EDELSON v. CHEUNG

Filing 73

OPINION. Signed by Judge Jose L. Linares on 7/16/15. (cm )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

LEONARD EDELSON,

Civil Action No. 13-5870 (JLL)

Plaintiff,
OPINION

V.

STEPHEN CHEUNG,
Defendant.
LINARES, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on Leonard Edelson’ s (“Plaintiff’) application for a
preliminary injunction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 and a writ of attachment pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ, P. 64(a) and New Jersey Court Rule 4:60-5(a). Plaintiff seeks a writ of attachment and a
preliminary injunction against Defendant Stephen Cheung (“Defendant”). The Court has
considered the papers submitted, as well as the oral argument of the Parties heard on June 9,
2015. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiffs application for a writ of attachment and a
preliminary injunction is DENIED.

I. Factual Background
Plaintiff Leonard Edelson has owned Westchester Lace & Textiles, Inc. (“Westchester”),
located in North Bergen, New Jersey, since 1976. (P1. Br. at 3.) Westchester sells lace to a
number of large undergarment manufacturers in the United States. (P1. Br. at 3.) Westchester’s
lace was manufactured in its North Bergen factory until 2003, when it became economically
unfeasible for production to continue in North Bergen. (P1. Br. at 3.) In 2004, Edelson and
Cheung formed Eastchester Lace & Textiles (“Eastchester”) with two additional partners,

Stephen Na and C.K. Chiu, to manufacture lace in China. (Pt. Br. at 3-4.) Eastchester, according
to Defendant, was known as Yishida in China. (Def. Br. at 1.) Plaintiff obtained 50% ownership
interest in Eastchester, while Ma, Chiu, and Cheung shared the remaining 50%, such that each
owned 16.6%. (P1. Br. at 4, Tr. at 9.) The new manufacturing facility and its main office were
located in Jiangmen, China. (P1. Br. at 4.)
Ma. Chiu, and Cheung were tasked with establishing the Chinese corporation due to their
familiarity with business procedures in China, while Edelson provided Westchester’s name,
contacts, proprietary methods, copyright-protected lace designs, and his expertise in the lace
manufacturing industry. (P1. Br.at 4.) Edelson also contributed capital to establish Eastchester,
including 34 machines, parts, and equipment, as well as over 133,000 pounds of yarn. (P1. Br. at
4.) Additionally, Edelson paid Matthew Ranieri, a consultant, over $250,000 to move to China to

set up the Eastchester facility and hire and teach employees to use the machinery. (P1. Br. at 4.)
Defendant and his sister-in-law, Liso Lee, managed Eastchester. They also own Frontier, a
related company that managed Eastchester billing. (P1. Br. at 5.)
In 2005, Defendant sent a letter to Plaintiff, Ma, and Chiu, indicating that the Bank of
China was seeking repayment for loans Eastchester had taken out, totaling approximately
$237,000. (P1. Br. at 5, Def. Br. at 2.) As a result of Eastchester’s debt, the Bank of China seized
several of Eastchester’s machines, which Defendant purchased back at auction with personal
funds. (Tr. at 38.) Defendant offered to handle Eastchester’ s financial issues in exchange for
acquiring full ownership of the company. (P1. Br. at 5.) Plaintiff, Ma, and Chiu each signed a
contract (“2005 Conveyance Agreement”) agreeing to convey their interests in Eastchester to
Cheung. (P1. Br. at 6.) Cheung then transferred 10% of his interest in Eastchester to his son
Marcus, allegedly in order to comply with a Chinese law. (P1. Br. at 7, Def. Br. at 2, Tr. at 30.)

