JONES v. MCKOY et al

Filing 9

OPINION. Signed by Judge Kevin McNulty on 2/26/2019. (sm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

RONALD JONES,

Civil No. 13-7832 (KM) (MAH)
Plaintiff,
OPINION

v.
B. MCKOY et al.,
Defendants.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintifipro se, Ronald Jones, commenced this action on December 23, 2013, by filing a
complaint under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. (“CplL”, DE 1) The action was initially administratively

terminated, as the complaint included a defective application to proceed in fonna paupeuis. (DE
2.) Mr. Jones subsequently filed a proper infonna pauperis application, and the action was
reopened. (DE 3, 5.) Thereafter, the action was again administratively terminated because Mr.
Jones failed to update his address with the Court in compliance with Local Civil Rule 10.1 and
could not be contacted. (DE 6, 7.) Thereafter, Mr. Jones provided the Court with an updated
address. (DE 8.) The Court now reopens this action and undertakes a screening of the complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B). For the reasons explained herein, the action is dismissed in
part but will be permitted to proceed in part.
II.

THE COMPLAINT

The bulk of Mr. Jones’s 342-paragraph complaint is a recitation of his interactions with

officials of Northern State Prison (“NSP”) between August 2008 and his ultimate release from
prison on September 28, 2012. From this intricate chronology of events, I extract six distinct

types of wrongs that Mr. Jones alleges he suffered: (I) erroneous withholding of portions of Mr.
Jones’s wages and work credits for his prison job; (2) improper extensions of Mr. Jones’s release
date; (3) assignments to top bunks and upper prison tiers despite a medical directive that he be
assigned a bottom bunk in a ground-level cell; (4) denial of adequate access to the prison law
library; (5) transfers to undesirable prison units; and (6) unjustified searches of his cell. (See
Cplt.

¶J 23—323.) Mr.

Jones also raises a number of allegations surrounding discipline that he

was subjected to in August—September 2011, including claims that he was falsely accused and
convicted of threatening a corrections officer; moved to another cell pending charges, during
which time he was deprived for two weeks of his eyeglasses, toothbrush, and toothpaste; tahtboth
his hearinu and the resulting decision were delayed beyond permissible timelines; and that some
of his personal belongings vent missing while his charges were pending.’ (See Cplt.

1

101—

208.)
Mr. Jones asserts against the defendants, who are all corrections officers or prison
administrators, claims under 42 U.S.C.

§

1983 for deprivation of due process, violation of his

equal-protection rights, cruel and unusual punishment, inadequate medical treatment, retaliation,
false imprisonment, denial of access to the courts, and conspiracy.2 (CpU.

1 324—39.) He seeks a

declaratory judgment that his rights were violated, injunctive relief against the defendants
barring further harassment or retaliation, and compensatory and punitive damages. (Id.

¶fflJ 340.)

Mr. Jones explains that his guilty determination was “rescinded” upon an administrative appeal
and that a new hearing was ordered. (Cplt. ¶ 211.) The complaint does not make clear whether a second
hearing ever occurred.
Mr. Jones refers only to federal law and alleges that he has “no adequate state remedy at law.”
(See Cplt. ¶ 336.) Accordingly, I do not construe his complaint as asserting any claims under state law. I
note, however, that any state tort claim related to his alleged deprivations of wages and property or the
purportedly false disciplinary charges would be barred by the applicable two-year tort statute of
limitations. See infiv, Part IV.a.

2

2

LEGAL STANDARDS

III.

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. 104-134.

§

801—810, 110 Stat. 1321-66

to 1321-77 (Apr. 26, 1996) (“PLRA”), district courts must review prisoner complaints when the
prisoner is proceeding in fonna pauperis. See 28 U.S.C.

§

1915(e)(2)(B). The PLRA directs

district courts to sua sponte dismiss claims that are frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C.

§

l915(e)(2)(B).

“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28
U.S.C.

§

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to FederaL

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012).
That standard is set forth in Ashcroft

i

iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp.

i

Thvomblv. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). To survive the Court’s screening for failure to state a claim, the
complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter to show that the claim is facially plausible.”
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “A daim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d
Cir. 2014). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twonthly, 550 U.S. at
555).
Pro se pleadings, as always, will be liberally construed. See Homes v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520 (1972); Glunkv. Noone, 689 F. App’x 137, 139 (3d Cir. 2017). Nevertheless, “prose

3

litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala

i’.

