ENGLISH v. FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION et al

Filing 37

OPINION AND ORDER that Defendant's first Motion to Dismiss is DENIED as moot; that Defendant's second motion to Dismiss is GRANTED without prejudice; and that even though it appears through Plaintiff's own exhibits and Freddie Mac' ;s submissions that the 2002 note was discharged, and that Freddie Mac has disclaimed any interest in Plaintiff's subsequent note, given Plaintiff's pro se status, to the extent Plaintiff's claims can be cured by way of amendment, Plaintiff is granted (14) days to reinstate this matter and file an Amended Complaint. Signed by Judge Claire C. Cecchi on 5/29/14. (gmd, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
MARILYNN ENGLISH
Plaintiff,

Civil Action No. 13-2028(CCC)

V.

FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE
ASSOCIATION, FEDERAL HOME
LOAN MORTGAGE CORPORATION,
BANK OF AMERICA N.A.

OPINION & ORDER

Defendants.
CECCHI, District Judge.
I.

INTRODUCTION
This matter comes before the Court on Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation’s

(“Defendant or Freddie Mac”) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Marilynn English’s (“Plaintiff’)
Amended Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and on Defendant’s Second Motion to
Dismiss. (ECF No. 18 & 32.) The Court has given careful consideration to the submissions from
each party. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. R. 78(b), no oral argument was heard. For the reasons that
follow. Defendant’s first motion to dismiss is denied as moot, (ECF No. 18.), and Defendant’s
second motion to dismiss is wanted without prejudice. (ECF No, 32.)
II.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff owns a residential property located at 97 Pease Avenue, Verona, New Jersey.

(Compl. 2.) Plaintiff acquired the property on September 19, 1988. (Compi. 4.) On March 21,
2003, Plaintiff refinanced her mortgage loan with Countrywide, America’s Wholesale Lender
(“AWL”). (Cornpl. 4.) This is the mortgage that is at issue in the Complaint. Plaintiff brings this

suit to quiet title to her property. (Compl. 4.)

Plaintiff alleges that the assignment of her

mortgage is “null and void” because of the appearance of a robo-signer. (Compl. 14.)
On February 27, 2013, Plaintiff filed her Complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey.
Chancery Division, Essex County. (Notice of Removal 2.)
Complaint was removed to this Court.

(Notice of

On April 1, 2013, Plaintiffs

Removal 1.) On April 8, 2013, Defendants

Bank of America and Fannie Mae filed their Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 4.)
On October 17, 2013, Freddie Mac filed its first Motion to Dismiss. Freddie Mac argues
that Plaintiff fails to state a claim because it is not a proper party to this action. (Def.’s Mot. 1.)
On October 28, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Supplemental Answer in Support of Plaintiffs Opposition
to Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, and a Second Supplemental Answer. (Pl.’s Supp. Answer
ECF No. 19; P1.’s Second Supp. Answer ECF No. 20.) On November 22, 2013, Plaintiff filed a
Supplemental Objection to Dismissal Request for Freddie Mac. (P1.’ s Supplemental Objection
ECF No. 22.) On November 26, 2013, this Court granted without prejudice Defendants Bank of
America and Fannie Mae’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Amended Complaint. (Order ECF No.
25.) On December 18, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint. (P1.’s Second Compl.
ECF No. 27.)

On February 17, 2014, Freddie Mac filed a Second Motion to Dismiss, and

incorporated by reference its earlier Motion. (Def.’s Second Mot,)

On February 18. 2014,

Plaintiff filed a Statement Disputing Alleged Facts of Defendant. (Pl.’s Statement)
III.

LEGAL STANDARD
A Defendant’s

otion To Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(B)(6)

For a complaint to survive dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(6), it “must contain

sufficient factual matter. accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
licr2ftjbal, 556 U.S. 662. 663 (2009) (quoting Bell Ati. Corp.

V.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

570 (2007)). Tn evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded

factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
non-moving party. See Phillips v. City of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008). ‘Factual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555. Furthermore, “[a] pleading that offers labels and conclusions.

