TELFAIR v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Filing 72

OPINION. Signed by Judge Susan D. Wigenton on 1/31/2018. (JB, )

*NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

TOMMIE TELFAIR,
Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

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Civil Action No. 13-6585 (SDW)

OPINION

WIGENTON, District Judge:
Presently before the Court is Petitioner Tommie Telfair’s motion for relief from this
Court’s denial of his motion to vacate sentence brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b)(6). (ECF No. 71). For the following reasons, this Court will deny Petitioner’s motion.

I. BACKGROUND
As this Court has explained the basis for Petitioner’s underlying claims in two extensive
prior opinions (see ECF Nos. 36, 58), that information will not be repeated here, and the Court
will instead only provide a brief recitation of the procedural history of this matter. Petitioner,
Tommie Telfair, filed his motion to vacate his sentence on or about October 25, 2013. (ECF No.
1). Following briefing, this Court denied all but one of Petitioner’s claims by way of an order and
opinion issued on February 17, 2016. (ECF Nos. 36-37). In the February 2016 order and
opinion, however, this Court ordered an evidentiary hearing as to Petitioner’s claim that his
statement had been taken in violation of his Miranda rights. (Id.).
This Court held a hearing on that issue on August 3, 2017. (See ECF No. 60). Following

the hearing, this Court issued an order and opinion denying Petitioner’s Miranda claim and
denying Petitioner a certificate of appealability. (ECF Nos. 58-59). In that second opinion, this
Court specifically found Petitioner’s testimony at the hearing incredible, “inconsistent[,] and
unreliable,” and found the testimony of Petitioner’s purported expert witness of no value to the
Court’s determination. (ECF No. 58 at 8-9). The Court also found the testimony of the various
officers both consistent with the testimony given at Petitioner’s trial and to be credible. (Id. at 78). Having reached these conclusions as to the credibility of Petitioner and the officers who
interviewed Petitioner prior to his trial, this Court rejected Petitioner’s Miranda claim, finding as
follows:
Based on the credible testimony of Agents Post and Thompson at
the evidentiary hearing, it is clear that Petitioner was given Miranda
warnings prior to his interrogation by the agents. Based on that
credible testimony it is also clear that Petitioner was cooperative and
appeared to understand the warnings he was given. The credible
testimony in the record also establishes that Petitioner never
complained of pain, never appeared to be or stated that he was under
the effects of any medication, and never stated he was on his way to
see a doctor. This Court therefore finds that Petitioner’s waiver of
his Miranda warnings was knowing and voluntary insomuch as he
chose of his own free will to give to the agents the statement which
was used against him at his trial after being informed of and
choosing to waive his Miranda rights.
This Court finds that there is no credible evidence in the
record of the coercion, threats, or other misdeeds that Petitioner
asserted in his affidavit, and instead finds that Petitioner’s waiver of
his rights was made “with full awareness of both the nature of the
right [he chose to] abandon[] and the consequences” of his decision
to waive his rights. Berghuis [v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 382-83
(2010)]. This Court likewise rejects Petitioner’s contention that he
requested, but was denied, a lawyer, and instead credits the
testimony of Agents Post and Thompson that, while Petitioner may
have mentioned Paul Bergrin as having represented him in other
matters, Petitioner did not invoke his right to counsel prior to the
end of his interrogation. As this Court thus finds that Petitioner’s
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waiver of his Miranda rights and decision to give the agents a
statement was knowing and voluntary, and that Petitioner did, in
fact, give the statement used against him at trial, the trial court in
this matter did not err in refusing to suppress Petitioner’s statement.
Likewise, to the extent Petitioner asserted the trial court erred in
refusing to hold a hearing on Petitioner’s suppression motion, any
such error that may have existed was in all respects harmless in light
of this Court’s determination that Petitioner was given and thereafter
knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. See Fry v.
Piller, 551 U.S. 112, 116 (2007) (on collateral review, even
constitutional errors will be considered “harmless unless [they] had
a substantial and injurious effect” on the outcome of criminal
proceedings); see also Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 631
(1993); Albrecht v. Horn, 485 F.3d 103, 139 (3d Cir. 2007), cert.
denied, 552 U.S. 1108 (2008).
(Id. at 10-11).
Following the denial of his final claim and the denial of a certificate of appealability,
Petitioner filed a motion for an extension of time within which to file a Rule 59(e) or 60(b) motion,
which this Court denied on November 8, 2017, as the Court is without authority to grant such an
extension. (ECF No. 67). Petitioner thereafter filed an untimely motion for reconsideration of
the Court’s September 2017 order and opinion on or about November 11, 2017. (ECF No. 68).
This Court denied that motion as untimely filed under either Rule 59(e) or Local Rule 7.1(i) by
way of an order entered on November 20, 2017. (ECF No. 69). Petitioner thereafter filed his
present motion, in which he requests that the Court treat his prior motion for reconsideration as a
motion for relief from judgment brought pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6). 1 (ECF No. 71).
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In his new motion, Petitioner states that the Court should consider his prior reconsideration
motion a Rule 60(b)(6) motion “only” to the extent the Court “continues its previous denials of
extensions of time” to permit him to file reconsideration motions and “depriv[ing]” him of redress
under Rule 59(e) or Local Rule 7.1(i). As this Court has already explained to Petitioner, the Court
has no authority to grant him the extension he requested, and his later filed reconsideration motion
was clearly untimely under either Rule 59(e) or Local Rule 7.1(i), thus Petitioner’s current motion
will only be considered under the Rule 60(b)(6) standard. (See ECF Nos. 67, 69).
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II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
“Rule 60(b) allows a party to seek relief from a final judgment, and request reopening of
his case, under a limited set of circumstances including fraud, mistake, and newly discovered
evidence.” Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 529 (2005). “The remedy provided by Rule 60(b)
is extraordinary, and special circumstances must justify granting relief under it.”

