GERONIMO v. SLATTERY et al

Filing 40

OPINION. Signed by Judge Jose L. Linares on 1/16/14. (gmd, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

STEPHANIE GERONIMO, individually and
as a representative of a class of similarly
situated persons.

Civil Action No. 13-1542 (JLL) (MAH)

Plaintiff,

OPINION

V.

ALLAN SLATTERY, et al.
Defendants.
LINARES, District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court by way of Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.’ The Court has considered the parties’
submissions in support of and in opposition to the instant motion and decides this matter withou
t
oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78. For the reasons set forth below,
the Court grants summary judgment in favor of Defendants as to Plaintiff Stephanie Geronimo
(“Plaintiff’)’s individual and class section 1983 claims and declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims. The Court, instead, remands Plainti
ffs
state law claims to the Superior of Court of New Jersey, Hudson County, Law Division.

‘On October 11, 2013, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure l2(b)(6). (ECF No. 28). On November 26, 2013, the Court notified the parties
of its intent to convert
Defendants’ motion into one for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(d). (ECF No.
37). In doing so, the Court provided the parties with an opportunity to submit additional
documentation for the
Court’s consideration by December 10, 2013. (Id.). The parties did not submit such
documentation.

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I.

BACKGROUND
The parties do not dispute the facts of this case. On March 11, 2011, Plaintiff allegedly
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started a house fire in Jersey City, New Jersey. (Vakharia Decl. Ex. A, ECF No. 28-4). Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant Detective Allan Slattery, an employee of the Jersey City Police
Department, spearheaded an investigation into the fire and subsequently applied to the Jersey
City Municipal Court for a Complaint Warrant alleging that Plaintiff committed criminal
-

mischief. (Compl. pp. 1-2, ¶J 2-4, ECF No. 1-1; Vakharia Dccl., Ex.A). Defendant Lieutenant
Frank Sprague, who Plaintiff alleges is an employee of the Jersey City Police Department,
reviewed and approved of Detective Slattery’s application for the Complaint Warrant. (Compl.
-

pp. 3,

¶J 7-8; Vakharia Deci. Ex. A). The Jersey City Municipal Court—where Plaintiff alleges

that Defendant Maria Pagan serves as the administrator—ultimately issued the Complaint

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Warrant after finding probable cause that Plaintiff started the March 11 house fire by negligently
burning a jacket in her bed, which caused approximately $100,000 in property damage. (Compi.
p. 4,

¶ 13; Vakharia Dccl., Ex. A).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Officers Doran and Donahue, employees of the Jersey

City Police Department, executed the Complaint Warrant and arrested Plaintiff in her home on
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or about May 10, 2011. (Compl. pp. 3-4, ¶J 9-10). Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Robert
Kakoleski was the Acting Director of the Jersey Police Department at the time of the events
underlying this action. (Id. at p. 4,

¶ 14).

On May31, 2012, a grand jury for the Superior Court of New Jersey, Hudson County,
Law Division, issued an indictment against Plaintiff for criminal mischief, aggravated assault,

2

While Plaintiff states that Defendants’ recitation of the facts “omitted certain relevant information,”
Plaintiff does
not explicitly dispute any of the facts contained therein. (P1. Opp’n Br. 2, ECF No. 31).

2

and arson. (Vakharia Decl. Ex. B.). Plaintiff eventually pled guilty to criminal mischief on
January 24, 2013. (Vakharia Decl. Ex. C, ECF No. 28-4).
On February 1, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Hudson County, Law Division. (Compl. p. 1). The Court construes Plaintiff’s Complaint as
asserting the following claims: (1) false arrest and false imprisonment under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 on

account of Defendant’s violation of New Jersey Court Rule 3:3 1(c) (Count I); (2) violation of
-

the New Jersey Civil Rights (“NJCRA”), N.J.S.A. 10:6-1, et seq., on account of Defendant’s
violation of New Jersey Court Rule 3:3-1(c) (Count Tfl; (3) state common law false
imprisonment (Count III); and (4) state common law negligent infliction of emotional distress
(Count IV).
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The Complaint was removed to this Court on March 13, 2013. (ECF No. 1). This Court
has original jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s individual and class section 1983 claims pursuant to 28
U.S.C.

§ 1331 and supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims pursuant to 28

U.S.C.

§ 1367. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint on October 11, 2013.

(ECF No. 28).
IL

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when, drawing all reasonable inferences in the non
movant’s favor, there exists no “genuine dispute as to any material fact” and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). The moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter law
of
when the non-moving party fails to make “a sufficient showing on an essential element
of her
case with respect to which she has the burden of proof.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317,
323 (1986). The Court must, however, consider all facts and their reasonable inferences
in the
Plaintiff also brings these claims on behalf of a putative class in Counts V through VIII

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of her Complaint.

light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Pennsylvania Coal Ass ‘n v. Babbitt, 63 F.3d

231, 236 (3d Cir. 1995). If a reasonable juror could return a verdict for the non-moving party
regarding material disputed factual issues, summary judgment is not appropriate. See Anderson,
477 U.S. at 242-43 (“At the summary judgment stage, the trial judge’s function is not himself to

weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a
genuine issue for trial.”).
III.