Crown

Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013).
A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 for certain violations of

his constitutional rights. That section provides as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a
judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was
unavailable.
42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege, first, the vioLation ofa

right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and second, that the alleged
deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law. See Harvey i
Plains Twp. Police Dep ‘I, 635 F.3d 606, 609 (3d Cir. 201 1); see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42,

48(1988).
IV.

ANALYSIS

a. Timelincss
I first assess the timeliness of Mr. Jones’s Complaint. “Although the running of the
statute of limitations is ordinarily an affirmative defense, where that defense is obvious from the
face of the complaint and no development of the record is necessary, a court may dismiss a timebared complaint sua sponte under 28 U.S.C.

§ 191 5(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim.”

Osneni v Wa Wa’s Mart, 532 F. Appx 110, 111—12 (3d Cir. 2013); see also Hunterson
Disabato, 244 F. App’x 455, 457 (3d Cir. 2007). Causes of action under 42 U.S.C.

4

i

§ 1983 are

subject to the same two-year statute of limitations as claims for other personal injuries under
New Jersey state law. See Patyrak i’. Apgar, 511 F. App’x 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Dique
v. N.J State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010)); Evans v. Gloucester Twp., 124 F. Supp.
3d 340, 349 (D.N.J. 2015) (citing Pittrnan v. Metuchen Police Dep ‘t, 441 F. App’x 826, 828 (3d
Cir. 2011)). The accrual of a cause of action is a matter of federal law and generally coincides
with the time that the plaintiff suffers injury. See Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634—35 (3d Cir.
2009).
Mr. Jones filed his complaint with the court on December23, 2Ol3, (DE 1) Thus, any
claims that accrued prior to December 23, 2011 are facially untimely. I will consider, however,
whether the limitations period may have been suspended or tolled. “State law, unless
inconsistent with federal law, also governs the concomitant issue of whether a limitations period
should be tolled.” McPherson v United States, 392 F. App’x 938, 944 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting
Dique, 603 F.3d at 185). Statutory tolling under New Jersey law must be based on a specifically
identified basis. See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann.

§

2A:14—21 (minority or insanity); N.J. Stat. Ann.

§

2A:14—22 (non-residency of persons liable). Nothing in the complaint, however, supports any
statutory basis for tolling.
Equitable tolling under New Jersey law may arise “where ‘the complainant has been
induced or tricked by his adversary’s misconduct into allowing the deadline to pass,’ or where a
plaintiff has ‘in some extraordinary way’ been prevented from asserting his rights, or where a
plaintiff has timely asserted his rights mistakenly by either defective pleading or in the wrong
*5 n.4 (D.N.J. June
forum.” Cason v. Arie St. Police Dep’!, No. 10-497, 2010 WL 2674399, at

Because Mr. Jones was not incarcerated when he flied his complaint, there is nothing to suggest
that he could receive any benefit under the “prison mailbox rule.” See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266,
270—71 (1988). I note that the envelope in which Mr. Jones submitted his complaint bears a residential
return address and is postmarked December 20, 2013. (See DE 1-2.)
5

29, 2010) (quoting Freeman v.8/ale, 347 N.J. Super. 11,31 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002)). Again,
the complaint does not articulate any basis for equitable tolling. Accordingly, I will dismiss as
untimely all claims that accrued before December 23, 2011. This includes all of Mr. Jones’s
claims concerning the disciplinary charge against him and his related punitive confinement in
August and September 2011.
Ii. Cruel and Unusual Punishment and Inadequate Medical Treatment
An Eighth Amendment claim under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause includes
both a subjective and an objective component: (I) that the defendant prison official acted with a
culpable state of mind and (2) that the conduct in question was sufficiently harmful to become a

constitutional violation. See Ricks v. Shover, 891 F.3d 468, 473 (3d Cir. 2018). Cruel and
Unusual Punishment claims may be divided into those alleging excessive force and those
concerning the conditions of confinement. See Hudson v McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8—9 (1992). AS
to the latter, the Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to “provide humane conditions of
confinement,” but it “does not mandate comfortable prisons.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 832 (1994) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981)). “[Ejxtreme
deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim. Because routine
discomfort is a part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society,
only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are
sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
A claim may encompass, not just direct infliction of harm, but also deliberate
indifference to a medical need. To state a claim, an incarcerated plaintiff must allege the
existence of a serious medical need and that facility staff demonstrated deliberate indifference to