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In 2006, Plaintiff and Defendant created a one-paragraph document that purported to
allow Plaintiff to exercise an option for 50% interest in Eastchester (“2006 Option Agreement”).
(P1. Br. at 6.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant drafted the 2006 Option Agreement, while
Defendant alleges it was drafted by Plaintiff. (P1. Br. at 6, Tr. at 35.) The 2006 Option
Agreement, dated September 14, 2006 and signed by Defendant and witnessed by a notary
public, indicated that:
Leonard Edelson has transferred machinery and yarn and
consultant services in excess of $600,000 to Eastchester Lace of
Jiangmen, China. In as much as [Defendant] will own 100% of the
shares after the company is reorganized, [Defendant] agree[s] to
give 50% interest in that company or a successor company to
Leonard Edelson at a date specified by him. He may exercise this
option at any time.
(P1. Br. at 6. Ex. 9).
Plaintiff alleges that from 2006 through mid-2013, Defendant and Lee managed
Eastchester and took profits and salaries therefrom. (P1. Br. at 7.) Defendant alleges that, while
he owned Eastchester, he did not make any profits and he invested more than $200,000 in
operating Eastchester. (Def. Br. at 4.) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant, though he
continued to work from 2010 through 2013, claimed to be retired and failed to report his income
from Eastchester and Frontier during that period. (P1. Br. at 7, n. 3.) Throughout this period,
Edelson continued to pay Ranieri for his consulting services and to purchase lace from
Eastchester, allegedly providing Eastchester with an average of $1.6 million in annual revenue
between 2010 and 2012. (P1. Br. at 8.)
In March 2009, Defendant presented Plaintiff with a potential investor. (P1. Br. at 8.)
After Plaintiff expressed concern, Defendant indicated to Plaintiff that he was the only “partner”
at Eastchester. (PT. Br. at 8.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant began negotiations to sell

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Eastchester to Hang Chen in 2012 and did not inform Plaintiff. (PT. Br. at 8.)
In April 2013, Defendant established Eastchester Lace Corp. in New York (“Eastchester
NY”) to sell lace and textiles. (P1. Br. at 8.) Defendant did not inform Plaintiff he was opening
this new business. (P1. Br. at 8.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant hired a Westchester employee,
Geremy Bernstein, to assist in opening Eastchester and competing with Westchester. (P1. Br. at
9.) In June of 2013, Defendant forwarded Plaintiff an email from Lee, detailing financial
problems allegedly afflicting Eastehester, and asked for Plaintiff’s opinion. (P1. Br. at 9.)
Plaintiff provides several emails indicating his requests to meet with Defendant regarding these
financial problems and the sale of Eastchester. (P1. Br. at 9.) These requests to meet were all
rebuffed. (P1. Br. at 9.)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant sold Eastchester on June 3, 2013 without informing
Plaintiff or allowing him to exercise the 2006 Option Agreement. (P1. Br. at 9.) Defendant
indicates that he sold Eastchester to Chen for $100,000. (Def. Br. at 4.) Plaintiff also alleges that
Defendant sent him several emails after June 3 requesting advice regarding the potential sale of
Eastchester, though the sale had already taken place. (P1. Br. at 10.) While Plaintiff and
Defendant discussed the potential for sale, Plaintiff requested that Defendant ensure that Plaintiff
receive compensation for his contributions if Eastchester were sold. (P1. Br. at 11.) Plaintiff
asserts that he tried to enforce the 2006 Option Contract at the end of July. (P1. Br. at 11.)
Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant sought to sabotage Westchester in a number of
ways, including cutting off his supply of lace from Eastchester, acquiring Westchester’s
customers, hiring Bernstein, advising the new owner of Eastchester not to do business with
Westchester, copying Westchester’s lace patterns, selling necessary machinery, and refusing to
take orders from Westchester. (P1. Br. at 12-13.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant advised that

