WILSON v. THE NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY ("DCP&P") et al
Filing
31
OPINION. Signed by Judge Kevin McNulty on 1/25/16. (DD, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
KAREN A. WILSON,
No. 13—cv-3346
(KM)(MAH)
Plaintiff,
V.
OPINION
THE NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD
PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY
(‘DCP&P’) (formerly Division of Youth &
Family Services), KARA P. WOOD, in her
official capacity as Director of DCP&P,
ALLISON BLAKE, in her official capacity as
the Commissioner of the Department of
Children and Families, KATHY CORAIN, in
her individual capacity, GILLIAN BATTS,
in her individual capacity, JANET
DASILVA, in her individual capacity,
SUSAN DEPRETENTS, in her individual
capacity, ODELIZIO ROSARIO, in her
individual capacity, MARIA LUGO, in her
individual capacity, FRANK J. DYER in his
individual capacity, CAROL PERSONETTE
DOYLE, in her individual capacity,
GERALDINE LIVENGOOD, in her individual
capacity, and John Does 1-15,
Defendants.
KEVIN MCNULTY, U.S.D.J.:
The plaintiff, Karen A. Wilson, brings this action alleging that the
defendants committed constitutional, federal statutory, and state statutory
violations during the process of removing her child from her care and
eventually terminating her parental rights. This matter comes before the court
on two motions:
1
(1) a motion (ECF No. 9) to dismiss the complaint, filed by defendants
New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency (“DCP&P”), Kara P.
Wood, Gillian Batts, Janet Dasilva, Odelizio Rosario, Carol Personette-Doyle,
Geraldine Livengood, and Allison Blake; and
(2) a motion (ECF No. 15) to dismiss the complaint, as well as to join
DCP&P’s motion to dismiss, filed by defendant Frank J. Dyer.’
For the reasons set forth below, the defendants’ motions to dismiss the
complaint are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
I.
2
BACKGROUND
A. The Parties
On May 28, 2013, Wilson filed a complaint (ECF No. 1) against:
A.
DCP&P (formerly Division of Youth & Family Services (“DYFS”)), a New
Jersey child protection and welfare agency within the Department of
Children and Families;
B.
Kara P. Wood in her official capacity as Director of DCP&P;
C.
Allison Blake in her official capacity as the Commissioner of the
Department of Children and Families;
D.
Kathy Corain, a nurse in St. Joseph’s Hospital in Paterson, New Jersey,
in her individual capacity;
E.
Gillian Batts, a DCP&P child protective services worker, in her individual
capacity;
F.
Janet Dasilva, a DCP&P supervisor of child protective services workers,
in her individual capacity;
Defendants Kathy Corain, Susan Depretents, and Maria Lugo have not
answered or moved in response to the complaint.
2 The facts that follow are
taken from the complaint. They are assumed to be
true solely for the purposes of the motions to dismiss. See Part III, irifra.
2
G.
Susan Depretents, a Passaic County social worker, in her individual
capacity;
H.
Odelizio Rosario, a DCP&P child protective services worker, in her
individual capacity;
I.
Maria Lugo, a DCP&P child protective services worker, in her individual
capacity;
J.
Frank J. Dyer, a psychological expert for DYFS, in his individual
capacity;
K.
Carol Personette-Doyle, the court appointed law guardian for Wilson’s
biological daughter, in her individual capacity;
L.
Geraldine Livengood, a New Jersey Deputy Attorney General, in her
individual capacity; and
M. John Does 1—15.
(Compi.
¶J
2—18)
B. Relevant Facts
The New Jersey courts terminated Wilson’s parental rights over her
daughter, and the decision was affirmed on appeal. The complaint alleges a
factual narrative that at times diverges sharply from the factual findings of the
state trial court as recited in the appellate opinion affirming the parental
termination decision. Compare Compi. with N.J Div. of Youth & Family Servs.
v.
