BOSESKI v. NORTH ARLINGTON MUNICIPALITY et al

Filing 23

OPINION. Signed by Judge Dennis M. Cavanaugh on 12/13/13. (DD, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
SHERRI BOSESKL

:

Plaintiff.

lion. Dennis M. Cavanaugh

:

OPINION

V.

Civil Action No. 2:12-cv-02652 (DMC) (JBC)

NORTH ARLINGTON MUNICIPALITY,:
BERGEN REGIONAL MEDICAL
CENTER AND DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE,
Defendants.

DENNIS M. CAVANAUGH, U.S.D.J.:
This matter comes before the Court upon two

motions

to dismiss the Complaint (April

25, 2013. ECF No. 1) of Plaintiff Sherri Boseski (“Pla
intiff’ or “Boseski”) brought by (i) Bergen
Regional Medical Center (“Bergen Medical”) (May
14, 2013, ECF No. 6) and (2) North
Arlington Municipality (“North Arlington”) (May
17, 2013, ECF No. 7) pursuant to FED. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6). Pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 78, no oral
argument was heard. Based on the following
and for the reasons expressed herein. Defendan
ts’ motions to dismiss are granted.
I.

BACKGROUND’
Plaintiff filed a Complaint with this Court on Apri
l 25, 2013 against North Arlington.

Bergen Medical and the Department of Defense.
(ECF No. 1). The Complaint contains
numerous allegations including (1) bias by judges
presiding over Plaintifts prior cases; (2) legal

1

The facts set forth in this Opinion are taken from
the

parties’ respective moving
iaicrs

and filings.

malpractice; (3) rape by two service members
during Plaintiff’s military service; (4) false arres
t
and attack by North Arlington Police; (5) invo
luntary commitment at Bergen Medical Center:
(6)
a conspiracy between the New Jersey Court Syst
em, the Department of Defense, Bergen Medical
and North Arlington; and (7) a continuous tort deny
ing Plaintiff useful access to the judicial
branch of the government for over ten years. Plain
tiffs Complaint asserts the following causes
of action: (1) conspiracy to commit fraud; (2) restr
iction of trade, 15 U.S.C. 1; (3) breach of
conti act 1w thc militai (4) ncgligence (5) assau
lt (6) legal malpiactice (7) talse ancst and
,

imprisonment: (8) defamation: (9) libel: and (10)
claims under 42 U.S.C.
1983 and 42 U.S.C.

§

§

1981. 42 U.S.C.

§

1983. Plaintiff previously filed a Complaint against
North Arlington on

October 9, 2012 in the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Bergen Vicinage. On February 22, 2013,
the Superior Court granted North Arlington’s motion
to dismiss on the grounds that Plaintiffs
complaint was filed beyond the applicable two-year
stature of limitations.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
In deciding a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a district cour
t is ‘required to accept as true all

factual allegations in the complaint and draw all infer
ences in the facts alleged in the light most
favorable to the [Plaintiffj.” Phillips v. Cnty. of Alle
gheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008).
“[AJ complaint attacked by a.

.

.

motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual alleg
ations.”

Bell AU. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (200
7). However, the Plaintiff’s ‘obligation to
provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relie
f requires more than labels and conclusions,
and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a caus
e of action will not do.” Id. (internal citations
omitted). “[A court isj not bound to accept as true
a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286
(1986). Instead, assuming that the fttctual
allegations in the complaint are true, those “[fjactual
allegations must be enough to raise a right

to relief above a speculative level.” Twombly
, 550 U.S. at 555.
A complaint will survive a motion to dismiss
if it contains sufficient factual matter to
“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.
” Ashcroft v. Igbal, 556 U.S. 662. 678 (2009)
(citing Twombly. 550 U.S. at 570). ‘A claim
has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual
content allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for
misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether
the allegations in a complaint are plausihle’ is
a ‘context-specific task that requires the reviewing
court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense.” Young v. Speziale, Civ. No. 07-0
3 129, 2009 WL 3806296, at *3 (D.N.J. Nov.
10, 2009) (quoting Tqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). “[W]here
the well-pleaded facts do not permit the
court to infer more than the mere possibility of misc
onduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has
not shown’—that the pleader is entitled to relief” lqba
l, 556 U.S. at 679.
III.

