NASH V TOWN OF KEARNY et al
Filing
16
OPINION. Signed by Judge William J. Martini on 6/4/15. (gh, )
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
Civ. No. 2:13-4378 (WJM)
STEVEN NASH,
Plaintiff,
OPINION
v.
TOWN OF KEARNY; TOWN OF
KEARNY POLICE DEPT.; KEARY
POLICE CHIEF JOHN DOWIE, in his
official and legal capacity as Police Chief;
JOHN DOWIE, individually; and
JOHN DOES 1-10,
Defendants.
WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J.
Defendants John Dowie, Town of Kearny, and Town of Kearny Police
Department filed this unopposed Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is
GRANTED.
I.
BACKGROUND
In this case, Plaintiff Steven Nash alleges that the Town of Kearny illegally
barred him from performing paid work as a referee/umpire for little league sports.
After over twenty years of participating in Kearny’s recreational sports programs,
Kearny’s Chief of Police John Dowie informed Nash that he could no longer umpire
because of his criminal record.
1
In 2002, Kearny implemented a policy requiring all coaches/volunteers
participating in recreation activities with children to complete an application form
and authorize a background check. The application asked applicants to answer
questions about their criminal history and driving records. Kearny sent the results
of the background checks to Chief of Police Dowie, who would send a letter to the
Town’s Business Administrator setting forth his recommendation concerning the
applicant.
On July 30, 2008, Nash signed a form entitled “Request for Criminal History
Record Information for a NonCrimnal Justice Purpose” permitting the Town of
Kearny to obtain his criminal records. On September 3, 2008, Chief Dowie wrote a
letter to the Business Administrator recommending that Nash’s application be
denied. Specifically, Dowie noted:
Mr. Nash currently has unresolved criminal issues pending in 2jurisdictions and is due in court . . . on 9/16/08.
In the 10-years that Mr. Nash resided in Brick Township, N.J., he had
documented contact with the police department 22-times, many for
arrests.
Mr. Nash has 267-entries on his DMV printout, his license is currently
suspended and he bounced checks to DMV as recently as 5/18/08.
Of the 5-indictable crimes listed on his criminal history from 5-different
jurisdictions, he has sustained 3-felony convictions and 2-more
outstanding.
Given the types of crimes he has been convicted of and has pending
coupled with his constant contempt of process, he is hardly a role
model.
In 2-separate jurisdictions, he is accused of stealing funds or obtaining
personal benefit from youth recreational or sporting organizations.
To underscore my point regarding his contempt, the last arrest of him
by the [Kearny Police Department] (6/18/07) was for 4-outstanding
warrants from 3-municipalities.
2
I fail to see where Mr. Nash has made himself a viable candidate for
any coach or volunteer position since his last review.
Other documents in the record demonstrate that most of Nash’s prior criminal
record involves thefts and the writing of bad checks. Nash was not placed on a list
of approved coaches in 2010 and 2011, nevertheless, he continued to work as an
umpire and referee because his cousin, Ralph Cattafi, a Recreation Department
employee, permitted him to do so. Cattafi was later disciplined for this.
In 2012, Kearny issued an ordinance (“Ordinance 2012-32”) barring people
convicted of theft and certain other crimes from working as volunteers or employees
for the Recreation Department.
The Plaintiff’s name did not appear on a Volunteer Coaches list, and he was
aware that he was “not approved,” but the Plaintiff acted as an umpire for the Town
of Kearny Recreation Department in 2011. The Plaintiff alleges that he was the only
individual who had a background check performed by the Town of Kearny
Recreation Department and that he was also the only individual who was denied the
opportunity to umpire because of criminal convictions. The Plaintiff identified five
individuals who allegedly 1.) worked for the Recreation Department and 2.) told him
that they had criminal convictions. However, Nash did not know the specifics
regarding the alleged convictions because he never asked the individuals for that
information.
