MUNIZ v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

Filing 25

OPINION. Signed by Judge Jose L. Linares on 9/15/14. (DD, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

ANGEL MUNIZ,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil Action No. 13-1026 (JLL)

OPINION

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

LINARES, District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court by way of Plaintiff Angel Muniz (“Plaintiff’)’s motion
for reconsideration of this Court’s June 27, 2014 Opinion and Order affirming AU
Richard L. Dc
Steno’s partially favorable Social Security decision. The Court declines Plaintiff’s reques
t for oral
argument, and thus resolves this matter on the parties’ briefs pursuant to Local Civil
Rule 9.1(f).
For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion.
I.

BACKGROUND

As this Court discussed in its previous Opinion in this matter,’ on May 1, 2012, AU
De
Steno issued a partially favorable Social Security decision, which concluded that
Plaintiff was
disabled as of January 1, 2011, but not before then. (R. at 293306).2 AU De
Steno’s decision
thoroughly discussed each step of the five-step process for determining whether
a Social Security

2

Muniz v. Comm r ofSoc. Sec., No. 13-1026, 2014 WL 2926525 (D.N.J. June
27, 2014).
“R.” refers to the pages of the Administrative Record.

claimant is disabled. (Id. at 295-306). The Court recaps AU De Steno’s finding
3
s at each step,
which Plaintiff argues are inconsistent with one another.
At step one, AU De Steno found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainfu
l
activity since April 30, 2007, the alleged onset date of disability. (Id. at 295).
At step two, he
found that since that date, Plaintiff “has had severe impairments involving spinal disc disease
,
diabetes, obesity osteoarthritis of the knee, depression, an anxiety disorder with panic attacks
, and
an impulse control disorder.

.

.

.“

(Id. at 296). At step three, he found that Plaintiff has not had

an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severit
y of any
of the listed impairments. (Id.). In finding so, he concluded that Plaintiff “has
had moderate
restriction of the activities of daily living, moderate difficulties in maintaining social functio
ning,
[and] moderate difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace..

.

.“

(Id. at 298).

Plaintiff generally argues that AU De Steno’s findings at steps two and three
are
inconsistent with his finding at step four that:
[P]rior to January 1, 2011
[Plaintiff] had the residual functional
capacity [(“RFC”)] to perform the full range of light work
without significant non-exertional limitations. He was able to
follow simple instructions, maintain attention, concentration, and
adequate pace and persistence, and to relate and adapt to routine
tasks in a work situation.
..

.

(Id. at 298). Because of this alleged inconsistency, which Plaintiff contends amoun
ts to clear error
of law, he moves the Court to reconsider its prior Opinion and Order affirming
AU De Steno’s
decision. (PL’s Br. 2-4, ECF No. 19). On the other hand, the Commissioner urges
the Court to
deny Plaintiffs motion because “[his] arguments fail to even sugges
t the extraordinary

-

Specifically, those steps inquire whether a claimant “(I) is engaged in substan
tial gainfu

an impairment or combination of impairments that is ‘severe’; (3) suffers from an impair l activity; (2) suffers from
ment or combination of
impairments that meets or equals a listed impairment; (4) is able to perform
his or her past relevant work; (5) is able

to perform work existing in significant numbers in the national economy.” McCre
a v. Comm ‘r ofSoc. Sec., 370
F.3d 357, 360 (3d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).

2

circumstances required under the legal standard for motions for reconsideration.” (Def.
‘s

Opp’ n

Br. 4, ECF No. 23). The Court now reviews that standard.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD

In this District, motions for reconsideration are governed by Local Civil Rule 7.1(i), and
“[r]econsideration is an extraordinary remedy, that is granted ‘very sparingly.” Bracke
tt v.
Ashcroft, No. 03-3988, 2003 WL 22303078, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 7, 2003) (quoting Interfa
ith Cmty.

Org. v, Jioneywell Int’l Inc., 215 F. Supp. 2d 482, 507 (D.N.J. 2002)). The purpos
e of such a
motion “is to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered eviden
ce.” Jilin
Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Chertof.f 447 F.3d 196, 199 n.4 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation and interna quotat
l
ion

marks omitted). Thus, a movant may not use a motion for reconsideration to relitigate old matter
s
or to raise new matters that could have been raised before the court reached its original decisio
n.
P. SchoenfldAssetMgmt. LLCv. Cendant Corp., 161 F. Supp. 2d 349, 352 (D.N.J. 2001) (citatio
n
omitted). To prevail on a motion for reconsideration, the movant “must satisfy a high burden
, and
must ‘rely on one of three major grounds: (1) an intervening change in controlling
law; (2) the
availability of new evidence not available previously; or (3) the need to correct clear
error of law
or prevent manifest injustice.” Leja v. Schmidt Mfg., Inc., 743 F. Supp. 2d 444, 456
(D.N.J. 2010)
(quoting N. River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reins. Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995))
.
III.

