BATH v. RED VISION SYSTEMS, INC.

Filing 31

OPINION. Signed by Judge Susan D. Wigenton on 5/29/14. (DD, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CORA BATH, on behalf of herself and
all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil Action No. 2:13-02366
(SDW) (MCA)
OPINION

RED VISION SYSTEMS, INC.,

May 29, 2014

Defendant.

WIGENTON, District Judge.
Before this Court is Plaintiff Cora Bath’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion for Conditional Certification
of Collective Action pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq.
Also before this Court is Defendant Red Vision Systems, Inc.’s (“Defendant” or “Red Vision”)
Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). This Court has jurisdiction
over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Venue is proper under 28
U.S.C. § 1391. This Court, having considered the parties’ submissions, decides this matter without
oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78. For the reasons stated below,
Plaintiff’s Motion for Conditional Certification of Collection Action is GRANTED, and
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.

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I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
According to the Complaint, Red Vision is a Delaware Corporation headquartered in

Parsippany, New Jersey that provides title search services and real estate data solutions to
customers across the United States. (Compl. at ¶¶ 18-19.) Plaintiff worked in Red Vision’s
employ as a title examiner from approximately September 2007 until 2011. (Id. at ¶¶ 20-21.) In
that capacity, Plaintiff earned an hourly wage plus additional compensation based upon the tasks
she performed. (Id. at ¶ 22.) Plaintiff calls this additional compensation “piece-rate.” (Id. at ¶
22.) Plaintiff alleges that Red Vision failed to add her piece-rate earnings with her hourly rate of
pay for purposes of calculating overtime pay. (Id. at ¶ 24.) She maintains that in calculating her
overtime pay, Red Vision only considered her regular rate of pay. (Id. at ¶ 25.) As a result, Bath
claims that Red Vision improperly calculated her overtime compensation when she worked more
than forty hours within a work week, in violation of the FLSA. (Id. at ¶ 23.)
Furthermore, Plaintiff also alleges that Red Vision improperly calculated the overtime pay
of all other title examiners that it employed. (Id. at ¶¶ 31-33.) Plaintiff contends that Red Vision
had a compensation policy applicable to all its title examiners nationwide in which Red Vision
purposely failed to include piece-rate pay in its calculations of overtime monies due to title
examiners. (Id. at ¶¶ 34-35.) Plaintiff alleges that she and all other title examiners in Red Vision’s
employ performed the same or similar job duties and were all subjected to the same compensation
policy. (Id. at ¶¶ 31-33.) Thus, Plaintiff claims that she and all other title examiners employed
by Red Vision during the relevant time period are similarly situated. (Id. at ¶¶ 31-33.)
Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint on April 12, 2013. (Dkt. No. 1.) The two-count
Complaint seeks (1) monetary damages on behalf of Plaintiff and the putative class members due
to Red Vision’s miscalculation of overtime pay in violation FLSA and (2) declaratory judgment

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declaring that Red Vision violated the FLSA and issuing an injunction precluding Red Vision from
engaging in the unlawful practices in the future. (Id. at ¶¶ 42-65.) Shortly after the Complaint’s
filing, Katherine Prevatt, who is allegedly similarly situated to Plaintiff, filed a Notice of Consent
to Join the Collective Action on April 16, 2013. (Dkt. No. 3.) On June 13, 2013, Patrick Harran
also filed a Notice of Consent to Join the Collective Action. (Dkt. No. 5.) On October 1, 2013,
Plaintiff filed the instant Motion for Conditional Certification of Collection Action. (Dkt. No. 14.)
On the same day, Red Vision moved to dismiss this matter for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
(Dkt. No. 15.) Subsequent to the filing of these motions, Kathleen Deaver, Amy Lane, and Helen
Norman filed Notices of Consent to Join the Collective Action on March 25, 2014 and April 3,
2014, respectively. (Dkt. No. 27, 28.)
II.

DISCUSSION
A.

