THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON TRUST COMPANY, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION v. POCZOBUT et al
Filing
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OPINION. Signed by Judge Stanley R. Chesler on 8/5/13. (gmd, )
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON
TRUST COMPANY, NATIONAL
ASSOCATION AS GRANTOR TRUSTEE
OF THE PROTIUM MASTER
GRANTOR TRUST,
Plaintiff,
v.
BOZENA POCZOBUT and JAN
POCZOBUT,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 13-3303 (SRC)
OPINION
CHESLER, District Judge
This matter comes before the Court upon the motion filed by Plaintiff The Bank of New
York Mellon Trust, N.A., as Grantor Trustee of the Protium Master Grantor Trust (hereinafter,
“Plaintiff” or “Mellon Trust”) to remand this action to the Superior Court of New Jersey.
Removing Defendants Bozena and Jan Poczobut (“Defendants” or “the Poczobuts”) have
opposed the motion. The Court has considered the papers filed by the parties, and for the
reasons discussed below, grants the motion to remand.
I. BACKGROUND
This is a foreclosure action, which was filed in the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division on or about April 29, 2013. According to the Complaint, in April 1995,
Defendant Bozena Poczobut and her husband Jan obtained title to the property located at 312
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Newark Avenue, Union, New Jersey (the “Property”), which apparently was at the time and
continued to be thereafter the Poczobut’s residence. On July 18, 2007, Defendant Bozena
Poczobut executed a note in the amount of $232,000, which was secured by a mortgage on the
Property. Plaintiff Mellon Trust is identified in the Complaint as the assignee of the mortgage
and note. The Complaint alleges that the Poczobuts defaulted on the loan on September 1, 2010,
triggering the Plaintiff’s right to accelerate repayment of the debt.
The Complaint asserts three claims. Count One seeks to enforce Plaintiff’s rights
pursuant to the subject note and mortgage. Specifically, it pleads for an order fixing the amount
due, directing that Plaintiff be paid such amount, ordering that the mortgaged property be sold,
and appointing a receiver. Count Two requests entry of judgment granting possession of the
mortgaged property in favor of Plaintiff or any purchaser at a sheriff’s sale. Count Three seeks
to impose an equitable mortgage against Jan Poczobut, whom the Complaint alleges failed to
sign the subject mortgage and note due to an inadvertent clerical error.
Defendants removed the action to this Court on May 23, 2013 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1441. The Notice of Removal asserts that subject matter jurisdiction exists based on both federal
question jurisdiction, under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and diversity jurisdiction, under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
II.
DISCUSSION
In an action removed to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, the removing party bears
the burden of demonstrating that there is federal subject matter jurisdiction over the action.
Samuel–Bassett v. KIA Motors Am., Inc., 357 F.3d 392, 396 (3d Cir.2004); Boyer v. Snap–On
Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 111 (3d Cir.1990). Section 1441 must be strictly construed against
removal, with all doubts to be resolved in favor of remand. Batoff v. State Farm Ins. Co., 977
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F.2d 848, 851 (3d Cir.1992). Federal district courts have limited jurisdiction, possessing “only
that power authorized by Constitution and statute.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc.,
545 U.S. 546, 552 (2005). Federal statutory law mandates that “if at any time before final
judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be
remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d).
Defendants have failed to demonstrate that there is federal question jurisdiction over this
action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Section 1331 provides that “[t]he district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. “The presence or absence of federal question is governed by
the well-pleaded complaint rule, which provides that federal question jurisdiction exists only
when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded Complaint.”
Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Typically, then, federal question
jurisdiction will lie only if the complaint pleads a federal cause of action. Merrell Dow Pharm.
Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986); Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Mottley, 211
U.S. 149 (1918).
The Complaint at issue asserts rights and seeks relief under state law. No federal claim
or cause of action is pled at all. Defendants argue that subject matter jurisdiction under § 1331
exists because adjudication of this matter will necessarily involve significant federal issues,
including questions pertaining to the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Defendants
maintain that Plaintiff’s representations regarding the subject debt, efforts to collect the debt and
even the foreclosure action itself may be in violation of that federal statute. This argument,
however, is unavailing. Defendants cannot create federal jurisdiction by raising issues outside of
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the Complaint or by pointing to potential federal defenses to Plaintiff’s state law claims to
enforce the note and mortgage on the Property. The well-pleaded complaint rule limits the
jurisdictional inquiry to the claims and theories asserted in the complaint, and absent a federal
question of the face of the complaint, jurisdiction will not lie even if a defense to the state law
claims relies on federal law. Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 12 (2003) (citing
Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 10 (1983)). Indeed, it
is “settled law that a case may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense,
including the defense of preemption, even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff's
complaint, and even if both parties concede that the federal defense is the only question truly at
issue.” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393 (citing Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 12) (emphasis in
original).
Turning to diversity jurisdiction, the Court concludes that Defendants’ attempt at removal
on the basis of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) is deficient in two respects. First, Defendants fail to
establish that there is diversity of citizenship between the parties. For diversity jurisdiction to
exist under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), there must be complete diversity, meaning all plaintiffs must
be citizens of a different state or states than all defendants, and the amount in controversy must
exceed $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1); Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3
Cranch 267, 2 L.Ed. 435 (1806) (holding that, for jurisdiction to attach under section 1332(a)(1),
there must be complete diversity between all plaintiffs and defendants). According to the Notice
of Removal, Defendants are citizens of the State of New Jersey, but no information is provided
regarding the citizenship of Plaintiff Mellon Trust. Instead, Defendants simply recite the
Denver, Colorado address of a limited liability company, which was given as the Plaintiff’s
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principal place of business in the Complaint. It is not even apparent what the legal identity of the
Plaintiff is, meaning whether it is a trust, a corporation or a limited liability company.
Defendants fail to carry their burden of establishing that diversity jurisdiction exists. Second,
even assuming the diversity of citizenship and amount in controversy criteria of § 1332(a)(1)
were satisfied, Poczobut is barred from removing the action on the basis of diversity jurisdiction
under the forum defendant rule. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2). Section 1441(b)(2) prohibits removal
of action based on diversity jurisdiction “if any of the parties in interest properly joined and
served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.” Id. This action,
of course, was filed in the state court of New Jersey, the state in which the removing Defendant
herself is domiciled. 1
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Defendants have failed to establish the existence
of federal subject matter jurisdiction. The case must therefore be remanded to the Superior Court
of New Jersey, Chancery Division.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion to remand will be granted. An appropriate
Order will be filed.
s/Stanley R. Chesler
STANLEY R. CHESLER
United States District Judge
Dated: August 5, 2013
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Bozena Poczobut notes in her papers that her husband, Jan, is deceased. While it is not clear whether he died
before or after this foreclosure action was filed, the removal papers assert that he was also a citizen of the State of
New Jersey.
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