move to
dismiss any appeal, collateral attack, writ, or motion
barred by the preceding paragraph and to file
any
appeal, collateral attack, writ, or motion, not barred
by the preceding paragraph.
.
Schedule A ¶ 7—8
.
.
(emphasis added)
The plain language of the plea agreement limits the
waiver provision to challenges to the sentence imposed by
the court if that sentence was within a specified Guideline
range.
Petitioner’s motion does not challenge his sentence:
he challenges the voluntariness of the plea itself and the
performance of his attorney.
These claims do not fall
10
within the scope of his appellate waiver.
The Court will
therefore proceed to the merits of the motion.
B.
Knowing and Voluntary Guilty Plea
Petitioner argues he did not knowingly and voluntarily
enter his guilty plea because he was under the influence of
medication at the time and that the Court failed to sufficiently
inquire into the effect of the medications.
A district court may not accept a guilty plea until it has
personally addressed the defendant “and determine[d]
plea is voluntary and did not result from force,
promises
Crim.
threats,
(other than promises in a plea agreement)
Pro.
11(b) (2).
that the
.“
Fed.
or
R.
“[I]ngestion of drugs is one of the
circumstances relevant to whether a plea was knowing and
voluntary.” United States v.
Cir.
2011)
Tuso,
433 F. App’x 120,
123
(3d
(internal quotation marks omitted)
“Rule 11 counsels a district court to make further inquiry
into a defendant’s competence to enter a guilty plea once the
court has been informed that the defendant has recently ingested
drugs or other substances capable of impairing his ability to
make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his constitutional
rights.” United States v.
Cole 813 F.2d 43,
46
(3d Cir.
“Cole makes clear that some inquiry is necessary,
little guidance’
about the
‘sufficiency’
11
but
1987)
‘provides
of such an inquiry.”
Tuso,
433 F.
F.3d 185,
App’x at 123
194
(3d Cir.
(quoting United States v.
Lassner,
498
2007)).
The following colloquy took place immediately after
Petitioner was sworn-in at the change of plea hearing:
COURT:
Mr. Ferguson, have you had any medication
or drugs of any kind in the last 48 hours?
PETITIONER:
Yes.
COURT:
Have they affected your ability to think
clearly?
PETITIONER:
No.
COURT:
And are you able to think clearly at this
time?
PETITIONER:
Yes.
COURT:
May I
had?
PETITIONER:
Psych medicines.
COURT:
What does that do?
PETITIONER:
Relaxing,
COURT:
I’m sorry?
PETITIONER:
I’m relaxed and controlled.
ask
what
type
of
Based on Petitioner’s answers
and the Court’s observations of his behavior,
going on
.
.
.
.“
Id.
you
control.
Plea Transcript at 2:16 to 3:—5.
concluded he was “able,
medication
intellectually,
at 4:17-20.
the Court
to understand what’s
Trial counsel later indicted
Petitioner had been taking these medications for several years
12
and had no negative effect on Petitioner’s ability to comprehend
the proceedings.
are
you
All
right.
satisfied?
TRIAL COUNSEL:
Yes, your Honor, I am satisfied, and I
would add, when you asked Mr. Ferguson
about his medication.
COURT:
Yes.
TRIAL COUNSEL:
he
has
been
I
would
just
add that
taking
diagnosed as schizophrenic. He is
medication, and he has taken medication
for many years. I have no doubt as to his
competence to proceed.
COURT:
Id.
Mr.
Carlucci,
COURT:
All right.
Thank you.
at 15:3—12.
Petitioner concedes the Court asked about his medications,
but relies on United States v.
Parra-Ibanez to argue the Court
“did not probe deeply enough.” Traverse Part 1 at 11
United States v.
that case,
Parra-Ibanez,
936 F.2d 588
(1st Cir.
(citing
1991)).
the First Circuit held that the trial court’s failure
to inquire into the dosages of the medications taken by
defendant and “what effects,
if any,
such medications might be
likely to have on Parra’s clear—headedness” violated Rule 11.
Parra-Ibanez,
936 F.2d at 596.
As demonstrated by two post-Cole Third Circuit opinions,
Parra—Ibanez is distinguishable from Petitioner’s case.
Lessner,
In
the district court asked about the medications
13
In
defendant was taking and “whether the medications she had taken
that morning affected her ability to understand the proceedings,
and posed several follow-up questions to elicit further
information.
It also inquired whether Lessner was presently
under the influence of any other medications or controlled
substances.” 498 F.3d at 194.
“put[]
[her]
She explained the medication
in perspective” and “calm[ed her]
could “deal with the circumstances.” Id.
Defendant argued,
down” so she
at 193.
as Petitioner does here,
that the
district court “‘made only a limited and superficial inquiry’
into the medications that she was taking while failing to
ascertain their dosages or whether she had taken any of them
‘the prior day,
Circuit,
week or month.’” Id.
however,
at 193—94.