Red Vision’s Motion to Dismiss

Red Vision’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for want of subject
matter jurisdiction is premised on its position that Plaintiff’s FLSA claim is now moot due to
Plaintiff’s failure to accept Red’s Vision offer of judgment. (Def.’s Br. 5-7.) On or about June
24, 2013, Red Vision served Plaintiff with an offer of judgment in the amount of $3,000 plus
reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 68. (Id. at 5.) Red Vision maintains
that this sum is far greater than the value of Plaintiff’s claim, which, if she ultimately prevails on
her FLSA claim, Red Vision calculates to be $593.30. (Id.) Plaintiff failed to respond to the offer
and it therefore lapsed fourteen (14) days after it was made. (Id.) Red Vision thus argues that
since it offered Plaintiff more than she could recover at trial if she is successful on her claim, no
case or controversy exists and this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. (Id. at 7.)

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“A Rule 12(b)(1) motion may be treated as either a facial or factual challenge to the court’s
subject matter jurisdiction.” Gould Elecs Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000)
(citing Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977)). Where,
as here, the defendant’s motion is supported by sworn statements of facts, the district court must
treat the motion as a factual attack, rather than a facial attack. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists &
Aerospace Workers v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 673 F.2d 700, 711 (3d Cir. 1982). “In such a case,
the trial court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear
the case.” Id. It is important to note both that “the existence of disputed material facts will not
preclude [a] trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims,” and that “a
plaintiff will have the burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact exist.” Mortensen, 549 F.2d
891. The plaintiff must not only demonstrate that a controversy existed at the time it filed suit but
that it continues to exist throughout the litigation. Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 975 F.2d 964, 974 (3d
Cir. 1992). “A claim may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) only if it ‘clearly appears to be
immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction’ or is ‘wholly insubstantial
and frivolous.’” Gould Elecs Inc., 220 F.3d at 178 (citing Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc.,
926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991)).
Under Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution, the jurisdiction of federal
courts is limited to “cases” and “controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. The Supreme Court has
interpreted this limitation as “restrict[ing] the authority of federal courts to resolving ‘the legal
rights of litigants in actual controversies.’” Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. 1523,
1528 (2013) (citing Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
and State, 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982)). The case or controversy must not only exist at the time of
the complaint’s filing but must be extant throughout the duration of the litigation. Symczyk, 133

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S. Ct. at 1528. Thus, if “the issues presented in a case are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a
legally cognizable interest in the outcome, the case becomes moot and the court no longer has
subject matter jurisdiction.” Weiss v. Regal Collections, 385 F.3d 337, 340 (3d Cir. 2004). Third
Circuit law is clear that an offer of complete relief moots a plaintiff’s claim “as at that point the
plaintiff retains no personal interest in the outcome of the litigation,” and the Court must dismiss
the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id.
Relying on Symczyk, Red Vision argues that its offer of judgment moots Plaintiff’s claim
because the offer is far greater than what Plaintiff could hope to obtain at trial. (Def.’s Br. 7.)
Plaintiff counters that Red Vision’s offer of judgment does not fully compensate her for actual and
liquidated damages, and further argues she cannot even assess whether Red Vision’s offer would
provide full relief as Red Vision has refused to furnish to her all applicable weekly pay and time
records. (Pl.’s Br. 4.) Plaintiff additionally rejects that Red Vision’s offer would constitute full
relief because Red Vision has used a legally incorrect mathematical formula in arriving at the
amount she is owed. (Pl.’s Br. 4-5.)
Red Vision’s reliance on Symczyk is misplaced. The Symczyk Court explicitly did not reach
the issue of whether an offer of complete relief moots the plaintiff’s FLSA claim, the key issue to
be decided here. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. at 1528-29. In Symcyzk, as the employee had not appealed
the district court’s conclusion that the employer’s offer of judgment mooted her FLSA claim, the
Supreme Court made clear in no fewer than three separate instances that it was assuming, without
deciding, that the employer’s offer of judgment mooted the employee’s individual FLSA claim.
Id. at 1528-29, 1532. The High Court acknowledged the circuit split with regard to whether “an
unaccepted offer that fully satisfies a plaintiff’s claim is sufficient to render the claim moot,” but
nevertheless “declin[ed] to resolve the split, because the issue [was] not properly before” the