K.W., No. A-5416—10T2, 2012 WL 1581252 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 8,
2012) (herein, “State Appellate Decision”). The complaint discusses abuses of
process in the immediate removal of Wilson’s child after birth and Wilson’s
subsequent interactions with the defendants throughout the termination
proceedings, while the State Appellate Decision depicts a failed, resource
intensive, four year effort to teach Wilson the skills necessary to raise her child.
(Id.) For present purposes, I consider the facts as related in Wilson’s complaint.
The complaint alleges the following: Wilson is a learning disabled high
school graduate. (Compl. ¶ 17) On October 26, 2007, she gave birth to a
3
daughter, Kate, at St. Joseph’s Hospital in Paterson, New Jersey. (Compi.
3
¶
18) At the time, Wilson was living with her parents and Kate’s father. (Compi.
¶
21)
Weeks before Kate’s birth, Wilson asked Depretents, a social worker at
St. Joseph’s, for assistance in finding an alternative home because the fatherto-be was abusive. Depretents assured her that assistance would be
forthcoming. (Compi. ¶j 22—25) Upon Kate’s birth, Depretents contacted
4
DYFS, which sent Rosario, a caseworker, to St. Joseph’s. (Compi. ¶ 27)
Shortly after Kate’s birth, Rosario, Depretents, and Corain, another St.
Joseph’s nurse, met with a heavily medicated Wilson and compelled her to sign
a HIPAA form releasing otherwise-confidential information to DYFS. (Compi. ¶j
28—33) DYFS then placed Kate with a foster family, acquaintances of Corain.
(Compi. ¶ 34)
Wilson did not commit any child abuse or neglect against Kate, and she
is not listed in New Jersey’s Child Abuse Registry. (Compl. ¶11 33, 35, 47) Kate,
who had no abnormalities at birth, manifested serious harms while under
DYFS’s care, including an irregular heartbeat, a spinal abnormality, a seizure
disorder, and a brain malformation. (Compl. ¶[ 36—37 citing State Appellate
Decision, 2012 WL 1581252 at *2) By the age of two, Kate’s development was
regressing; for example, she lost words that she had learned, and reverted from
walking to crawling. Id.
The defendants allegedly gave a misleading picture of Wilson’s fitness as
a parent. (Compl. ¶f 24, 41, 44) Specifically they misrepresented Wilson’s IQ to
the court, and Dr. Dyer, DYFS’s psychological expert, did not administer
diagnostic tests in a manner that accommodated Wilson’s learning disability.
(Compi. ¶j 42, 43)
“Kate” is a fictitious name used by the State Appellate Decision; I use it in this
opinion as well.
DCP&P was known as DYFS throughout the relevant period.
4
Wilson also alleges that the defendants have retaliated against her for
complaining about their conduct, and that they have conspired to deny her
parental rights. (Compl. ¶j 48—50) She alleges, upon information and belief,
that all of the defendants’ conduct is part of an established scheme to earn
money from the federal government through creating new foster care
situations, and that DYFS has acted in this manner on prior occasions.
(Compl.
¶J 54—58)
C. Claims
Wilson’s complaint, filed on May 28th, 2013, alleges eight claims for
relief:
1.
§ 1983 violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments by DCP&P,
Wood, and Blake for failure to properly promulgate rules and train those
in their command who committed abuses of process during their
investigation. Wilson requests an injunction requiring the formulation of
explicit instructions and policies against abuse of process. (Compi.
¶J
59-66)
2.
§ 1983 and 1986 violations of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments by
DCP&P, Wood, and Blake, for a policy or custom of improper hiring and
inadequate training that led to abuses of process and deliberate
indifference to the rights of persons including Wilson. Wilson requests
the same injunction as in count 1. (Compl.
3.
¶f 67—72)
§ 1985 conspiracy by all defendants to violate the Wilson’s civil rights
through the alleged abuses of process. Wilson requests $10 million in
damages, $50 million in punitive damages, counsel fees, costs of suit,
interest, damages for pain and suffering, and other appropriate relief.
