BRYANT v. LANIGAN et al

Filing 2

OPINION. Signed by Judge Jose L. Linares on 9/12/2013. (ld, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

JERMAINE L. BRYANT,
Plaintiff,
v.
MR. G. LANIGAN, et al.,
Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 13-1857 (JLL)

OPINION

APPEARANCES:
JERMAINE L. BRYANT, Plaintiff pro se
#259250/949312B
New Jersey State Prison
P.O. Box 861
Trenton, New Jersey 08625
LINARES, District Judge
Plaintiff, Jermaine L. Bryant, a state inmate confined at
the New Jersey State Prison in Trenton, New Jersey, at the time
he filed this Complaint, seeks to bring this action in forma
pauperis.

Based on his affidavit of indigence and prison

account statement, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s application
to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a) and order the Clerk of the Court to file the Complaint
accordingly.

At this time, the Court must review the Complaint, pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A, to determine whether it
should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes

that the Complaint should be dismissed.
I.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Jermaine L. Bryant (“Plaintiff”), brings this
civil action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Defendants,
Mr. G. Lanigan, Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of
Corrections (“NJDOC”); Charles E. Warren, Administrator of the
New Jersey State Prison (“NJSP”); George Hanuschik, Regional
Supervisor Food Service Department; and Nurse Blessing.
(Complaint, Caption, ¶ 4b.)

The following factual allegations

are taken from the Complaint, and are accepted for purposes of
this screening only.

The Court has made no findings as to the

veracity of Plaintiff’s allegations.
Plaintiff alleges that, on December 11, 2012, he was in the
NJSP mess hall and went to obtain tea from a brown juice
container.

The liquid shot out of the container and burned

Plaintiff on his right hand.

An officer escorted Plaintiff to

medical for treatment at that time.
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(Compl., ¶ 6.)

At medical, Nurse Blessing found nothing wrong with
Plaintiff’s hand, stating it was a sunburn or minor burn, and
did not treat his injury.

She also did not place Plaintiff on a

call back list for treatment.

The next day, Plaintiff’s hand

had swollen and was painful.

Assistant Superintendent Barnes

issued Plaintiff an emergency medical pass and Plaintiff was
taken for treatment.

Plaintiff received an antibiotic cream and

Ibuprofen/800mg for pain.

Plaintiff complains that he has

discoloration and problems closing his hand now.

(Compl., ¶ 6.)

Plaintiff seeks more than $25,000.00 in monetary
compensation for his injuries.
II.

(Compl., ¶ 7.)

STANDARDS FOR A SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996),
requires a district court to review a complaint in a civil
action in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis or
seeks redress against a governmental employee or entity.
Specifically, the PLRA directs the district court to screen the
complaint for cognizable claims and to sua sponte dismiss any
claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief.
1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A.

28 U.S.C. §§

This action is subject to sua sponte
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screening for dismissal under both 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and
§ 1915A.
The Supreme Court refined the standard for summary
dismissal of a complaint that fails to state a claim in Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).

Citing its opinion in Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) for the
proposition that “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do,’”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555), the Supreme Court held that, to
prevent a summary dismissal, a civil complaint must now allege
“sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is facially
plausible.

Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.

2009)(citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676).

See also Bistrian v.

Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012) (“The touchstone of the
pleading standard is plausibility. ...

“[A]llegations that are

no more than conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of
truth; ... [a court should] “look for well-pled factual
allegations, assume their veracity, and then ‘determine whether
they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.’”)
(citations omitted).

In short, “[a] complaint must do more than

allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief.
to ‘show’ such an entitlement with its facts.”
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A complaint has
Fowler, 578 F.3d

at 211 (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79).

Thus, while pro se

pleadings are liberally construed, Higgs v. Atty. Gen., 655 F.3d
333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011), “pro se litigants still must allege
sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.”

Mala

v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013)
(citation omitted).

Nonetheless, courts must be cognizant that

the Iqbal standard “is not akin to a probability requirement.”
Covington v. International Association of Approved Basketball
Officials, 710 F.3d 114, 118 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 679).
III.

SECTION 1983 ACTIONS

Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory ... subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress ... .
Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege, first, the violation of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States and, second, that the
alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting

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under color of state law.