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Court. Id. at 1528-29. Having assumed the issue without deciding it, the Court’s analysis turned
“to the question of whether [the employee’s] action remained justiciable based on the collectiveaction allegations in her complaint.” Id. at 1529. The Court concluded that the absence of any
opt-in plaintiffs combined with the offer that fully satisfied her claims deprived the employee of
any personal stake in the litigation’s outcome and thereby, stripped the Court of jurisdiction. Id. at
1529. Thus, Symczyk is clearly inapposite to the threshold issue presented here.
Further, Plaintiff vehemently disputes that Red Vision’s offer provides her with complete
relief, as opposed to the employee in Symczyk who conceded that point. (Pl.’s Br. 4.) Additionally,
Plaintiff argues that Red Vision’s damages calculation is legally incompetent as it is based on a
two-week period. (Pl.’s Br. 4-5.) Plaintiff correctly points out that overtime calculations must be
premised upon a weekly basis. See 29 C.F.R. § 778.103. Red Vision tacitly acknowledges this
point and advances three methods that could be used to calculate the allegedly withheld overtime
payments. (Def.’s Reply Br. 2-7.) Accordingly, based on the disputed amount of damages and
dispute regarding the method of calculating it, the Court is unable to determine the amount of
damages that would fully compensate Plaintiff, even if it were to accept the pay stubs and
timesheets submitted with Red Vision’s motion as authentic.
Relying on Beery v. Quest Diagnostic, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95096 (D.N.J. July 8,
2013), Red Vision further argues that the presence of opt-in plaintiffs Harran and Prevatt is not an
impediment to granting its motion to dismiss. (Def.’s Br. 8-9.) Red Vision’s reliance on Beery is
misplaced as Beery is not controlling with respect to the issues presented here.

In

Beery, the court dismissed the named plaintiffs’ FLSA claim in favor of arbitration based on
arbitration clauses in their employment agreements. Beery, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *1, *3. After
dismissing the named plaintiffs’ claims, the court then determined that it did not have subject

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matter jurisdiction over the opt-in plaintiffs’ claims, who had opted-in prior to the court’s grant of
conditional certification. Id. at *2-*3, *7-*8. Contrary to the facts presented here, the named
plaintiffs’ FLSA claims in Beery were dismissed pursuant to an arbitration clause. Additionally,
the opt-in plaintiffs in Beery opted-in without the filing of a motion for conditional certification.
Id. at *2. Here, the filing of the motion for conditional certification on October 1, 2013 relates
back to the filing of the Complaint on April 12, 2013. See Weiss, 385 F.3d at 348 (holding that
absent undue delay in the filing of a class certification motion, the filing of the certification motion
relates back to the filing of the complaint when there is an offer of judgment that could potentially
moot the named plaintiff’s claim). Accordingly, the presence of opt-in plaintiffs, as discussed
more fully infra, further precludes this Court from granting Red Vision’s motion to dismiss. See
Bamgbose v. Delta-T Group, Inc., 724 F. Supp. 2d 510, 517 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (finding that plaintiff’s
accepted offer of judgment still did not moot the collective FLSA action where there were opt-in
plaintiffs).
Finally, this Court notes that it shares the concern raised by many other courts who are
troubled by the “pick-off” strategy employed by many defendants, wherein they make an offer of
judgment to the named plaintiff relatively early in the litigation in hopes of mooting the plaintiff’s
claim and consequently, stripping the court of jurisdiction. This strategy has the potential of
frustrating the purpose of the collective actions. See Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S.
326, 339 (1980) (“Requiring multiple plaintiffs to bring separate actions, which effectively could
be ‘picked off’ by a defendant’s tender of judgment before an affirmative ruling on class
certification could be obtained, obviously would frustrate the objectives of class actions . . . .”);
Weiss, 385 F.3d at 344 (“allowing the defendants here to ‘pick-off’ a representative plaintiff with
an offer of judgment less than two months after the complaint is filed may undercut the viability