DISCUSSION

The Court begins by noting that Plaintiff anchors all of her claims against Defendants on
their purported violation of New Jersey Court Rule 3:3-1(c). That Rule provides:
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A summons rather than an arrest warrant shall be issued unless:
(1) the defendant is charged with murder, kidnapping, aggravated
manslaughter, manslaughter, robbery, aggravated sexual assault,
sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, criminal sexual
contact, second degree aggravated assault, aggravated arson, arson,
burglary, violations of Chapter 35 of Title 2C that constitute first
or second degree crimes, any crime involving the possession or use
of a firearm, or conspiracies or attempts to commit such crimes;
(2) the defendant has been served with a summons and has failed
to appear;
(3) there is reason to believe that the defendant is dangerous to
self, other persons, or property;
(4) there is an outstanding warrant for the defendant;
(5) the defendant’s identity or address is not known and a warrant
is necessary to subject the defendant to the jurisdiction of the
court; or
(6) there is reason to believe that the defendant will not appear in
response to a summons.
It bears mentioning that Counts I through IV of Plauitiff’s Complaint are all premised on Defendants’ purported
violation of New Jersey Court Rule 3:3-1(c). In accordance, Plaintiff clarifies in her brief that “[t]he essence
of
[her] claim. is that [Defendants] issued a warrant for her arrest in violation of [New Jersey Court Rule 3:3-1(c)].
(P1. Opp’n Br. 6),
.

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Plaintiff contends that Defendants violated the Rule because they arrested her when they
should have instead issued her a summons. (P1. Opp’n Br. 3). As a result, Plaintiff mainta
ins
that she needlessly spent days in prison while her family tried to raise bail. (id. at 7). Since
the
parties do not dispute the facts, the Court must determine whether Defendants are entitle
d to
summary judgment. The Court first reviews Plaintiff’s individual and class section 1983 claims
.
A.

Whether Defendants are Entitled to Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s
Individual and Class Section 1983 Claims

The overriding issue before this Court is whether Plaintiff can premise her individual and
class section 1983 claims on Defendants’ purported violation of a New Jersey Court Rule.
The
Court holds that Plaintiff cannot do so.
“[Section] 1983 provides a cause of action for any person who has been deprived of
rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States by a person acting under color
of
law.” Curley v. Kiem, 298 F.3d 271, 277 (3d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). One such right,
the
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, “prohibits the
police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect’s home in order
to
make a routine felony arrest.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576 (1980).
Plaintiff contends that Defendants, acting under color of law, deprived her of her
Fourth
Amendment rights by arresting her with a “legally invalid” warrant. (P1. Opp’n Br.
7). Plaintiff
cites to United States v. Merritt, 293 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1961), to suggest that an arrest
made with
a “legally invalid” warrant is the equivalent of a constitutionally impermissible warran
tless arrest
in the home. (Id.) In support of this suggestion, Plaintiff quotes the following
text from Merritt:
“[T]he officers’ entry into the defendant’s apartment was on the same plane as
an entry without
any warrant at all and as such was an unlawful ‘invasion’ within the proscription
of the Fourth

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Amendment.” Id. (quoting 293 F.2d at 742). Notably, Plaintiff fails to explain why the Third
Circuit held that the warrant at issue in Merritt was “legally invalid.” That explan
ation is
dispositive.
In Merritt, the Third Circuit concluded that a search warrant was “legally invalid”
because of a failure to comply with its terms. 293 F.2d at 744-45. Reading the text from Merrit
t
quoted by Plaintiff in context clarifies this point:
The District Court’s correct conclusion of law that ‘the search
warrant was legally invalid,’ premised on its factual finding that
the warrant was served at night and not during daytime as
provided by its terms, obliged the District Court to sustain the
motion to dismiss, and it erred in failing to do so. Since the
warrant was ‘legally invalid’ the officers’ entry into the
defendant’s apartment was on the same plane as an entry without
any warrant at all and as such was an unlawful ‘invasion’ within
the proscription of the Fourth Amendment.[] As a consequence
the ‘fruits’ of the entry were inadmissible as evidence and should
have been suppressed.
Id. at 745-46 (emphasis added). Here, Plaintiff does not argue that the arrest warran
t in this case
was “legally invalid” because Defendants failed to comply with its terms. She instead
argues
that the arrest warrant was “legally invalid” because it was issued in violation of
New Jersey
Court Rule 3:3-1(c).

(See P1. Opp’n Br. 7). That is simply not the context in which the Third

Circuit used the words “legally invalid” in Merritt. Thus, this case is distinguishab
le from
Merritt.
Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court has declined to hold “that violati
ons of state
arrest law are also violations of the Fourth Amendment.