Plaintiff filed a five-count Complaint alleging that Ordinance 2012-32 was
specifically passed to bar him from being an umpire. He alleges that no other
employee was asked to submit to a background check and that other people with past
convictions continued to work as umpires and referees. The Five Counts of the
Complaint are:
COUNT 1: Violation of New Jersey Rehabilitated Convicted Offenders
Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:168A-1 (RCOA)
COUNT 2: Unauthorized Criminal Background Check (Violation of
N.J.A.C. 13:59-1.2(a)(2))
COUNT 3: “Discrimination”
3
COUNT 4: Violation of Procedural Due Process
COUNT 5: Violation of New Jersey Constitution Liberty Interest
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides for summary judgment “if the
pleadings, the discovery [including, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file] and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Turner v. Schering-Plough Corp., 901 F.2d 335, 340
(3d Cir. 1990). A factual dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could find for the
non-moving party, and is material if it will affect the outcome of the trial under
governing substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). The court considers all evidence and inferences drawn therefrom in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party. Andreoli v. Gates, 482 F.3d 641, 647 (3d
Cir. 2007).
III.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff did not oppose this motion for summary judgment. Defendants make
the following persuasive arguments for dismissal of each of the Complaint’s five
counts.
A. RCOA
The New Jersey RCOA forbids licensing authorities from denying an
applicant a professional license due to a prior conviction. See N.J.S.A. 2A:168A-2.
The RCOA provides Plaintiff no remedy in this case because he was only seeking
permission to perform a job, not the issuance of a professional license.
B. Unauthorized Background Search
Count 2 will be dismissed because there is undisputed evidence that Plaintiff
did sign a form dated July 30, 2008, which was called “Request for Criminal History
4
Record Information for a NonCrimnal Justice Purpose.” The form authorized the
Town of Kearny to obtain his criminal records.
C. Discrimination
Plaintiff does not allege that he was a member of a class protected under the
New Jersey Law Against Discrimination because there is no protected class status
for convicted felons. N.J.S.A. 10:5-12. However, Plaintiff alleges what could be
construed as “class of one” discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment because Defendants intentionally treated him differently
than others similarly-situated without any rational basis. Village of Willowbrook v.
Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). In this case, the Complaint alleges that other
applicants were not subjected to a background check, and other convicted felons
were not barred from working for the Recreation Department. However, Plaintiff
never produced any evidence to support this contention.
D. Procedural Due Process
In Count Four, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his procedural due
process rights because Ordinance 2012-32 does not provide for an appellate process.
The United States Supreme Court has held that “the requirements of procedural due
process apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth
Amendment’s protection of liberty and property.” Board of Regents of State
Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). There is no property interest in
continued public employment unless a claimant can demonstrate “a legitimate claim
of entitlement to it.” Dungan v. Slater, 252 F.3d 670, 676 (3d Cir. 2001). The
Plaintiff must have more than a “unilateral expectation” of continued employment
to prove the entitlement. Latessa v. New Jersey Racing Comm’n, 113 F.3d 1313,
1318 (3d Cir. 1997). Plaintiff has no evidence that he was entitled to a referee or
umpire position.
E. New Jersey Constitutional Liberty Interest
Under the New Jersey Constitution, Article 1, “All persons . . . have certain
natural and unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life
and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and of pursuing and
obtaining safety and happiness.” In defining those substantive rights that are
fundamental under Article I, New Jersey courts refer to the general standard
followed by the United States Supreme Court in construing the Due Process Clause
5
of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Greenberg v. Kimmelman, 99 N.J. 552 (1985).
The United States Supreme Court looks to “the traditions and (collective) conscience
of our people to determine whether a principle is so rooted (there) as to be ranked as
fundamental.” Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.479, 493 (1965).
Plaintiff alleges in the Complaint, without citing any supporting case law, that
he has a fundamental interest in working and earning income. Even if that were true,
the Defendants have not deprived him of that right. He can work and earn income
anywhere he can get hired, but it will not be with the Kearny Recreation Department.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Motion for Summary Judgment is
GRANTED. An appropriate order follows.
/s/ William J. Martini
____________________________
WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J.
Date: June 4, 2015
6
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?