BEY v. ZUNIC et al

Filing 2

OPINION. Signed by Judge Stanley R. Chesler on 5/9/13. (gmd, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

AKIL ASIM BEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
PASSAIC MUNICIPAL COURT,
PROSECUTOR JOHN ZUNIC, JUDGE
KAREN BROWN, and JUDGE XAVIER
RODRIGUEZ,
Defendants.

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

Civil Action No. 13-2653 (SRC)

OPINION

CHESLER, District Judge
This matter comes before the Court on the application of pro se Plaintiff Akil Asim Bey
(“Plaintiff” or “Bey”) to file a Complaint without prepayment of fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915. Based on Plaintiff’s affidavit of indigence, the Court finds that Plaintiff qualifies for in
forma pauperis status pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. However, having thoroughly reviewed
Plaintiff’s pleading, the Court will dismiss the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
At the outset, the Court notes that because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court
construes the pleadings liberally and holds them to a less stringent standard than those filed by
attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Even so, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which
governs proceedings filed in forma pauperis, the Court must examine the merits of the claims
asserted and dismiss a case if it determines that the action cannot or should not proceed. The
statute provides as follows:
1

Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may
have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the
court determines that –
(A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or
(B) the action or appeal –
(i)

is frivolous or malicious;

(ii)

fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted; or

(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who
is immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
I.

Factual Background
This case arises out of a criminal proceeding in the Passaic Municipal Court against Bey.

According to the Complaint, Bey has appeared before the Passaic Municipal Court several times,
beginning on October 10, 2012, the date of his arraignment, but has consistently contested that
court’s subject matter jurisdiction. The Complaint does not make clear what criminal charges
Bey is facing in the municipal court action. The various individual defendants named as parties
by Plaintiff have been involved in the municipal court proceedings against Bey. As recently as
March 14, 2013, Bey continued to challenge the authority of the Passaic Municipal Court and
refused to submit to its jurisdiction. It appears that on or about that date, Judge Xavier Rodriguez
informed Bey that any applications he had made to terminate proceedings for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction were denied and stated that the case against Bey was moving forward to trial.
Plaintiff submitted his Complaint for filing with the federal court on or about April 25,
2013. He seeks an order from this Court entering a “Writ of Prohibition and or Mandamus” that
would enjoin the Passaic Municipal Court and its officers from proceeding against Plaintiff. The

Complaint alleges that the Passaic Municipal Court lacks jurisdiction to proceed against Bey
because it is a “foreign state” which enjoys the benefit of 11th Amendment immunity and, as
such, according to Bey, also lacks the authority to initiate lawsuits against others. While the
Complaint numbers 24 single-spaced pages, the following allegation summarizes the basis of
Plaintiff’s plea for injunctive relief:
If the State or municipal government can claim immunity under the 11th
Amendment, then the State or municipal government cannot use Law or
Equity jurisdiction against the Petitioner in Court, being one of the people
and not subject to a “foreign state” under Title 28 USC, Judicial
Procedure, §§ 1602-1610. The States are made up of “State Citizens,” and
under the 11th Amendment, “State Citizens” cannot be sued by a “foreign
state.”
(Compl. at ¶ 9) (emphasis in original).

II.

Discussion
The relief sought by Plaintiff implicates the limits on a federal court’s authority to

interfere in state criminal proceedings. In Younger v. Harris, the Supreme Court of the United
States held that, absent extraordinary circumstances, a district court must abstain from enjoining
state criminal proceedings. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971); see also Port Auth. Police
Benevolent Ass’n v. Port Auth. of New York and New Jersey, 973 F.2d 169, 173 (3d Cir. 1992)
(holding that in Younger, “the Supreme Court held that principles of federalism and comity
require district courts to abstain from enjoining pending state criminal proceedings absent
extraordinary circumstances.”). “The Younger doctrine, which counsels federal-court abstention
when there is a pending state proceeding, reflects a strong policy against federal intervention in