DISCUSSION

A.

Whether AU De Steno’s Findings at Steps Two and Four are Consistent

Plaintiff claims that AU De Steno found at step two that he has three “severe” psychi
atric
impairments, namely, depression, an anxiety disorder, and an impulse contro disorde
l
r. (P1.’ s Br.
2, 4). That finding, according to Plaintiff, conflicts with AU De Steno’s step four
finding that he
“had the [RFC] to perform the full range of light work

3

.

.

.

without significant non-exertional

limitations” prior to January 1, 2011. (Id. at 2-4). Because AU De Steno found
his psychiatric
impairments to be severe at step two, Plaintiff argues AU De Steno had to
find that those
impairment produced an RFC limitation at step four.
4

(Id. at 3).

However, in Santini v.

Commissioner of Social Security, Judge Stanley R. Chesler rejected the
same argument as
“meritless” because “the legal tests at step two and a step four are wholly different.”
No. 08-5348,
2009 WL 3380319, at

*

7 (D.N.J. Oct. 15, 2009), aff’d 413 F. App’x 517 (3d Cir. 2011). The

Court agrees with Judge Chesler’s conclusion.
At bottom, the step two inquiry “is a de minimis screening device to dispose of ground
less
claims.” Newell v. Comm ‘r ofSoc. Sec., 347 F.3d 541, 546 (3d Cir. 2003) (citatio
ns omitted). By
addressing Plaintiff’s psychiatric impairments at step two, AU De Steno simply heeded
the Third
Circuit’s warning that “[rjeasonable doubts on severity are to be resolved in favor

of the claimant.”

Id. at 547; see generally SSR 85-28, 1985 WL 56856, at *4 (“If an adjudicator
is unable to
determine clearly the effect of an impairment or combination of impairments on
the individual’s
ability to do basic work activities, the sequential evaluation process should
not end with the not
severe evaluation step. Rather, it should be continued.”). In any event, Plainti
ff’s argument suffers
from three additional flaws: (1) it mischaracterizes AU De Steno’s step two finding
; (2) it ignores
the other half of his step four RFC assessment; and (3) it does not point to any
specific evidence
that cuts against his step four RFC assessment.
At step two, AU Dc Steno found that Plaintiff “has had severe impair
ments involving
spinal disc disease, diabetes, obesity, osteoarthritis of the knee, depression,
an anxiety disorder
with panic attacks, and an impulse control disorder” since April 30, 2007.
(R. at 296). AU De
Steno did not explicitly find, as Plaintiff suggests, that each of Plainti
ff’s three psychiatric
Plaintiff raises the same argument with respect to AU De Steno’s “sever
ity” findings concerning his obesity and
diabetes. (P1. ‘s Br. 3). That argument fails for the same reasons discussed
throughout Part III. A. of this Opinion.
‘‘

4

impairments would qualify as a “severe” impairment on its own. (Id.). This distinction
cannot be
ignored. See McQueen v. Comm ‘r ofSoc. Sec., No. 07-2092, 2008 WL 1925298, at *2..3
(D.N.J.
Apr. 30, 2008), aff’d 322 F. App’x 240 (3d Cir. 2009) (highlighting another plainti
ffs similar
mischaracterization of an AU’s step two finding).

Indeed, when a claimant has multiple

impairments, an AU ‘s step two analysis must “consider the combined effect of
all of [his)
impairments without regard to whether any such impairment, if considered separa
tely, would be
of sufficient severity.” 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1523, 416.923. Upon finding a medically severe

combination of impairments, an AU must consider “the combined impact of the
impairments.
throughout the disability determination process.” 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1523, 416.923. Here, AU De

Steno did just that—as discussed in greater detail in this Court’s prior Opinion—and
it was thus
logical for him to find at step four that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform the full
range of light work
without significant nonexertional limitations prior to January 1, 2011. See
McQueen, 2008 WL
1925298, at *3 (reaching similar conclusion).
What is more, Plaintiffs argument that AU De Steno’s findings at steps two and
four are
inconsistent ignores the other half of his step four finding. Not only did AU
De Steno find at step
four that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform the full range of light work withou
t significant non
exertional limitations prior to January 1, 2011, but he also found that beginning
on that date:
[Plaintiff) has had the [RFC] to lift and carry objects weighing up to
five pounds; sit for up to six hours in half-hour intervals; and stand
and walk up to two hours in half-hour intervals in an eight-hour day.
[Plaintiff) can never bend, squat, or stoop. He can do no work
requiring sustained periods of concentration or strict adherence to a
work schedule.
(R. at 302). In doing so, AU De Steno ultimately found that Plaintiffs
psychiatric impairments
produced some RFC limitations.

