MASSEY v. WARREN et al

Filing 46

OPINION. Signed by Judge Esther Salas on 1/13/2019. (JB, )

Not for Publication
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
____________________________________
:
ANTHONY MASSEY,
:
:
Civil Action No. 13-3439 (ES)
Petitioner,
:
:
v.
:
OPINION
:
CHARLES W. WARREN, JR., et al.,
:
:
Respondents.
:
____________________________________:
SALAS, DISTRICT JUDGE
I.

Introduction
Pending before the Court is Petitioner Anthony Massey’s (“Petitioner’s”) motion for

reconsideration (D.E. No. 45 (“Motion”)) of this Court’s December 19, 2018 Opinion and Order
denying habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (D.E. Nos. 43 & 44). Respondents have not filed
an opposition. The Clerk will be ordered to reopen this matter so that the Court may rule on the
Motion. For the reasons stated below, the Motion is DENIED.
II.

Discussion
A. The Motion’s Claims
The Court summarized the factual and procedural background of this sexual assault and

burglary case in its December 19, 2018 Opinion, which is incorporated herein by reference. (D.E.
No. 43 at 1–6).
In the Motion, Petitioner asserts various criticisms of his trial counsel, Alan Bowman,
Esquire (“Mr. Bowman”). Petitioner states that Mr. Bowman “testified that he did not do an
investigation” into the “man that [victim] J.L. introduced . . . to [her neighbor] Ms. Quentero . . .

as [J.L.’s] husband . . . . No investigation is deficient counsel.” (D.E. No. 45 at 5). Petitioner
alleges that although Mr. Bowman told the state court “that he was looking for said man as a result
of the DNA evidence which excluded [Petitioner] as [a] contributor to [a specimen from the
victim], . . . [Mr. Bowman] lied.” (Id. at 5). Petitioner contends that “[p]ossible doubt may well
have been reasonable doubt at trial if [counsel had put] [apartment manager] Mr. Laderman’s
testimony before the jury.” (Id. at 6). Petitioner claims that “[t]o hold [Petitioner] accountable for
what is determined to be unexhausted claims is unfair.” (Id. at 6). He insists that “[f]ailure to do
an investigation by trial attorney is the bas[i]s for [his] ineffective assistance of counsel [claim].”
(Id. at 6–7). Petitioner’s Motion contends that he is “actually innocent.” (Id. at 6 & 7).
This Court reasonably construes the Motion as essentially re-alleging Ground Two of
Petitioner’s § 2254 Petition. (D.E. No. 1). In Ground Two, Petitioner had claimed that: (1) his
trial counsel “fail[ed] to investigate” (id. at 17); (2) “[Martin] Laderman’s testimony should have
been put before [the] jury” and that Mr. Bowman failed to investigate “phone records” (id.); and
(3) trial counsel (a) made no search “for the person [the victim] introduced to Claudia Quintero as
her husband; (b) did not search for “a possible DNA match . . . that excluded Petitioner;” (c) did
not “request a complete DNA analysis of other evidence collected [from J.L.’s apartment]; (d) did
not investigate “missing investigative reports;” and (e) did not “contact investigating Det[ectives]
Larry Malang and Luis Cruz” (id).1