.

.

.“

See Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S.

164, 173 (2008); McMullen v. Maple Shade Twp., 643 F.3d 96, 100 n. 5
(3d Cir. 2011) (citations
omitted) (“Many states have enacted laws that afford individuals protect
ions beyond those found
Plaintiff cites no authority explicitly supporting the proposition that a violati
on of New Jersey Court Rule 3:3-1(c),
in and of itself could give rise to a claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and this Court
§
is aware of none.

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in the United States Constitution. But arrests made in violation of these state laws are
not, in and
of themselves, actionable under

§ 1983.”). While a state is free to create arrest rules that afford

greater protections than the Fourth Amendment, its decision to do so does not alter the
level of
protections actually afforded by the Fourth Amendment. Moore, 553 U.S. at 174.
(“A State is
free to prefer one search-and-seizure policy among the range of constitutionally permis
sible
options, but its choice of a more restrictive option does not render the less restrict
ive ones
unreasonable, and hence unconstitutional.”). In other words, “when States go above
the Fourth
Amendment minimum, the Constitution’s protections concerning search and seizure
remain the
same.” Id. at 173. Accordingly, to the extent that any Defendant violated New Jersey
Court
Rule 3:3-1(c), such a violation, in and of itself, is not actionable under section 1983. See
United
States v. Sed, 601 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[Defendant] is plainly wrong when
he argues
that his arrest in violation of Ohio law renders the conduct of the State Police
unreasonable per
se under the Fourth Amendment.”); see also Abdeo v. Borough ofS. Plainfi
eld Police Dep ‘t, No.

07-4965, 2010 WL 547603, *3 (D.N.J. Feb. 11,2010) (Linares, J.) (holding
that section 1983
liability could not arise from the violation of New Jersey Court Rule 3:3-1(f)).
B.

Whether Defendants are Entitled to Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s State
Law Claims

In addition to her section 1983 claim, Plaintiff asserts a NJCRA claim and
state law tort
claims for false imprisonment and negligent infliction of emotional distress
against Defendants.
She brings these claims on behalf of herself and a putative class. This Court
must determine
whether it will retain jurisdiction over these claims.
Section 1367(c)(3) of Title 28 provides a district court with discretion to “declin
e to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim.
it has original jurisdiction.

.

.

.“

.

.

if.

.

.

[it) has dismissed all claims over which

“‘[W]here the claim over which the district court has original
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jurisdiction is dismissed before trial, the district court must decline to decide the penden
t state
claims unless considerations ofjudicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the
parties
provide an affirmative justification for doing so.’” Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109,
123 (3d Cir.
2000) (quoting Borough of W. Muffin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 788 (3d Cir. 1995))
.
The Court begins by noting that is has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction. With respect to judicial economy, this case has not yet entered discov
ery and there
is no significant interest served by adjudicating Plaintiff’s state law claims in federal
court. See,
e.g., Freund v. Florio, 795 F. Supp. 702, 711 (D.N.J. 1992) (“[Alt this early stage
in the

litigation, dismissal of the pendent state claims in a federal forum will result in neither
a waste of
judicial resources nor prejudice to the parties.”). Moreover, the New Jersey Suprem
e Court has
determined on “several occasions” that the New Jersey State Constitution “afford
s greater
protections against unreasonable searches and seizures than the federal Constitution
affords.”
State

Pierce, 136 N.J. 184, 209 (1994) (citations omitted). In light of these determination
s, it

would be preferable for a New Jersey court to decide Plaintiff’s NJCRA and state
law tort
claims. See United Mine Workers ofAm. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (“It has
consistently been recognized that pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine of discret
ion, not of plaintiff’s
right.... Needless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter
of comity and to
promote justice between the parties.

..

This Court, therefore, in an act of discretion, declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims and remands the pendin
g state law claims
to the Superior Court of New Jersey. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(c)(3); see, e.g., Figueroa i’. Buccaneer

Hotel Inc., 188 F.3d 172, 181 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that district court “acted
well within its
discretion in dismissing Figueroa’s remaining territorial claims,” under section
l367(c)(3), “as it

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had dismissed the Title VII claim that provided the court with its [originalj jurisdiction.”); see
also Carluccio v. Parsons Inspection & Maint. Corp., No. 06-43 54, 2007 WL 1231758, *6

(D.N.J. Apr. 24, 2007) (Linares, J.) (remanding remaining state law claims sua sponte to
Superior Court of New Jersey after declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction)
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of
Defendants as to Plaintiff’s individual and class section 1983 claims. The Court declines to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law claims, and, instead, remands them
to the Superior Court of New Jersey, Hudson County, Law Division.
An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.

DATED:

of January, 2014.

JOSE L.LTNARES
U:S. DiSTRICT JUDGE

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