JUTROWSKI v. TOWNSHIP OF RIVERDALE et al

Filing 15

OPINION AND ORDER that Defendants motions to dismiss (ECF Nos. 4 and 10) are DENIED as to Counts One, Two, Five, and Seven of Plaintiffs complaint. The Court will reserve decision as to Counts Three, Four, and Six of Plaintiffs complaint. The parti es shall simultaneously submit additional briefing within ten and shall contact the Chambers of Magistrate Judge Falk to arrange a scheduling and settlement conference days of the date of this Opinion and Order. Signed by Judge Claire C. Cecchi on 7/31/14. (sr, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
EMIL JUTROWSKI,

Plaintiff,

Civil Action No.: 13-735 1 (CCC)

OPINION & ORDER

V.

TOWi SHIP OF RIVERDALE, et aL
Defendants.

CECCHI, District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on the motion of Defendants the state of New Jersey

(by and through the New Jersey State Police), State Trooper Jeffrey Heimbach,’ State Trooper
James Franchino (in their representative and individual capacities), and Col. Rick Fuentes (in his
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representative capacity as Chief Executive Officer of the New Jersey State Police) (collectively
the “State Defendants”) to dismiss the complaint of Plaintiff Emil Jutrowski (“Plaintiff’), (ECF
No, 4),3 as well as the motion of Defendants the Township of Riverdale, Chief Thomas Soules (in

his representative capacity as Chief of the Riverdale Police Department), and Riverdale Police

At various points in the parties’ briefing. Trooper Heimbach is referred to as “Jeremy
Heimbach.”
2
At points in the parties’ briefing. Col. Fuentes is referred to as both “Rick” and “Joseph:’
Upon viewing of Col. Fuentes’ biography, it appears both names are correct. See
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The State Defendants’ motion to dismiss was originally filed as a cross-motion to Plaintiffs
motion to remand this matter. See ECF No. 4. However. Plaintiff subsequently withdrew the
motion to remand. See ECF No. 13. Therefore, the Court will treat the State Defendants’ motion
as a standard motion to dismiss rather than a cross-motion.

Officers Travis Roemmele and Sgt. Christopher Biro (in both their individual and representative
capacities) (collectively the “Town Defendants”) to dismiss Plaintiffs complaint. (ECF No. 10).
No oral argument was heard pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78. For the reasons discussed below,
Defendants’ motions are denied in part and reserved in part.
I.

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BACKGROUND

On June 23, 2010. Plaintiff was involved in a car accident. Compl. at ¶J 10-Il. According
to the complaint, the New Jersey State Police and Riverdale Township officers who are defendants
in this matter arrived at the scene of his accident shortly thereafter. Compi. at

¶ 12. After the

officers arrived, Plaintiff asserts that he requested medical help and then began filming his
interaction with the officers, allegedly making them “frustrated” in the process. Compl. at
18.

¶J 13-

As a result of this, the officers prevented Plaintiff from obtaining medical help, and

subsequently threw him to the ground and began kicking him. Compi. at

¶J 18-20. This assault

caused Plaintiff to sustain severe injuries, subsequently resulting in the loss of his job due to his
extensive recovery time. Compl. at ¶J 21-27. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that the officer defendants
conspired to file “false and misleading police reports” omitting the Plaintiffs injuries. Compl. at

¶ 28.
The case currently before the Court is the second iteration of this litigation. On June 3,
2012, nearly two years after the original accident, Plaintiff filed Civil Action No. 12-3318 in the
District of New Jersey (Jutrowski I) against all of the same Defendants as the instant case. See

Jutrowski I, ECF No, 1. Plaintiffs complaint was substantially the same as his complaint in this

All facts as described are taken as alleged in Plaintiffs complaint. For purposes of a motion to
dismiss. the Court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true, drawing all inferences in favor of
the non-moving party. See Santiago v. Warminster Twp.. 629 F.3d 121. 128 (3d Cir. 2010).