The Third
distinguished Parra-Ibanez by noting that the
trial court in that case had “fail[ed]
to inquire whether any of
the medications impaired the defendant’s ability to understand
the implications of his guilty plea.” Id.
at 195.
In contrast,
the Lessner district court had “sufficiently discharged its duty
under Rule 11 to inquire into Lessner’s capacity to enter a
knowing and voluntary plea” as it “ascertained that she was only
under the influence of two Ativans at the time of the hearing,
and that that medication did not impair her ability to
understand the proceedings.” 498 F.3d at 195—96.
“Lessner
clearly demonstrated her understanding of the proceedings
14
throughout the hearing,
to the satisfaction of both the Court
and defense counsel.” Id.
at 196.
Likewise,
the Third Circuit
upheld a plea as knowing and voluntary when the district court
“directly asked
interfere with
[defendant]
[her]
whether her medications
ability to understand and perceive events.’
She responded that they do not.” United States v.
App’x 120,
123-24
‘in any way
(3d Cir.
2011)
Tuso,
433 F.
(citing Lessner)
Petitioner’s case is more like Lessner and Tuso than Parra
Ibanez.
Upon learning that Petitioner had taken medication
within the past 48 hours,
medications “affected
the Court explicitly asked if the
[his]
ability to think clearly,” to which
Petitioner unambiguously answered “No.” Plea Transcript at 2:1920—21.
The Court then asked if he was able to think clearly at
that time,
and Petitioner responded “Yes.” Id.
at 2:22—24.
The
Court then specifically inquired into to the type of medications
he had taken and their effects,
and Petitioner responded he took
“Psych medicines” that made him “relaxed and controlled.”
at 2:25 to 3:5.
Petitioner was then asked questions about his
history and education and provided clear,
at 3:6 to 4:10.
Id.
coherent answers.
Id.
His allegations “that his answers during the
plea colloquy show that he was so incoherent that the court
should have postponed the proceedings sua sponte and ordered a
psychiatric review.
Despite having taken prescription medication
that morning,” Traverse Part 1 at 10,
15
are conclusively
contradicted by the record and the Court’s observations of the
proceedings.
Trial counsel also informed the Court that
Petitioner had been taking the medications for a long time in
order to treat his schizophrenia.
He then affirmatively
represented to the Court there was “no doubt as to
[Petitioner’s]
1.
competence to proceed.” Plea Transcript at 15:10
The Court reviewed the appellate and collateral attack waiver
provision of the plea agreement with Petitioner,
and Petitioner
acknowledged he understood the provision after declining the
Court’s offer to provide him more time to consider it.
Plea
Transcript at 12:7-25.
In light of the Court’s observation of Petitioner during
the proceedings,
Petitioner’s answers to the Court’s questions,
and counsel’s representation to the Court,
the Court concludes
there is no question that Petitioner was competent to plead
guilty.
at *2
See United States v.
(3d Cir. Mar.
10,
Tann,
2016)
No.
14—4504,
2016 WL 909264,
(upholding plea as voluntary based
on defendant’s responsive answers to trial court’s questions,
statements and conduct during the guilty plea hearing,
and
counsel’s representation as to competence);
see also United
States v.
2003)
Jones, 336 F.3d 245,
256
(3d Cir.
(noting
district court’s may consider an attorney’s affirmative
representation about client’s competency)
16
.
The record
conclusively demonstrates Petitioner’s plea was knowing,
intelligent,
C.
and voluntary.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Petitioner raises three ineffective assistance of counsel
claims aside from the issue of the voluntariness of the plea,
which the Court has already determined.
governed by the Strickland standard.
These claims are
Petitioner must first “show
that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness.” Strickland v.
(1984)
.
Washington,
466 U.s.
668,
He must then show “a reasonable probability that,
for counsel’s unprofessional errors,
688
but
the result of the
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.” Id.
1.
at 694.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel for failure to file a
Motion to Suppress
Petitioner asserts without explanation that trial counsel
was ineffective for failure to file a motion to suppress.
Although Respondent correctly notes that Petitioner does not
specifically state what evidence should have been suppressed,
it
is not unreasonable to infer that he is referring to the seized
firearm.
Petitioner also does not state on what grounds the
firearm should have been suppressed.
In any event,
given that
the firearm was discarded and abandoned by Petitioner in his
17
attempt to evade the police and before he was seized,
Transcript at 15:15 to 16:17;
PSR ¶[ 6—8,
Court would have granted such a motion.
D.,
199,
621
499 U.s.
203—04
(1991);
(3d Cir.
It is unlikely the
See California v.
United States v.
2011)
(“[B]ecause
see Plea
Thomas,
Hodari
423 F. App’x
[defendant]
dropped the
duffel bag and walked away from it before he was stopped by the
detectives,
was
he is foreclosed from arguing that the abandonment
‘precipitated by an unlawful seizure,’
exclusion”)
(3d Cir.
