MEYERS v. HYATT et al

Filing 26

ORDER denying 19 Motion Pro Bono Counsel without prejudice. Signed by Judge William J. Martini on 9/14/15. (gh, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
ROBERT J. MEYER,
13-CV-6043-WJM

Plaintiff,
v.

MEMORANDUM
OPINION & ORDER

MICHAEL HYATT, et al.,
Defendants

This matter comes before the Court on pro se Plaintiff Robert Meyer’s second
application for the appointment of pro bono counsel. For the reasons stated below, Meyer’s
request for pro bono counsel is DENIED.
While civil litigants possess no constitutional or statutory right to an appointed
counsel, Section 1915(e)(1) states that a “court may request an attorney to represent any
person unable to afford counsel.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). District courts have “broad
discretion” to determine if appointing pro bono counsel would be appropriate and may
grant litigant counsel sue sponte at any point in the litigation. Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294
F.3d 492, 498 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 153 (3d Cir. 1993)). As
a threshold matter, courts should first determine whether the claimant’s case has merit, and
then weigh specific criteria, including: (1) the plaintiff’s ability to present his or her own
case; (2) the difficulty of the particular legal issues; (3) the degree to which factual
investigation will be necessary and the ability of the plaintiff to pursue investigation; (4)
the plaintiff’s capacity to retain counsel on his or her own behalf; (5) the extent to which a
case is likely to turn on credibility determinations, and; (6) whether the case will require
testimony from expert witnesses. Tabron, 6 F.3d at 155-57. This list is not exhaustive, but
“should serve as a guidepost for the district courts.” Montgomery, 294 F.3d at 499 (citing
Parham v. Johnson, 26 f.3d 454, 456-47 (3d Cir. 1997).
This is Meyer’s second application for pro bono counsel. The Court denied his first
application less than four months ago after applying the facts of the case to Tabron. After
reviewing Meyer’s most recent application, the Court finds no reason to depart from its
previous ruling. Meyer’s second application primarily argues that he requires counsel to
assist him with discovery. However, counsel should not be appointed in a case simply
because some discovery is required. Montgomery, 294 F.3d at 504. Courts instead should
consider whether confinement severely disadvantages the claimant, and if the claims are

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likely to require extensive discovery and compliance with complex discovery rules.
Montgomery, 294 F.3d at 504 (citing Rayes v. Johnson, 969 F.2d 70, 703 (8th Cir. 1992));
see also Tabron, 6 F.3d at 156. There is no indication that discovery in this case is
extensive in scope or procedurally complex. To the contrary, it appears that Meyer intends
to serve written interrogatories and document requests. As the Court explained in its
previous opinion denying Meyer’s application, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provide a means for Meyer to pursue such discovery, even while incarcerated.
Simply put, the Court stands by its recent decision. The appointment of pro bono
counsel is not appropriate at this time.
IT IS on this ___ day of September 2015, hereby,
ORDERED that Meyer’s application for pro bono counsel is DENIED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

/s/ William J. Martini
WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J.

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