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case. In his original six-count complaint, Plaintiff alleged violations of 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 (Counts

One and Two), violations of the State Tort Claims Act (Counts Three and Four), and conspiracy
to violate his federal and state civil rights (Counts Five and Six). Id.. On July 2, 2013, Magistrate
Judge Dickson entered a Report and Recommendation to this Court that Plaintiffs complaint be
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim,

e Jutrowski I, ECF

No. 36. Judge Dickson’s Opinion focused largely on the sovereign immunity granted to the state

of New Jersey by the Eleventh Amendment.

at

346

Judge Dickson also recommended that

Plaintiffs conspiracy claims be dismissed for failure to state a claim, finding that Plaintiffs
allegations failed to satisfy the pleading standards set forth by the Supreme Court.

at 5-6. This

Court adopted Judge Dickson’s Report and Recommendation on July 30, 2013, dismissing
Plaintiffs complaint as to the State Defendants without prejudice.

$ Jutrowski I, ECF No. 37.

Rather than file an amended complaint, Plaintiff informed the Court that he intended to
refile the matter against the same parties in the New Jersey state court. See Jutrowski I, ECF No.
39. Plaintiff filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss his complaint. See Jutrowski I, ECF No. 39.
This Court then dismissed the complaint on September 30, 2013 at Plaintiffs request. See
Jutrowski I, ECF No. 43.
Afier informing the Court of his intention to voluntarily dismiss his complaint, but before
the motion was granted, Plaintiff filed the instant complaint in New Jersey Superior Court, Morris
County, on August 29, 2013. See Def. Br. at 2. Defendants filed a timely notice of removal, with

Plaintiffs current complaint contains a slightly different, though non-material characterization
of the facts alleged, as well as one additional count for common law assault and battery.
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Judge Dickson’s Report and Recommendation addressed only the State Defendants, and did not
apply to the Town Defendants.
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the State Defendants waiving their Eleventh Amendment immunity. See ECF No. 1. Although
Plaintiff initially sought to remand this matter, see ECF No. 3, he later consented to this Court
exercising jurisdiction over this case. ECF No. 13. The State Defendants filed the instant motion
to dismiss on December 27. 2013, arguing that Plaintiifs claims were time-barred under the
applicable statutes of limitation. See Def. Br. at 14-1 7. On January 16. 2014. the Town Defendants
adopted the majority of the State Defendants’ arguments in filing their own motion to dismiss.
ECFNo. 10.
II.

DISCUSSION

In their motions to dismiss, the Defendants do not attack the factual basis for the complaint.
Rather, they assert that when Plaintiff filed his complaint in state court, he did so after the
expiration of the statutes of limitations applicable to his claims, barring him from bringing suit.
Plaintiff argues that the applicable statutes of limitations were tolled during the pendency of his
original federal complaint, and that his suit is therefore timely. Plaintiff’s accident occurred on
June 23, 2010. Compl.

¶ 10. The original federal suit in this matter was filed on June 3, 2012,

roughly three weeks before the expiration of the applicable two-year statutes of limitations. Thus,
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without tolling, Plaintiff’s state court suit filed on August 29, 2013 would be untimely and
therefore barred.
A statute of limitations bar is an affinnative defense, See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c). On a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). the Court’s analysis of
whether a claim is barred by the statute of limitations is restricted to the face of the complaint. See

See below for a discussion of the various statutes of limitations relevant to Plaintiffs
complaint.
4

Barefoot Architect. Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 822. 835 (3d Cir. 2011). If it cannot be determined
from the face of the complaint whether or not a claim is untimely, a motion pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) may not be granted.
New Jersey courts have taken a liberal view of the doctrine of equitable tolling. In Galligan
v. Westfield Centre Service, Inc., the New Jersey Supreme Court explicitly held that the filing of
a complaint later dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction acts to toll the statute of
limitations. 82 N.J. 188 (19803. The Galligan Court found that although repose is an important
purpose of a statute of limitations, similarly important is a party’s ability to answer allegations
against them. Id. at 191-92. Finally, the Court found that statutes of limitations exist to prevent
litigation of stale claims. Id. Despite these purposes, the Supreme Court held that “{ujnswerving,
‘mechanistic’ application of statutes of limitations would at times inflict obvious and unnecessary
harm upon individual plaintiffs without advancing these legislative purposes.” Id. at 192. To
prevent this, the Court held that “public policy requires that in each case the equitable claims of
opposing parties

.

