LOVE v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS et al

Filing 7

OPINION fld. Signed by Judge Susan D. Wigenton on 1/6/14. (sr, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

LEMONT LOVE,
Plaintiff,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
et al.,
Defendants.

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Civil Action No.: 13-1050 (SDW)

OPINION

APPEARANCES:
LEMONT LOVE, Plaintiff pro se
# 331321C
Northern State Prison
P.O. Box 2300
Newark, New Jersey 07114
CHRISTINE H. KIM, ESQ.
OFFICE OF THE N.J. ATTORNEY GENERAL
Department of Law & Public Safety – Division of Law
R.J. Hughes Justice Complex
25 Market Street, P.O. Box 112
Trenton, New Jersey 08625
Counsel for Defendants
WIGENTON, District Judge
This matter is before the Court pursuant to a motion to dismiss
Plaintiff’s

Complaint,

under

Federal

Rule

of

Civil

Procedure

12(b)(6), (ECF No. 5), filed on behalf of Defendants, New Jersey
Department of Corrections (“NJDOC”), Northern State Prison (“NSP”),

and Paul Lagana.
motion.

Plaintiff has filed an opposition to Defendants’

(ECF No. 6.)

This motion is decided on the papers, without

oral argument, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 78.

For the reasons set

forth below, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion and dismiss the
Complaint accordingly.
I.
A.

BACKGROUND

Procedural History
Plaintiff filed his Complaint initially in the Superior Court

of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, on August 1, 2012.
No. 1-1.)

(ECF

Thereafter, on February 21, 2013, Defendants removed the

case to this District Court.

(ECF No. 1.)

After granting an

extension of time to answer or otherwise respond to the Complaint,
Defendants filed this motion to dismiss on May 1, 2013.
5.)

Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendants’ motion on May 21,

2013.
B.

(ECF No.

(ECF No. 6.)

Statement of Facts
Plaintiff brings this action against the following Defendants:

the NJDOC; the NSP; Paul Lagana, Administrator at NSP; Ms. McGee,
NSP Control Officer; and John Doe Defendants 1-10.

(ECF No. 1-1,

Complaint at ¶ 1.)

Plaintiff alleges that he had made several

complaints

and

verbally

by

the

administrative

remedy

process

concerning the mailroom staff “not giving [Plaintiff his] mail in
a timely fashion.”

(Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that he was told that
2

his “mail is sorted and handed out on a daily basis.”

(Id.)

Plaintiff complains that this alleged wrongful conduct by Defendants
has deprived him of his constitutional right of access to the courts.
(Id.)
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants have failed to provide
adequate light in his cell, which has led to the deterioration of
his eyesight.

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the light in his

cell was broken and he asked to have it fixed.

“Despite a work order

being placed to fix this problem,” the light remained broken and
Plaintiff was “forced to read and write in virtual darkness for the
past several months.”

(Id. at p. 2.)

blurry vision and frequent headaches.

Plaintiff now suffers from
(Id.)

Plaintiff seeks over $850,000.00 in compensatory and punitive
damages from Defendants.

(Id. at ¶ 3.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)); see also Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224,
234 (3d Cir.2008) (“[S]tating ... a claim requires a complaint with
enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest the required
element.

This does not impose a probability requirement at the
3

pleading stage, but instead simply calls for enough facts to raise
a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the
necessary element.”) (internal quotations omitted).
When considering a motion to dismiss under Iqbal, the Court must
conduct a two-part analysis.

“First, the factual and legal elements

of a claim should be separated.

The District Court must accept all

of the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any
legal conclusions.

Second, a District Court must then determine

whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show
that the plaintiff has a plausible claim for relief.”

Fowler v. UPMC

Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210–11 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal citations
and

quotations

omitted).

“A

pleading

that

offers

labels

and

conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do.

Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked

assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 678 (internal quotations and alterations omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
A.

Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Defendants NJDOC and NSP first argue that they are entitled to

immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, and that they are not
“persons” subject to liability under 42 U.S.C § 1983.
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that, “The Judicial power of the United States shall not
4

be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”

As a general

rule, a suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability that
must be paid from public funds in a state treasury is barred from
federal court by the Eleventh Amendment, unless Eleventh Amendment
immunity is waived by the state itself or by federal statute.