.

.

will not do. Nor

does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement.”
Igbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal citations omitted).
B. Liberal Pleading Standard for Pro Se Litigants

A pro se litigant’s complaint is held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). Courts have a duty to
construe pleadings liberally and apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether a pro se litigant
has mentioned it by name. Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2013);
Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003); Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d
Cir. 2002). A pro se complaint “can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would
entitle him to relief.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (citing Haines, 404 U.S. at 52021); Bacon v. Minner, 229 F. App’x 96, 100 (3d Cir. 2007).
IV.

DISCUSSION
At issue in Plaintiff’s complaint is her note with Countrywide, America’s Wholesale

Lender that she entered into on March 21, 2003. (Compi, 4, 13; P1. ‘s Second Compl. ECF No.
27. Ex. 3. 13.) Plaintiff generally seeks to bar Defendants from having or claiming any right or

title adverse to Plaintiff to the premises.” (Compi. 4. 6. 8.) In support of her complaint, Plaintiff
attaches a record of loan payments to Bank of America from March 27, 2003 through January 8.

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2013. (Compl. Ex. 2. ) Plaintiff argues in her complaint that Freddie Mac “did not state a claim
of who is my true creditor and what Trust is holding my note and mortgage. Nor did they grant
my discovery requests.” (Compi. 5.) Plaintiff alleges that Freddie Mac is the investor on her loan
at issue. (Compi. 5.)
Freddie Mac argues that Plaintiffs complaint should be dismissed because it is not a
proper party to this action and a claim by Plaintiff cannot be sustained. (Def’s Mot. 6.)
Specifically, Freddie Mac alleges that their lien was no longer of record and that they no longer
hold any interest in the subject property. (Def’s Mot. 6.)

It is Freddie Mac’s position that

Plaintiff mistakenly believes that it is the investor of her loan. (Def’s Mot. 6.)
Despite Freddie Mac’s arguments, Plaintiff does not allege any facts indicating that
Freddie Mac is a proper party to this action. Plaintiffs allegations focus on her 2003 mortgage
with Bank of America.

In 2002 Freddie Mac was the investor of a loan in the amount of

$192,000.00, but the loan was satisfied and discharged in 2003 when Plaintiff refinanced and
took out the mortgage loan for $315,750.00. (Def’s Mot. 6-8; Pl.’s Second Compi. ECF No. 27,
Ex. 3, 12, 13, 14.) None of the supplemental documents that Plaintiff provided to this Court
indicate that Freddie Mac falsely represented that they had a claim to her 2003 mortgage. (Pl.’s
Second Compi. ECF No. 27, Ex.

9)1

Therefore, Plaintiffs quiet title action against Freddie Mac

is dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim.
The Court notes that Plaintiff provided a second amended complaint after Defendant filed its
initial motion to dismiss. The Court considers the exhibits attached to this second amended
complaint without converting Defendant’s motion into a motion for summary judgment, See
Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. V. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993) (“To
decide a motion to dismiss, courts generally consider only the allegations contained in the
complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint and matters of public record.”); In re Burlington
Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding that “a document integral
to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be considered without converting the motion [to
dismiss] into one for summary judgment”).

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IV.

CONCLUSION
Based on the reasons set forth above.
IT IS on this 29th day of May 2014,

ORDERED that Defendant’s first Motion to Dismiss is DENIED as moot; and it is
further
ORDERED that Defendant’s second otion to Dismiss is GRANTED without
prejudice; and it is further
ORDERED that even though it appears through Plaintiff’s own exhibits and Freddie

Mac’s submissions that the 2002 note was discharged, and that Freddie Mac has disclaimed any
interest in Plaintiff’s subsequent note, given Plaintiff’s pro se status, to the extent Plaintiff’s
claims can be cured by way of amendment, Plaintiff is granted fourteen (14) days to reinstate this
matter and file an Amended Complaint.
SO ORDERED.

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CLAIRE C. CECCHI, U.S.D.J.