MOORE v. CARTERET POLICE DEPT. et al
Filing
13
OPINION. Signed by Judge Jose L. Linares on 9/20/13. (gmd, )
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
LEROY T.
MOORE,
Civil Action No.
Plaintiff,
v.
:
13-943
(JLL)
OPINION
CARTERET POLICE DEPARTMENT,
et all,
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
LEROY T. MOORE, Plaintiff pro
se
MC#67 056
Middlesex County Adult Correct
ion Center
P.O. Box 266
North Brunswick, New Jersey 0890
3
WILLIAM T. CONNELL, ESQ.
DWYER, CONNELL & LISBONA, ESQ
S.
100 Passaic Avenue, P.O. Box
629
Fairfield, New Jersey 07004
Counsel for Defendants, Borough
of Carteret,
Police Department, Ptl. Marcus
Rosario, Ptl.
Esposito, Sgt. Hart, and Sgt
. Muzyka
MICHAEL JOHN STONE, ESQ.
THE STONE LAW GROUP
20 Glenview Drive
Warren, New Jersey 07059
Counsel for Defendant Patrolm
an Louis Reyes
ERIC L. HARRISON, ESQ.
METHFESSEL & WERBEL, PC
3 Ethel Road, Suite 300, P.O.
Box 3012
Edison, New Jersey
08818—3012
Carteret
Kazio, Ptl.
Counsel for Defendants, County of Middlesex,
County Prosecutor’s Office, Christopher L.C.
Marcia Silva
Middlesex
Kuberiet, and
GARY S. SPAGNOLA, ESQ.
GOLDEN, ROTHSCHILD, SPAGNOLA, LUNDELL, LEVITT
& BOYLAN, PC
1011 Route 22 West, Suite 300, P.O. Box 6881
Bridgewater, New Jersey 08807—0881
Counsel for Defendant Detective Lieutenant
Michal Damman
LINARES,
District Judge
This matter comes before the Court by way of
Defendants
Middlesex County and the Middlesex County
Prosecutor’s Office
(“MCPO”),
Assistant Prosecutor Christopher L.C.
Assistant Prosecutor Marcia Silva
Kuberiet,
and
(hereinafter the “MCPO
Defendants”)’s motion to dismiss the Complaint in
this matter.
(Docket Item # 6.)
This motion is being considered on the
papers pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 78.
reasons set forth below,
For the
the MCPO and the MCPO Defendants’
motion is GRANTED.
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed his Complaint in the Superior
Court of New
Jersey,
39-13,
Law Division,
on or about January 2,
Defendants,
Patrolman
2013,
(“Ptl.”)
Marcus Rosario,
Sergeant
(“Sgt.”)
under Docket No.
Carteret Police Department,
Ptl.
Michael Kazio,
James Hart,
(hereinafter “Carteret Defendants”),
2
MID-L
against the following
the Borough of Carteret,
Phillip Esposito,
Muzyka
Middlesex County,
Ptl.
and Sgt.
and Middlesex
Louis
County
Middlesex County Prosecutors Office
Prosecutor Christopher L.C.
Marcia Silva.
Kuberiet
On February 15,
2013,
(“MCPO”),
Assistant
and Assistant Prosecutor
the Carteret Defendants
removed the state action to this Court,
upon the consent of all
named Defendants,
§ l
41(b),
4
pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
1446,
asserting that this Court has origina’ jurisdici
00 under 28
U.S.C.
§ 1331 over Plaintiff claims,
5
which are grounded on
alleged violations of federal law under 42
U.S.C.
§ 1983.
Plaintiff did not seek to remand the matter
back to state court.’
In his origjn Complaint,
21,
Ptl.
2009,
Defendants Ptl.
Esposito
Sgt.
Plaintiff alleges that,
Louis Reyes,
Ptl.
Rosario
on May
Ptl.
Kazio,
Hart and Sgt. Muzyka of the Carteret Police
Department,
“falsely imprisoned Plaintiff alleging he
(Plaintiff)
Possessed what was allegedly known to be cocaine
‘This Court notes that Plaintiff has
filed numerous actions in
the District of New Jersey, against
many of the same defendants
as named in this action.