See,

e.g., Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 389
(1998); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974); Rivers v. SCI
Huntingdon Prison, ––– F. App’x ––––, 2013 WL 3958615 (3d Cir.2013).
Thus, absent consent by a state, the Eleventh Amendment bars federal
court suits for money damages against that state or any one of its
agencies.

Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections, supra; Rivers, supra.

Section 1983 does not override a state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 340–41 (1979); Ellington v. Cortes,
––– F. App'x ––––, 2013 WL 3822161, *2 (3d Cir. 2013).
The NJDOC is a state entity or agency of the State of New Jersey.
See N.J. Stat. Ann. 30:1B (establishing “in the Executive Branch of
the State Government a principal department which shall be known as
the Department of Corrections.”).
the NJDOC.

Moreover, NSP is a sub-part of

Wilson v. Haas, No. 11–7001, 2012 WL 6761819, at *5

(D.N.J. Dec. 28, 2012) (explaining that “New Jersey state prison
facilities are entitled to immunity from suit in federal court under
5

the Eleventh Amendment and, therefore, they are not “persons” within
the

meaning

of

§

1983.”)

(citing

Grabow

v.

Southern

State

Correctional Facility, 726 F. Supp. 537, 538–39 (D.N.J. 1989); Cf.
Bey v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corr., 98 F. Supp.2d 650, 657 (E.D.Pa.
2000) (finding that State correctional institutions were arms of the
state because those entities were run exclusively by and through the
State’s Department of Corrections, and therefore they were immune
under the Eleventh Amendment from claims raised in a prisoner’s §
1983 action).

Accordingly, the Complaint against the NJDOC and NSP

is barred by the Eleventh Amendment and should be dismissed with
prejudice accordingly, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(2). 1
B.

Respondeat Superior
Defendants next argue that Plaintiff’s claims against Paul

Lagana, Administrator at NSP, are based solely on the impermissible
theory of respondeat superior because Plaintiff does not allege facts
to establish that Lagana was personally involved in the alleged
wrongdoings.

Indeed, the Complaint alleges nothing more than “Paul

1

In addition, as argued by Defendants in their motion to dismiss,
the Complaint must be dismissed as against Defendants NJDOC and NSP
because both the NJDOC and the NSP are not entities cognizable as
“persons” for the purposes of a § 1983 suit. See Will v. Michigan
Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 70–71 and n. 10 (1989); Duran
v. Merline, 923 F. Supp.2d 702, 713, fn. 4 (D.N.J. 2013) (holding
that a jail is not a “person” under § 1983).
6

Lagana is the administrator and has supervisory liability over the
staff defendants.”

(ECF No. 1-1, Compl. at p. 2.)

“In order for liability to attach under § 1983, a plaintiff must
show that a defendant was personally involved in the deprivation of
his federal rights.”

Fears v. Beard, No. 12–4564, 2013 WL 3834399,

*2 (3d Cir. July 25, 2013) (per curiam) (citing Rode v. Dellaciprete,
845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)).

“[L]iability cannot be

predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.

Personal

involvement can be shown through allegations of personal direction
or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.”

Evancho v. Fisher, 423

F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).

See also Walsifer

v. Borough of Belmar, 262 F. App’x 421, 425 (3d Cir. 2008).
Allegations of personal involvement, however, “must be made with
appropriate particularity.”

Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207.

In this case, the Complaint fails to assert specific allegations
that Lagana had any personal involvement in the alleged mail delivery
delays or the light in Plaintiff’s cell that remained broken for
several months.

Plaintiff’s allegation against Lagana is plainly

conclusory in nature and is limited solely to Lagana’s role as
supervisor/administrator at NSP.
Consequently, Plaintiff fails to state any allegations “with
appropriate particularity” as to Lagana with regard to the alleged
wrongful conduct of the NSP staff sufficient to give rise to a
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plausible claim for relief under § 1983.
Therefore,

this

Court

concludes

See Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207.
that

Plaintiff’s

general

allegation against Lagana is based on an impermissible theory of
respondeat superior.
against

Lagana,

the

As this is the only allegation asserted
Complaint

is

dismissed

without

prejudice

accordingly. 2
C.

The Complaint Fails to State a Cognizable Claim
1.