(Compi.
4.
¶J 73—76)
§ 1983 violations by all defendants of Wilson’s due process and equal
protection rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments for policies, conduct, acts, and omissions that excessively
interfered with Wilson’s fundamental rights to privacy and freedom to
5
raise a family. Wilson requests the same relief as in count 3. (Compl.
¶J
77—83)
5.
§ 1983 violations by all defendants of the First, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth,
and Fourteenth Amendments for depriving Wilson of her due process
rights, her rights to be free from excessive interference with family
relationships, and her rights to speak freely about the defendants’
conduct without fear of reprisal and retaliation. Wilson requests the
same relief as in count 3. (Compl.
6.
¶J 84—93)
§ 1983 violations by all defendants under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments for retaliating against Wilson’s opposition to defendants’
unlawful practices. Wilson requests the same relief as in count 3.
(Compi. VT 94—103)
7.
Violations of Wilson’s rights under Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, (42 U.S.C.
§ 12131—12 165), for failing to provide
plaintiff with services to protect her rights and using her disabilities as a
means to deprive her of those rights. Wilson requests the same relief as
in count 3. (Compl.
8.
¶J 104—09)
Violations of the above rights under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act
(“NJCRA”), N.J. Stat. Ann.
as in count 3. (Compl.
§ 10:6—1 to —2. Wilson requests the same relief
¶J 110—13)
D. These Motions to Dismiss
On February 11, 2014, the defendants who have appeared in the case
moved to dismiss the complaint. They argue that: (1) Wilson’s claims are barred
by the Rooker-Feidman doctrine, (2) Wilson’s claims are barred as a result of
issue preclusion, (3) the defendants are immune from suit under the Eleventh
Amendment, (4) Wilson failed to sufficiently plead a conspiracy, and (5) the
defendants are immune under principles of quasi-judicial immunity.
6
II.
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
The defendants’ motions assert that this Court is barred from
considering Wilson’s suit because of the Rooker-Feidman doctrine and because
the Eleventh Amendment protects the State and its agencies from suit. (Def.
Br. Parts II, IV (ECF No. 9—3); Dyer Br. Section I (ECF No. 15—1)) “Both of those
grounds are jurisdictional in nature.” Bolick v. Sacavage, 617 F. App’x 175, 177
(3d Cir. 2015) (non-precedential).
A challenge to subject matter jurisdiction may be brought under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(1), on either a factual or facial basis. See 2 Moore’s Federal
Practice
§ 12.30[4] (3d ed.2007); Mortensen v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass’n, 549
F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). A facial challenge asserts that the complaint does
not sufficiently allege grounds for subject matter jurisdiction. In re Schering
Plough Corp. Intron/Temodar Consumer Class Action, 678 F.3d 235, 243 (3d
Cir. 2012). A court considering such a facial challenge “appl[ies] the same
standard of review it would use in considering a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6).” Constitution Party of Pa. v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 358(3d Cir. 2014).
That is, a court must assume the truth of the allegations in the complaint and
the documents it attaches or relies upon. Construing such allegations in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, the court may dismiss the complaint only if
it nevertheless appears that the plaintiff will not be able to assert a colorable
claim of subject matter jurisdiction. Aichele, 757 F.3d at 358—59. “With respect
to 12(b)(1) motions in particular, the plaintiff must assert facts that
affirmatively and plausibly suggest that the pleader has the right he claims
(here, the right to jurisdiction), rather than facts that are merely consistent
with such a right.” In re Schering Plough, 678 F.3d at 244 (internal quotations
marks omitted).
A. Rooker-Feidman
The defendants assert that the complaint must be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (Def. Br. Point II; Dyer
7
Br. Section I) See generally Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416, 44
S. Ct. 49, 150 (1923); D.C. Court ofAppeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482, 103
S. Ct. 1303, 1315 (1983). I will deny those portions of their motions. State
court findings will surely have relevance here—collateral estoppel, for example,
may come into play at a later stage—but the complaint here does not actually
seek to invalidate the state court judgment in the sense of reversing the
termination of Wilson’s parental rights.
