GUMBS v. UNIVERSITY OF MEDICINE DENTISTRY NEW JERSEY et al

Filing 16

OPINION. Signed by Judge Stanley R. Chesler on 8/28/2014. (nr, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

CLOSED

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
_________________________________
:
KEVIN B. GUMBS,
:
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 13-1749 (SRC)
:
v.
:
UNIVERSITY OF MEDICINE &
DENTISTRY OF NEW JERSEY, et al., :
Defendants.
:
_________________________________
:
KEVIN B. GUMBS,
:
Plaintiff,
:
v.
:
UNIVERSITY OF MEDICINE &
DENTISTRY OF NEW JERSEY, et al., :

Civil Action No. 14-1549 (SRC)

OPINION
APPLIES TO BOTH ACTIONS

Defendants.
:
_________________________________
CHESLER, District Judge:
These two matters are before the Court upon Plaintiff’s submission of two substantively
identical civil complaints. The first arrived unaccompanied by his filing fee or in forma paupers
(“IFP”) application. See Gumbs v. University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey
(“Gumbs-I”), Civil Action No. 13-1749 (SRC), ECF No. 1. Being denied IFP status without
prejudice in Gumbs-I, he: (a) filed his IFP application, see id., ECF No. 7; and, in addition, (b)
commenced another civil suit by submitting an identical complaint accompanied by his latest IFP
application. See Gumbs v. University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey (“Gumbs-II”),

Civil Action No. 14-1549 (SRC), ECF No. 1. 1 Since Gumbs-II is duplicative of Gumbs-I, it will
be terminated as duplicative, without assessment of the filing fee in connection with Gumbs-II. 2
Plaintiff states that, in January 2012, being in the prison’s recreation yard, he had his leg
kicked by another inmate. See Gumbs-II, ECF No. 1, at 8. The kick produced a painful swelling.
See id. Having reported his injury to the prison medical staff, Plaintiff was given pain-reducing
and swelling-reducing medication, and was scheduled for an x-ray. See id. The x-ray showed
that he did not suffer a bone fracture. See id. However, since he kept suffering from pain, a
doctor (“Dr. Godinsky”) informed him that he would be treated with a steroidal injection, and
ordered such injection. See id. After the injection, Plaintiff’s pain increased, and he was given
“a bottom bed” (so to reduce the burden on his injured leg) and seen by another doctor (“Dr.
Martin”). See id. at 8-9. Dr. Martin examined Plaintiff’s leg and made an MRI appointment.
See id. at 9. Since the MRI results established that Plaintiff suffered a rupture of his Achilles
tendon, Dr. Martin referred him for surgery. See id. A surgery was duly performed, and
Plaintiff’s leg was placed in a post-surgical cast. See id. When the case was removed, he was
provided with post-surgical physical therapy. See id.

The IFP application submitted in Gumbs-II shows that, during the last six months, Plaintiff’s
prison account fluctuated between $600 and $826, thus establishing that Plaintiff has funds to
prepay the entire $400 filing fee. See Gumbs-II, ECF No. 1-1, at 8-9. However, in light of his
prisoner status and the Supreme Court’s guidance that one need not be absolutely destitute to
proceed IFP, see Adkins v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., Inc., 335 U.S. 331 (1948) (plaintiff
need not contribute virtually his last dollar to the cost of litigating his suit, since the district court
enjoys discretion to determine whether the payment of the fees would be unduly burdensome for
plaintiff), it appears warranted to grant Plaintiff IFP status and to direct incremental assessments.
1

The power of a federal court to prevent duplicative litigation is intended “to foster judicial
economy and the ‘comprehensive disposition of litigation,’” Curtis v. Citibank, N.A., 226 F.3d
133, 138 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Kerotest Manufacturing Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equipment Co.,
342 U.S. 180, 183 (1952)), and “to protect parties from ‘the vexation of concurrent litigation
over the same subject matter.’” Id. (quoting Adam v. Jacobs, 950 F.2d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 1991)).
2