These actions include:
Moore v.
Middlesex County Prosecutors Office, et al.,
Civil No. 11-6198
(JLL) (consolidated with associated case,
Civil No. 11—281
(JLL)); Moore v. Middlesex County
ecutors Office, et al.,
Pros
Civil No. 11-3879 (JLL) (dismissed with prejudj
pursuant to 28
U.S.C
§ l (2) (B) (ii) and l (1));
15(e)
9
re v. Dow, et
15(b)
9
Moo
a]., Civil No. 11-281 (JLL)
(Pending); Franklin
et a]. v.
Borough of Carteret
at a]., Civil No. 10-1467 (JLL)
(dismissed
with prejudi pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
0
§ 19 (2) (B) (ii) and
l5(e)
15 9
1(b) (1)); Moore v. Carteret Police
Department
et a]., Civil
No. 4-33i (SRC) (sumary judgme
granted defendants on May 3,
2007); Moore v. Novak, et a]., Civil
No. 04-1250 (WHW)
(stipulation of dismissal filed on June 25, 2008); and
Moore v.
Comba, at a]., Civil No. 03—2521 (WHW)
(dismissed with prejudj
pursuant to 28 u.S.C
§ 19 (B) (ii) and 1(b) (1)).
15(e)(2)
15 9
3
[and a straw],
[and]
failed to prove Plaintiff committed any
crime,” in violation of his rights under
the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments.
July 23,
2009,
(Dkt.
# 1-1,
Complaint at ¶I 1,
3.)
On
Defendant Detective Lieutenant Michael Damman
allegedly reported that he took all evidence
seized from
Plaintiff at his arrest to a lab company,
but the lab report
purportedly does not show evidence of a straw
or twenty dollar
bill taken from Plaintiff.
Plaintiff thus alleges that
Defendant Damman “tampered with physical
evidence.”
(Id.,
Factual Background at ¶ 5.)
Plaintiff further alleges that in September
2009,
Defendant
Reyes testified at a grand jury hearing
that Plaintiff possessed
a controlled dangerous substance and drug
paraphernalia.
Factual Background at ¶ 2.)
September 17,
2009,
Also,
(Id.,
according to Plaintiff,
on
Defendant Assistant Prosecutor Silva
“failed
to present exculpatorial
[sic],
discoverable evidence to the
grand jury” that was in the possession of
MCPO Defendants.
(Id.,
Factual Background at ¶ 4.)
The Complaint also alleges that from
February 2010 to
December 17,
2012,
the MCPO Defendants “maliciously prosecuted”
Plaintiff until December 17,
2012,
when the charges against
Plaintiff terminated in his favor
upon the written decision of
the Honorable Michael A.
Toto,
J.S.C.
4
dismissing the indictment.
(Id.,
Factual Background at ¶ 3.)
alleges that on December 20,
In particular,
2012,
Plaintiff
Defendant Kuberiet convened a
second grand jury and conspired with Reyes
to testify in
conformity with Judge Toto’s December 17,
According to Plaintiff,
2012 opinion.
Kuberiet instructed Reyes to “tell
members of said grand jury everything the
Superior Court Judge
(Toto)
stated in his opinion dated December 17,
stated wasn’t done September 17,
Background at ¶6.)
2009.”
(Id.,
2012
[sic]
Factual
(parentheses and emphasis in original).
Plaintiff further claims that the MCPO
Defendants knew that
the former indictment
(# 09-09-1644)
had been dismissed,
but
conspired to violate Plaintiff’s constitutional
rights by
bringing a superseding indictment under
the same statute,
N.J.S.A.
jury.
2C:35—1Q(a) (1),
as the one dismissed,
Plaintiff asserts that the Defendants’
to a second grand
re—filing of
criminal charges against him violated
his “constitutional rights
under false imprisonment,
and double jeopardy clause.”
Factual Background at ¶[ 6,
(Id.,
7.)
Plaintiff also alleges that Kuberiet
“filed false reports
in connection with his actions
instituted on December 20,2012.”
(Id.,
Factual Background at ¶ 7.)