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, lower federal courts are barred
“from exercising jurisdiction over ‘cases brought by state-court losers
complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the
district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and
rejection of those judgments.” Bolick, 617 F. App’x at 177—78 (citing Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125, S. Ct. 1517,
152 1—22 (2005)). The doctrine does not apply, however, even “[i]f the matter
was previously litigated, as long as the federal plaintiff present[sj some
independent claim, albeit one that denies a legal conclusion that a state court
has reached in a case to which he was a party... .“ Great W. Mining & Mineral
Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Wilson does not complain explicitly about injuries caused by the state
court judgment or ask this Court to overturn that judgment. See Hoblock v.
Albany Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 87 (2d Cir. 2005). She asserts
claims for damages based on alleged abuses by state officials, and asks for an
injunction to prevent future abuses. (Compl.
¶J
59—12 5) Her claims, if granted,
might tend to undermine the state court’s conclusions, but would not require
that they be overruled. Great W. Mining, 615 F.3d at 166, 173 (holding that if
plaintiffs could prove that constitutional violations precipitated an adverse
state court decision, and that an award of damages would not require
overruling that decision then Rooker-Feldman does not bar their claim); see
also B.S. v. Somerset Cnty., 704 F.3d 250, 260 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding that
8
injuries traceable to defendants’ actions, rather than the state court orders
caused by those actions, are not barred by Rooker-Feldman). I therefore deny
the motions to dismiss on Rooker-Feidman grounds.
5
B. Eleventh Amendment
The defendants argue that they are immune from suit under the
Eleventh Amendment. (Def. Br. Point IV) The Eleventh Amendment to the
Constitution guarantees the states’ immunity from certain claims for damages:
“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State.” U.S. Const. Amend. XI. Despite the seemingly limited scope of its
wording, the Eleventh Amendment has long been held to incorporate a more
general principle of sovereign immunity that bars citizens from bringing suits
for damages against any state in federal court. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100—10 1, 104 5. Ct. 900, 908 (1984). This immunity
had been extended to “state agencies and departments and officials when the
state is the real party in interest.” Pa. Fed’n of Sportsmen’s Clubs, Inc. v. Hess,
297 F.3d 310, 323 (3d Cir. 2002). Eleventh Amendment immunity is subject to
three exceptions: “(1) congressional abrogation, (2) waiver by the state, and (3)
suits against individual state officers for prospective injunctive and declaratory
relief to end an ongoing violation of federal law.” Id. There is no claim of waiver
here, but the first and third exceptions may be relevant, as discussed below.
1. Damages under
§ 1983, 1985, 1986 (Claims 3-6)
Claims 3—6 seek damages under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, 1985, and 1986.
Section 1983 provides:
We are, of course, at the pleading stage. Should it emerge after discovery that
the plaintiff has merely “pleaded around” Rooker-Felciman, the issue may be revisited.
Certain allegations potentially implicate the validity or effect of the state court decision
itself (See, e.g., Compi. ¶J 46, 52, 80, 91).
5
9
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress....
42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (emphasis added).
DCP&P. Eleventh Amendment immunity is closely intertwined with the
issue of a suable “person” under section 1983. Thus a state and its
departments are not considered “persons” amenable to suit under
§ 1983
because they are protected by sovereign immunity. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of
State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 67—70, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 2310—2312 (1989). Suits for
damages against “governmental entities that are considered ‘arms of the state’
for Eleventh Amendment purposes” and suits against state officials, which are
“no different from a suit against the State itself,” are also barred by sovereign
immunity. Id. at 70—7 1, 109 S. Ct. at 2312.6 DCP&P is therefore immune under
the Eleventh Amendment to the extent it is an “arm of the state.”
