HOLLIDAY v. CITY OF ELIZABETH et al

Filing 115

OPINION & ORDER denying 108 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Judge John Michael Vazquez on 1/23/2019. (ys, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

NAKIKI HOLLIDAY,
No. 13-1006 (JMV) (JBC)
Plaint[f
V.

OPINION & ORDER

CITY OF ELIZABETH, eta!.,
Defendants.

John Michael Vazguez, U.S.D.J.

This matter comes before the Court on a motion for reconsideration filed by Plaintiff
Nakiki Holliday (“Plaintiff’), D.E. 108, concerning the Court’s February 20, 2018 Opinion and
Order, D.E. 103 (“Prior Opinion” or “Prior Op.”), 104, granting in part and denying in part motions
for summary judgment filed by Defendants Grisel Arias, Franklin Banos, Alexander Blanco,
Patrick Shannon, Carrie Scharpnick, and the City of Elizabeth (the “City”), D.E. 71, 74, 75, 76,
78. In the Prior Opinion and Order, the Court (1) granted the motions for summary judgment filed
by Defendants Arias, Banos, Blanco, Shannon, and the City of Elizabeth; (2) granted in part and
denied in part Defendant Scharpnick’s motion for summary judgment; and (3) granted
Scharpnick’s motion to exclude Plaintiffs expert’s testimony. Plaintiff requests reconsideration
of the Court’s decision (1) granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant City and Defendant
Shannon as to Mone!! liability, and (2) granting the motion to exclude Plaintiffs expert’s testimony
regarding her Mone!! liability claim. D.E. 108. Plaintiff does not challenge the remainder of the
Court’s decision. Id. The Court reviewed all submissions in support and opposition of Plaintiffs

motion’ and considered the motion without oral argument pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b) and L.
Civ. R. 78.1(b). For the reasons that follow, Plaintiffs motion for reconsideration is denied.
I. BACKGROUND
The Court included an extensive factual background in its Prior Opinion, Prior Op. at 2-9,

which the Court incorporates by way of reference here. Plaintiff first requests that the Court
reconsider its grant of summary judgment as to Defendant City and Defendant Shannon on
Plaintiffs lionel! liability claim. P1. Br. at 1. Second, Plaintiff requests that the Court reconsider
its grant of summary judgment excluding Plaintiffs expert’s testimony regarding Plaintiffs
Monel! liability claim. P1. Br. at 1.
II.

RECONSIDERATION STANDARD

In the District of New Jersey, motions for reconsideration can be made pursuant to Local
Civil Rule 7.1(i). The rule provides that such motions must be made within fourteen days of the
entry of an order. The Court issued its Opinion and Order on February 20, 2018. D.E. 103, 104.
Plaintiff filed her motion for reconsideration on March 5,201$. D.E. 10$. Accordingly, Plaintiff
complied with this time requirement.
Substantively, a motion for reconsideration is viable when one of three scenarios is present:
(1) an intervening change in the controlling law, (2) the availability of new evidence not previously
available, or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice. Carmichael
v. Everson, No. 03-4787, 2004 WL 1587894, at *1 (D.N.J. May 21, 2004) (citations omitted).
Granting a motion for reconsideration is an “extraordinary remedy,” to be granted “sparingly.” NL
Indus., Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 935 F. Supp. 513, 516 (D.N.J. 1996) (citations omitted).

Plaintiffs brief in support of her motion for reconsideration will be referred to hereinafter as
“P1. Br.” (D.E. 10$); Defendant City of Elizabeth and Defendant Shannon’s brief in opposition
will be referred to hereinafter as “Def. Opp’n” (D.E. 109).
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A motion for reconsideration, however, does not entitle a party to a second bite at the apple.
Therefore, a motion for reconsideration is inappropriate when a party merely disagrees with a
court’s ruling or when a party simply wishes to re-argue or re-hash its original motion. Sch.
Specialty, Inc.

i’.

ferrentino, No. 14-4507, 2015 WL 4602995, *23 (D.N.J. July 30, 2015); see

also Florharn Park Chevron, Inc. v. Chevron US.A., 680 F. Supp. 159, 162 (D.N.J. 198$).

Moreover, a motion for reconsideration is not an opportunity to raise matters that could have been
raised before the original decision was reached. Bowers v. NCAA, 130 F. Supp. 2d 610, 613 (D.N.J.
2001).
III.

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff does not argue that there has been an intervening change in law or that new
evidence is available. Instead, Plaintiff asks the Court to reconsider its decision granting summary
judgment for Defendants City and Shannon, as well as the Court’s holding that Plaintiffs expert
report was inadmissible, because “dispositive factual matters and controlling decisions of law were
overlooked by the Court in reaching its decisions.” P1. Br. at 2. Plaintiff contends that
had these overlooked factual matters and legal decisions been
considered in their entirety, the Court would have denied summary
judgment on the unlawful policy, custom practice [sic] Monell claim
against Defendants City of Elizabeth and Chief of Police Shannon
and would have concluded that the testimony, opinions and report
of Plaintiffs police liability expert would have been admissible to
prove those Monell claims against them.
Id. Plaintiff does not challenge the remainder of the Court’s decision granting summary judgment

for Defendants Arias, Banos, and Blanco.
In essence, Plaintiff argues that the extraordinary remedy of reconsideration is necessary
to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice, for the reasons discussed below,
Plaintiffs arguments are unconvincing.