(emphasis in original)
Plaintiff further alleges that a
Carteret police officer
conspired with Kuberiet to violate
Plaintiff’s rights under
5
N.J.S.A.
10:6-1.
(Id.,
Factual Background at ¶ 6.)
Plaintiff
finally alleges that all Defendants violated
his constitutional
rights before dismissal of the indictment on
December 17,
(Id.,
Factual Background,
2012.
last unnumbered paragraph.)
The Complaint asserts claims of false
imprisonment and
excessive bail against all named Defendants.
In addition,
the
Complaint asserts claims of malicious prosecution
and violation
of the double jeopardy clause against the
MCPO Defendants, more
particularly,
Defendant Kuberiet.
Plaintiff generally cites a
violation of his Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights.
He
seeks punitive and compensatory damages.
On March 11,
2013,
the MCPO Defendants filed a motion to
dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Fed.
(Dkt.
# 6.)
R.
Civ.
P.
12(b) (6).
Plaintiff filed a response to the motion on
or
about March 18,
2013.
(Dkt.
# 9.)
On May 31,
2013,
counsel for
the MCPO Defendants wrote to the Court
to inform that on May 24,
2013,
Plaintiff had plead guilty to criminal
charges that are
the subject of this litigation.
II.
(Dkt.
# 12.)
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) (2)
requires that a
complaint set forth “a short and plain
statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.”
The
plaintiff’s short and plain statement of the
claim must “give
6
the defendants fair notice of what the
grounds upon which it rests.”
U.S.
544,
(1957))
545
(2007)
Thus,
.
12(b) (6),
...
Bell Atl.
(quoting Conley v.
claim is and the
Corp.
v.
Gibson,
Twombly,
355 U.S.
550
41,
47
to survive summary dismissal under Rule
the complaint “must contain sufficient
factual matter,
accepted as true,
to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.’” Ashcroft v.
(citing Twombly,
550 U.S.
Iqbal,
556 U.S.
at 570)).
662,
678
(2009)
More concisely,
the
plaintiff’s short and plain statement of the
claim must “give
the defendants fair notice of what the
grounds upon which it rests.”
...
Twombly,
claim is and the
550 U.S.
at 545
(citation omitted)
When deciding a motion under Rule 12(b) (6),
a district
court should conduct a three-part analysis
as set forth in Iqbal
and Twombly.
2011)
.
Malleus v.
“First,
George,
the court must
641 F.3d 560,
at 675).
and conclusions’
However,
or
‘naked assertion[s]’
enhancement.’”
Iqbal,
at 555,
Second,
557))
.
“[a)
Id.
(quoting Igbal,
pleading that offers
‘labels
‘a formujaic recitation of the elements
of a
cause of action will not do.
tenders
(3d Cir.
‘take note of the elements a
plaintiff must plead to state a claim.’”
556 U.S.
563
Nor does a complaint suffice if it
devoid of
556 U.S.
at 678
‘further factual
(citing Twombly,
550 U.S.
the court must accept as true all
well
7
pleaded factual allegations and construe the
complaint in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Shadyside,
578 F.3d 203,
210—11
Fowler v.
(3d Cir.
2009).
UPMC
Finally,
once
the well-pleaded facts have been
identified and the conclusory
allegations ignored,
a court must next determine whether
the
“facts alleged in the complaint are
sufficient to show that
plaintiff has a
at 211
‘plausible claim for relief.’”
(quoting Iqbal,
556 U.S.
Fowler,
578 F.3d
at 679).
While factual allegations must be more
than speculative,
“the
[Plausibility]
requirement.’”
Officials,
U.S.
555
at 678
standard is not akin to a
Covington v.
710 F.3d 114,
118
Int’l Ass’n of Approved Basketball
(3d Cir.
(quoting Bell Atl.
(2007))).
In addition,
‘probability
Corp.
2013)
v.
(quoting Iqbal,
Twombly,
550 U.S.
556
544,
although “[t]he obligation to
liberally construe a pro se litigant’s
pleadings is well—
established,” Higgs v. Atty.
2011),
Gen.,
655 F.3d 333,
(3d Cir.