To determine whether an entity is an arm of the state, the Court
considers three factors: (1) whether payment of a judgment resulting from the
suit would come from the state treasury, (2) the status of the entity under state
law, and (3) the entity’s degree of autonomy. See Estate of Lagano v. Bergen
Cnty. Prosecutor’s Office, 769 F.3d 850, 856 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Fitchik v. N.J
Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 873 F.2d 655, 659 (3d Cir. 1989) (en banc)). The
Third Circuit has held that DYFS (now DCP&P) is an arm of the state covered
by New Jersey’s sovereign immunity. See Howard v. N.J Div. of Youth and
Logically, the same analysis applies to § 1985 and 1986, which were passed
along with § 1983 as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. See Querri v. Jordan, 440
U.s. 332, 342, 99 S. Ct. 1139, 1146 (1979) (the Civil Rights Act of 1871 did not
abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity); Muhammad v. Dempsey, No. 1 1—CV—350,
2011 WL4905513, at*3 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 14, 2011) affd, 531 F. App’tx 216 (3d Cir.
2013).
6
10
Family Serus., 398 F. App’x 807, 811—812 (3d Cir. 2010); see also Mammaro v.
The N.J. Div. of Child Permanency & Prot., No. 13-CV-6483 FLW, 2015 WL
225999, at *4_5 (D.N.J. Jan. 16, 2015); Love v. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family
Servs., No. 07—CV-3661 JET, 2010 WL 2950019, at *2 (D.N.J. July 22, 2010)
(collecting cases).
I follow suit, and grant the motion to dismiss Counts 3—6 on Eleventh
Amendment grounds as against DCP&P.
Wood and Blake. Defendants Wood and Blake are sued solely in their
capacities as state officials. State officials are, like state agencies,
indistinguishable from the state itself. They may not be sued for damages
consistent with the Eleventh Amendment; in their official capacities, they are
not “persons” subject to suit under
§ 1983. Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n.10, 109 S.
Ct. at 2312 n.l0; Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n. 14, 105 S. Ct.
3099, 3106 n.14 (1985). I therefore also grant the motion to dismiss Counts 3—
6 as against defendants Wood and Blake.
Remaining individual defendants. The remaining individual
defendants, although employed by the state, are sued for damages in their
individual capacities. A state official in his or her individual capacity does not
partake of the state’s Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, and is a
“person” amenable to suit under Section 1983. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30—
31, 112 S. Ct. 358, 364 (1991) (“the Eleventh Amendment does not erect a
barrier against suits to impose individual and personal liability on state
officials under
§ 1983”) (internal quotations omitted); Graham, 473 U.S. at 167—
68, 105 S. Ct. at 3106; Smith v. New Jersey, 908 F. Supp. 2d 560, 563 (D.N.J.
2012). An award of damages from an individual defendant, as opposed to the
public treasury, is a “permissible remedy in some circumstances.” Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 238, 94 S. Ct. 1683 (1974).
The motions to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment grounds the remaining
individual defendants, who are sued in their individual capacities, are therefore
DENIED.
11
2. Injunctive relief under sections 1983/1986 (Claims 1 and 2)
Claims 1 and 2 seek only prospective injunctive relief, not damages,
under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and 1986. These claims name DCP&P, a state agency,
as well as Wood and Blake in their official capacities as heads of state agencies.
(Compl.
¶J 2—4)
The agency itself, as an office of state government, is not amenable to
suit, even on an injunctive theory. The Eleventh Amendment permits an
equivalent claim to be brought, however, by way of an “official capacity” suit
against a state official. See, e.g., Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S. Ct. 441
(1908) (Eleventh Amendment permits “suits against state officials that seek
prospective relief to end an ongoing violation of federal law”); Will, 491 U.S. at
70—71 n.10, 109 S. Ct. at 2312 n.10; Graham, 473 U.S. at 167 n.11, 105 S. Ct.
at 3106 n. 11; Christ the King Manor, Inc. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., 730 F.3d 291, 318 (3d Cir. 2013). It is thus customary to do what
plaintiff has done here: sue the head of an agency (here, Wood or Blake)
demanding cessation of the agency’s alleged violation of federal law.