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A. Plaintiffs Monet! Claims

Plaintiff first requests reconsideration of the Court’s grant of summary judgment to
Defendants Shannon and the City. P1. Br. at 3-12. In its Prior Opinion, the Court granted summary
judgment to Defendant City of Elizabeth and Defendant Shannon on Plaintiffs Section 1983
Mon ell claims based on an alleged unlawful policy, custom, or practice, or inadequate training by
the Elizabeth Police Department. Prior Op. at 24-28. The Court found, in part, that “Plaintiff
fail[ed] to identify any genuine issues of material fact that could give rise to a showing of a policy,
practice, or custom that proximately caused Plaintiffs alleged constitutional harms specifically
caused by Defendant Scharpnick [and that] Plaintiff offer[ed] insufficient evidence that Elizabeth
and Shannon inadequately trained Scharpnick.” Id. at 28. The Court reasoned that two excessive
force complaints filed against Defendant Scharpnick in a two-year period did not present sufficient
evidence of a potential pattern of improper conduct to result in potential liability to either the
department or its supervising officers. Id. at 28.
Plaintiff does not challenge the Prior Opinion’s reasoning or holding granting summary
judgment for Defendants Arias, Banos, and Blanco. Instead, Plaintiff only contends that the Court
erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants City and Shannon on Plaintiffs
Monell claims. Plaintiff argues that when granting summary judgment in favor of the City and
Shannon, the Court overlooked (1) Plaintiffs arguments regarding the New Jersey Attorney
General’s Guidelines for Internal Affairs Policy and Procedure, (2) Plaintiffs analysis of the
internal affairs process, (3) and controlling case law cited by both the Plaintiff and Court in its
Opinion. P1. Br. at 3.
The Court disagrees. First, these arguments were largely already made by Plaintiff in her
opposition brief submitted in response to Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. The Court

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fully considered all of Plaintiffs arguments. Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff did not raise her
current arguments in her summary judgment opposition brief, such arguments were clearly
available to her and she chose, for whatever reason, not raise them. Neither Plaintiffs attempt to
re-hash the same arguments nor her attempt to make new arguments that were previously available
to her are appropriate for a motion for reconsideration. See, e.g., Mercer Ctv. Childrens Med.
Davcare, LLC v. O’Dowd, No. 13-1436, 2014 WL 1350657, at * 1 (D.N.J. Apr. 7, 2014) (“A motion
for reconsideration is not an opportunity to raise new matters or arguments that could have been
raised before the original decision was made.”).
Plaintiff cites four cases

—

two of which the Court explicitly addressed in its Prior Opinion.

All four cases are distinguishable from the facts presented in this case. The Court’s Prior Opinion
addressed and distinguished Noble v. City of Camden, 112 F. Supp. 3d 20$ (D.N.J. 2015) and
Merman v. City of Camden, 824 F. Supp. 2d 581 (D.N.J. 2010). Prior Op. at 26-28. Plaintiff does
not contend that the Court overlooked these cases; rather, Plaintiff merely disagrees with the
Court’s analysis.

Plaintiff simply argues that the Court should have considered these cases

differently. This type of argument is not grounds for reconsideration.
Plaintiff also now cites two cases that were cited in her opposition brief, but not expressly
cited in the Court’s Prior Opinion: Monaco v. CTh of Camden, No. 04-2406, 2008 WL 408423
(D.N.J. Feb. 13, 2008) and White v. City of Trenton, No. 06-5 177, 2011 WL 6779595 (D.N.J. Dec.
27, 2011), on reconsideration in part, 84$F. Supp. 2d 497 (D.N.J. 2012). Plaintiff argues “[t]he
Court’s Prior Opinion overlooked” these two cases. P1. Br. at 7. Neither case constitutes binding

precedent on the Court. In issuing a decision, a court need not address each and every case that
the parties cite. Nevertheless, the Court considered these cases before issuing its Prior Opinion.
The selected quotes that Plaintiff now cites do nothing to change the Court’s analysis. Plaintiff is

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free to disagree with the Court’s analysis. However, Plaintiff will not prevail on a motion for
reconsideration when she is simply requesting the Court reevaluate cases previously cited to the
Court. See Mercer Cty. Childrens Med. Davcare, 2014 WL 1350657, at *f (“Nor is a motion for
reconsideration an opportunity to ask the Court to rethink what it has already thought through.”).
Critically, Plaintiff still fails to address the Court’s analysis on causation. As the Court
described in its Prior Opinion, “a plaintiff must show that the [alleged] unlawful policy or custom
was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries.” Prior Op. at 25; see also Watson v. Abington
Twp., 478 F.3d 144, 156 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[A] sufficiently close causal link between.

.

