INTERNATIONAL UNION OF PAINTERS AND ALLIED TRADES DISTRICT COUNCIL 711 HEALTH & WELFARE AND VACATION FUNDS et al v. COATING TECHNOLOGIES, INC. et al

Filing 60

LETTER OPINION and ORDER that Defendant's unopposed Motion to Dismiss, 59 is GRANTED. The cross-claims described herein are dismissed with prejudice. Signed by Judge Jose L. Linares on 12/10/14. (gmd, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
Chambers of

Martin Luther King, Jr. Federal Bldg.
& U.S. Courthouse
50 Walnut Street
Newark, New Jersey 07102
(973-645-6042)

Jose L. Linares
United States District Judge

LETTER OPINION and ORDER
December 10, 2014

All counsel ofrecord via ECF

Re:

International Union of Painters and Allied Trades District Council 711
Health and
Welfare and Vacation Funds et a!
Civil Action No.: 13-4932 (JLL) (JAD)

Dear Counsel:
This Letter Opinion and Order shall address Defendant Manuel Caamano’s
Motion to
Dismiss Defendant, RTI Restoration Technologies, Inc., (hereinafter
“RTI”)’s Cross-Claim
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 59). This
Motion is unopposed
by RTI.

Afier careful consideration of the moving submission on the issue, and
for the reasons

stated below, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 59), is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs filed a Complaint in this action on August 15, 2013. (See Compl
aint, ECF No.
1). Thejurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to Section 502 and
515 of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. §1132
and §1145 respectively,
and Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§185. (Am. Compl., ECF
No. 32 ¶1). This Court is one of proper venue pursuant to Section
502(e)(2) of ERISA, 29

U.S.C.

§ 11 32(e)(2) as the relevant trust funds are administered in the State of New Jersey

and the various Defendants maintained and/or maintains a principal place of business in
the
State of New Jersey. (1d.J2).
Defendant Coating Technologies was a party to and/or agreed to abide by the terms and

conditions ofa collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) with the International Union ofPain

ters

and Allied Trades District Council 711 (‘the Union”) orone ormore local laborunions ordistr
ict
councils affiliated with the Union. (Id. ¶19). By virtue of the CBA, trust agreements,
and in
accordance with federal law and administrative regulations, Defendant Coating Technologies
agreed to a number of items (i.e. remit fringe benefits, submit monthly remittance reports
etc),
of which, it has allegedly failed to do. (Id. ¶2 1-25). There are many other defendants in
this
action but only two are relevant to this Motion. Defendant, Manuel Caamano is and/or was
the
principal shareholder of Defendant, Coating Technologies, as well as a fiduciary. (Id. ¶J41,
49).
Defendant, RTI, has allegedly been the “alter-ego of Defendant Coating Technologies
and is
bound to the CBA under a single or joint employer theory.” (Id. ¶58).
Defendant RTI submitted its Answer to the Amended Complaint on October 14, 2014.
(ECF No. 55). RTI asserted cross-claims against all other defendants stating “crossc
laims
against all other defendants for all or part of the claims asserted in this action by the
plaintiffs
against it.” (ECF No. 55 at 10). Defendant. Manuel Caamano moves to dismis
s this cross
claim..
II. LEGAL STANDARD

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), “[cjour
ts are
required to accept all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and to draw
all reasonable

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inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” Phillips v. County ofAllegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231
(3d Cir. 2008). But, “[fjactual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” Bell Ati. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Courts are not require
d
to credit bald assertions or legal conclusions draped in the guise of factual allegations. See In re
Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d at 1429 (3d Cir. 1997).

“A pleading that offers

‘labels and conclusions’ or a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.” Ashcroft v. Jqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 6782 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Thus, a
complaint will survive a motion to dismiss if it contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570).

). Additionally, in evaluating a plaintiffs claims, generally “a court looks only

to the facts alleged in the complaint and its attachments without reference to other parts of the
record.” Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994).
III. DISCUSSION

The Court is mindful that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8’s pleading standards are
applicable to cross claims. See Mathis v. Camden Cnty., 2009 WL 4667094 (D.N.J. Dec.
3,
2009) (applying the standards of pleading set forth in Rule 8 to a party’s cross-claim
for
contribution). Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) provides that any claim for relief (including a cross-c
laim)
must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to
relief. As previously stated, RTI only asserts a cross claim against all other defend
ants by
stating “cross-claims against all other defendants for all or part of the claims asserte
d in this
action by the plaintiffs against it.” (ECF No. 55 at 10). RTI does not assert any
substantial
facts or arguments beyond this in their cross-claim. Additionally, RTI failed
to submit an
opposition to this motion to provide any clarification to the Court as to the basis
for any cross3

claim,

Without alleging any facts, this broad and all-encompassing cross-claim must be

dismissed.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons articulated above, Defendant’s unopposed Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No.
59), is GRANTED. The cross-claims described herein are dismissed with prejudice.

SO ORDERED

L. LINARES, U.S.D.J.

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