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Eastchester would no longer do business with Westchester and told Chen to notify Westchester’s
customers about the end of their relationship. (P1. Br. at 14.) According to Plaintiff, Chen sent
emails to four of Westchester’s customers informing them that they should direct orders to
Eastchester and that they would no longer accept orders through Westchester. (P1. Br. at 15.)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant is in the process of liquidating his assets and removing
money to China (P1. Br. at 17.) Defendant asserts that he recently sold a property he owns and
transferred funds to his father-in-law in Hong Kong to repay a debt. (Def. Br. at 1.)
II. Procedural History
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on October 2, 2013, alleging breach of contract and breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (Compi. 4-5.) The parties exchanged written
discovery requests and served responses to the discovery requests on May 14, 2014. (ECF No.
15). On May 16, 2014, Magistrate Judge Dickson entered an Order referring this case to
mediation and appointed Harold I. Braff to serve as the mediator. (ECF No. 17). The parties
engaged in mediation sessions with Braff on June 27, 2014 and January 13, 2015, which were
both ineffective in reaching a resolution. (ECF Nos. 19, 25).
On March 12, 2015, Plaintiff moved to amend his complaint to allege two additional
causes of action: fraud and unjust enrichment. (ECF No. 30). On April 2, 2015, Magistrate Judge
Dickson granted the motion. (ECF No. 41). Defendant was given an extension to answer the
Amended Complaint from April 16, 2015 until May 4, 2015. (ECF No. 45). On April 29, 2015,
Defendant’s counsel moved for leave to withdraw as counsel and requested an addition extension
to answer the Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 43.) Magistrate Judge Dickson extended
Defendant’s time to answer to May 11, 2015 (ECF No. 49.) On May 1, 2015, Magistrate Judge
Dickson granted Plaintiff’s counsel leave to file for prejudgment attachment. (ECF No. 49.) On

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May 5, 2015, Magistrate Judge Dickson entered an order granting Defendant’s counsel’s motion
to withdraw. (ECF No. 49.) On May 6, 2015, Plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction and/or
a writ of attachment preventing Defendant from moving his assets overseas based on the
allegation that Defendant was “liquidating his assets and removing money to China,” making
Defendant judgment-proof. (ECF No. 53, P1. Br. at 17.)
III. Legal Standard
A. Writ of Attachment
Fed. R. Civ. P. 64(a) provides that “every remedy is available that, under the law of the
state where the court is located, provides for seizing a person or property to secure satisfaction of
the potential judgment.” For a court to issue a writ of attachment pursuant to New Jersey Court
Rule 4:60-5(a), a plaintiff must show that (1) there is a probability that final judgment will be
rendered in favor of the plaintiff, (2) there are statutory grounds for the issuance of the writ, and
(3) there is real or personal property of the defendant at a specific location within this State
which is subject to attachment.
With respect to the first prong, a final judgment in favor of the plaintiff is “probable if it
can reasonably and fairly convincingly be accepted as true, factual, or possible without being
undeniably so.” Sentry Ins. V. Sky Mgmt., Inc., 34 F. Supp. 2d 900, 905 (D.N.J 1999). This
means that a plaintiff seeking a writ of attachment must demonstrate a prima facie case against
the defendant. Tanner Assoc., Inc. v. Ciraldo, 33 N.J. 51, 62 (1960).
N.J.S.A

§ 2A:26-2(a) provides statutory grounds for attachment “where the facts would

entitle plaintiff to an order of arrest before judgment in a civil action,” a procedure known as
capias ad respondendum. N.J.S.A.

§ 2A:15-41, 2A:15-42. A capias ad respondendum can issue

in an action founded in contract or in tort. In a tort action,

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§ 2A: 15-41 provides that:

[a] capias ad respondendum shall issue. only when the action is
founded upon (a) an outrageous battery or mayhem, (b) a claim of
damages for the misconduct or neglect of a public officer, or (c) a
willful or malicious act and the defendant is a nonresident or is
about to remove from the state.
.

.

In a contract action, whether the contract is express or implied,

§ 2A: 15-42 provides that:

A capias ad respondendum shall issue. only when the proof
establishes. (a) that defendant is about to remove any of his
property out of the jurisdiction of the court in which the action is
about to be commenced or is then pending with intent to defraud
his creditors, or (b) that defendant has property or choses in action
which he fraudulently conceals, (c) that defendant has assigned,
removed, disposed of, or is about to assign, remove, or dispose of
any of his property with intent to defraud his creditors, or (d) that
defendant fraudulently contracted the debt or incurred the demand.
.

.

.

.