Interference with Mail Claim

“[P]risoners, by virtue of their incarceration, do not forfeit
their First Amendment right to use of the mails.”

Jones v. Brown,

461 F.3d 353, 358 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Bieregu v. Reno, 59 F.3d
1445, 1452 (3d Cir. 1995)); Nixon v. Secretary Pennsylvania Dept.
of Corrections, 501 F. App’x 176, 178 (3d Cir. 2012).

However, a

prisoner’s right to send and receive mail may be restricted for
legitimate penological concerns.

Id. (citing Thornburgh v. Abbott,

490 U.S. 401, 407 (1989); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)).

2

The Court recognizes that Plaintiff may be able to cure the
deficiencies of his Complaint by pleading facts of personal
involvement by the supervisory Defendant, Paul Lagana, with the
requisite particularity as required under Rode, supra. Plaintiff
should note that an amended complaint supersedes prior complaints.
See Snyder v. Pascack Valley Hosp., 303 F.3d 271, 276 (3d Cir. 2003).
Accordingly, an amended complaint must name all defendants, assert
facts stating a claim against each defendant, and must otherwise be
complete in and of itself. Id.

8

Here, Plaintiff alleges that he does not receive his mail in
a timely fashion and that Defendant McGee does not permit inmates
to carry their mail to the mailbox, but rather collects the mail
herself.

Plaintiff relates these instances of interference with his

mail as an infringement on his access to the courts.

In his

opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Plaintiff generally
alleges that the delay in receiving his mail has caused him to miss
deadlines with the court.

(ECF No. 6 at 9.)

Plaintiff does not

allege that any lawsuits were dismissed or terminated as a result
of the alleged delay in receiving or sending his mail.
Plaintiff’s claim of interference with his mail can be construed
as a denial of access to the courts in violation of the First
Amendment.

A prisoner who alleges such a violation of his right of

access to the courts, however, must show “actual injury.”

Dunbar

v. Barone, 487 F. App’x 721, 724 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Lewis v. Casey,
518 U.S. 343, 349-50 (1996)).

Plaintiff may show “actual injury”

by alleging that Defendants’ interference with his mail resulted in
the loss or rejection of a claim.
U.S. at 351).

Dunbar, supra (citing Lewis, 518

However, such a claim must relate to either a direct

or collateral challenge to the prisoner’s sentence or conditions of
confinement.

Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355 (“Impairment of any other

litigating capacity is simply one of the incidental ... consequences
of conviction and incarceration.”); Nixon, 501 F. App’x at 178, fn.
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2.

As noted above, Plaintiff has not specifically identified any

claims or lawsuits relating to a challenge to his conviction or
sentence, or to his conditions of confinement, which were lost or
rejected due to the alleged interference with his mail.
Accordingly, he has not established actual injury, and this claim
is dismissed without prejudice, in its entirety as against all named
Defendants, for failure to state a claim at this time.
2.

Conditions of Confinement Claim

Finally, Plaintiff alleges that his cell light had been broken
for several months and was not fixed despite a work order for same.
He further alleges that he was “forced to read and write in virtual
darkness” resulting in blurred vision and headaches.
9.)

(ECF No. 6 at

The Court construes Plaintiff’s allegations as asserting an

Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim.
Prison conditions may amount to cruel and unusual punishment
contrary to the Eighth Amendment if they cause “unquestioned and
serious deprivations of basic human needs ... [or] deprive inmates
of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.”

Tillman

v. Lebanon County Correctional Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 417–18 (3d
Cir. 2000) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981));
Allah v. Ricci, --- F. App’x ----, 2013 WL 3816043, *2 (3d Cir. Jul.
24, 2013); Gardner v. Lanigan, Civil No. 13-7064 (FLW), 2013 WL
6669230, *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 18, 2013).
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To state an Eighth Amendment

conditions of confinement claim, an inmate must satisfy both an
objective and subjective test.

Namely, the prisoner must allege

facts plausibly showing (1) objectively, his conditions were so
severe that they deprived him of an identifiable, basic human need,
such as food, clothing, shelter, sleep, recreation, medical care,
and reasonable safety, 3 and (2) defendant was deliberately
indifferent to the risk of harm to the plaintiff’s health or safety.
See Allah, supra (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 837
(1994); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)).