West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48

(1988); Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).
IV.
A.

DISCUSSION

Negligence Claim
Plaintiff expressly alleges that Defendants Lanigan, Warren

and Hanuschik, were negligent in allowing a defective juice
container filled with hot tea to cause injuries to his right
hand.

(Compl., ¶ 6a.)

The Complaint does not allege any

constitutional wrongs stemming from Plaintiff’s accident.
The Supreme Court has held that “liability for negligently
inflicted harm is categorically beneath the threshold of
constitutional due process.”
U.S. 833, 848 (1998).

County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523

“[M]erely negligent misconduct will not

give rise to a claim under § 1983; the state defendant must act
with a higher degree of intent”.

Burton v. Kindle, 401 F. App’x

635, 637 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849).
Indeed, the Supreme Court has long held that prison authorities’
mere negligence in and of itself does not violate a prisoner’s
constitutional rights.
330–30 (1986).

See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,

See also Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347

(1986); Singletary v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 266 F.3d 186, 193 n. 2
(3d Cir. 2001).
of tort law.”

The United States Constitution is not a “font
Lewis, 523 U.S. at 847 n. 8, 848 (The
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Constitution does not guarantee due care on the part of
government officials.); Innis v. Wilson, 334 F. App’x 454, 457
(3d Cir. 2009).

In a due process challenge, the threshold

question is whether the behavior of the government officer “is
so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock
the contemporary conscience.”

Lewis, 523 U.S. at 847 n. 8; see

Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330 (claim arising out of a fall from
pillow left on prison stairs is a claim of negligence, not
actionable under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Sanford v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 298, 305 (3d Cir.2006).
See also Robinson v. Temple Univ. Health Svcs., No. 12-2724,
2012 WL 6183603 at *2 (3d Cir. Dec. 12, 2012) (unpubl.)
(allegations of negligence do not support a section 1983 claim).
When judged against this higher standard, the facts alleged
here do not rise to such a level of indifference as to
constitute gross negligence.

Plaintiff does not allege that

Defendants knew or were made aware that the juice container was
defective before Plaintiff’s accident.

At most, Plaintiff’s

allegations, if true, demonstrate only simple negligence.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim will be dismissed with prejudice,
in its entirety as against Defendants Lanigan, Warren and
Hanuschik, for failure to state a cognizable claim under § 1983.

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Even if Plaintiff’s claim was construed as a state-law
based negligence action against these Defendants, his claim
would nonetheless be dismissed for lack of diversity
jurisdiction.

To establish diversity jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1332(a), “the party asserting jurisdiction must show
that there is complete diversity of citizenship among the
parties and an amount in controversy exceeding $75,000.”
Schneller ex rel. Schneller v. Crozer Chester Med. Ctr., 387 F.
App’x 289, 292 (3d Cir. 2010).

In this regard, a plaintiff

relying on diversity of citizenship as the asserted basis for
federal jurisdiction “‘must specifically allege each party’s
citizenship, and these allegations must show that the plaintiff
and defendant[s] are citizens of different states.’”

Gay v.

Unipack, Inc., Civil No. 10–6221, 2011 WL 5025116, at *4 (D.N.J.
Oct. 20, 2011) (citation omitted).

Thus, the Court may properly

dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in
the absence of complete diversity—i.e., where the plaintiff and
any defendant are citizens of the same state.

Schneller, 387 F.

App’x at 292 (affirming district court’ determination that it
lacked diversity jurisdiction where plaintiff and eleven
defendants were citizens of the same state).
Here, Plaintiff fails to assert complete diversity among
the named Defendants -- he does not specify the domicile of each
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defendant.

He also does not assert an amount in controversy

over $75,000, as required to establish diversity jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
$25,360.00 in damages.

Rather, Plaintiff claims only

Therefore, the Complaint will be

dismissed without prejudice as against all Defendants for
failure to assert facts necessary to establish diversity
jurisdiction at this time.

The dismissal of negligence claims

is without prejudice to Plaintiff’s right to refile his
negligence claims, if any, in a court of competent jurisdiction,
i.e., the Superior Court of New Jersey, if he complies with the
New Jersey Tort Claims Act requirements.
B.