6

that medical need. Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850 F,3d 526, 534 (3d Cir. 2017); Mattern v.
City ofSea Isle, 657 F. App’x 134, 138 (3d Cir. 2016); Gites v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 330 (3d
Cir. 2009). The Third Circuit has staled that “a medical need is ‘serious’ for purposes of a denial
of medical care claim if it is either ‘one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring
treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a
doctor’s attention.” Mallen,, 657 F. App’x at 139 (quoting Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst. Inmates
v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987)).
A finding of deliberate indifference requires a demonstration that the defendant had the
requisite stale of mind, i.e.. knowledge of a serious medical risk and disregard for that risk. See
Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 335. 337 (3d Cir. 2016); NaMe v Camden Cty. Corr.
Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003); see also Whilley v. Athers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)
(finding that an Eighth Amendment violation requires a showing of “obduracy and
wantonness”); Palakovic

K

iVerze!, 854 F.3d 209, 227 (3d Cir. 2017) (equating deliberate

indifference with at least “reckless[] disregard [forj a substantial risk of serious harm.”). The
Third Circuit has identified a variety of forms that deliberate indifference may commonly take,
including “where the prison official (1) knows of a prisoner’s need for medical treatment but
intentionally refuses to provide it; (2) delays necessary medical treatment based on a nonmedical reason; or (3) prevents a prisoner from receiving needed or recommended medical
treatment.” Parkell, 833 F.3d at 337 (quoting Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir.
1999D; see also Natale, 318 F.3d at 582. A mere “inadvertent failure to provide adequate
medical care”—i.e., negligent diagnosis or treatment—will not create an Eighth Amendment
ejaim. Este/le

K

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105—06 (1976); Parke/I, 833 F.3d at 337.

7

Mr. Jones’s Eighth Amendment medical claims alleges that, because of his knee and back
injuries, a medical pass entitled him to assignment to a bottom bunk in a ground-floor cell, but
that the prison authorities failed to give him such a bunk assignment. (See Cplt.

¶ 328.) The

relevant allegations dating from within the limitations period (i.e., after December 23, 2011),
assumed to be true for purposes of this motion to dismiss, are as follows: After numerous
requests for a transfer from NSP’s F-Unit, on April 4,2012, Mr. Jones was moved to A-Unit, but
assigned a fourth-tier cell. (See Cplt.
he alerted defendant

¶ 277, 279, 283, 290, 292, 295, 298—99.) On the same day,

Sgt. Castro that he had a medical directive to be assigned a bottom bunk in a

ground-floor cell, and Sgt. Castro “stated that he would take care of this.” (Id.

¶ 299.) When the

bunk reassignment did not occur, on April 1, 2012, Mr. Jones spoke to defendant Sgt. Mercado
on April 10, 2012, and again to Sgt. Castro on April 11, 2012. Both said they would address the
issue. (See Id.

¶ 30 1—02.) Mr. Jones alleges that on April 24, 2012, he submitted an

administrative remedy form concerning Sgt. Castro’s failure to reassign him to a bottom bunk in
a ground-floor cell. (Id.

¶ 305.) On April 26, 2012, he again again talked to

Sgt.

Mercadoexplaining that a corrections lieutenant had given verbal approval of a transfer to a
bottom bunk in a lower ceLl. This time, Sgt. Mercado “stated that he didn’t believe the Plaintiff.”
(ifi.

¶ 308.) Mr. Jones sent a letter to defendant Commissioner Lanigan’s office concerning this

issue on April 27, 2012. Resubmitted further administrative remedy forms on May 10, May 15,
and May 18, 2012. (Id.

¶J 309—12.) On June

12, 2012, again asked Sgt. Mercado about being

moved. Sgt. Mercado became “somewhat irate” and “told the Plaintiff that he would speak with
the area [lieutenant] about having the Plaintiff moved somewhere in the prison.” (Id.

¶ 316.) Re

explains that, later that day, he was moved back to F-Unit, though he does not state what bunk or
level he was placed on. (Id. ¶! 317—1 8.)