Jones v.

Citigroup, Inc., Civil Action No. 14-6547, 2015 WL 3385938, at *3 (D.N.J. May 26, 2015)
(quoting Moolenaar v. Gov’t of the Virgin Islands, 822 F.3d 1342, 1346 (3d Cir. 1987). A Rule
60(b) motion “may not be used as a substitute for appeal, and that legal error, without more cannot
justify granting a Rule 60(b) motion.” Holland v. Holt, 409 F. App’x 494, 497 (3d Cir. 2010)
(quoting Smith v. Evans, 853 F.2d 155, 158 (3d Cir. 1988)). A motion under Rule 60(b) may not
be granted where the moving party could have raised the same legal argument by means of a direct
appeal. Id. While Rules 60(b)(1)-(5) permit reopening a judgment for specific, enumerated
reasons, Rule 60(b)(6) permits a party to seek relief from a final judgment for “any . . . reason that
justifies relief.” “The standard for granting a Rule 60(b)(6) motion is a high one. The movant
must show ‘extraordinary circumstances’ to justify reopening a final judgment.” Michael v.
Wetzel, 570 F. App’x 176, 180 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 536). “[A] showing
of extraordinary circumstances involves a showing that without relief from the judgment, ‘an
“extreme” and “unexpected” hardship will result.’” Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 244,
255 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Mayberry v. Maroney, 558 F.2d 1159, 1163 (3d Cir. 1977)).

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B. Analysis
In his motion for reconsideration, which Petitioner now wishes to have addressed as a
motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b), Petitioner essentially expresses his
disagreement with this Court’s credibility determinations and ultimate denial of his Miranda claim.
Petitioner argues that the Court should accept his version of events, rather than those testified to
by the agents who testified at trial and at his hearing, and that based on his testimony and arguments
he should be entitled to relief as he asserts both that he asked for counsel and that he was
improperly coerced or threatened. This Court, however, already rejected these arguments in
denying Petitioner’s Miranda claim, finding that Petitioner’s testimony was “inconsistent and
unreliable,” and ultimately incredible. This Court instead credited the testimony of the agents,
and determined, for the reasons expressed above, that Petitioner’s statement to the Government
had not been taken in violation of his Miranda rights. Petitioner has therefore presented no more
than his mere disagreement with this Court’s rejection of both his credibility during the hearing
and his Miranda claim, and has not shown any extraordinary circumstances warranting relief from
this Court’s prior judgment. This Court has fully considered Petitioner’s testimony and the claims
presented in his § 2255 motion, and has found those claims meritless in light of the record and the
testimony at Petitioner’s hearing. As Petitioner has failed to show any actual error on the Court’s
part, and has in any event failed to show any extraordinary circumstances, his Rule 60(b)(6) motion
must be denied. Michael, 570 F. App’x at 180; see also Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 536.

IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Petitioner’s motion (ECF No. 71) is DENIED. An appropriate
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order follows.

Dated: January 31, 2018

s/ Susan D. Wigenton___
Hon. Susan D. Wigenton,
United States District Judge

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