5

Lastly, by failing to point this Court to any specific evidence that cuts agains
t AU De
Steno’s step four RFC assessment, Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden
of proof. Poulos v.
Comm ‘r of Soc. Sec., 474 F.3d 88, 92 (3d Cir. 2007) (“The claimant bears the
ultimate burden of
establishing steps one through four.”). As this Court noted in its previous Opinio
n in this matter,
AU Dc Steno marshaled a great deal of evidence in support of his RFC assessment.
Muniz, 2014
WL 2926525, at *15. With regard to Plaintiffs psychiatric impairments, AU
De Steno provided
a thorough discussion of Plaintiff’s psychiatric progress notes and other treatm
ent records. (R. at
300-01). He noted that “[t]he focus of most, if not all, of [Plaintiffs psychi
atric] progress notes
was primarily on relationship issues, instead of any signs or symptoms of depres
sion and anxiety.”
(Id. at 300). Remarkably, as AU De Steno highlighted, a January 2009 psychi
atric progress note

stated that Plaintiff “loves drama, thrives on it, [and] creates it,” and opined
that Plaintiff was not
depressed any more. (Id. at 301, 570). Because AU Dc Steno discussed the
evidence at length in
reaching his step four RFC assessment, the Court again affirms that finding
. See, e.g., Garret v.
Comm ‘r of Soc. Sec., 274 F. App’x 159, 163-64 (3d Cir. 2008) (conclu
ding that AU’s RFC was

based on substantial evidence where AU provided comprehensive discussion
of relevant medical
evidence).
B.

Whether AU De Steno’s Findings at Steps Three and Four are Consis
tent

Plaintiff next argues that AU De Steno’s step three finding that Plaintiff
“has had moderate
restriction of the activities of daily living, moderate difficulties in mainta
ining social functioning,
[and] moderate difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, or
pace” is inconsistent with
his step four finding that “prior to January 1, 2011
full range of light work

.

.

.

.

.

.

[Plaintiff] had the [RFC] to perform the

without significant non-exertional limitations.” (Pl.’s Br. 2-4).

6

Underlying Plaintiff’s argument, is the assumption that AU Dc Steno’s
step three finding
“cover{s] the entire period at issue, April 30, 2007— December 31, 2010..

.

.“

(Id. at 3).

Again, Plaintiff has mischaracterized AU De Steno’s findings. AU De Steno
did not
qualify precisely when Plaintiff had moderate difficulties stemming from
psychiatric mental
impairments. (R. at 297-98). He instead merely noted that Plaintiff “has had”
such difficulties.
(Id. at 298). While AU De Steno concluded at step four that Plaintiff’s moder
ate difficulties
produced no nonexertional limitations prior to January 1, 2011, he apparently
concluded that those
difficulties produced nonexertional limitations after that date. (Id. at 297-98
, 302). Specifically,
AU De Steno concluded that beginning on January 1, 2011, Plaintiff could
“do no work requiring
sustained periods of concentration or strict adherence to a work schedule.” (Id.
at 302). Therefore,
AU De Steno’s decision is internally consistent.
Because AU De Steno’s RFC assessment—finding Plaintiff capable of light work
without
significant nonexertional limitations prior to January 1, 2011—is based on
substantial evidence, it
was proper for him to rely on Medical-Vocational Guideline 202.20 at step
five, see, e.g., Nerahoo
v. Colvin, No. 12-6553, 2013 WL 6190197, *6..7 (D.N.J. Nov. 26, 2013)
(affirming AU’s step
five reliance on the Medical-Vocational Guidelines where AU’s RFC
finding was based on
substantial evidence). The Court declines to consider Plaintiff’s speculation
about AU De Steno’s
motivations. Suffice it to say that AU Dc Steno’s decision is based on
substantial evidence, and
that this Court thus denies Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. See Richar
dson, 402 U.S. at 401
(Substantial evidence “means such relevant evidence as a reason
able mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.”).

7

IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed herein, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for reconsiderati
on.

An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.

---

//

DATED: September5Ol4

JOL. LINARES
U DISTRICT JUDGE

8