8

These allegations are sufficient to survive this Court’s preliminary screening as a claim of
deliberate indifference to a serious medical need against Sgt. Castro and

Sgt. Mercado. Mr. Jones

has sufficiently alleged that his knee and back injury constituted a serious medical condition as
he has asserted that prison medical staff had determined that they required his assignment to a
bottom bunk in a ground-floor cell. See Ala/tern, 657 F. App’x at 139. Sgt. Castro’s and Sgt.
Mercado’s refusal to reassign Mr. Jones to a ground-floor cell could be interpreted as deliberate
indifference to the need for medical treatment prescribed by the prison authorities themselves.
See Par/cell, 833 F.3d at 337. Prior decisions from within this District have found similar claims

sufficient to survive preliminary screening. See Matins

i’.

Sims, No. 17-3815, 2018 WL 2230550,

at *6 (D.N.J. May 16, 2018) (permitting Eighth Amendment claims to proceed against
defendants who “denied him his prescribed pain medication, refused to honor his first-floor and
bottom-bunk passes, and ignored his complaints of constant pain”); Adeyi v. FCI Ft. DLt Health
Servs., No. 09-5316, 2010 WL 1838463, at *6 (D.N.J. May 4,2010) (finding that bottom-bunk
pass demonstrated serious medical need and that refusal “to relieve plaintiff from snow removal
and top bunk assignment” supported allegation of deliberate indifference); Jones v. Glover, No.
09-2506, 2010 WL 2326187, at

10 (D.N.J. June 7, 2010). Accordingly, these claims will be

permitted to proceed as against Sgt. Castro and Sgt. Mercado only. As the complaint does not
allege personal involvement by any other defendant, these Eighth Amendment claims are
dismissed as against all other defendants.
The complaint also alleges that that Mr. Jones submitted a prison medical request to see a
doctor on March 29, 2012, and was seen by a doctor five days later, on April 3,2012. (See Cplt.

¶IJ 296—97.) He also allegedly sought medical treatment on April

10 and on April 16, 2012, but it

appears that he received treatment in response, and there are no further allegations in relation to

9

these medical complaints. (See CpU.

¶f 300,

303—04.) These additional allegations do not

support any separate medical-treatment claim.
The Complaint alleges that unpaid wages deprived him of the means “to acquire basic
hygiene items and human essentials,” and indeed “the bare necessities of life.” (Cplt.

¶ 331.) The

last month for which Mr. Jones was allegedly denied proper pay was November 2011. (Cplt.

¶

273 (citing account stated dated Dec. 20, 2011.) The complaint was therefore tiled out of time,
Ic., more than two years after these claims had accrued. In any case, Mr. Jones indicates that he
subsequently received his pay (though not his work credits) for October and November 2011.
(Cplt.

¶ 284.) More fundamentally, it is “well-settled that prisoners have.

.

.

no inherent

constitutional right to wages for work performed while incarcerated.” Loyal v. Lanigan, No. 155769, 2016 WL 4545308, at *4 (D,N.J. Aug. 30, 2016) (collecting cases).
An additional claim that must be considered one under the Eighth Amendment is Mr.
Jones’s argument that his release from prison was improperly delayed.4 (Sec DE I

¶ 330.) A

claim for detention after the expiration of a term of imprisonment has three elements:
(1) a prison official had knowledge of the prisoner’s problem and
thus of the risk that unwarranted punishment was being, or would
be, inflicted; (2) the official either failed to act or took only
ineffectual action under the circumstances, indicating that his
response to the problem was a product of deliberate indifference to
the prisoner’s right; and (3) a causal connection between the
official’s response to the problem and the unjustified detention.

Montanez v. Thompson, 603 F.3d 243, 252 (3d Cir. 2010). Such claims are potentially subject to
the bar of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), unless a plaintiff can show that his
conviction or imprisonment was “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order,

Mr. Jones alleges that his incarceration beyond what he contends should have been his release date
violated his due process rights. (DE I ¶ 330.) The Third Circuit has made clear that civil-rights claims for
“over-detention” are properly analyzed under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth
Amendment, See, e.g., Wharton v. Danberg, 854 F.3d 234, 241 (3d Cir. 2017).
10

declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into
question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 486—87; see
also Glenn

Pa. Bet, ofProb. & Parole, 410 F. App’x 424, 426 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Were we to

i

agree with [plaintiff] that he has been imprisoned beyond the expiration of his sentence, that
would necessarily imply that the Parole Board has incorrectly determined his release date or has
failed to timely release him. Because no court has so held, [plaintiffsl action is barred by
Heck.”).5
Mr. Jones alleges two factual circumstances related to his ultimate release date. First, he
alleges that the purportedly false disciplinary proceedings against him in August and September
2011 led to a 180-day loss of commutation time. (See DE I

¶

192.) He alleges that, upon an

administrative appeal, an associate administrator issued a decision that “rescinded the guilty
decision

.