.

a known

but uncorrected custom or usage and a specific violation is established if occurrence of the specific
violation was made reasonably probable by permitted continuation of the custom.”). As the Third
Circuit explained:
[P]roof of the mere existence of an unlawful policy or custom is not
enough to maintain a § 1983 action. A plaintiff bears the additional
burden of proving that the municipal practice was the proximate
cause of the injuries suffered. To establish the necessary causation,
a plaintiff must demonstrate a “plausible nexus” or “affirmative
link” between the municipality’s custom and the specific deprivation
of constitutional rights at issue. As long as the causal link is not too
tenuous, the question whether the municipal policy or custom
proximately caused the constitutional infringement should be lefi to
the jury.
Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850-5 1 (3d Cir. 1990) (internal citations omitted).
Here, the only evidence advanced by Plaintiff specifically related to Defendant
Scharpnick’s alleged excessive force are two excessive force complaints filed against Scharpnick
in a two-year period.2 The second complaint concerns Scharpnick’s conduct in this case. P1. Br.

2

As explained above, Plaintiff does not challenge the Court’s grant of summary judgment for the
remainder of the officer Defendants. Accordingly, the Court focuses on the causation issues
related to Defendant Scharpnick’s conduct.
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at 4 (“Defendant Scharpnick had two Excessive force Internal Affairs complaints, one of which
was Plaintiffs complaint and which has never been investigated.”). Additionally, Plaintiff failed
to provide any information about Scharpnick’s first excessive force complaint beyond the date, the
complainant, the location of the event, and that Defendant Scharpnick was exonerated. See D.E.
86-4, Ex. R.
Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to meet the high burden of demonstrating that the Court’s grant
of summary judgment in favor of the City and Shannon on Plaintiffs Monell claims was in clear
error. See Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 F.3d 120, 127 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that “a failure to
train, discipline or control can only form the basis for section 1983 municipal liability if the
plaintiff can show both contemporaneous knowledge of the offending incident or knowledge of a
prior pattern of similar incidents and circumstances under which the supervisor’s actions or
inaction could be found to have communicated a message of approval to the offending
subordinate.”).
B. Plaintiffs Expert Report

Plaintiff next requests reconsideration of the Court’s decision to exclude Plaintiffs expert
testimony regarding her Monell liability claim against Defendants City and Shannon. P1. Br. at 1.
The Court, in its Prior Opinion, found that Mr. Rivera’s expert testimony regarding Plaintiffs
Monell liability claim against Defendants City and Shannon “are moot because the Court has
granted summary judgment to those Defendants on all counts.” Prior Op. at 2$. Plaintiff now
submits that the Court “overlooked the dispositive factual matters contained in Mr. Rivera’s report
and a controlling decision of law cited by the Court,” referring to Noble v. City of Camden, 112 F.
Supp. 3d 208, 224 (D.N.J. 2015). P1. Br. at 13-16.

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First, Plaintiff’s claim that the Court “overlooked” Noble is untenable, as Plaintiff even
admits that this decision was “cited by the Court” in its Prior Opinion. P1. Br. at 13. In its Prior
Opinion, the Court explained,
In Noble, the court denied summary judgment when the plaintiff
presented evidence that two officer defendants who had
accumulated 19 excessive force complaints “had been flagged for
monitoring and supervision. and that past complaints against the
officers had not been timely or properly investigated.”
.

.

Prior Op. at 26-27. The Court then distinguished Noble from the present case, where Defendant
Scharpnick only accumulated two excessive force complaints (one being the current action),
explaining that “no court has found that two complaints over a two-year period sufficient evidence
of a potential pattern of improper conduct to result in potential liability to either a department or
its supervising officers.” Id. at 27-28. Again, as above, Plaintiff merely disagrees with the Court’s
analysis, which is not grounds for reconsideration.
Additionally, Plaintiff submits that the Court overlooked “dispositive factual matters”
contained in Mr. Rivera’s report. P1. Br. at 13. As explained above, the Court did not overlook
any portion of Mr. Rivera’s report; the Court carefully analyzed the report and its legal impact on
Plaintiff’s claims. Specifically, the Court found that “Rivera essentially assurne[d] the role of the
jury by deciding which facts to credit as reliable, assume[d] the role of the Court by opining on
the relevant legal standards, and then opine[d] on the correct application of those facts to the law.”
Prior. Op. at 30. The Court then concluded that in doing so, “Rivera improperly invade[d] the
province of both the jury and the Court.” Id. Thus, the Court did not “overlook” dispositive factual
matters, it simply concluded that Mr. Rivera incorrectly assumed the role of making such factual
determinations and applying them to the law. The fact that Plaintiff disagrees with this analysis
and conclusion is not grounds for reconsideration.

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In sum, Plaintiff fails to fulfill her burden of showing that the Court made a clear error of
law. Plaintiffs motion is an attempt to re-argue the same issues already addressed by this Court
in its Prior Opinion. A motion for reconsideration is not the appropriate place to request a “second
bite at the apple.” Accordingly, Plaintiffs motion for reconsideration is denied.
IV.

CONCLUSION

for the reasons stated above, and for good cause shown,
IT IS on this 23 day of January, 2019,
ORDERED that Plaintiffs motion for reconsideration (D.E. 108) is DENIED.

John Michael Vazqz, .S.D.J.

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