“pro se litigants still must allege
sufficient facts in
their complaints to support a claim.”
Inc.,
339
704 F.3d 239,
Generally,
245
(3d Cir.
2013)
Mala v.
Crown Bay Marina,
(citation omitted).
in a motion filed pursuant to Rule
12(b) (6),
the
court may not consider matters
extraneous to the pleadings
without converting the motion
into one for summary judgment.
exception to this general rule may
be made where there is a
8
An
‘document integral to or explicitly relied
upon in the
complaint.”
1410,
1426
omitted);
3
In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec.
(3d Cir.
1997)
see also Lum v.
Litig.,
(emphasis in original)
Bank of erica,
(3d Cir.
2004);
Perlmutter v.
App’x 161,
163 n.
1
(3d Cir.
.
(citations
361 F.3d 217,
Russell Hobbs,
2011)
114 F.3d
Moreover,
Inc.,
222 n.
450 F.
a plaintiff
cannot prevent the court from considering
the text of documents
expressly relied upon in the complaint
where plaintiff failed to
attach them.
Here,
17,
In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec.
Litig.,
supra.
Plaintiff expressly refers to Judge
Toto’s December
2012 decision dismissing the indictment
against him.
Accordingly,
this Court may properly consider Judge
Toto’s
decision in deciding this motion.
III.
A.
Claims
DISCUSSION
Middlesex County
The MCPO Defendants first contend that
the Complaint must
be dismissed against Middlesex County
because a county cannot be
held vicariously liable for the
actions of prosecutorial
defendants when the county prosecutors
were acting as agents of
the State.
(DMC),
2008 WL 839556,
F. App’x 833
422,
See Hyatt v.
452-53
(3d Cir.
(2001)
*
County of Passaic,
11
2009).
(D.N.J. Mar.
27,
Civil No.
2008),
See also Wright v.
04—1545
aff’d,
State,
340
169 N.J.
(the county prosecutor “remains at all
times
9
subject to the supervision and suppression
power of the Attorney
General” when performing its prosecutorjal
function and is not
autonomous from the State for vicarious-liability
purposes)
In this case,
Plaintiff has not asserted any allegations
against Middlesex County independent from
the claims alleged
against the MCPO and assistant prosecutors
in connection with
the criminal prosecution against
Plaintiff.
Consequently,
this
Court finds that Middlesex County cannot
be held vicariously
liable for the actions of assistant
prosecutors,
and the
Complaint will be dismissed in its entirety
with prejudice with
respect to Middlesex County.
B.
Prosecutorial Immunity
It is well settled that “a state
prosecuting attorney who
act[s]
within the scope of his duties in initiating
and pursuing
a criminal prosecution” is not amenable
to suit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.
Imbler v.
Pachtman,
424 U.S.
409,
410
(1976)
.
The
Supreme Court held that a prosecutor is
absolutely immune from
damages under § 1983 for acts that are
“intimately associated
with the judicial phase of the criminal
process,” id.
at 430—31,
including use of false testimony and
the decision to withhold
exculpatory evidence while functioning
as an advocate for the
state.
See Moore v. Middlesex County
Prosecutor’s Office,
10
503
F. App’x.
108,
109
(3d Cir.
2012)
2
Since Imbler,
the Supreme
Court has held that ‘absolute immunity
applies when a prosecutor
prepares to initiate a judicial proceeding,
or appears in court
to present evidence in support of a
search warrant application.”
Van de Kamp v.
omitted).
(3d Cir.
Goldstein,
See also 5.5.
2013)
.
555 U.S.
v.
335,
343
Somerset County,
(2009)
(citations
704 F.3d 250,
269
Prosecutorial immunity also extends to
decisions to seek an indictment and preparing
for the grand
jury.
See Ray v.
New Jersey,
219 F. App’x.
121,
125
(3d Cir.
2007).
In this case,
Plaintiff alleges that the MCPO Defendants
failed to present exculpatory evidence
to the grand jury,
instructed grand jury witnesses to testify
in accordance with
Judge Toto’s December 17,
2012 decision,
and re-filed an
indictment against Plaintiff after the
first indictment was
dismissed without prejudice.