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of the class action procedure, and frustrate the objectives of this procedural mechanism for
aggregating small claims”); Reyes v. Carnival Corp., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11948, *9-*10 (S.D.
Fla. May 25, 2010) (“Finally, it is important to note that the defense strategy of providing an offer
of judgment to the initial plaintiff in a FLSA collective action in order to bar the case from
proceeding as to all similarly situated plaintiffs violates the very policies behind the FLSA.”); Reed
v. TJX Cos., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21605, *7 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 27, 2004) (noting with concern the
defendant’s “pickoff” strategy). Therefore, Red Vision’s motion to dismiss is denied.
B.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Conditional Certification of Collection Action

In pertinent part, the FLSA states as follows:
An action to recover the liability prescribed in [this section] may be
maintained against any employer (including a public agency) in any
Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more
employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other
employees similarly situated. No employee shall be a party plaintiff
to any such action unless he gives his consent in writing to become
such a party and such consent is filed in the court in which such
action is brought.
29 U.S.C. § 216(b). While the statute does not define the phrase “similarly situated,” the Third
Circuit instructs district courts to undertake a two-step process in determining whether an action
may proceed as an FLSA collective action. Camesi v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 729 F.3d
239, 243 (3d Cir. 2013); White v. Rick Bus Co., 743 F. Supp. 2d 380, 386-87 (D.N.J. 2010). The
first step is conditional certification, which is then followed by final certification at step two.
White, 743 F. Supp. 2d at 387. Importantly, “the ‘plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying the
similarly situated standard.’” Id. (citation omitted).
While district courts in this circuit appear to be divided as to the governing standard utilized
at the conditional certification step, the Third Circuit has embraced the “modest factual showing”
standard, which requires that the plaintiff show a “modest factual nexus between their situation

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and that of the proposed class members.” Id. at 387 (citation omitted, emphasis in original); see
Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 691 F.3d 527, 536 n.4 (3d Cir. 2012) (“We adopted the ‘modest
factual showing’ standard, under which a ‘plaintiff must produce some evidence, ‘beyond pure
speculation,’ of a factual nexus between the manner in which the employer’s alleged policy
affected her and the manner in which it affected other employees.’”) (citation omitted)).
In support of her motion, Plaintiff submitted a declaration in which she avers that beginning
in approximately May 2011, Red Vision instituted a policy wherein it paid title examiners an
hourly wage plus “production pay”1. (Dkt. No. 14, Ex. C at ¶ 6.) The production pay was based
upon the quantity of work performed. (Id. at ¶ 7.) She maintains that although she worked in
excess of forty hours during some workweeks, the overtime payments she received were based
solely upon her regular wage and did not include her production pay. (Id. at ¶¶ 8-10.) Plaintiff
states that Red Vision continued using this payment policy throughout her tenure there, which
ended in November 2011. (Id. at ¶ 10.) She attached two paycheck stubs dated August 5, 2011
and September 2, 2011 that she contends show that her production pay was not taken into account
when calculating her overtime wages. (Dkt. No. 14, Ex. C.) Moreover, Plaintiff avers that Red
Vision utilized the same payment policy for all of its title examiners; she knows this was done
based upon her personal experiences in Red Vision’s employ and her conversations with other title
examiners and Red Vision management. (Dkt. No. 14, Ex. C at ¶¶ 10-14.)
Similarly, former Red Vision employee Kathy Prevatt (“Prevatt”) submitted a declaration
substantially corroborating Plaintiff’s account. Prevatt declares that she worked as a Red Vision
title examiner from September 2008 until June 2012. (Dkt. No. 14, Ex. D at ¶ 3.) She states that
in approximately May 2011, Red Vision began compensating all title examiners with an hourly

