WEBSTER v. WOJTOWICZ et al

Filing 62

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Esther Salas on 09/17/2018. (sms)

Not for Publication
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
:
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
OFFICER PAUL WOJTOWICZ, et al., :
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Defendants.
:
:
ABDUL-JABBAR WEBSTER,

Civil Action No. 13-1171 (ES)
MEMORANDUM OPINION

SALAS, DISTRICT JUDGE
It appearing that:
1.

This matter is before the Court upon Defendants Jesse D. Hilburn and Paul

Wojtowicz’s (collectively, “Defendants”) second Motion for Summary Judgment. (D.E. No. 61).
2.

In a prior Opinion and Order, the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’

first Motion for Summary Judgment.
29th Order”)).

(D.E. Nos. 56 (“August 29th Opinion”) & 57 (“August

Specifically, the Court granted the Motion on Plaintiff’s slander claim, as well as

his claims pursuant to the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments.

(August 29th Order).

The Court also granted summary judgment with regard to Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim
alleging excessive force, but denied summary judgment on his Fourteenth Amendment fabrication
of evidence claim.

(Id.).

The Complaint also alleged a Fourth Amendment excessive force

claim against Defendants, but Defendants declined to move for summary judgment on that claim.
3.

Subsequently, with the permission of the Court, Defendants filed the instant Motion

for Summary Judgment, seeking judgment in their favor on the Fourteenth Amendment fabrication
of evidence claim and the Fourth Amendment excessive force claim. (D.E. No. 61).

Plaintiff

has not filed any opposition. 1
4.

The allegations of the Complaint arise from an incident in April 2011 during which

Defendants, who are officers with the Jersey City Police Department, arrested and charged Plaintiff
with possession of a controlled dangerous substance, possession of a controlled dangerous
substance with intent to distribute, possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to
distribute within 1,000 feet of a school, possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent
to distribute within 500 feet of a public housing facility, resisting arrest, obstructing the
administration of the law, and aggravated assault.

(D.E. No. 61-3, Defendants’ Statement of

Undisputed Material Facts (“Defs.’ SMF”) ¶ 1).
5.

A jury subsequently found Plaintiff guilty on three of those counts: possession of a

controlled dangerous substance, possession with intent to dispense or distribute a controlled
dangerous substance and possession with intent to dispense or distribute a controlled dangerous
substance within 1,000 feet of school property.
6.

(Id. ¶ 2).

The state court sentenced Plaintiff to a term of ten years, with five years parole

1

Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party shows that there is “no genuine issue of any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). An issue is “genuine” if it is
supported by evidence such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in the nonmoving party’s favor. Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under
the governing law.” Id. The burden is on the moving party to show no genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving
party may discharge its burden by showing “that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s
case.” Id. at 325. If the movant meets this burden, the nonmovant must then set forth specific facts that demonstrate
the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324; Azur v. Chase Bank, USA, Nat’l Ass’n, 601 F.3d 212, 216 (3d
Cir. 2010). Conversely, where the moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, it “must show that it has produced
enough evidence to support the findings of fact necessary to win.” El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. (SEPTA), 479 F.3d
232, 237 (3d Cir. 2007). “Put another way, it is inappropriate to grant summary judgment in favor of a moving party
who bears the burden of proof at trial unless a reasonable juror would be compelled to find its way on the facts needed
to rule in its favor on the law.” Id. at 238.
Notably, the “evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in
his favor.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. But the non-moving party “must do more than simply show that there is
some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
586 (1986); see also Swain v. City of Vineland, 457 F. App’x 107, 109 (3d Cir. 2012) (stating that the non-moving
party must support its claim “by more than a mere scintilla of evidence”).

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ineligibility. (Id. ¶ 3).
7.

With regard to Plaintiff’s fabrication of the evidence claim, the Court stated the

following in its prior Opinion:
As to Webster’s Fourteenth Amendment claim based on fabrication
of evidence (i.e., that the Officers planted narcotics on him), the
Third Circuit has held that there can be “a stand-alone Fourteenth
Amendment claim predicated on the fabrication of evidence.”
Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 294 (3d Cir. 2014) (“[I]f a
defendant has been convicted at a trial at which the prosecution has
used fabricated evidence, the defendant has a stand-alone claim
under section 1983 based on the Fourteenth Amendment if there is
a reasonable likelihood that, without the use of that evidence, the
defendant would not have been convicted.”); see also EbuzorOnayemi v. Union Cty. Police Dep’t, No. 16-1869, 2017 WL
1377640, at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 12, 2017) (“In the Third Circuit,
fabrication-of-evidence is a freestanding constitutional tort.”). Here,
the Officers have not moved for summary judgment on Webster’s
claim based on his fabrication-of-evidence allegation. Because this
issue is not presently before the Court, Webster’s claim that the
Officers violated his substantive due process rights by “planting
drug narcotics on [him]” (Compl. at 4) survives.
(August 29th Opinion at 13-14).
8.

In the instant Motion, Defendants now argue that this claim is barred by Heck v.