There is nothing in these
allegations to suggest that any of the
MCPQ Defendants were
This
2 Third Circuit case, Moore v.
Middlesex County Prosecutor’s
Office, 503 F. App’x. 108 (3d Cir.
2012), was an appeal from
this Court’s dismissal of a related
lawsuit filed by Plaintiff
against the MCPO and Assistant
Prosecutor Kuberiet for
prosecutorial actions taken in connection
with Plaintiff’s 2009
indictment stemming from Plaintiff’s
2009 arrest, which is
partly at issue in the present
case.
See Moore v. Middlesex
County Prosecutor’s Office, et
al., Civil No. 11-3879 (JLL).
Plaintiff’s claims against the MCPO
Defendants in the instant
action mostly pertain to the second
or ‘re-filed” indictment in
December 2012, which is based on
the initial 2009 drug charges.
11
acting outside the scope of their
prosecutorjal duties in
pursuing a criminal prosecution against
Plaintiff.
Thus,
the
MCPO Defendants are absolutely immune
from a claim of malicious
prosecution as alleged by Plaintiff
because the alleged acts by
these Defendants plainly were taken
in exercise of their core
functions as prosecutors.
————,
U.S.
132 S.Ct.
at 430—31.
1497,
1504,
Therefore,
prosecutorial immunity,
See Rehberg v.
Paulk,
182 L.Ed.2d 593
U.S.
———
(2012);
————,
Imbler,
424
the MCPO Defendants are entitled to
and the Complaint will be dismissed
in
its entirety with respect to Assistant
Prosecutor Christopher
L.C.
C.
Kuberjet and Assistant Prosecutor
Marcia Silva.
3
Double Jeopardy Claim
As noted above,
Plaintiff essentially alleges claims
of
malicious prosecution and violation of
double jeopardy with
regard to the MCPO Defendants’
re-indictment of Plaintiff after
the first indictment was dismissed
without prejudice by Judge
Toto on December 17,
2012.
Defendants now argue that
Plaintiff’s claim against the MCPO
Defendants based on double
jeopardy must be dismissed.
Because the Court has determined
that the MCPO Defendants are
entitled to absolute prosecutorial
immunity based on their
conduct being purely prosecutorial
functions during a criminal
prosecution, the Court need not
discuss the other privileges and
related state law claims raised by
Defendants in their motion to
dismiss.
12
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Fifth Amendment provides:
“[Njor shall any person be subject for
the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb.”
The Double Jeopardy
Clause was designed to protect a
person from being subjected to
a trial and possible conviction
more than once for an alleged
offense.
2012)
United States v.
Thus,
.
54
683 F.3d 69,
74
(3d Cir.
if a mistrial is properly declared
it does not
prevent re-prosecution
49,
Figueroa,
(3d Cir.
Id.;
United States v.
Rivera,
384 F.3d
2004).
The Supreme Court has long held
that double jeopardy does
not attach until a defendant has
been “put to trial before the
trier of facts.”
(1975)
.
Serfass v.
For instance,
United States,
420 U.S.
377,
388
jeopardy has not yet attached when
a
trial court grants a defendant’s
motion to dismiss the
indictment.
Id.
at 389.
In the present case,
Plaintiff has not
alleged that a jury was empaneled
or that the trial court heard
evidence in connection to his 2009
indictment before the trial
court granted Plaintiff’s motion
to dismiss the indictment.
Moreover,
the indictment was dismissed
without prejudice to the
State re-filing charges.
Thus,
double jeopardy did not attach,
and Plaintiff has failed to state
a cognizable claim for
recovery of damages based on an
alleged double jeopardy
13
violation.
Plaintiff’s double jeopardy claim will be
dismissed
with prejudice accordingly.
D.
Statute of Limitations
The MCPO Defendants also contend that
any claims alleged by
Plaintiff that accrued before January 2,
2011,
are time-barred
and should be dismissed with prejudice.
Federal courts look to state law to
determine the
limitations period for § 1983 actions.
U.S.
384,
387—88
(2007)
See Wallace v.
Kato,
549
A § 1983 complaint is “characterized
.
as a personal injury claim and thus
is governed by the
applicable state’s statute of limitations
for personal—injury
claims.”