Consistent with its December 19, 2018 habeas Opinion (D.E. No. 43), the Court’s instant Opinion again
refers to Ground Two’s claims as follows: claims regarding ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) as to witness
Martin Laderman are “Laderman IAC Claim;” claims regarding IAC as to investigation of phone records are “Phone
Records Investigation Claim;” claims regarding IAC as to Roberto Lopez, Eddie Carbone, the person introduced by
J.L. to Claudia Quintero, Detective Larry Malang, and Detective Luis Cruz are “Other Witnesses IAC Claim;” and
claims regarding IAC as to possible DNA match, DNA analysis, and missing investigative reports are “Evidence
Search Claim.”
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B. The Motion Fails to Satisfy Petitioner’s Burden For Reconsideration
The scope of a motion for reconsideration of a final judgment under Rule 59(e) is extremely
limited. Blystone v. Horn, 664 F.3d 397, 415 (3d Cir. 2011); Woodson v. Unknown Agents of
Unknown Agency, No. 14-7033, 2015 WL 71156, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 6, 2015). It requires the
moving party to set forth the factual matters or controlling legal authorities it believes the Court
overlooked when rendering its initial decision. Id.; see L. Civ. R. 7.1(i). “The purpose of a motion
for reconsideration . . . is to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered
evidence.” Max’s Seafood Cafe ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir.
1999) (quoting Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
As such, in order to prevail on a motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e), the movant
must show: “(1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence
that was not available when the court [rendered the judgment in question]; or (3) the need to correct
a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice.” Blystone, 664 F.3d at 415; see U.S.
ex rel. Schumann v. Astrazeneca Pharm. L.P., 769 F.3d 837, 848–49 (3d Cir. 2014). To prevail
under the third prong, the movant must show that “dispositive factual matters or controlling
decisions of law were brought to the court’s attention but not considered.” Mitchell v. Twp. of
Willingboro Municipality Gov’t, 913 F. Supp. 2d 62, 77–78 (D.N.J. 2012) (cleaned up). “The
standard of review involved in a motion for reconsideration is high and relief is to be granted
sparingly.” Id. at 78.
Here, there has been no intervening change in the controlling law; there is no new evidence
that was not available when the Court denied the Petition; and there is no need to correct a clear
error of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice. Instead, Petitioner merely disagrees with the

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Court’s previous holding (D.E. No. 45 at 4–8), which is not a ground for reconsideration. See
Assisted Living Assocs. of Moorestown, LLC v. Moorestown Twp., 996 F. Supp. 409, 442 (D.N.J.
1998).
However, the Court finds that one particular contention in the Motion warrants
clarification, in light of Petitioner’s pro se status. Petitioner suggests that the Court’s December
19, 2018 Opinion held him “accountable” for “unexhausted claims.” (D.E. No. 45 at 6). His
contention misunderstands the governing law and this Court’s December 19, 2018 habeas ruling.
In that habeas Opinion, this Court determined that (1) the state court ruling on the Laderman IAC
Claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court
precedent, and thus habeas relief was denied; and (2) while the Phone Records Investigation Claim,
Other Witnesses IAC Claim, and Evidence Search Claim were not fairly presented to state courts
and thus appeared unexhausted, this Court could—and did—nevertheless deny them on the merits.
(D.E. No. 43 at 11–19). A federal court may not grant a writ under § 2254 unless the petitioner
has first “exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A).
In other words, given that Petitioner did not fairly present the Phone Records Investigation Claim,
Other Witnesses IAC Claim, and Evidence Search Claim to each level of New Jersey state courts
before he filed his § 2254 Petition, those claims were unexhausted—which could prevent a federal
habeas court from ruling on them altogether.
This Court nevertheless determined, as it may properly do under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2),
that those claims’ unexhausted status did not preclude a ruling on their merits. The Court in fact
proceeded to rule on them. See Taylor v. Horn, 504 F.3d 416, 427 (3d Cir. 2007); Bronshtein v.
Horn, 404 F.3d 700, 728 (3d Cir. 2005). Petitioner was not held “accountable” for the claims’
unexhausted status. The claims’ failure on the merits was independent of their unexhausted status.

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In short, Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust certain of his claims was a necessary part of the Court’s
analysis of the Petition; however, that unexhausted status was not determinative of the claims’
ultimate disposition. Rather, the claims’ failure on the merits was the dispositive analysis that led
to denial of the Petition—i.e., an analysis separate from exhaustion.
III.

Conclusion
In sum, Petitioner has presented no new arguments, facts, or caselaw, that were not

available to this Court when it rendered its prior Opinion and Order denying the Petition. Petitioner
cites no case law or other authorities in support of his Motion, and this Court is aware of none that
would alter its December 19, 2018 decision in this proceeding. (See D.E. Nos. 43 and 44).
For the reasons stated above, the Court denies the Motion for Reconsideration. An
appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.

s/Esther Salas
Esther Salas, U.S.D.J.

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