.

.

,

ordered a new hearing and suspended only a portion of the sanction imposed[;]

[s]uspending, in specific, the 180-days administrative segregation aspect of it; ‘and not the.
180-day loss of commutation time portion of it’.” (Id.

¶ 211.) Mr. Jones explains that, three days

later, defendant Assistant Superintendent Paladino “improperly approved the 180-day loss of
commutation time aspect of the sanction.” (Id.

¶ 212.) Jones says that he appeared before the

prisons classification committee on October 19, 2011, at which time he was advised that, due to
his loss of commutation time, his release date was changed from May 2012 to November 4,
2012. (Id. ¶jJ 247, 252.) During parole proceedings in November 2011, Jones raised his claims
regarding the invalidity of the disciplinary charge, but his release date remained November 4,
2012. (See id.

¶ 264—68.) At the end of May 2012, he submitted a letter and administrative

I note that the Third Circuit applies the Heck bar to such cases even when a plaintiff is no longer in
custody and therefore cannot invoke habeas corpus to in an attempt to meet the Heck favorable-termination
requirement. See Dee,ner v Beard, 557 F. App’x 162, 163—67 (3d Cir, 2014). The result may be that, in
practical terms, prisoners must usually pursue such claims while incarcerated, or else lose them.
II

grievance to NSP officials claiming that he “was being held beyond his maximum May 17, 2012
sentence date,” but the release date remained the same. (Id

¶17 314—15.)

This claim appears to be explicitly barred under Heck v. Humphrey. In effect, Mr. Jones
is asking the Court to determine that the Parole Board’s finding as to his proper release date was
erroneous. The Third Circuit has specificalLy found that this sort of claim is barred unless the
plaintiff can demonstrate that the propriety of his imprisonment was reversed or at least called
into question by an authorized state body, or as the result of a federal habeas proceeding. See
Glenn, 410 F. App’x at 426. Mr. Jones has not alleged any such circumstances.
Mr. Jones additionally alleges that, on June 14, 2012, he “received notice from the
Cumberiand County Superior Court Law Division advising him that 314-days of county jail
credit being sought by

.

.

.

him had been corrected, providing him with an amended Judgment of

Conviction (JOC) reflecting this and that NSP OFFICIALS HAD been copied with the same.”
(DR 1

¶ 320.) This, he says, should have prompted his release but “NSP officials refused to

bring about his release date.” (Id.) He contends that he further sought 314 days of county jail
credits from the Cumberland County Superior Court Law Division; the outcome of that petition
is not stated. (Id.

¶ 322.) Mr. Jones’s actual release date was

September 18, 2012.

These allegations are insufficient to state a claim for cruel and unusual punishment. To
begin with. Mr. Jones has pled no facts to overcome the bar of Heck v Humphrey, Beyond that,
he has not alleged that any specific defendant had knowledge that he was being improperly
incarcerated. He has not explained the term of his sentence or the factors employed to determine
his ultimate release date, so as to show that his continued incarceration was in fact improper.
Neither has he pleaded facts suggesting that any defendant was deliberately indifferent to his
improperly prolonged incarceration.

12

Accordingly, all claims under the Eighth Amendment, except those related to cell
assignment as against Sgt. Castro and Sgt. Mercado, are dismissed.
c. Denial of Access to the Courts
An inmate has a constitutional right of meaningful access to the courts. which
incorporates a right of access to legal reference materials.6 Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346
(1996); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821—28 (1977). This right is not, however, “an abstract,
freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351; see also
*
Pallipurath v. N.J Dep ? of Corr., No. A-i 671-1ST!, 2017 WL 3297456, at I (N.J. Super. Ct.

App. Div. Aug. 3,2017), certjf denied, 232 N.J. 54(2018). Rather, such plaintiffs must allege
and demonstrate actual resulting injury—Le., “that they lost a chance to pursue a ‘nonfrivolous’
or ‘arguable’ underlying claim.” Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008). Thus a
plaintiff must describe the underlying, predicate claim with sufficient specificity and must
identify the lost remedy. Id. at 205—06. Because an access-to-the-courts claim is often
redundant—it is ordinarily a backstop for the substantive, underlying claim—a plaintiff must
further show that there is no remedy for the claimed harm other than an access-to-the-courts
claim. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002); Monroe, 536 F.3d at 205—06.