Plaintiff uses the term “piece-rate pay” in the Complaint but “production pay” in the declaration and briefs; both
terms appear to refer to the same compensation policy.
1

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wage plus production pay. (Id. at ¶13.) She states that in work weeks when she logged more than
forty hours, her overtime payments were exclusively based on her hourly wage and did not include
production pay. (Id. at ¶¶ 15-16.) She, too, avers that all title examiners were compensated under
the allegedly unlawful policy when she departed the company in June 2012. (Id. at ¶ 17.) Prevatt
maintains that her knowledge of Red Vision’s compensation policy is based on her personal
experiences at the company and her discussions with other title examiners and management. (Id.
at ¶¶ 19-21.) Prevatt attached a paycheck stub dated May 4, 2012, which she claims evidences
Red Vision’s failure to include her production pay in its overtime calculation. (Dkt. No. 14, Ex.
D.) Furthermore, Patrick Harran (“Harran”) also submitted a declaration in support of Plaintiff’s
motion. He likewise avers that during his career as a title examiner at Red Vision, it instituted a
compensation policy starting in May 2011 that paid title examiners an hourly wage in addition to
production pay. (Dkt. No. 14, Ex. E at ¶¶ 3, 11.) Harran maintains that when he worked more
than forty hours during a given work week, Red Vision exclusively included his hourly wage in
the overtime calculation. (Id. at ¶¶ 12-14.) He states that all title examiners were subject to this
compensation policy, which continued until he left the company in March 2012. (Id. at ¶ 15.)
Harran also avers that his personal knowledge is acquired from his discussions with other title
examiners and Red Vision management. (Id. at ¶¶ 17-18.)
Based upon Plaintiff’s declaration and the declarations of Prevatt and Harran, Plaintiff has
sustained her burden of demonstrating that there is a “factual nexus” between her situation and
that of the putative class members. All three former Red Vision title examiners aver that Red
Vision instituted a compensation policy in approximately May 2011, applicable to all title
examiners, which excluded their production pay when calculating their overtime wages. This
Court also notes that three prospective plaintiff’s opted in to the collective action after the instant

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motion had been fully briefed. (Dkt. No. 27, 28.) Consequently, this Court finds that Plaintiff and
Red Visions’ other title examiners are similarly situated for FLSA purposes.
In connection with the instant motion, Plaintiff submitted a proposed notice of pendency.
Plaintiff’s proposed notice states, in part, as follows:
IF YOU ARE OR WERE A TITLE EXAMINER FOR RED VISION
SYSTEMS AT ANY TIME BETWEEN 2011 TO THE PRESENT WHO
WORKED MORE THAN FORTY HOURS WITHIN A WORKWEEK, A
COLLECTION ACTION LAWSUIT MAY AFFECT YOUR RIGHTS.
(Dkt. No. 14, Ex. G) (emphasis in original). In addition to having the notice mailed to potential
class members, Plaintiff seeks to have the notice posted in common, non-public employee spaces
at each of Red Vision’s locations nationwide. (Pl.’s Br. 19-20; Pl.’s Reply Br. 11.) Plaintiff also
seeks limited discovery of the names, addresses, and e-mail addresses of potential class members.
(Pl.’s Br. 20-21.) Red Vision objects to the proposed notice’s content and also to Plaintiff’s posting
and discovery demands.

