GREENE v. PEREZ et al

Filing 39

OPINION. Signed by Judge William J. Martini on 11/21/16. (gh, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
RONALD B. GREENE,
Civ. No. 2:13-05493

Plaintiff,
v.

OPINION

MICHAEL PEREZ, et al.,
Defendants.

WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J.:
Pro se Plaintiff Ronald Greene brings this action against four detectives of the
Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office, namely Brian Kelly, Michael Perez, John Doe #1 and
John Doe #2 (collectively “Defendants”). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants used excessive
force against him during his arrest in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter comes
before the Court on Plaintiff’s motion to reinstate his claims under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b). There was no oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b). For the reasons set
forth below, Defendants’ motion to reinstate is GRANTED.
I.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a convicted and sentenced prisoner, currently serving his sentence in East
Jersey State Prison, Rahway, New Jersey. See Pl.’s Mot. to Reinstate § 1983 Excessive
Force Claims (“Pl.’s Mot.”), Ex. A 2–3 [hereinafter “Am. Compl.”], ECF No. 36. On
October 18, 2011, Plaintiff alleges that he was arrested by detectives employed by the
Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office during a police sting operation, taking place in a
Hampton Inn parking lot in Ridgefield Park, New Jersey. See Am. Compl. at 5. On
December 5, 2013, Plaintiff was convicted by a jury on several charges, including robbery
and unlawful possession of a handgun. See Br. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (“Defs.’
Dismiss Mot.”) 2–3, Nov. 10, 2015, ECF No. 24. On April 11, 2014, Plaintiff was
sentenced to thirty-five years of imprisonment, which he is currently serving. See id. at 3.
On September 13, 2013, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants, alleging the
use of excessive force by Defendants against him during the course of his arrest, among
other allegations. See Compl. 14–15, ECF No. 1. Defendants never actually answered
Plaintiff’s complaint; instead, they filed a motion to dismiss on November 10, 2015. See
Defs. Dismiss Mot. at 1–3. On February 2, 2016, Plaintiff filed a response to Defendants’
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motion, attaching a proposed amended complaint, which he claimed addressed the pleading
deficiencies set forth in the motion to dismiss. See Reply to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss and
Leave to Amend 1–2, ECF No. 29.
On February 29, 2016, this Court granted Defendants’ motion, dismissing all of
Plaintiff’s claims, including his excessive force claim. Op. 4, ECF No. 30. Specifically,
the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s excessive force claim because he did not “go beyond naked
assertions and conclusory statements by alleging specific facts describing how the use of
force was excessive” in his complaint. See id. The Court dismissed the claim without
prejudice and granted Plaintiff thirty days to file an amended complaint. Id. Notably, the
Court did not reference Plaintiff’s response and proposed amended complaint in its
opinion. See id.
On March 28, 2016, Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s
February 29 order, again attaching an amended complaint. Plaintiff argued that the
amended complaint, “being duly filed contemporaneously herewith,” superseded the
original because no responsive pleadings had been made by Defendants. See Pl.’s Mot. for
Reconsideration (“Reconsider Mot.”) 3, ECF No. 32. The Court modified the February 29
order, stating that certain claims should have been dismissed without prejudice and that
Plaintiff would be given the opportunity to reassert those claims only if his conviction was
reversed. See id. at 4. The Court did not reference Plaintiff’s amended complaint.
Plaintiff now moves this Court to reinstate his excessive force claim. Plaintiff
argues that the amended complaint cured the pleading deficiencies noted by the Court, that
the Court did not consider it prior to the February 29 order, and that his claim, therefore,
should be allowed to proceed. See Pl.’s Mot. at 4. Defendants oppose, arguing that the
motion is untimely because it failed to meet the Court’s thirty-day deadline imposed by the
February 29 order. See Defs.’ Br. in Opp’n to Mot. to Reinstate (“Defs.’ Opp’n”) 1, Sept.
6, 2016, ECF No. 38.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) “governs petitions to reinstate an action.” See
Fisco v. Lamplight Farms, Inc., No. 11-cv-3855, 2013 WL 6253192, at *1 (D.N.J. Dec. 4,
2013). “It is well settled that the determination of a Rule 60(b) Motion is within the sound
discretion of the Court.” Id. The Court liberally construes Plaintiff’s motion as seeking
relief from the Court’s dismissal of his claims pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1), which provides
that a court may grant relief due to “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1).
“In determining excusable neglect, a court must consider four factors: (1) prejudice
to the adverse party; (2) length of the delay and its potential impact on the judicial
proceedings; (3) reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable
control of the movant; and (4) whether the movant acted in good faith.” Murray v.
Walgreen Co., 470 F. App’x 97, 98 (3d Cir. 2012).

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III.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff submits that the Court overlooked his amended complaint, which he claims
to have mailed to the Court for filing on January 21, 2016 and which was received by the
Court on February 3, 2016. See Pl.’s Mot. at 1 n.1. Defendants counter that the Court did
not overlook the amended complaint because the submission “constituted no more than a
proposed amended complaint.” See Defs. Opp’n at 2. Neither party references Plaintiff’s
March 28 filing, which Plaintiff characterized as a motion for reconsideration but which
also included the amended complaint. See Reconsider Mot. at 3.
While it is true that the record does not contain an entry expressly titled “Amended
Complaint,” it does show that Plaintiff attempted to file his amended complaint both prior
to and within thirty days after the Court’s issuance of the February 29 order. Plaintiff
appears pro se and the Court will afford him greater leniency than it would if he were
represented by counsel. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972) (“we hold
[pro se pleadings] to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”);
Alexander v. Gennarini, 144 F. App’x 924, 926 (3d Cir. 2005) (“pro se pleadings must be
liberally construed”).
In this light, the Court finds that reinstatement is warranted. First, there is no
prejudice against Defendants because Defendants have not yet filed an answer to the
complaint. See DeJesus v. Mohammad, No. 12-cv-7007, 2013 WL 5963018, at *3 (D.N.J.
Nov. 7, 2013) (finding no prejudice where opposing party had not answered the complaint
and discovery had not begun). Second, the length of delay will not impact judicial
proceedings because the litigation is in its earliest stages. See id. (finding no adverse
impact to the judicial proceedings because the case was in its earliest stages). Third, the
reason for delay is reasonable and excusable because Plaintiff originally thought that he
had timely filed his amended complaint and his procedural deficiencies are given more
leniency due to his pro se status. See Haines, 404 U.S. at 520–21. Fourth, Plaintiff acted
in good faith because the record clearly reflects Plaintiff’s attempt to correct the
complaint’s deficiencies and follow the Court’s February 29 order. See ECF Nos. 29, 32.
Finally, the Court will accept the amended complaint attached to the instant motion
as the actual amended complaint, to which Defendants must now respond.

In general, the liberality of the pleading regime is accentuated within the
civil rights context. We have “consistently held that when an individual
has filed a complaint under § 1983 which is dismissible for lack of factual
specificity, he should be given a reasonable opportunity to cure the defect,
if he can, by amendment of the complaint . . . .
Kundratic v. Thomas, 407 F. App’x 625, 629–30 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Darr v. Wolfe,
767 F.2d 79, 81 (3d Cir. 1985), abrogated on other grounds by Alston v. Parker, 363
F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2004)). Here, Plaintiff has amended his complaint, alleging
sufficient, specific facts in support of his excessive force claim. See Am. Compl. at 5–6.

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Accordingly, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion and reinstate his excessive force
claim.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s motion to is GRANTED. An appropriate
order follows.

/s/ William J. Martini
WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J.
Date: November 21, 2016

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