(quoting United States v.
thus mandating its
Coggins,
986 F.2d 651,
653
1993)
As Petitioner cannot establish he was prejudiced by
counsel’s failure to file a motion to suppress,
assistance of counsel claim fails.
F.3d 308,
315
(3d Cir.
2002)
.
his ineffective
United States v.
Cross,
308
(noting courts should address the
Strickland prejudice prong first where it is dispositive of a
petitioner’s claims)
2.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel for failure to
Investigate Mitigating Circumstances
Petitioner further argues his trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to investigate mitigating circumstances to present
at sentencing.
This argument is equally meritless. The list of
mitigating factors that trial counsel allegedly failed to
investigate,
“background,
placement in foster homes,
childhood neglect,
psychiatrists
18
special education,
[sic]
hospitals,”
Petition ¶ 12(b),
were all investigated and brought to the
Court’s attention either by trial counsel or by the PSR.
Trial
counsel specifically noted during his sentencing argument that
Petitioner lost his mother at a very young age and did not know
his father,
3:12—15,
¶ 74.
Sentencing Transcript, No.
10—0821
(ECF No.
26)
at
and the PSR related the circumstances of her death,
PSR
He denied being abused or neglected by his grandmother,
PSR ¶ 76,
and his schizophrenia and bipolar disorders were both
brought to the Court’s attention via the PSR,
Id.
at ¶ 81,
and
the Court specifically took his mental health into consideration
while fashioning an appropriate sentence,
Sentencing Transcript
at 15:11—17.
Beyond those vague and conclusory allegations,
Petitioner
does not state with specificity the information the counsel
neglected to investigate and how the outcome of the sentencing
hearing,
which resulted in a sentence near the low end of the
Guideline range,
would have been different.2 He therefore has not
met his burden of demonstrating prejudice.
Thomas,
221 F.3d 430,
437
(3d Cir.
2000)
United States v.
(“[V]ague and
conclusory allegations contained in a § 2255 petition may be
disposed of without further investigation by the District
2
The applicable Guideline range was 77 to 96 months;
was sentenced to 80 months.
19
Petitioner
Court.”
Cir.
(citing United States v.
Dawson,
857 F.2d 923,
928
(3d
1988)))
3.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel for Failure to Request
a Competency Hearing
Petitioner’s final claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel alleges that counsel erred by failing to request a
mental health evaluation.
“[A]
hearing
Petitioner ¶ 12 (ID)
criminal defendant shall be subjected to a competency
‘if there is reasonable cause to believe that the
defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or
defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he
is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the
proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense.’”
United States v.
Jones,
(quoting 18 U.S.C.
336 F.3d 245,
§ 4241(a)).
Here,
256
(3d Cir.
2003)
there is no evidence that
trial counsel had “reasonable cause” to suspect Petitioner was
incapable of understanding the plea proceedings.
In fact,
counsel affirmatively represented to the Court that there was
“no doubt as to
[Petitioner’s]
competence to proceed.” Plea
Transcript at 15:10—1.
Trial counsel’s representation is supported by the Court’s
own observations of Petitioner at the hearing.
F.3d at 256
See Jones,
336
(noting that district court must hold hearing on its
own motion if it has reasonable cause to suspect Petitioner is
20
incompetent to proceed).
competency,
including
“When evaluating a defendant’s
a district court must consider a number of factors,
‘evidence of a defendant’s irrational behavior,
demeanor at trial,
to stand trial.’
determination
his
and any prior medical opinion on competence
Other factors that are relevant to the
‘may include an attorney’s representation about
his client’s competency.’” Ibid.
(quoting United States v.
Leggett,
162 F.3d 237,
242
(3d Cir.
1998);
Renfroe,
825 F.2d 763,
767
(3d Cir.
1987))
United States v.
.
Nothing about
Petitioner’s behavior or answers suggested to the Court that he
was unable to understand and participate in the proceedings.
Petitioner gave clear answers to the Court’s questions and did
not appear confused or incoherent.
order a competency hearing.
Thus,
there was no basis to
Petitioner has not established trial
counsel erred by failing to request a competency hearing,
and
his claim fails under Strickland.
D.
Certificate of Appealability
An appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from a
final order in a § 2255 proceeding unless a judge issues a
certificate of appealability on the ground that “the applicant
has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c) (2).
“A petitioner satisfies this
standard by demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree
with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional
21
claims or that jurists could conclude that the issues presented
here are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.”
Miller—El v.
Cockrell,
537 U.s.
322,
327
(2003)
.
This Court
denies a certificate of appealability because jurists of reason
would not find it debatable that Petitioner has not made a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.
V.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above,
Vacate,
Correct,
Petitioner’s Motion to
or Set Aside his sentence is denied,
and no
certificate of appealability shall issue. An accompanying Order
will be entered.
WILLIAM H. WA
Senior U.S. District Judge
Date
22
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?