As to claims 1 and 2, then, the motion to dismiss on Eleventh
Amendment grounds is GRANTED as to DCP&P and DENIED as to Wood and
Blake. The consequences, however, are limited; the claim for injunctive relief
remains, in substance if not in form, a claim against the agency.
2. NJCRA (Claim 8)
Wilson sues all defendants for damages under the New Jersey Civil
Rights Act (“NJCRA”), N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 10:6—1 to -2 (Claim 8). “The NJCRA is
substantially similar to the federal civil rights statutes....” Lopez-Siguenza v.
Roddy, No. 13—CV—2005 JBS, 2014 WL 1298300, at *7 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2014).
Like
§ 1983, the NJCRA uses the word “person.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:6—2.
Courts have applied Will’s § 1983 sovereign immunity reasoning in parallel
fashion to bar NJCRA claims for damages against the state, its entities, and
officers. See Estate of Lagano, 769 F.3d at 856. Indeed, state officials are
immune even from claims for prospective injunctive relief under the NJCRA.
12
Balsam v. Sec’y of N.J., 607 F. App’x 177, 183 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Pennhurst,
465 U.S. at 106, 104 S. Ct. at 911) cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 189 (2015).
Accordingly, the motion to dismiss Claim 8 as against the official
defendants, DCP&P, Blake, and Wood, is GRANTED. As to the remaining
individual-capacity defendants, the motions to dismiss are DENIED.
3. ADA (Claim 7)
Wilson also sues all defendants under Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12131 etseq. (claim 7). Title II of the ADA
provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such
disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the
services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to
discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Wilson’s claims imply
that Congress, in enacting the ADA pursuant to its Section 5 powers under the
Fourteenth Amendment, abrogated the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity
as to her claims.
Eleventh Amendment immunity from ADA claims presents a question
that I cannot resolve on the pleadings or the present record. The relevant
factors are canvassed and discussed in Bowers v. National Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n, 475 F.3d 524 (3d Cir. 2007). See also United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S.
151, 159, 126 S. Ct. 877, 882 (2006); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 124 S.
Ct. 1978 (2004).
For certain well-established ADA claims (for example, denial of handicap
access facilities in courthouses) the relevant analysis has been performed in
the case law. Plaintiffs’ ADA claims are not of that nature. The defendants’
motions, too, fail to offer the requisite analysis. In any event, it appears that
such an analysis will require development of a factual record and refinement of
the claims themselves after discovery. See Floyd v. N.J. Casino Comm’n, No. 05—
CV—3949 RMB, 2007 WL 1797656, at *4 (D.N.J. June 19, 2007) (The defendant
“has not come close to performing the requisite analysis and, thus, the Court is
13
in no position to make the immunity determination as to Plaintiffs ADA claims
at this juncture.”)
The motions to dismiss the ADA claim (Claim 8) on Eleventh Amendment
grounds are therefore DENIED.
III.
MERITS
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint, in whole
or in part, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The
defendant, as the moving party, bears the burden of showing that no claim has
been stated. Animal Science Products, Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d
462, 469 n.9 (3d Cir. 2011). For the purposes of a motion to dismiss, the facts
alleged in the complaint are accepted as true and all reasonable inferences are
drawn in favor of the plaintiff. N.J Carpenters & the Trustees Thereof v.
Tishman Const. Corp. of N.J., 760 F.3d 297, 302 (3d Cir. 2014). Thus, the
complaint’s factual allegations must be sufficient to raise a plaintiff’s right to
relief above a speculative level, so that a claim is “plausible on its face.” Bell Ati.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964—65 (2007); see
also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 5. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
A. Issue Preclusion
The defendants assert that Wilson’s claims are barred by principles of
issue preclusion, based on the state court’s findings in the parental rights
proceeding. (Def. Br. Point III) New Jersey preclusion law applies. See Greenleaf
v. Garlock, Inc., 174 F.3d 352, 357 (3d Cir. 1999.
