MALIK v. KAPLAN INC.
Filing
12
OPINION & ORDER granting deft's 5 Motion to Dismiss the complt.; pltf. may file an amended complt. within 30 days from this order to address the deficiencies ***CIVIL CASE TERMINATED. Signed by Judge Faith S. Hochberg on 2/14/2014. (nr, )
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
ABDUL J. MALIK,
Plaintiff,
v.
KAPLAN INC.,
Defendant.
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:
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: Civil Case No. 13-5948 (FSH)
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: OPINION & ORDER
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: Date: February 14, 2014
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:
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HOCHBERG, District Judge:
This matter comes before the Court upon Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s
complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), or, in the alternative, for a more
definite statement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e). (Dkt. No. 5.) The Court has
reviewed the submissions of the parties and considers the motions pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 78. Plaintiff failed to oppose Defendant’s motion to dismiss.
Plaintiff filed his Complaint on October 4, 2013 and is proceeding pro se. 1
I.
BACKGROUND 2
Plaintiff Abdul Malik (“Plaintiff” or “Malik”) is a licensed physician in Pakistan, who
came to the United States to work as a medical doctor. (Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 2.) In order to work as a
1
When considering a pro se complaint, the Court is mindful that it must construe the complaint
liberally in favor of the plaintiff. See Erikson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007); Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). The Court must “accept as true all of the allegations in the
complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and view them in a light
most favorable to the plaintiff.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir.
1997). Liberal construction does not, however, require the Court to credit a pro se plaintiff’s
“bald assertions” or “legal conclusions.” Id.
2
These facts are taken from Plaintiff’s Complaint, unless otherwise noted.
medical doctor in the United States, Plaintiff needs to complete the required licensing
examinations. (Dkt. No. 1, ¶¶ 4, 10.) Plaintiff alleges that in 1992 he became disabled and
underwent several surgical procedures. (Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 3.)
Defendant Kaplan Inc. (“Defendant” or “Kaplan”) offers test preparation course in a
variety of subject areas, including medicine. Plaintiff enrolled in Kaplan’s courses at various
times since 1992 but could not complete the courses due to medical problems. (Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 5.)
In 2009, Plaintiff again enrolled in Kaplan courses but had to stop attending the courses by late
2010 due to surgery on his shoulder and his spouse’s medical condition. (Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 7.)
Plaintiff sent letters to Kaplan’s CEO and chief administrator requesting to complete the courses
free of charge. (Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 8.)
Plaintiff requests that the Court order Kaplan to provide Plaintiff with these courses free
of charge and order Kaplan to refund $15,000 to compensate Plaintiff for money spent on Kaplan
courses over the years. (Dkt. No. 1, ¶¶ 12-13.)
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.
Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also
Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[S]tating . . . a claim requires
a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest the required element. This
does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage, but instead simply calls for
enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the
necessary element.”) (internal quotations omitted).
2
When considering a motion to dismiss under Iqbal, the Court must conduct a two-part
analysis. “First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District
Court must accept all of the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal
conclusions. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the
complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a plausible claim for relief.” Fowler v.
UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal citations and quotations
omitted). “A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action will not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions
devoid of further factual enhancement.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (internal quotations and
alterations omitted).
III.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff sues Defendant under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) with respect
to a place of public accommodation—namely, Kaplan’s prep courses pertaining to medical
residency. 3
Section 302 of Title III of the ADA provides that “no individual shall be
discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public
accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public
3
There is also an argument that Plaintiff’s claims fall under Section 309 of Title III of the ADA.
Section 309 provides that “[a]ny person that offers examinations or courses related to
applications, licensing, certification, or credentialing for secondary or post-secondary education,
professional, or trade purposes shall offer such examinations or courses in a place and manner
accessible to persons with disabilities or offer alternative accessible arrangements for such
individuals.” 42 U.S.C. § 12189. However, the better reading of Secion 309 is that it only
applies to courses that directly lead to applications, licensing, certification, or credentialing
rather than optional courses that provide preparation for a test required for applications,
licensing, certification, or credentialing. For example, a company that administers a test that is
required to become licensed would fall under Section 309 while a company that provides a
course or service that merely prepares a person for that licensing test would fall under Section
302.
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accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182; see also Doe v. Nat’l Bd. of Med. Examiners, 199 F.3d
146, 157 (3d Cir. 1999). “In order to succeed on a claim under Title III of the ADA, a plaintiff
must prove that: (1) he was discriminated against on the basis of disability; (2) in the full and
equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of
any place of public accommodation; (3) by any person who owns or operates a place of public
accommodation.” Louisiana Counseling & Family Servs., Inc. v. Makrygialos, LLC, 543 F.
Supp. 2d 359, 365 (D.N.J. 2008).
Plaintiff’s claims fail for at least two reasons. First, Plaintiff fails to allege that he was
discriminated against on the basis of a disability, and he fails to state how, or in what manner, he
was deprived of the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation. Plaintiff’s Complaint
only alleges that he was unable to complete Kaplan courses because of his medical conditions
and his wife’s health. Plaintiff never alleges that Kaplan discriminated against him on the basis
of his disability.
Second, Plaintiff requests monetary relief for alleged violations of the ADA, to wit, free
courses and a refund of previously paid money. 4 This type of relief is not available under the
statute. Title III of the ADA provides that a plaintiff is only entitled the “[t]he remedies and
procedures set forth in section 2000a-3(a) of this title.” 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1). Under 42
U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a), an individual may commence “a civil action for preventive relief, including
an application for a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order[.]” In
short, “Title III defendants cannot be liable for money damages.” Bowers v. Nat’l Collegiate
4
Plaintiff does not request any sort of accommodation from Kaplan.
4
Athletic Ass’n, 346 F.3d 402, 433 (3d Cir. 2003). For these reasons, Plaintiff’s complaint must
be dismissed.
IV.
CONCLUSION & ORDER
For the reasons stated above,
IT IS on this 14th day of February, 2014,
ORDERED that Defendant’s motions to dismiss (Dkt. No. 5) is GRANTED; and it is
further
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; and
it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff may file an Amended Complaint within 30 days of this Order
should he be able to address the deficiencies discussed above.
/s/ Hon. Faith S. Hochberg____
Hon. Faith S. Hochberg, U.S.D.J.
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