NEWSOME v. CITY OF NEWARK et al

Filing 29

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Magistrate Judge James B. Clark on 5/2/14. (DD, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
JOHN NEWSOME,
Civil Action No. 13-6234 (CCC)
Plaintiff,
v.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

CITY OF NEWARK, et al.,
Defendants.

CLARK, Magistrate Judge
This matter comes before the Court upon Defendant Paul Sarabando’s (“Sarabando”)
motion to stay discovery in this matter pending a decision on his Motion to Dismiss. [Docket
Entry No. 21]. Plaintiff John Newsome (“Plaintiff”) opposes Sarabando’s motion. [Docket
Entry No. 25]. The Court has fully reviewed and considered all of the papers submitted in
support of and in opposition to Sarabando’s Motion, and considers same without oral argument
pursuant to L.Civ.R. 78.1(b). For the reasons set forth more fully below, Sarabando’s motion to
stay discovery is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
This case arises out of the November 1, 2011 arrest and prosecution of Plaintiff for, inter
alia, assault against one Jermaine Bruce. See generally Compl.; Docket Entry No. 1. All
charges were later dismissed on the basis of mistaken identity. Id. at ¶58. Plaintiff filed the
instant action on October 19, 2013 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 against the City of Newark,
Chief of Police Sheilah A. Coley, Director of Police Samuel A. Demaio, Detective Lawrence
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Collins, three John Doe Newark Police Officers and Detective Paul Sarabando alleging false
arrest, malicious prosecution and their state law counterparts. Plaintiff alleges that, as a result of
his arrest and prosecution, he was initially suspended without pay, and later terminated from his
employment as a security guard for the Department of Homeland Security. Id. at ¶¶38, 59.
Defendants Coley, Demaio, Collins and the City of Newark answered Plaintiff’s
complaint on December 2, 2013. See Docket Entry No. 9. Defendant Sarabando moved to
dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint on January 2, 2014, alleging various immunity defenses, and
thereafter he filed the instant motion to stay discovery pending a decision on the motion to
dismiss. See Docket Entry Nos. 12, 21.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), the Court may stay discovery pending
determination of a motion to dismiss only on a showing of “good cause” by the party requesting
the stay. Gerald Chamales Corp. v. Oki Data Americas, Inc., et al., 247 F.R.D. 453, 454 (D.N.J.
Dec. 11, 2007) (“A protective order pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) may only be issued if ‘good
cause’ is shown.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1) (establishing that the court may issue a protective
order with respect to discovery only for “good cause”); see Perelman v. Perelman, Civ. No.
10-5622, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85470, at *2-3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 2011) (“The burden is on the
party seeking the stay [of discovery] to show ‘good cause.’”) (citations omitted). It is well
settled that “the mere filing of a dispositive motion does not constitute ‘good cause’ for the
issuance of a discovery stay.” Chamales, 247 F.R.D. at 454; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(2)(A)
(“[M]ethods of discovery may be used in any sequence . . . .”).
Indeed, courts generally do not favor granting motions to stay discovery “because when
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discovery is delayed or prolonged it can create case management problems which impede the
court's responsibility to expedite discovery and cause unnecessary litigation expenses and
problems.” Coyle v. Hornell Brewing Co., Civ. No. 08-2797 (JBS), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
49109, 2009 WL 1652399, at *3 (D.N.J. June 9, 2009) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted). Nonetheless, this Court maintains wide discretion to manage discovery issues and
enter stays where good cause has been shown. See Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254, 57 S.
Ct. 163, 81 L. Ed. 153 (1936); Coyle, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49109, 2009 WL 1652399, at *3
(“In discovery disputes, the Magistrate Judge exercises broad discretion and is entitled to great
deference.”) (citations omitted); Chamales, 247 F.R.D. at 454 (“Magistrate Judges have broad
discretion to manage their docket and to decide discovery issues, including whether to stay
discovery pending a decision on a dispositive motion.”) (citations omitted).
However, in cases where immunity defenses are raised, the Supreme Court has
admonished that “[u]ntil [the] threshold immunity question is resolved, discovery should not be
allowed.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). “Unless the plaintiff's allegations
state a claim of violation of clearly established law, a defendant pleading qualified immunity is
entitled to dismissal before the commencement of discovery.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,
526 (1985). The Harlow Court recognized that immunity was “an entitlement not to stand trial
or face the other burdens of litigation, conditioned on the resolution of the essentially legal
question [of immunity].” Mitchell, at 526. In this regard, “pretrial matters [such] as discovery
are to be avoided if possible[.]” Id.; see also Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299 (1996) (“Harlow
and Mitchell make clear that the defense is meant to give government officials a right, not merely
to avoid standing trial, but also to avoid the burdens of such pretrial matters as discovery…”)
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(internal citations and quotations omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
Relying on Harlow and Mitchell, Sarabando argues that discovery should be stayed in this
matter pending a ruling on his motion to dismiss which raises several immunity defenses,
including “prosecutorial immunity, qualified immunity and sovereign immunity.” Sarabando’s
Brief in Support at 7; Docket Entry No. 21-1. Sarabando submits that “[i]f granted, the motion
to dismiss would result in the dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint against Detective Sarabando”
and therefore “in the interests of avoiding unnecessary litigation and pre-trial
discovery…discovery in this action [should] be stayed[.]” Id.
Plaintiff opposes Sarabando’s motion, arguing that he “has failed to satisfy the
requirements for a protective order under Rule 26[.]” Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition at 1; Docket
Entry No. 25. Further, Plaintiff states that a stay of discovery pending decision on a motion to
dismiss may only be granted upon a showing of “good cause” and that Sarabando has failed to
show same. Id. at 2. Plaintiff contends that Sarabando’s reliance on Harlow lies in dicta and
that “no court has held that a claim of immunity is, in itself, sufficient to stay discovery in all
cases where the affirmative defense of immunity is raised by a police officer in a civil rights
claim.” Id.

Plaintiff asserts that discovery may only be stayed “where a plaintiff fails to

adequately plead the deprivation of a constitutional right” and submits that “there is no facially
defective claim” in this matter. Id. at 3.
The Court finds that the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Harlow and Mitchell applies
and that a stay of discovery is warranted in this case. Immunity is a defense designed to insulate
certain individuals from the burdens of standing trial or “other burdens of litigation[.]” Mitchell,
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at 256. This Court, guided by Harlow, finds that these “other burdens” include discovery and
that immunity is indeed a threshold question which should be decided before discovery is
permitted. Although Plaintiff claims that discovery may only be stayed where it is found that the
complaint has not been adequately pled, there has been no determination made yet as to the
adequacy of the Plaintiff’s pleading. Indeed, the adequacy of the pleadings has been directly
challenged by Sarabando’s motion to dismiss. See Mitchell, at 256 (“Unless the plaintiff's
allegations state a claim of violation of clearly established law, a defendant pleading qualified
immunity is entitled to dismissal before the commencement of discovery.”) At this juncture, the
District Court’s ruling on the motion to dismiss would serve to confirm whether the allegations
“state a claim of violation of clearly established law” and whether Sarabando’s claims of
immunity apply. As such, the Court finds that this litigation would be streamlined by staying
discovery as to Defendant Sarabando pending a determination on his immunity claims.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Sarabando’s motion to stay discovery is GRANTED with
respect to him. An appropriate Order follows.

Dated: May 2, 2014
s/ James B. Clark, III.
HONORABLE JAMES B. CLARK, III
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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