To satisfy the third prong, a plaintiff must show that the Defendant has real property that
the Court can reach and attach.
B. Preliminary Injunction
Although the Court typically applies state law in diversity actions, the Court utilizes a
federal standard in examining requests to federal courts for preliminary injunctions. Instant Air
Freight, Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 799 (3d Cir. 1989). A preliminary injunction
is a “drastic and extraordinary remedy that is not to be routinely granted.” Intel Corp. v. ULSI
Sys. Tech., Inc., 995 F.2d 1566, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Whether to issue a preliminary injunction
is within the trial court’s discretion. New Eng. Braiding Co., v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 970 F.2d
878, 882 (Fed Cir. 1992). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that
“a district court has the authority to grant injunctive relief in an arbitrable dispute, provided that
the traditional prerequisites for such relief are satisfied.” Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Amgen, Inc.,
882 F.2d 806, 812 (3d Cir.1989). The court identified those “traditional prerequisites” as
follows: (1) whether the movant has demonstrated reasonable probability of eventual success in
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the litigation; (2) the probability of irreparable harm to movant if immediate relief is not granted;
(3) the potential harm to the non-moving party; and (4) the public interest. Id. at 8 12-13. See
also Allegheny Energy, Inc. v. DQUE, Inc., 171 F.3d 153, 158 (3d Cir. 1999). A plaintiff must
establish more than a risk of irreparable injury. He must demonstrate “a clear showing of
immediate irreparable injury.” Hoxworth v. Blinder. Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186, 205 (3d
Cir, 1990) (quoting ECRI v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 225 (3d Cir. 1987)). The Third
Circuit has placed particular weight on the probability of irreparable harm and the likelihood of
success on the merits, stating that “we cannot sustain a preliminary injunction ordered by the
district court where either or both of these prerequisites are absent.”

at 197 (quoting jç

Arthur Treacher’s Franchisee Litig., 689 F.2d 1137, 1143 (3d Cir.1982)); see also Instant Air
Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 800 (3d Cir. 1989); Morton v. Beyer, 822
F.2d 364, 367 (3d Cir. 1987); Freixenet, S.A. v. Admiral Wine & Liquor Co., 731 F.2d 148, 151
(3dCir. 1984).

IV. Discussion

A. Plaintiff is not entitled to a writ of attachment on Defendant’s property in New Jersey
based on any of his claims.
Plaintiff asserts that his request for a writ of attachment satisfies the three prongs required
by New Jersey Court Rule 4:60-5(a). He argues that there is a probability that final judgment on
his breach of contract, breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing, fraud, and unjust enrichment
claims will be rendered in his favor. To satisfy the second prong, Plaintiff asserts that New
Jersey’s capias ad respondendum statutes provide grounds for the issuance of a writ. Finally, he
argues that Defendant has property in New Jersey that can be attached.
Plaintiff has not shown there is a probability that final judgment will be rendered in his
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favor with respect to any of his claims. In order to show there is a probability that final judgm
ent
will be rendered in Plaintiffs favor, he must state aprimafacie case on one or more of his
claims.
I. Breach of contract
To state a prima facie claim for breach of contract, Plaintiff must show that (1) a contract
existed, (2) Defendant breached that contract, (3) the breach caused damage to Plaintiff, and
(4)
Plaintiff performed his own contractual obligations. Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 203
(3d, Cir. 2007). In order to establish that a contract existed, Plaintiff must prove the basic
elements of a contract: (1) offer, (2) acceptance, and (3) consideration. Boro Constr., Inc. v.
Lenape Reg’l High Sch. Bd. Of Educ., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135822, 15 (D.N.J. 2010).
Additionally, the contract must be “sufficiently definite that the performance to be rendered
by
each party can be ascertained with reasonable certainty.” Schulz v. United States Boxing Ass’n,
105 F.3d 127 (3d. Cir. 1997).
Though Plaintiff baldly asserts that “there is no question that Edelson and Cheung
entered into a valid contract,” this Court disagrees. (P1. Br. at 22). Plaintiff alleges that Defend
ant
breached the 2006 Option Agreement, but fails to show that a contract existed. Though it appear
s
from the one-paragraph agreement that there was offer and acceptance, whether there was
consideration is in dispute. A contract is unenforceable without consideration. Blair v.
Scott
Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d 595, 604. (3d. Cir. 2002). The 2006 Option Agreement states
that
Plaintiff “has transferred machinery and yam and consultant services in excess of $600,0
00 to
Eastchester” prior to the promise. It is well-established that “past consideration, as oppose
d to
true consideration. cannot form the basis for a binding contract.” J.C. Trading Limited v.
Wal
. .