In New Jersey, a party seeking to invoke preclusion must show that:
(1) the issue to be precluded is identical to the issue decided in the
prior proceeding;
(2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior proceeding;
(3) the court in the prior proceeding issued a final judgment on the
merits;
(4) the determination of the issue was essential to the prior
judgment; and
14
(5) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted was a party to
or in privity with a party to the earlier proceeding.
Winters v. N. Hudson Reg’l Fire & Rescue, 212 N.J. 67, 50 A.3d 649, 659 (2012)
(line breaks added for clarity); accord Houbigant, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 374 F.3d
192, 204 (3d Cir. 2004).
I cannot resolve these factors at the motion to dismiss stage. The state
trial court’s decision (which is not before me in any event) focused on the
interests of the child and the termination of parental rights. This complaint
focuses on the alleged unfairness of the procedures to which Wilson was
subjected by the state agencies. The issue is not so clear that I can decide it on
a Rule 12(b)(6) standard. (See Def. Br. 14—15) The motions to dismiss on issue
preclusion grounds are therefore DENIED.
B.
§ 1985 (Claim 3)
Wilson’s complaint alleges, inter alia, conspiracy to deprive her of her
civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (claim 3). The defendants challenge
the sufficiency of the
§ 1985 claim. (Def. Br. Point VI)
Title 42, United States Code, Section 1985(3), permits a plaintiff to bring
a claim that two or more people have acted together to deprive her of her civil
rights. A plaintiff must show: “(1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving,
either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal
protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws;
and (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is injured
in his person or property or deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the
United States.” Farber v. City of Paterson, 440 F.3d 131, 134 (3d Cir.2006)
(citing United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners u. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 828—29, 103
S. Ct. 3352, 3356 (1983)).
Wilson’s 1985 claim is potentially vulnerable. It fails to clearly allege any
sort of racial or class-based animus, or any specifics about the formation of
any conspiratorial agreement. Covert conspiracies, however, may be inferred
from surrounding factual circumstances, and the complaint does elsewhere
15
allege violations of equal protection. Dismissal, or not, of Claim 3 would not
alter the course of discovery, and factual issues are best addressed on
summary judgment or at trial. For the present, I will permit Count 3 to stand.
C. Absolute Immunity
The defendants’ final argument is that Wilson’s claims are barred
because they enjoy quasi-judicial immunity. (Def. Br. Point VII; Dyer Br.
Section II) This aspect of the motions are granted as to defendants Personette
Doyle and Livengood, but cannot be granted as to other defendants at the
motion to dismiss stage.
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that certain common law
immunities survived Congress’s passing of § 1983. See Bums v. Reed, 500 U.s.
478, 484, 111 S. Ct. 1934, 1938 (1991); see also Yarns v. Cnty. of Delaware,
465 F.3d 129, 135 (3d Cir. 2006). Absolute immunity is restricted to public
officials who perform special functions, such as judges, jurors, and
prosecutors, when performing specific activities. See Butz v. Economou, 438
U.S. 478, 508—1 1, 98 S. Ct. 2894, 2911—13 (1978). Absolute immunity
“attaches to actions intimately associated with the judicial phases of litigation,
but not to administrative or investigatory actions unrelated to initiating and
conducting judicial proceedings.” Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202, 208 (3d Cir.
2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the court must perform a
“meticulous analysis of [the] actions and functions” of those seeking immunity.
See Light v. Haws, 472 F.3d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 2007); accord Odd, 538 F.3d at
208. In the child welfare context, a court must “ascertain whether [the
defendants] functioned as the state’s advocate when performing the actions
that gave rise to the due process violations [that the plaintiff] seeks to redress,
or whether those claims instead arose from unprotected administrative or
investigatory actions.” B.S., 704 F.3d at 265 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Often, such an analysis will involve facts beyond the scope of the
pleadings.