2010)
23,
Dique v.
N.J.
(citing Cito v.
25
Garcia,
(3d Cir.
471 U.S.
603 F.3d 181,
Bridgewater Twp.
1989));
261,
State Police,
Police Dep’t,
see also Wallace,
276
(1985)
.
185
supra;
In New Jersey,
(3d Cir.
892 F.2d
Wilson v.
§ 1983 claims
are subject to New Jersey’s two—year
statute of limitations on
personal injury actions.
N.J.
Stat. Ann.
See Dique,
§ 2A:14—2.
603 F.3d at 185;
Accordingly,
see also
Plaintiff’s § 1983
claims against the MCPO Defendants
are subject to this two-year
period.
Similarly,
Plaintiff’s state law claims under
the New
Jersey Civil Rights Act
(“NJC”)
14
are also subject to a two-year
statute of limitations.
*4_5
5512460,
Here,
Thus,
(N.J.
Hawkins v.
Feder, A—4004—10T2,
Super. A.D. Nov.
15,
2012 WL
2012).
Plaintiff filed his Complaint on January
2,
2013.
any claim asserted in his Complaint
that accrued prior to
January 2,
2011,
Complaint,
Plaintiff alleges false imprisonment
and excessive
would be time—barred.
bail claims in Nay 2009,
¶ 1.)
in his
in violation of his Eighth and
Fourteenth endment rights.
Background,
For instance,
(Dkt.
# 1-1 at ¶ 1,
3,
Factual
These § 1983 claims are subject to
the two—
year limitation period.
The Supreme Court has held that the
statute of limitations for a claim of
false arrest or false
imprisonment begins to run “at the time
the claimant becomes
detained pursuant to legal process.”
Wallace,
549 U.S.
at 397.
Thus,
in this case,
2009,
when Plaintiff alleges that he was
subject to false
the statute of limitations commenced
in May
imprisonment and excessive bail.
Plaintiff filed his § 1983
action in state court on January 2,
2013,
well beyond the
expiration of the limitations period.
Likewise,
that time,
period.
any excessive bail claim would
have accrued at
and is now beyond the expiration
of the limitations
See Wallace,
549 U.S.
at 391.
Additionally,
any
related state law claims asserted
against the MCPO Defendants
are similarly time—barred.
See Hawkins,
15
2012 WL 5512460 at *4_
5.
Therefore,
the MCPO Defendants are entitled to summary
dismissal of these claims against them.
F.
Malicious Prosecution Claim
Plaintiff mainly asserts a claim of
malicious prosecution
against the MCPO Defendants regarding the
re-filing of charges
against Plaintiff on December 20,
2012,
after Judge Toto
dismissed the first indictment on December 17,
2012.
To establish a § 1983 claim for malicious
prosecution,
Plaintiff must satisfy each of the following
five elements:
the defendants initiated a criminal
proceeding;
proceeding ended in plaintiff’s favor;
initiated without probable cause;
(4)
(3)
(2)
“(1)
the criminal
the proceeding was
the defendants acted
maliciously or for a purpose other than
bringing the plaintiff
to justice; and
(5)
the plaintiff suffered deprivation of
liberty consistent with the concept of
seizure as a consequence
of a legal proceeding.”
502 F. App’x 225,
Crisanti,
227
Minatee v.
(3d Cir.
564 F.3d 181,
186
2012)
(3d Cir.
Philadelphia Police Dept.,
(quoting Kossler v.
2009)
(en banc)
(internal
quotation marks and citations omitted))
Here,
the Complaint fails to allege that
the December 2012
re-indictment of Plaintiff terminated in
his favor,
therefore,
and
Plaintiff cannot establish all of the
requisite
elements to prove a malicious prosecution
claim under § 1983.
16
Indeed,
at the time Plaintiff filed this
Complaint,
the criminal
proceedings on Plaintiff’s re—indictment were
still pending.
Further,
according to the MCPO Defendants,
Plaintiff pled guilty
to criminal charges that are the
subject of this lawsuit on May
24,
2013.
(Dkt.
