BURNEY v. HYATT et al

Filing 4

OPINION. Signed by Judge Claire C. Cecchi on 10/29/2014. (ld, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

JANAR BURNEY,

Civil

Action No.

13—2263

(CCC)

Plaintiff,
v.
SCO N.

HYATT,

:

OPINION

et al.,
Defendants.

APPEARANCES:

JAMAR BURNEY, Plaintiff pro se
#000641
East Jersey State Prison
Special Treatment Unit
8 Production Way, CN—905
Avenel, New Jersey 07001
—

CECCHI,

District Judge

Plaintiff,

Jamar Burney,

an involuntarily committed person

pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator Act
30:4—27,24,
pauperis,

et seq.,

(‘SVPA”),

N.J.S.A.

seeks to bring this action in forrna

Based on his affidavit of indigence,

the Court will

grant Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis
(‘iFP”)

pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)

and order the Clerk of

the Court to file the Complaint.
At this time,
to 28 U.S.C.

the Court must review the Complaint,

§ 1915(e) (2) (B),

pursuant

to determine whether it sho•old be

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Plaintiff also alleges that, on April 4, 2013, Defendants
Hall and Hyatt “started sexually harassing me in front of [the]
unit when [Plaintiff] had a towel on going to the shower.”
(Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that he wfelt seriously humiliated, and

reacted in mental frustration of constantly being abused by
these officers’ derogatory and discriminating statements.”
(Id.)
On April 7, 2013, Defendants Hall and Hyatt again started
harassing Plaintiff, who responded wverballyn to these officers.
(Id.)

Without any investigation or disciplinary hearing,

Plaintiff was returned to M.A.P. that day.

Plaintiff alleges

that M.A.P. is a 24-hour lock down with no shower, no phone
calls, and no change of clothes.
property was taken.

In addition, his personal

(Id.)

On April 19, 2013, Plaintiff filed an waddendumn to his
Complaint.

(Dkt. * 2.)

Plaintiff complains that, on February

21, 2013, Defendant Ware-Cooper put Plaintiff and his
“associate” or “treatment partner” on a “‘verbal keep separate’
while in isolation,” causing the two to yell across the unit to
converse with each other.

(Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that the

whole unit of 60 residents now hears his personal family issues.
(Id.)

3

Plaintiff alleges that his 24-hour lock down has extended
his time in the STU and has delayed his prescribed treatment.
He further alleges that Defendants are using treatment issues
for disciplinary purposes.

Plaintiff also alleges that he is

denied his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to freedom of
association.

Finally, Plaintiff alleges that he is being

treated as a prisoner, not a civilly committed person, and is
being subjected to the wequivalent of a second prosecution.”
(Id.)
Plaintiff seeks unspecified monetary compensation.

He also

seeks injunctive relief, namely, his release from M.A.P., and an
investigation of the disciplinary board who makes wlock up
decisions.”

(Compl. ¶ 7.)
II.

STANDARDS FOR A SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL

A district court is required to review a complaint in a
civil action where the litigant is proceeding in farina pauperis.
Specifically, the court is required to identify cognizable
claims and to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous,
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (2) (B).
Accordingly, because Plaintiff is proceeding in farina pauperis

4

in this matter, this action is subject to sua sponte screening
for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (2) (B).
The Supreme court refined the standard for summary
dismissal of a complaint that fails to state a claim in Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).

citing its opinion in Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) for the
proposition that [a] pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do,’”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555), the Supreme court held that, to
prevent a summary dismissal, a civil complaint must now allege
wsufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is facially
plausible.

Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.

2009) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676).

See also Bistrian v.

Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012)

(“The touchstone of the

pleading standard is plausibility.

.

.

.

.

[A]llegations that

are no more than conclusions are not entitled to the assumption
of truth;

.

.

.

[a court should] look for well—pled factual

allegations, assume their veracity, and then ‘determine whether
they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.’”)
(internal citations omitted).

In short,

W

[a] complaint must do

more than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief.

5

A

complaint has to ‘show’ such an entitlement with its facts.”
.Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211 (citing Iqbal, 556 U.s. at 678—79).
Thus, while pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Higgs v.
Atty. Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011), “pro se litigants
still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to
support a claim.”

Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239,

245 (3d Cir. 2013)

(citation omitted).

Nonetheless, courts must

be cognizant that the Iqbal standard “is not akin to a
probability requirement.”

Covington v. International

Association of Approved Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d 114, 118
(3d Cir. 2013)

(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
III.

SECTION 1983 ACTIONS

Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory ... subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress . . .
Thus, to state a claim for relief under Section 1983, a
plaintiff must allege, first, the violation of a right secured
by the Constitution or laws of the United States and, second,

6

that the alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person
acting under color of state law.

West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42,

48 (1988); Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).
IV.
A.

DISCUSSION

Harassment Claim
As a civilly committed person, Plaintiff’s allegations of

harassment fall under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause.

See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321—22 (1982)

(“Persons who have been involuntarily committed are entitled to
more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than
criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to
punish.”); see also Bell

ti.

Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979);

Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 166 (3d Cir. 2005).