DISCUSSION
a. Statute of Limitations
Plaintiff alleges claims of assault and false arrest again
st North Arlington. According to

Plaintiffs Complaint, these incidents occurred on Nov
ember 5, 2003; July 3, 2004; and
September 13, 2006. As previously determined by the
Superior Court, these actions are barred
by New Jersey’s two-year statute of limitations for
personal injury actions. See N. J.S.A. 2A: 142(a) (‘every action at law for an injury to the perso
n caused by the wrongful act, neglect or
default of any person within this State shall be com
menced within two years next after the cause
of any such action shall have accrued.”). The two-year
statute of limitations also applies to
Plaintiffs claims arising under 42 U.S.C.

§

1983. $g Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985)

(holding that the statute of limitations to be applied in
all cases brought under

§

1 983 is the

statute of limitations of the state involved for perso
nal injury actions); Brown v. Foley, 8 1 0 F. 2d

55, 56 (3d Cir. 1987).

The Court recognizes that the statute of limitations period
Plaintiffs military service “and six months thereafter.”

must be tolled for the period of

N.J.S.A. 2A:14-26. However, even

considering Plaintiffs military service from September 24,2

006 through October 15, 2009, the

Complaint was not filed within the applicable limitations period

and is therefore time-barred.

Plaintiffs Complaint describes an alleged assault and false impris

onment by North Arlington

police on November 5, 2003 and another alleged assault on July
3, 2004. The two-year statute of
limitations on these claims expired on November 5, 2005 and July
3, 2006, respectively. Thus,
the statute of limitations on these two claims expired before Plainti
ff entered the U.S. Army on
September 24,2006 and long before Plaintiff filed this Complaint
on April 25, 2013.
Plaintiff alleges an additional attack by North Arlington police on Septem

ber 13, 2006.

Plaintiff asserts that she was forcibly removed from her home by a police

officer and taken to

Bergen Medical where she was allegedly involuntarily committed for over

five days. The statute

of limitations on Plaintiffs claims against North Arlington and Bergen
Medical would have

been

tolled until April 15, 2010, six months after the end of Plaintiffs militar
y service. Thus, the
statute of limitations would have expired two years later, on April 15, 2012,
one year before
Plaintiff filed this Complaint. As such, all of Plaintiffs claims agains
t North Arlington and
Bergen Medical with respect to these incidents are time-barred and

therefore dismissed.

b. Res Judicata
In addition, res judicata bars Plaintiff from pursuing any claims agains

t North Arlington

related to the November 5, 2003 and July 3, 2004 incidents in this Court
since these claims were
previously disposed of in state court. The doctrine of res judicata prohib
its a plaintiff from
relitigating the same claims in a new forum. $.ç Watkins v. Resorts Int’l
Hotel & Casino, 124

4

N.J. 398, 409 (1991) (“Essential to the prop
er functioning of state and federal courts is
the
principle that a disappointed litigant may not
circumvent a judgment entered in one syste
m by
relitigating the claim or the decided issues
in the other system. Generally speaking, whet
her
started in state or federal courts, the determina
tion of a case in one system should conclude
the
matter,”). With respect to the incidents of Nov
ember 5, 2003 and July 3, 2004, Plaintilis
Complaint sets forth the same facts and alleg
ations as pleaded before the Superior Court.
The
Superior Court dismissed the matter with preju
dice and this Court must give full faith and cred
it
to that judgment.
c.

Conspiracy allegations

As to the conspiracy allegations against North
Arlington and Bergen Medical, the Court
finds that they are conclusory and fail to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Plaintiff’s Complaint simply states that there is
a conspiracy against her between the i’ew Jerse
Court System, the Department of Defense, Berg
en Medical and North Arlington. However.
Plaintiff provides no facts to support this alleg
ation. The Court therefore finds that any
conspiracy allegations lack facial plausibility
and must be dismissed.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ moti
ons to dismiss are granted and all claims
against North Arlington and Bergen Medical
are dismissed. An appropriate Order accompa
nies
this Opinion.

Dale:
0’
cc:

l

Deni is M. Cavanaugh, U

December/p 2013
Clk Off
Hon. James B. Clark. U.S.M.J.
All Counsel of Record
File

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J.