Mart Stores, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 2d 449,456 (D. Del. 2013) (citing Continental Ins. Co. v.

9

Rutledge & Co., 750 A.2d 1219, 1232 (Del. Ch. 2000)). According to the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts,

§ 86 Comment a, “past consideration is inconsistent with the meaning of

consideration.” See also Starr v. Katz, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14437 (D.N.J. 1994); Van Brunt
v. Rauschenberg, 799 F. Supp. 1467, 1471 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). Thus, it is not clear that Edelson
and Cheung entered into a valid contract.
Alternatively, Plaintiff asserts that at least one of the following constitutes consideration:
(a) Plaintiff’s transfer of his ownership of Eastchester to Defendant, (b) Plaintiff’s continued
purchasing relationship with Eastchester, and (c) Plaintiff’s continued payment of Ranieri ‘S
consultant fee. For purposes of the extraordinary remedy sought, plaintiff has not made a
sufficient showing of consideration. Because past promises cannot constitute consideration, the
transfer of interest in the 2005 Conveyance Agreement may not constitute consideration for the
2006 Option Agreement. Additionally, it is unlikely that any of the enumerated actions could
constitute consideration because they are not stated within the four corners of the contract.
Where parties have “deliberately put their engagements in writing,” that writing is “not only the
best, but the only, evidence of their agreement.” Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Business Credit,
Inc., 619 F.2d 1001, 1010 (3d. Cir. 1980) See also Duquesne Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp.. 66 F.3d 604, 613 (3d. Cir. 1995). This precludes the court from considering extrinsic
evidence adding to the written terms of an agreement.
Because it appears that Plaintiff is unable to show there was a valid contract at this time,
he has failed to show there is a probability that final judgment will be rendered in his favor with
respect to his breach of contract claim. Thus, he has failed to satisfy the first requirement for
obtaining a writ of attachment on this claim.

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2. Breach oft/ic implied covenant ofgoodfaith andfair dealing

The covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implicit in all contracts in New Jersey.
Pepe v. Riva Co., 85 F. Supp. 2d 349, 390 (D.N.J. 1999). However, in the absence of a valid
contract, there can be no implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
j Since Plaintiff has
not adequately established that there was a valid contract, he has failed to show that there is a
probability that final judgment will be rendered in his favor on this claim. Therefore, he has not
satisfied the first requirement for obtaining a writ of attachment with respect to his breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim.

3. Unjust enrichment
Plaintiff asserts that Defendant received a benefit and deprived Edelson of valuable
equity, property, services, and money without providing Edelson his share of Eastchester. (P1.
Br. at 24.) To show that Defendant was unjustly enriched, Plaintiff must prove that Defendant
received some benefit, and that retaining that benefit would be unjust. Iwanowa v. Ford Motor
67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 471 (D.N.J. 1999). Plaintiff has not adequately shown that Defendant
received any benefit and does not rebut Defendant’s assertion that he sustained significant losses
in maintaining Eastchester’ s operations. Additionally, it seems that Edelson was not entitled
to
any share of Eastchester after the 2005 Conveyance Agreement. Though the 2006 Option
Agreement purports to allow Edelson to obtain 50% of Eastchester upon exercise of the option,
Plaintiff has not adequately shown that the 2006 Option Agreement was a valid contract.