3

state judicial processes in the absence of great and immediate irreparable injury to the federal
plaintiff.” Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415,423 (1979).
The Third Circuit has held that the Younger abstention doctrine bars a federal court from
interfering in a state court action when the following three requirements are present:
(1) there are ongoing state proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2) the state proceedings
implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford an adequate
opportunity to raise federal claims.
Port Auth. Police Benevolent Ass’n, 973 F.2d at 173 (quoting Schall v. Joyce, 885 F.2d 101, 106
(3d Cir. 1989)). When these requirements are satisfied, a federal court may invoke the Younger
doctrine, unless there is a showing of “bad faith prosecution, harassment, or a patently
unconstitutional rule that will cause irreparable injury to the plaintiff.” Id.
The Younger abstention doctrine bars this Court from entertaining Plaintiff’s action to
enjoin the Passaic Municipal Court and its officers from proceeding with the criminal action
pending against him. The state action is ongoing, implicates important state interests as it seeks
to enforce the criminal laws of the state of New Jersey and affords Bey an adequate opportunity
to raise his claims that 11th Amendment immunity deprives Defendants of the authority to
prosecute alleged violations of state criminal law. Moreover, there is no indication that Bey has
been or will be subjected in the Passaic Municipal Court proceedings to bad faith prosecution or
harassment. Indeed, Bey does not provide any information in the Complaint regarding the nature
of the charges, the wrongdoing of which he is accused, or the conduct of the judges and
prosecutor. Certainly, the information he provides falls far short of forming a sufficient basis for
this Court to conclude that, absent interference with the state proceedings, Bey will suffer a
“great and immediate irreparable injury.”

4

Additionally, given the dearth of factual allegations in the Complaint, the Court must
dismiss the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e )(2)(B)(ii)for the additional reason that it
fails to meet the pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). The applicable
standard of review for dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the
standard for a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Grayson
v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103 (3d Cir. 2002). To state a claim that survives a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). As best the Court can construe, Plaintiff may be trying to assert a
federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a cause of action against state actors for
certain violations of an individual’s constitutional rights. To prosecute an action pursuant to §
1983, a plaintiff must plead that (1) defendants acted under color of state law and (2) deprived
plaintiff of rights secured by the Constitution or federal statutes. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48
(1988). Plaintiff states, in a conclusory manner, that the Passaic Municipal Court lacks
jurisdiction to prosecute him, but he gives no factual basis whatsoever for this assertion. While

5

Bey claims that the criminal action against him violates the 11th Amendment (or perhaps some
other constitutional protection), 1 such a bare-bones legal conclusion will not suffice to state a
plausible claim. Id. at 678-79.

III.

Conclusion
In short, this Court cannot afford Plaintiff the relief he seeks. While Bey claims that the

municipal court action against him violates the Constitution of the United States and must
therefore be enjoined, this Court must exercise its discretion to abstain from exercising
jurisdiction over this action, as counseled by the Younger doctrine. Additionally, the Complaint
lacks sufficient facts to state a plausible claim. An appropriate order dismissing this action will
be filed.

s/Stanley R. Chesler
STANLEY R. CHESLER
United States District Judge
Dated: May 9, 2013

1

The Court notes that as Plaintiff is pro se, it reads his Complaint liberally. Contrary to Plaintiff’s understanding of
the rights and protections afforded by the 11th Amendment, the law is well-settled that the amendment bars a federal
action for damages against a state and against state officials sued in their official capacity, unless that immunity is
abrogated by congressional action or waived by the state. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985); MCI
Telecommunication Corp. v. Bell Atlantic Penn., 271 F.3d 491, 503 (3d Cir. 2001). It does not deprive the state or
state officials of the authority to enforce the state’s criminal laws. Perhaps Plaintiff is complaining that some other
constitutional protection is being infringed in the course of the municipal court action, but there are no facts in the
Complaint that would even suggest what that deprivation might be.

6