# 12.)
Therefore,
Plaintiff cannot show that
the criminal proceedings terminated
in his favor,
and the
malicious prosecution claim must be
dismissed with prejudice for
failure to state a claim.
To the extent that Plaintiff is alleging
that the MCPQ
Defendants maliciously prosecuted him
prior to the December 17,
2012 dismissal of the first indictment,
a matter of law.
the claim also fails as
Plaintiff relies on the December 17,
2012
written decision of Judge Toto dismissing
the first indictment.
However,
Judge Toto dismissed the indictment
without prejudice
to the re-filing of charges.
Moreover,
(Dkt.
# 6-4,
Exhibit C at 5.)
Judge Toto expressly stated that the
dismissal of the
indictment was not based on any of the
following grounds:
“vindictive prosecution,
prosecution,
under the
th
5
Finally,
selective prosecution, malicious
or violation of Defendant’s
Constitutional rights
th,
8
or
th
14
endments.”
(Id.)
this Court observes that there was
no finding that
Plaintiff’s arrest lacked probable
cause.
Rather,
Judge Toto’s
decision was based solely on the
State’s failure to establish
17
the first element of Possession
of a Controlled Dangerous
Substance charge,
namely,
that the white powdery substance
discovered on the twenty dollar
bill was cocaine.
Judge Toto
coented that no laboratory report
was presented to the grand
jury to confirm that the powdery
substance was indeed cocaine,
and that the prosecution instead
relied solely on the testimony
of Officer Reyes in the
presentment of the charges to the
grand
jury.
(Id.
at 4-5.)
Therefore, based on these state
court findings concerning
the first indictment,
Plaintiff cannot establish the
third and
fourth elements of a malicious
prosecution claim,
(i.e.,
the proceeding was initiated
without probable cause;
“(3)
[and]
(4)
the defendants acted maliciously
or for a purpose other than
bringing the plaintiff to justice,”
see Minatee,
227)
.
Accordingly,
502 F. App’x at
Plaintiff’s claim for malicious
prosecution
must be dismissed with prejudice.
F.
Fourteenth Amendment Claims
Plaintiff generally asserts
violations of his Fourteenth
Amendment rights, but fails to allege
any facts to support a
Fourteenth Amendment violation under
either a substantive due
process theory or an equal
protection theory.
Defendants argue that,
The MCPO
even construing the limited
allegations
18
in the most indulgent manner,
the Complaint fails to state a
claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.
1.
Substantive Due Process Claim.
Substantive due process is a doctrine reserved
for the most
egregious governmental abuses of
fundamental civil liberties.
Armbruster v.
Cavanaugh,
410 F. App’x 564,
567
(3d Cir.
2011).
To state a substantive due process
claim under the Fourteenth
Amendment,
a plaintiff must allege the following
that:
actor engaged in conduct under color of
state law;
2)
1)
an
he
suffered a deprivation of a protected
liberty interest by that
conduct; and 3)
Chainey v.
the deprivation “shocks” the conscience.
Street,
In this case,
523 F.3d 200,
219
(3d Cir.
2008).
Plaintiff fails to allege any facts to
show
conscience-shocking behavior by the MCPO
Defendants.
Consequently,
he cannot establish a substantive
due process
violation and this claim must be dismissed.
2.
Equal Protection Claim.
The Equal Protection Clause prohibits
the “selective
enforcement” of a law based on an
unjustifiable standard.
PG Pub.
v.
Co.
v. Aichele,
Independence T.,
United States v.
705 F.3d 91,
463 F.3d 285,
Batchelder,
115
297
442 U.S.
prove a selective—enforcement claim,
19
(3d Cir.
(3d Cir.
114,
125 n.
2013);
2006);
9
See
Thomas
see also
(1979)
Plaintiff must show:
.
To
“(1)
that he was treated differently from
other similarly situated
individuals,
and
(2)
‘that this selective treatment was
based on
an unjustifiable standard,
other arbitrary factor,
fundamental right.’”
v.
City of Scranton,
Again,
such as race,
...
Dique,
or some
or to prevent the exercise of a
603 F.3d at 184 n.
411 F.3d 118,
in this case,
or religion,
125
(3d Cir.