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Asserting that he is “still suffering from pain[,] . . . walking with [a] cane and taking
medication,” Plaintiff commenced these two matters matter naming, as Defendants: (a) Dr.
Godinsky; (b) Dr. Godinsly’s employer, the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey
(“NJUMD”); (c) New Jersey Department of Corrections (“NJDOC”); and (d) unspecified “John
Does et al.” Id. at 1. Plaintiff seeks $5 million in compensatory and $5 million in punitive
damages in light of Dr. Godinsky’s failure to correctly diagnose his injury and Dr. Godinsky’s
medical decision to treat Plaintiff’s leg with a steroidal injection. See id. at 4-10.
Plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a viable claim.
To survive dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), “a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In the context of Eighth Amendment claims based on
medical care, a plaintiff must demonstrate deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. See
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). “To act with deliberate indifference . . . is to
recklessly disregard a substantial risk of serious harm.” Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 330 (3d
Cir. 2009). For instance, a plaintiff may make this showing by establishing that the defendants
“intentionally den[ied] or delay[ed] medical care.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). However,
“[w]here a prisoner has received some medical attention and the dispute is [limited to] the
adequacy of the treatment, federal courts [do not] second guess medical judgments and [decline]
to constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort law.” Walker v. Fayette Cnty., 599 F.2d
573, 575 n.2 (3d Cir. 1979) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, Plaintiff’s allegations verify that he was provided with constant medical care,
although Dr. Godinsky’s medical diagnosis and his medical judgment as to Plaintiff’s treatment

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eventually proved incorrect. While Plaintiff’s allegations may, hypothetically, rise to the level of
medical malpractice, his fact fail to plausibly show that Dr. Godinsky acted with a sufficient
“culpable state of mind” when he treated Plaintiff. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment
claim against Dr. Godinsky is facially meritless. See Singletary v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr.,
266 F.3d 186, 193 (3d Cir. 2001) (“In the context of a deliberate indifference claim based on
failure to provide adequate medical treatment, ‘[i]t is well-settled that claims of negligence or
medical malpractice, without some more culpable state of mind, do not constitute deliberate
indifference’”) (quoting Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir.1999); see also White v.
Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103 (3d Cir. 1990) (since neither a difference in medical diagnoses, nor a
failure to perform specific medical tests can amount to cruel and unusual punishment, a hindsight
disagreement over medical judgment cannot not state a viable claim). Correspondingly, it will
will be dismissed. 3 Such dismissal will be with prejudice, since Plaintiff’s complaints in GumbsI and Gumbs-II, being as detailed as they are lengthy, establish that his facts cannot support a
claim of constitutional magnitude. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (a court will
exercise its discretion to deny leave to amend where it is apparent from the record that the
amendment would be futile).
Plaintiff’s claims against the remaining Defendants fare even worth. Even if Dr. Godinsky’s
actions would amount to a violation of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights, his claims against
the NJUMD are subject to dismissal since challenges based on the theory of respondeat superior
are facially deficient. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (supervising entities “may not be held liable for
unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior”).
Plaintiff’s claims against the NJDOC are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, since the NJDOC
is not a “person” amenable to suit under § 1983. See McCauley v. Univ. of V.I., 618 F.3d 232,
241 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)); see also
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 30:1B-2 (establishing the Department of Corrections as an executive-branch
agency); Grabow v. S. State Corr. Facility, 726 F. Supp. 537, 539 (D.N.J. 1989). Finally,
Plaintiff’s claims against unspecified John Does are subject to dismissal for failure to allege any
facts implicating these John Does. See Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005)
(“defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing”)
(quoting Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).
3

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An appropriate Order follows.

___s/ Stanley R. Chesler_____
STANLEY R. CHESLER
United States District Judge
Dated: August 28, 2014

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