4. Fraud
To state a claim for fraud under New Jersey law, Plaintiff must allege (1) a material

Ii

misrepresentation of fact, (2) knowledge or belief by the defendant of its falsity, (3) intention
that the other person rely on it, (4) reasonable reliance thereon by the other person, and (5)
resulting damage. Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors, 148 N.J. 582, 610 (1997). Under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 9(b), a party alleging fraud “must state with particularity the circumstances constituting
fraud or mistake.”
With respect to the 2005 Conveyance Agreement, Plaintiff suggests that Defendant
materially misrepresented Eastchester’s financial situation. (P1. Br. at 6.) Plaintiff also suggests
that Defendant represented to him that the business relationship between Eastchester and
Westchester would not change, and that this was false. (P1. Br. at 6.) However, Plaintiff has
provided no evidence that Defendant misrepresented Eastchester’s financial situation. Plaintiff
has also failed to provide any evidence indicating that, at the time the 2005 Conveyance
Agreement was signed, Defendant represented to him that the business relationship between
Eastchester and Westchester would not change.
With respect to the 2006 Option Agreement, Plaintiff contends that Defendant made a
material misrepresentation to Plaintiff in asserting that he owned 100% of Eastchester, when he
owned 90% and his son owned 10%. (P1. Br. at 7). Though it appears that Defendant’s assertion
that he owned 100% of Eastchester was a misrepresentation, there is no evidence that it was
material or that Plaintiff relied upon it. Whether Defendant owned 100% or 90% of Eastchester,
he would still be able to convey 50% of Eastchester to Plaintiff.
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant was dishonest about Eastchester’s financial situatio
n
in June of 2013. (P1. Br. at 9). However, Plaintiff has failed to show that Defendant’s descrip
tion
of Eastchester’ s finances was a misrepresentation. Plaintiff makes a conclusory statement.
Plaintiff asserts that “Cheung forwarded an e-mail to Edelson that presented a false picture
of

12

Eastchester Lace’s financial condition” without providing any factual basis for conclu
ding that
his representation of Eastchester’s financial condition was false. (P1. Br. at 9). Furthe
r, there is no
evidence that Cheung intended for Edelson to rely on this information; he merely asked
for
Edelson’s opinion regarding Eastchester’s financial situation. (P1. Br. at 9, Ex. 13). Plainti
ff
asserts that “Cheung intended to deceive Edelson. .so as to discourage Edelson from exercis
ing
.

his option for 50%” of Eastchester, but again provides no factual basis for this conclu
sion. (P1.
Br. at 9).
Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant made a material misrepresentation with respec to
t
the timing of the sale of Eastchester, and that Plaintiff relied on this misrepresentation in
choosing not to exercise his option for 50% of the company. (P1. Br. at 9). If the 2005
Conveyance Agreement is enforceable, Plaintiff no longer had any interest in Eastchester prior
to
its sale, and Plaintiff has not produced sufficient evidence to show that the 2005 Conveyance
Agreement is unenforceable. Plaintiff has also not sufficiently shown that the 2006 Option
Agreement constitutes a contract, so even if Defendant had told Plaintiff about the sale before
it
occurred, there is no evidence that Plaintiff could have exercised his alleged right to 50% of
Eastehester, Therefore, the alleged misrepresentation seems immaterial and does not justify
the
extraordinary remedy sought. Since Plaintiff has not provided facts supporting allegat
ions of a
material misrepresentation of fact, this Court finds that he has failed to adequately state
a prima
Jäcie fraud claim.
Because Plaintiff has failed to state aprimafacie case for any of his claims, he has failed
to satisfy the first prong required for a writ of attachment. Thus, this Court declines issue
to
a
writ of attachment.
B. Plaintiff is not entitled to a preliminary injunction based on any of his claims.

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Under Hoxworth, a preliminary injunction cannot be granted unless Plaintiff
demonstrates both a reasonable probability of eventual success in the litigation and the
probability of Plaintiff suffering irreparable harm. Plaintiff argues that he will suffer irreparable
harm if a preliminary injunction is not granted, based on allegations that Defendant has begun
moving his assets to China and will therefore be judgment proof. However, Plaintiff has failed
to
demonstrate a reasonable probability of eventual success in the litigation for the reasons
described above with respect to the writ of attachment. Because Plaintiff has failed to state a
prima fiicie case for any of his claims, he has failed to satisfy an element necessary for granting
a

preliminary injunction. As a result, this Court declines to issue a preliminary injunction.
V.

CONCLUSION

Therefore, having determined that Plaintiff has not demonstrated a likelihood of success
on his breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, unjust
enrichment, and fraud claims, the Court denies Plaintiff’s request for the issue of a writ of
attachment and a preliminary injunction.
An appropriate Order follows this Opinion.

DATED: /,ofcJ2Ol5.
/

)
/

JQ L. L NARES
DISTRICT JUDGE

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