Generally,

the Fourteenth Amendment requires that civilly committed persons
not be subjected to conditions that amount to punishment, Bell,
441 U.S. at 536,’ within the bounds of professional discretion,
Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321—22.

Specifically, in Youngberg, the

Supreme Court held that civilly committed persons do have
constitutionally protected interests, but that these rights must
In Bell v. Wolfish, the Supreme Court held that whether a
condition of confinement of pretrial detainees violated their
constitutional rights turns on whether the disability is imposed
for the purpose of punishment or whether it is but an incident
of some other legitimate government purpose. 441 U.S. at 535—
39.
7

be balanced against the reasons put forth by the State for
restricting their liberties.

Id. at 307.

The Constitution is

not concerned with de minimis restrictions on patients’
liberties.

Id. at 320.

Moreover, “due process requires that

the conditions and duration of confinement [for civilly confined
persons] bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which
persons are committed.”

Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 265

(2001).
Here, Plaintiff’s general allegations of verbal abuse or
threats, unaccompanied by injury or damage, are not cognizable
under § 1983, regardless of whether the inmate is a pretrial
detainee, civilly committed person, or sentenced prisoner.

See

Jean—Laurent v. Wilkerson, 438 F. Supp.2d 318, 324—25 (S.D.N.Y.
2006)

(holding that pretrial detainee’s claim of verbal abuse

not cognizable under § 1983 because verbal intimidation did not
rise to the level of a constitutional violation). See also Price
v. Lighthart, Civil No. 1:08—cv—265, 2010 ilL 1741385 (W.D. Mich.
Apr. 28, 2010); Glenn v. Hayman, Civil No. 07—112 (PGS), 2007 ilL
894213, *10 (D.N.J. Mar. 21, 2007); Stepney v. Gilliard, Civil
No. 02—5259 (GEB), 2005 ilL 3338370 (D.N.J. Dec. 8, 2005)
(“[V]erbal harassment and taunting is neither ‘sufficiently
serious’ nor ‘an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’

8

under the common meaning of those terms.
profanity alone

...

‘Verbal harassment or

no matter how inappropriate, unprofessional,

or reprehensible it might seem,’ does not constitute the
violation of any federally protected right and therefore is not
actionable under [Section] 1983”)

(quoting Aziz Zarif Shabazz v.

Pico, 994 F. Supp. 460, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), and citing Collins
v. Graham, 377 F. Supp.2d 241, 244 (D.Me. 2005)).

See also

Moore v. Morris, 116 F. App’x 203, 205 (10th Cir. 2004)

(holding

that mere verbal harassment does not give rise to a
constitutional violation, even if it is inexcusable and
offensive, it does not establish liability under section 1983),
cert. denied, 544 U.S. 925 (2005); Abuhouran v. Acker, No. Civ.
A. 04—2265, 2005 WI, 1532496 (E.D.Pa. June 29, 2005)
harassment

.

.

.

(“[V]erbal

stanèling alone, do[es] not state a

constitutional claim.”).
In this case, Plaintiff’s allegations of harassment are
nothing more than the mere recitation of a legal conclusion
without factual allegations sufficient at this time to support
the claim that Defendants were verbally harassing Plaintiff as a
form of punishment.

Consequently, this harassment claim will be

dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim at this
time.

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security and order in the facility).

The Court of Appeals for

the Seventh Circuit has acknowledged that restrictions on
association or interaction between civilly committed persons are
not constitutionally offensive if the restrictions rest on
legitimate security measures or disciplinary purposes, and are
not treatment decisions.
(7th Cir. 2012).

Lane v. Williams, 689 F.3d 879, 882

Here, the freedom of association restrictions

are consistent with Plaintiff’s status as a dangerous sex
offender.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s freedom of association claim is
dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a cognizable
claim at this time.
C.

Remaining Claims
Plaintiff also generally alleges that he does not receive

treatment or therapy while confined on M.A.P. status.

This bald

claim, without any allegations as to what treatment was denied
or what injury he has suffered, does not state a claim for
relief.

See Bohannan v. Doe, 527 F. App’x 283, 291, 297 (5th

Cir. 2013)

(dismissing civilly committed sex offender’s § 1983

and Eighth Amendment claims based on “deliberate indifference”
to his medical needs because Plaintiff failed to show that
prison officials “refused to treat him, ignored his complaints,

11

iz.:enticnally treated him incorrectly, or ergaged in any SImilar
conduct that w uld cleary e’-.:.r.ce a wanton disregard :or ary
serious nedcal needs”
Plaintiff further alleges, without any explanation, that
his M.A.P. status has delayed his treatment and extended h:s
time in the Special Treatment Unit, and that Defendants punished
Plaintiff by placing him in M.A.P. without affording him a
disciplinary hearing.

Plaintiff also finally claims that he is

being treated as a prisoner, not a civilly committed person.
Plaintiff provides no factual support for any of these bare
allegations.
As stated above, Plaintiff must allege wsufficient factual
matter” to show that his claim here is facially plausible.
Iq.bal, 556 U.S. at 676.

See

Therefore, these general claims, as

pled, do not satisfy the threshold requirement set forth in
Iqbal, and they are dismissed without prejudice for failure to

state a claim at this time.’
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