5
(quoting Hill
2005)).
Plaintiff fails to allege any facts
to
show that he was discriminated
against on the basis of race,
religion,
or any other reason,
or that he was treated
differently than other similarly
situated persons.
Judge Toto’s December 17,
first indictment,
Moreover,
in
2012 decision dismissing Plaintiff’s
Judge Toto explicitly stated that
the
dismissal of the indictment was not
based on any claim of
selective prosecution.
(Dkt.
# 6-4,
Ex.
C at 5.)
Therefore,
the Court will dismiss any
purported equal protection claim
because Plaintiff has failed to
state a cognizable claim for
relief under § 1983.
G.
False Imprisonment and Excessive
Bail Claims
Finally,
to the extent that Plaintiff
is asserting claims
of false imprisonment and
excessive bail that are not time
barred,
i.e.,
occurring or continuing after
January 2,
alleges no facts to support
such claims.
20
2011,
he
1.
False Imprisonment Claim.
Under both federal and New Jersey law,
false imprisonment,
was detained;
and
549 U.s.
at 389;
557,
(2009)
4597
591
(JAP),
Generally,
(2)
the detention was unlawful.
Jersey City Bd.
See also Tringali v.
2013 WL 1701764,
*2
198 N.J.
Of Manalapan,
(D.N.J. Apr.
18,
he
See Wallace,
of Educ.,
Tp.
(1)
No.
12-
2013).
the existence of probable cause
defeats a claim for
false imprisonment.
Herman v.
a plaintiff must demonstrate that:
Leang v.
.
to state a claim for
See Tringali,
City of Millville,
2013 WL 1701764 at *2
66 F. App’x 363,
365
(citing
(3d Cir.
2003)
(holding that probable cause is a
“complete defense” to claims
of false arrest,
and Wildoner v.
false imprisonment and malicious
prosecution)
Bor.
of Ramsey,
162 N.J.
375,
389,
(2000)
(explaining that probable cause is an
absolute defense to claim
for false imprisonment))
In this case,
Plaintiff alleges no facts to support
a claim
of false imprisonment by the MCPO
Defendants after the December
20,
2012 re—indictment.
it appears that Plaintiff alleges
that
the MCPO Defendants had him falsely
imprisoned on May 21,
and that he was falsely imprisoned
until December 17,
2009,
2012,
but
Plaintiff does not allege facts
regarding the actual dates of
his purported imprisonment or by
whom he was imprisoned.
Moreover,
Plaintiff does not allege that he
was imprisoned
21
without probable cause,
imprisonment claim.
a requisite element of a false
As discussed above,
Judge Toto made no
finding that Plaintiff’s arrest
lacked probable cause,
dismissed the first indictment
without prejudice.
when he
Therefore,
because Plaintiff has failed
to allege any facts to show a
lack
of probable cause or other
factors to support his bald claim
of
false imprisonment by the MCPO
Defendants, Plaintiff’s false
imprisonment claim will be dismissed.
2.
Excessive Bail Claim.
The MCPO Defendants lastly
assert that Plaintiff’s excessive
bail claim must be dismissed
because Plaintiff fails to allege
any facts to support such a
claim.
To state an excessive bail
claim under § 1983,
Plaintiff must allege facts
showing that his
bail was excessive in violation
of the Eighth Amendment.
McKnight v.
(D.N.J. Nov.
Taylor,
20,
No.
2012)
.
12-1684
Here,
(RMB),
2012 WL 5880331,
*7
Plaintiff does not allege any
facts to show that his bail
was excessive;
even indicate the amount of
his bail.
indeed,
he does not
Plaintiff also does not
allege any facts to show that
the MCPO Defendants proximately
caused his bail to be set
too high.
Therefore,
this excessive
bail claim must be dismissed
for failure to state a claim.
22
Id.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above,
MCPO Defendants’
motion to dismiss,
dismissed with prejudice,
the Court will grant the
and Complaint will be
in its entirety,
Middlesex County and the MCPO Defendants.
with respect to
An appropriate order
follows.
United States District Judge
Dated:/
(I)
23
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?