.

.

be identified, evaluated and weighed

.

.

.

.

Whenever dismissal would not

further the Legislature’s objectives in prescribing the limitation, the plaintiff should be given an
opportunity to assert his claim.” Id. at 192-93 (internal citations and quotations omitted). To ensure
this, a mistaken selection of a court that has “questionable or defective jurisdiction” will not
prevent tolling when the underlying purposes of the statute of limitations are otherwise satisfied.
In GaHigan, much as in this case, the Plaintiff tiled a timely action in federal court. only to
have it later dismissed largely for lack ofjurisdiction. Id. at 189-92. Additionally, in both Gailigan
and the instant case, the state court complaint was filed prior to final dismissal of the federal court
action. Id. In tolling the statute of limitations in Galligan, the New Jersey Supreme Court found
that the original, timely filing had put the Defendants on notice of possible claims against them,
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and therefore would not prejudice their ability to litigate. Id. at 193..94.
Both the New Jersey courts and the Third Circuit have extended Galligan in recent years
beyond cases dismissed in another forum for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In Mitzner v. W.
Ridgelawn Cemetary, Inc., the Appellate Division held that Galligan must be read broadly so as
to effectuate the equitable principles on which it was based. 31 1 NJ. Super. 233, 237 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1998) (applying Galligan where a federal court had dismissed an earlier filed case
for lack of personal jurisdiction). In Staub v. Eastman Kodak Co., the Appellate Division applied
Galligan in the context of an individual plaintiff’s claims after the original class in a class action
suit was denied certification by a federal court. 320 N.J. Super. 34 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 199).
Finally, in Jaworowski v. Ciasulli, the Third Circuit abrogated one of its own earlier decisions in
light of the broad reading of Galligan applied by the New Jersey courts. See 490 F.3d 331, 334 (3d
Cir. 2007) (collecting cases reading Galligan broadly and extending Galligan to cases dismissed
for lack of personal jurisdiction and finding that “the Supreme Court of New Jersey, if confronted
with this issue, would agree

.

.

.

and find that the personal injury statute of limitations could be

equitably tolled”).
Counts One and Two of Plaintiffs complaint allege violations of 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. Count

One is for excessive force, Count Two is for the “failure to properly train, supervise and control
officers,” Count Five of Plaintiffs complaint alleges a conspiracy to violate his federal rights.
also alleged under

1983. The Supreme Court has held that in

1983 actions. courts must apply

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the personal injury statute of limitations for the state in which the action takes place. In New

In federal civil rights cases, the Court looks not only to the relevant state statutes of limitations,
but also any relevant state tolling rules. See Getchey v. County of Northumberland. 120 F. App’x
6
8

Jersey, the relevant statute is NJ,S.A.

§ 2A:14-2, which provides for a two-year statute of

limitations. Finally, Count Seven of Plaintiffs complaint asserts a claim for common law Assault
and Battery. This too is governed by New Jersey’s general two-year statute of limitations for
personal injury. Thus, the same two-year statute of limitations appears to apply to Counts One,
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Two. Five, and Seven of Plaintiffs complaint.
Nothing in New Jersey’s general statute of limitations evinces a purpose other than the
archetypal purposes underlying such statutes, as discussed in Galligan. Therefore, the Court sees
no reason that Galligan should not apply. Plaintiff timely filed his first complaint in the District
of New Jersey.

That most of the claims were later dismissed for lack of subject matter

0
jurisdiction’ does not undermine Defendant’s right to litigate. New Jersey’s tolling principles are
not in conflict with the goals of

§ 1983, which are deterrence and compensation. See Bey v.