Denial of Medical Care Claim
Next, Plaintiff alleges that Nurse Blessing denied him

medical care for his burned right hand.

It is well-established

that in order for a prisoner to establish a constitutional
violation on the basis of being provided inadequate medical
care, he must demonstrate: (1) a serious medical need; and (2)
behavior on the part of prison officials that constitutes
deliberate indifference to that need.
U.S. 97, 106 (1976).

Estelle v. Gamble, 429

A “serious medical need” is one “that has

been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one that
is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the
necessity for a doctor’s attention. [citation omitted].
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A

medical need is also serious where the denial of treatment would
result in the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’
[citation omitted], or ‘a life-long handicap or permanent
loss.’”

Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 272–73 (3d Cir.

2003).
A prison official displays deliberate indifference when he
(1) knows of an inmate’s need for medical treatment yet refuses
to administer it; (2) delays medically necessary treatment for
non-medical reasons; or (3) prevents a prisoner from receiving
needed or recommended treatment.

Moriarty v. de LaSalle, No.

12–3013, 2012 WL 5199211 at *5 (D.N.J. Oct. 19, 2012) (citing
Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999)).

Thus,

the inquiry is whether the defendant in question displayed an
“obduracy and wantonness” that demonstrates a recklessness or a
conscious disregard of a serious risk to the prisoner’s health
and safety.

See Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197 (citing Whitley v.

Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) and Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 842 (1994)).

Demonstrating mere negligence or even

professional malpractice does not on its own amount to
deliberate indifference that would sustain an Eighth Amendment
claim under § 1983.

Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d

Cir. 2004).

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In this case, Plaintiff's factual allegations do not
support an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim
against Defendant Blessing or the supervisory officials, Lanigan
and Warren, for denial of medical care.

Plaintiff received

medical treatment for his burnt hand the very next day after the
injury when it appeared that his hand had swollen.

Plaintiff

merely contends that Nurse Blessing did not treat his hand the
day of the accident because it appeared to be a sunburn.

This

allegation shows that Plaintiff was simply unsatisfied with this
diagnosis.

However, “mere disagreements over medical judgment

do not state Eighth Amendment claims.”
F.2d 103, 110 (3d Cir. 1990).

White v. Napoleon, 897

Moreover, even if Nurse

Blessing’s diagnosis was later proven to be wrong, at most,
Plaintiff alleges medical negligence, which is not cognizable
under § 1983 Eighth Amendment claims.

See Pierce v. Pitkins,

No. 12-4083, 2013 WL 1397800, *1 (3d Cir. Apr. 8, 2013)
(“Allegations of negligent treatment or medical malpractice do
not trigger constitutional protections.”) (citing Estelle, 429
U.S. at 105-06).
Therefore, the Court will dismiss without prejudice
Plaintiff’s denial of medical care claim asserted against
Defendant Blessing and supervisory officials, Commissioner

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Lanigan and Administrator Warren, for failure to state a
cognizable claim for relief under § 1983.1
V.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s claim alleging
simple negligence will be dismissed with prejudice, as against
all Defendants, for failure to state a cognizable claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) and
1915A(b)(1).

Further, Plaintiff’s denial of medical care claim

will be dismissed without prejudice, as against Defendants
Lanigan, Warren and Blessing, for failure to state a claim at
this time.

An appropriate order follows.

s/ Jose L. Linares
JOSE L. LINARES
United States District Judge
Dated: Sept. 12, 2013
This dismissal is without prejudice to Plaintiff filing an
amended Complaint to allege facts that conform to the legal
standard for Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference liability
as set forth in this Opinion. Plaintiff should note that when
an amended complaint is filed, it supersedes the original and
renders it of no legal effect, unless the amended complaint
specifically refers to or adopts the earlier pleading. See West
Run Student Housing Associates, LLC v. Huntington National Bank,
No. 12-2430, 2013 WL 1338986, *5 (3d Cir. April 4, 2013)
(collecting cases). See also 6 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R.
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1476 (3d ed. 2008). An
amended complaint may adopt some or all of the allegations in
the original complaint, but the identification of the particular
allegations to be adopted must be clear and explicit. Id. To
avoid confusion, the safer course is to file an amended
complaint that is complete in itself. Id.
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