MEYERS v. HYATT et al

Filing 11

OPINION AND ORDER re 7 Application for Pro Bono Counsel and to Amend the Complaint filed by ROBERT MEYERS; ORDERED that Meyer's motion to amend his complaint is GRANTED; ORDERED that Meyer's application for pro bono counsel is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge William J. Martini on 5/8/2015. (ld, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
ROBERT J. MEYER,
13-CV-6043-WJM

Plaintiff,
v.

MEMORANDUM
OPINION & ORDER

MICHAEL HYATT, et al.,
Defendants

This matter comes before the Court on pro se Plaintiff Robert Meyer’s (1) “motion
to amend the complaint,” and (2) application for the appointment of pro bono counsel. For
the reasons stated below, Meyer’s motion to amend the complaint is GRANTED and his
request for pro bono counsel is DENIED.
Pro se Plaintiff Robert Meyer, who is currently incarcerated at East Jersey State
Prison in Avenel, New Jersey, has asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against a number
of prison employees. Essentially, Meyer alleges that a corrections officer physically
assaulted him with excessive force and that other prison employees were involved in a
subsequent cover-up.
Meyer has filed what he describes as a “motion to amend the complaint.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15(a)(1) provides that a party may amend its pleading once a matter of course within
21 days after serving it, or within 21 days after service of an answer or certain motions
made under Rule 12. Because Defendants in this case have yet to file an answer or any
Rule 12 motion, Meyer is permitted to amend his complaint as of right. See Dasrath v.
Continental Airlines, Inc., 228 F.Supp.2d 531, 534 n.1 (D.N.J. 2002). Therefore, although
Meyer does not currently require leave of Court to amend his complaint, the Court will
GRANT his motion to amend.
Meyer also requests the appointment of pro bono counsel. Section 1915(e)(1)
provides that a “court may request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford
counsel.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). District courts have “broad discretion” to decide
whether requesting counsel is appropriate, and may request counsel sua sponte at any point
in the litigation. Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492, 498 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Tabron
v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 153 (3d Cir. 1993)). In exercising its discretion to appoint counsel,
district courts must first assess whether a given case has merit, and then weigh specific

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factors, including (1) the litigant’s ability to present his or her own case; (2) the difficulty
of the particular legal issues; (3) the degree to which factual investigation will be necessary
and the ability of the litigant to pursue that investigation; (4) the litigant’s capacity to retain
counsel on his or her own behalf; (5) the extent to which a case is likely to turn on
credibility determinations; and (6) whether the case will require testimony from expert
witnesses. Tabron, 6 F.3d. at 155-57. The list is non-exhaustive, and the Court may
consider other facts or factors it determines are important or helpful. Montgomery, 294
F.3d at 499.
Applying Tabron, this Court first concludes that Meyer’s allegations of misconduct
are sufficiently detailed for his § 1983 claim to have “some arguable merit” for the purposes
of his § 1915(e)(1) application. However, at this stage in the litigation, the appointment of
pro bono counsel is not warranted. First, Meyer’s pleadings and other submissions to this
Court are coherent and reflect a general understanding of the litigation process. Therefore,
Meyer has shown an ability to present his own case. Second, the allegations in the
complaint largely focus on whether a corrections officer used excessive force against
Meyer, and whether other prison employees were involved in a subsequent cover-up. For
now, the Court finds that these types of claims are not sufficiently complex to warrant the
appointment of an attorney. Third, while this case may require some factual investigation,
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide Meyer with a means to investigate his claims.
See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 31 (providing for depositions by written questions); FED. R. CIV.
P. 45 (providing for written testimony by subpoena). Fourth, “[w]hile the case may turn
on credibility determinations, this factor alone does not determine whether counsel should
be appointed.” See Revel v. Governor Thomas Carper’s Force, No. Civ.A.A. 00-421-KAJ,
2004 WL 406336, *1 (D.Del. March 2, 2004). Finally, Meyer makes no specific showing
as to why this case would require expert testimony.
After considering the other relevant factors and the practical restraints on the
Court’s ability to appoint counsel, this Court concludes that the appointment of pro bono
counsel is not appropriate at this juncture.
IT IS on this 8th day of May 2015, hereby,
ORDERED that Meyer’s motion to amend his complaint is GRANTED; and it is
further

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ORDERED that Meyer’s application for pro bono counsel is DENIED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

/s/ William J. Martini
WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J.

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