Specifically, Red Vision argues that the potential class period is

overbroad because it discontinued the complained of compensation policy in July 2012. (Def.’s
Br. 8.) Red Vision also argues that the notice must contain a statement advising the prospective
plaintiffs of Red Vision’s defenses, the putative plaintiffs’ discovery obligations, and that they
could be liable for defense costs. (Id. at 8-9.) Red Vision also maintains that the notice should
specify that opt-in plaintiffs are not obligated to be represented by Plaintiff’s counsel and that the
notices should be returned to the Court, rather than Plaintiff’s counsel. (Id. at 9.) Red Vision
raises several other objections, including that the notice should not be posted at its locations and
that Plaintiff’s limited discovery request is overbroad and thereby violates the potential plaintiffs’
privacy interests. (Id. at 9-10.)
The Supreme Court has held that district courts have broad discretion under FLSA to
facilitate notice to potential collective action plaintiffs. See Hoffmann-La Roche v. Sperling, 493

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U.S. 165, 169 (1989); Woodard v. FedEx Freight E., Inc., 250 F.R.D. 178, 185 n.6 (M.D. Pa. 2008)
(“District courts, however, have discretion to ‘facilitat[e] notice to potential plaintiffs’ of the
pending collective action.”) (citation omitted)). The Court noted that “[b]y monitoring preparation
and distribution of the notice, a court can ensure that it is timely, accurate, and informative.”
Hoffman-LaRoche, 493 U.S. 165 at 172. As a threshold matter, Plaintiff does not object to
narrowing the collective action class to the time period when the allegedly unlawful compensation
policy was in effect, namely, May 2011 through July 2012. (Pl.’s Reply Br. 7.) Accordingly, the
putative collective class is hereby limited to current and former Red Vision title examiners
employed at any location nationwide that worked in excess of forty hours in any work week from
May 2011 through July 2012, inclusive. Additionally, the notice should specify that opt-in
plaintiffs are free to be represented by counsel of their choosing. See Garcia v. Pancho Villa’s of
Huntington Village, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 2d 89, 95 (E.D.N.Y. 2010); Delaney v. Geisha NYC, LLC,
261 F.R.D. 55, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
Red Vision’s remaining objections are unfounded. Red Vision’s position that the notice
must include recitation of its defenses is meritless. A statement that “Red Vision denies Plaintiff’s
allegations and maintains that it paid its title examiners in full as required by law” is sufficient to
advise the potential plaintiffs that Red Vision rejects Plaintiff’s allegations. See Delaney, 261
F.R.D. at 59 (stating that a sentence in the notice advising that defendants denied that they violated
the FLSA was sufficient). Furthermore, a statement in the notice that highlights the opt-in
plaintiffs’ discovery obligations and possibility of having to pay defense costs is unwarranted.
Such statements have the potential of chilling participation in the collective action. Id. at 59
(“Defendants cite no other Court that has required a notice to warn opt-in plaintiffs of potential

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discovery obligations and liability for Defendants’ costs or required plaintiffs to sign the consent
form on penalty of perjury.”).
Additionally, Plaintiff’s limited discovery request is narrowly tailored to identify potential
class members and is therefore appropriate. See Hoffman-LaRoche, 493 U.S. at 170 (“The District
Court was correct to permit discovery of the names and addresses of the discharged employees.”).
Red Vision’s suggestion that opt-in plaintiffs’ consent to join forms should be returned to the Court
instead of Plaintiff’s counsel is unnecessary because the notice will specify that opt-in plaintiffs
may choose their own counsel. Finally, Red Vision’s objection to the notice being posted at its
locations is meritless. Numerous courts have endorsed posting the notice in the employer’s
locations as it ensures that a large number of potential plaintiffs are notified. Thompson v. Peak
Energy Services USA, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143704, No. 13-0266, *8-9 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 4,
2013); Garcia, 678 F. Supp. 2d at 96 (“Moreover, while defendants object to the posting of the
Notice at their business locations - and request an order prohibiting it - such a practice has been
routinely approved in other cases.”) As such, subject to the modifications discussed above,
Plaintiff’s proposed notice is approved.
III.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s Motion for Conditional Certification of Collective

Action is GRANTED. Red Vision’s Motion to Dismiss, however, is DENIED.
s/Susan D. Wigenton, U.S.D.J.
Orig: Clerk
Cc:
Madeline Cox Arleo, U.S.M.J.
Parties

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