Clementon Elementary Sch. Dist., Civ. No. 10-5609, 2011 WL 2973772, at *34 (D.N.J. July 21,
2011). Moreover, Defendants cannot argue that they did not have timely notice of Plaintiffs
allegations. Finally, when it became apparent that his claims lacked subject matter jurisdiction
before the District Court, Plaintiff diligently sought to dismiss his original action in order to file
promptly in state court, which he did even before dismissal of Jutrowski I. Therefore, a rigid
application of the statute of limitations would be unjust and unwarranted in this case.

895, 898 (3d Cir, 2005) (quoting Lake v. Arnold, 232 F3d 360, 368 (3d Cir. 2000): see also
Hardin v, Straub. 490 L.S. 536. 543-44 (1989).
Count Three, Four. and Six are addressed later in the Court’s Opinion.
Counts One through Six of Plaintiffs original complaint were dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction based on New Jersey’s Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. See Inre
Camden Police Cases, Civ. No. 11-1315,2011 WL 3651318. at *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 18, 2011).
Counts against Col. Fuentes and the State Troopers, insofar as they were asserted against officers
in their individual capacities. were dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(h)(6). See 12-33 18, ECF No. 36, at 5-6.
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Although the State Defendants argue that their status as a sovereign entity entitles them to
a more stringent application of the statute of limitations, they cannot overcome the weight of
precedent in New Jersey evincing a clear intent to allow cases such as the one before the Court to
move forward. Allowing New Jersey’s status as a state to defeat an otherwise valid claim,
especially given the State’s change from its initial position regarding federal jurisdiction over this
matter, would go against the policies embodied in both the New Jersey statutes of limitation and

§

1983 itself. Accord Mills v. State Dept’t of Treasury, 435 N.J. Super. 69, 78-79 (App. Div. 2014).
Both federal and state courts in New Jersey have been willing to use Galligan in tolling claims
against a public entity. See Clark v. Buchko, 936 F. Supp. 212, 222-23 (D.N.J. 1996); see also
Kramerv. City of Jersey City, A-3373-12T4, 2014 WL 1257116, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
Mar. 28, 2014). Therefore, the Court finds that it would be unjust and against the policy and intent
of Galligan and the subsequent decisions interpreting that case to dismiss Plaintiffs complaint on
that matter.
Next, Defendant argues that the individual claims against the State Troopers as well as Col.
Fuentes must also be dismissed as time-barred. Although the individual counts in Plaintiffs first
suit were dismissed for failure to state a claim, an area of law not explicitly covered by Galligan,
they were dismissed without prejudice. allowing Plaintiff the opportunity to file an amended
complaint. For practical purposes. there is little difference between the filing of an amended
complaint and the filing of a new complaint in a different court, especially when the original
dismissal can be construed as effectively remanding the case. Zacharias v. Whitman PLC, 345 N.J.

Super. 218, 225-26 (.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). Moreover, because the majority of Plaintiffs
claims were dismissed for a lack ofjurisdiction, the most efficient course of action at the time this
Court granted the motion to dismiss was to file a new complaint in state court. To prevent Plaintiff
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from going forward with his claims based upon an overly strict application of the statute of
limitations would be inequitable and against the clear principles of the New Jersey courts. Thus,
the Court finds that the statute of limitations will be equitably tolled as to all counts against the
State and Town Defendants, including all individual defendants in their official capacities.
Finally, Defendant argues that Counts Three, Four. and Six must be dismissed as timebarred because, even if Galligan was controlling, it cannot be applied to Plaintiff’s claims brought
pursuant to the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (“NJTCA”), N.J.S.A.
NJTCA, an injured party must file suit within two years. N.J.S.A.