16
One form of immunity for child welfare workers is clearly defined,
however, and is suitable for resolution on a motion to dismiss. Under Ernst v.
Child & Youth Serus. of Chester Cnty., 108 F.3d 486, 495 (3d Cir. 1997), child
welfare workers are “entitled to absolute immunity for their actions on behalf of
the state in preparing for, initiating, and prosecuting dependency proceedings.”
Such immune activities “include the formulation and presentation of
recommendations to the court in the course of such proceedings.” Id. The face
of the complaint establishes that Ernst immunity applies to two defendants:
Personette-Doyle and Livengood.
The only fact pled as to Personette-Doyle is that she was “the Court
appointed Law Guardian” representing Wilson’s daughter. (Compi.
¶ 12; Def.
Br. 6) “In abuse and neglect proceedings, a law guardian is appointed by the
court to act on behalf of the child pursuant to New Jersey Statue
§
9:6—8.43,
and accordingly, a law guardian is ‘cloaked with the long-standing immunity
afforded judges by state and federal law.”’ Melleady u. Blake, No. 1 1—CV—1807
NLH, 2011 WL 6303245, at *15 (D.N.J. Dec. 15, 2011). Lacking any other
immunity-destroying fact or allegation, I will dismiss the complaint as against
Personette-Doyle.
The only fact pled as to Livengood is that she is “a Deputy Attorney
General in the State of New Jersey.” The implication seems to be that she
represented the State in Wilson’s parental termination proceedings. (Compl.
¶
13; Def. Br. 6) “[A]ttorneys who prosecute dependency proceedings on behalf of
the state are entitled to absolute immunity from suit for all of their actions in
preparing for and prosecuting such dependency proceedings.” Ernst, 108 F.3d
at 488—89. Again, lacking any allegation that Livengood performed any act
outside the scope of judicial proceedings, I must dismiss the complaint as
against her.
All other defendants are alleged to have acted in more administrative
capacities. I cannot determine at the pleading stage how closely their acts were
tied to the judicial function.
17
Accordingly, the motions to dismiss on grounds of absolute immunity are
GRANTED as to Personette-Doyle and Livengood, but DENIED as to all other
defendants.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the defendants’ motions to dismiss are
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. All counts of the complaint are
DISMISSED as to Livengood and Personette-Doyle. Claims 1—6 and 8 are
DISMISSED as to DCP&P. Claims 3—6 and 8 are DISMISSED as to Blake and
Wood. The motions to dismiss are otherwise denied. A chart is attached as a
guide.
Dated: Janua 25, 2016
,)
)
Hon. Kevin McNulty
,‘
United States District Judge
18
Claim
1 & 2
§ 1983,
1986
3
§ 1985
conspiracy
4, 5 & 6
§ 1983
7
ADA Title II
8 NJCRA
Relief
Against
sought
Injunction Official
defendants
Dismissed
against
DCP&P
Defendants
remaining
Wood, Blake
Damages
All
defendants
Official
defendants;
Livengood;
PersonetteDoyle
Individual
defendants
except Livengood
and Personette
Doyle
Damages
All
defendants
All
defendants
Damages
Damages
“Official Defendants”
=
“
“
Livengood;
PersonetteDoyle
All
defendants
Official
defendants;
Livengood;
PersonetteDoyle
Official
defendants;
Individual
defendants
except Livengood
and Personette
Doyle
Individual
defendants
except Livengood
and Personette
Doyle
DCP&P, Wood, and Blake
“Individual Defendants” = all other defendants except Kathy Corain, Susan
Depretents, and Maria Lugo, who have not answered or moved in response to
the complaint.
“All defendants”
=
Official Defendants plus Individual Defendants
19
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?