“However, only

‘extreme deprivations’ are sufficient to present a claim for
unconstitutional conditions of confinement.”

Dockery v. Beard, 509

F. App’x 107, 112 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503
U.S. 1, 8-9 (1992)).
Some federal courts have held that the constitutional
requirement of adequate shelter for a prisoner includes adequate
lighting.

See Hoptowit v. Spellman, 753 F.2d 779, 783 (9th Cir. 1985)

(holding that “[a]dequate lighting is one of the fundamental

3

“Relevant considerations include the length of confinement, the
amount of time prisoners must spend in their cells each day,
sanitation, lighting, bedding, ventilation, noise, education and
rehabilitation programs, opportunities for activities outside the
cells, and the repair and functioning of basic physical activities
such as plumbing, ventilation and showers.” Dockery v. Beard, 509
F. App’x 107, 112 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d
63, 67 (3d Cir. 1996)).
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attributes of ‘adequate shelter’ required by the Eighth Amendment,”
and that the Eighth Amendment is violated where the evidence showed
that “lighting was so poor that it was inadequate for reading and
caused eyestrain and fatigue”); Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323, 341-42
(5th Cir. 2004); Carney v. Craven, 40 F. App’x 48, 51 (6th Cir. 2002).
However, the circumstances, nature, and duration of the deprivation
are critical in determining whether the condition (in this case,
inadequate lighting) is grave enough to form the basis of a viable
Eighth Amendment claim.

See Fantone v. Herbik, 528 F. App’x 123,

126-28 (3d Cir. 2013); Dockery, 509 F. App’x at 112.
Here, Plaintiff’s bare allegation that the light in his cell
was broken would not normally rise to the level of an extreme
constitutional deprivation to satisfy the objective component of an
Eighth Amendment violation.

Nevertheless, Plaintiff also alleges

that the lighting has not been fixed and he has not been moved to
a cell with lighting for a substantially long period of time. 4
Moreover, he alleges that his cell is virtually dark, resulting in
his suffering from blurry vision and headaches from trying to read
and write in such inadequate illumination.
4

Therefore, these

At the time Plaintiff filed his Complaint, in August 2012, he
alleged that the lighting situation has existed for several months
and has not been fixed. On May 21, 2013, when Plaintiff filed
opposition to Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff again indicated that the
light in his cell has not been fixed. This ten month time period
is substantial in length.
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allegations as to the overall circumstances, nature and duration of
the inadequate lighting condition may suggest an Eighth Amendment
violation.
However, the Complaint contains no allegations suggesting that
Lagana or any other identifiable prison officials were personally
involved, that they knew of this lighting deprivation, or that they
failed to take reasonable measures in response to such knowledge.
As discussed in the previous section, the allegation against Lagana
is based solely on an impermissible theory of respondeat superior.
See McKeither v. Folino, --- F. App’x ----, 2013 WL 5421990, *2, fn.
5 (3d Cir. Sep. 30, 2013) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (“[A] prison
official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for
denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the
official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health
or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm
exists, and he must also draw the inference.”).

Thus, the Complaint

fails to state a viable § 1983 conditions of confinement claim against
Lagana or any other named Defendant 5 at this time.
Therefore, this conditions of confinement claim pertaining to
inadequate lighting is dismissed without prejudice, in its entirety,
5

Defendant McGee is named only with respect to the interference with
mail claim, which has been dismissed as indicated above.
13

as against all named Defendants.

Plaintiff may seek leave to file

an amended Complaint in the event he can cure the deficiencies as
noted.

See fn. 2 supra.

Finally, the Court need not address the issue of punitive
damages as raised by Defendants in their motion to dismiss, because
it is rendered moot by dismissal of the Complaint.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Defendants’ motion
to dismiss the Complaint.

Accordingly, this action is dismissed

with prejudice as to the named Defendants, the NJDOC and NSP, because
these Defendants are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity and are
not persons subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

However,

the Complaint is dismissed without prejudice as to the remaining
Defendants for failure to state a cognizable claim at this time.

An

accompanying Order is filed herewith.

January 6, 2014

S/Susan D. Wigenton____
SUSAN D. WIGENTON
United States District Court

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