§ 59:1-1

et seq.” Under the

§ 59:8-8, 9. Defendants cite one

unpublished opinion, Astorino v. New Jersey Transit, for support. 2008 WL 2520513 (N.J. Super.
App. Div. June 26, 2008). In Astorino, a factually distinct case from the one before the Court, the
Appellate Division found that based on the policies underlying the Tort Claims Act and the
requirement that it must be strictly construed, Galligan was inapplicable to suits brought under the
Act. However, it must be noted that although Astorino references strict construction of the Tort
Claims Act, the Appellate Division also noted that the Plaintiff in that case had been delinquent in
filing a new suit in state court, and had also lacked a good faith basis for filing the initial complaint.
Neither of those concerns is present in this case.
Even ifiijg’s doctrine of equitable tolling is not available for Plaintiff, other equitable

1

Plaintiff concedes that these three counts of his complaint are all filed pursuant to the NJTCA.
See P1. Br. at 13. Plaintiffs state conspiracy claim, although not pounded in any particular statute.
would appear to be brought under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (“NJCRA”). NJS.A. § 10:61. Although there is no specific statute of limitations for NJCRA claims, both federal and state
courts in New Jersey have held that the same two-year statute of limitations applies to both § 1983
and NJCRA claims. See Brown v. City of Newark, Civ. No. 09-3752. 2010 WL 1704748. at *4
(D.N.J. Apr. 26, 2010).
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doctrines may be applicable to his NJTCA claims. In fact, another panel of the Appellate Division
has held that the statute of limitations for claims under the NJTCA may be tolled in certain
circumstances, See Dunn v. Boro of Mountainside, 301 N.J. Super. 262, 275 (N.J. Super. App.
Div. 1997). Additionally. New Jersey courts have used other doctrines to toll the NJTCA’s statute
of limitations. See Beauchamp v. Amedio. 164 N.J. 1 11(2000) (recoizing that the discovery
rule acts to toll the NJTCA statute of limitations). New Jersey courts have also developed the
2
doctrine of substantial compliance, which may act to preserve a claim that is otherwise untimely.’
Thus, even if Plaintiff’s causes of action under the Tort Claims Act were not equitably tolled under
Galliggn, other doctrines may exist that would warrant tolling in this case. For purposes ofjudicial
efficiency and to allow for full consideration of the issues, the Court will reserve judgment as to
the remaining counts of Plaintiff’s complaint and allow the parties to further brief the issue of
equitable tolling and substantial compliance under the Tort Claims Act.
III.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the Court finds that the New Jersey Supreme Court’s
application of equitable tolling principles applied to this case warrant the tolling of the statute of

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In Negron v. Llarena. utilizing many of the same policies underlying its earlier Galligan
decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that if a party can satisfy a five-part test, the
doctrine of substantial compliance will allow a tolling of the statute of limitations. 156 N.J. 296
(1998). To be entitled to substantive tolling, a party must demonstrate:
(I) The lack of prejudice to the defending party: (2) a series of steps
taken to comply with the statute involved; (3) a general compliance
with the purpose of the statute; (4) a reasonable notice of petitioner’s
claim[;] and (5) a reasonable explanation why there was not a strict
compliance with the statute.

Negron. 156 N.J. at 305 (internal citations and quotations omitted). However, because the
parties did not address this doctrine in their arguments, the Court will decline to rule on these
arounds at this time.
1 ()

limitations for Counts One, Two, Five, and Seven of Plaintiffs complaint. The Court will reserve
decision on the remaining counts of the complaint so as to allow the parties to submit additional
briefing on the issues discussed above. Accordingly,
IT IS, on this 31st day of July, 2014
ORDERED that Defendants’ motions to dismiss (ECF Nos. 4 and 10) are DENIED as to
Counts One, Two, Five, and Seven of Plaintiffs complaint; and it is further
ORDERED that the Court will reserve decision as to Counts Three, Four, and Six of
Plaintiffs complaint; and it is further
ORDERED that the parties shall simultaneously submit additional briefing within ten (10)
days of the date of this Opinion and Order; and it is further
ORDERED that the parties shall contact the Chambers of Magistrate Judge Falk to arrange
a scheduling and settlement conference.

A

CLAIRE C. CECCIII, U.S.D.J.

Ti