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

As the Court also stated in its prior Opinion:

In Heck, the Supreme Court held that:
to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional
conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm
caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render
a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff
must prove that the conviction or sentence has been
reversed on direct appeal, . . . declared invalid by a
state tribunal authorized to make such determination,
or called into question by a federal court’s issuance
of a writ of habeas corpus. A claim for damages
bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence
that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable
under § 1983. Thus, when a state prisoner seeks
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damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must
consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff
would necessarily imply the invalidity of his
conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint
must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can
demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has
already been invalidated. But if the district court
determines that the plaintiff’s action, even if
successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any
outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff,
the action should be allowed to proceed, in the
absence of some other bar to the suit.
512 U.S. at 486-87 (emphasis in original)
(August 29th Opinion at 7).

The Court further noted that Heck applies to § 1983 actions seeking

either monetary damages or declaratory relief.

(Id. (citing Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 643

(1997))).
9.

Plaintiff’s fabrication of evidence claim, for which the sole supporting factual

allegation in the Complaint is that Defendants “plant[ed] drug narcotics on [him],” is barred by
Heck. 2

As stated above, Plaintiff was convicted of possession of a controlled dangerous

substance, possession with intent to dispense or distribute a controlled dangerous substance and
possession with intent to dispense or distribute a controlled dangerous substance within 1,000 feet
of school property.

If Plaintiff is successful with his § 1983 fabrication of evidence claim, it

would require a finding that fabricated evidence was used at trial and, without that evidence, there
is a reasonable likelihood he would not have been convicted.

See Halsey, 750 F.3d at 294.

Certainly, a finding in this matter that the drug evidence was fabricated, i.e. planted on Plaintiff,
and without such evidence, there is a reasonable probability that Plaintiff would not have been

2

The Court notes that even if not barred by Heck, this claim would be subject to dismissal as insufficiently
pled under Iqbal. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

4

convicted, would necessarily imply the invalidity of his convictions on the drug possession
charges. See Long v. Atl. City Police Dep’t, 670 F.3d 436, 447 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding that claim
that defendants conspired to obtain a conviction by “committing perjury and/or fabricating
evidence” barred by Heck); Spuck v. Clearfield Cty., Pa., 540 F. App’x 73, 74 (3d Cir. 2013)
(planting false evidence claim barred by Heck); Tillery v. Wittevrongels, No. 17-2366, 2017 WL
1927923, at *3 (D.N.J. May 10, 2017) (“[T]he implied invalidity of the conviction arising out of
altered evidence is exactly what a plaintiff is required to plead to proceed on a fabricated/altered
evidence claim . . . . Thus, where a plaintiff raises a claim for money damages asserting that altered
or fabricated evidence was used against him at trial and resulted in his conviction, that claim is
barred by the Heck doctrine unless and until he has his conviction arising out of that evidence
invalidated.”).
10.

As such, Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment falsification of evidence claim is

dismissed without prejudice. See Coulston v. Superintendent Houtzdale SCI, 651 F. App’x 139,
143 (3d Cir. 2016) (“We stress that the claims denied on Heck grounds are without prejudice.”);
Fottler v. United States, 73 F.3d 1064, 1065-66 (10th Cir. 1996) (noting that Heck dismissals are
without prejudice).
11.

On Plaintiff’s excessive force claim, Defendants argue that the Court lacks

jurisdiction to grant the relief he seeks.

In the Complaint, Plaintiff requests that the Court

“discipline these officers because they have abuse [sic] they [sic] authority knowingly, discipline
them for transgress all bounds.”

(Compl. ¶ 7).

However, Defendants argue that because

disciplining police officers falls outside of this Court’s jurisdiction, see In Re Telfair, 745 F. Supp.
2d 536, 538 (D.N.J. 2010), and that is the only relief he seeks, Plaintiff’s excessive force claim
must be dismissed.
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12.

Reading the Complaint broadly, as this Court is required to do for a pro se plaintiff,

the Court finds that Plaintiff’s request for “disciplining the officers” can be construed to seek
monetary, as well as declaratory relief.

This is especially true when looking at the allegations of

the Complaint as a whole, wherein he describes the administrative remedies he sought prior to
filing the Complaint and stated: “no relief was resolved nor was the officer discipline[d]…”
(Compl. ¶ 5) (emphasis added).

Moreover, Plaintiff later submitted a copy of his hospital medical

bills, also supporting the inference that he intended to seek monetary damages as well in his
Complaint.

See Sheppard v. Zavis, No. 11-2398, 2012 WL 2341036, at *7 (D.N.J. June 19, 2012)

(“Construing Plaintiff's amended complaint liberally in light of his pro se status, the Court
concludes that Plaintiff's allegations regarding his injuries can reasonably be considered as
Plaintiff's attempt to seek compensatory damages for actual losses he may have sustained.”). 3
Because the Court does not interpret Plaintiff’s request for relief as strictly as Defendants do, their
Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s excessive force claim is denied.
13.

For these reasons, the Court GRANTS-IN-PART the Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment.
14.

An appropriate order follows.
s/ Esther Salas
Esther Salas, U.S.D.J.

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The Court notes that Defendants have also failed to address the fact that Plaintiff may seek nominal damages,
as “it is not necessary to allege nominal damages [in the complaint].” Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir.
2000) (citing Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 87 (3d Cir. 1965).

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