The New Jersey Administrative Code also explicitly defines rights of meaningful legal access.
NJ. Admin. Code § IOA:6-2.l to -2.16; see also Taylor v Hendricks, No. 04-5864, 2006 WL 2532990.
at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 31.2006). These statutory’ rights generally become relevant in judicial review of final
agency decisions by the New Jersey Department of Corrections. See, e.g., Lumumba v.N.J Dept of
Con,, No. A-4784-14T2, 2017 WL 1244337, at *12 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 5,2017; Garcia v.
*
NJ. Dept of Co,t, No. A-0277-14T1, 2016 WL 3389774, at I (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 21,
*1_2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 6,
2016); Conley v N.J Dep’tofCorn.,2008 WL4108052,at
2008). This court lacksjurisdiction to conduct a review of the Department of Corrections’ decisions. See
Thompson v. Union Cry. Div. ofSoc. Sen’s., No. 07-4928, 2010 WL 457742, at *2(D.N.J. Feb. 5,2010)
(citing (‘hicago, RI. & P.R. Ca v. Snide, 346 U.S. 574, 581 (1954)), affd389 F. App’x 95 (3d Cir.
2010).
6

13

Mr. Jones alleges that submitted “daily law library requests,” but generally received law
library passes for only a few days per month. (Cplt.

C

278, 287—88, 306, 318.) He contends that

he needed greater law library access “to do the necessary legal research and [to get] basic legal
materials to prepare and file pleadings in both his pending legal actions and for contemplated
litigation.” (Cplt.

¶ 282, 289.) Mr. Jones asserts that on April 24, 2012, he requested extended

library access from the prison librarian, but that the librarian was unfamiliar with a procedure for
extended access. (Cplt.

¶ 307.)

Mr. Jones fails to state an actual injury for the purposes of an access-to-the-courts claim.
He details library requests and passes he received, but makes no specific allegations as to how
the limitation on access caused him to sacrifice a meritorious claim. “[Pjrison law libraries and
legal assistance programs are not ends in themselves, but only the means for ensuring ‘a
reasonably adequate opportunity to present claimed violations of fundamental constitutional
rights to the courts.” Lewis. 518 U.S. at 351 (quoting Bounds, 430 U.S. at 825)). Pleading an
access-to-the-courts claim requires a plaintiff to show “that [he] lost a chance to pursue a
‘nonfrivolous’ or ‘arguable’ underlying claim” and that the underlying claim represented “more
than mere hope.” Monroe, 536 F.3d at 205—06). Mr. Jones has not identified any claim that he
lost the chance to pursue. Accordingly, this claim is dismissed upon screening.
d. False Imprisonment and Due Process Violations

Mr. Jones’s false-imprisonment and due-process claims seem to arise from the
disciplinary proceedings against him in August—September 2011. These, he says, resulted in
punitive cell reassignment, deprivation of eyeglasses and hygiene items, and ultimately the
disappearance of some of his property. (See Cplt.

¶ 330, 333—34.) As noted above, all

14

of these

claims had accrued by the end of September 201 1; they precede the two year limitations period
and must be dismissed as untimely. (See CpU.

¶17

101—213.)

To the extent that Mr. Jones generally alleges that the defendants violated procedures
dictated by Title IOA of the New Jersey Administrative Code, he has failed to identi’ a specific
factual basis for such a claim. (See Cplt. ¶17324—25.) Furthermore, violations of Administrative
Code provisions alone could not form the basis for a

§

1983 claim, which must allege a violation

of”a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” West, 487 U.S. at 48; see
also Thompson v. Union Cty. Div. ofSoc. Servs., No. 07-4928, 2010 WL 457742, at *2 (D.N.J.
Feb. 5, 2010) (“Section 1983 imposes liability on state actors for violations of rights protected by
the Constitution, not for disagreements with state agency decisions.”), affd 389 F. App’x 95 (3d
Cir. 2010). To the extent that Mr. Jones alleges that his deprivation of proper wages violated due
process (see DE 17331), I have noted above that claims concerning this issue are untimely. To the
extent that Mr. Jones alleges that extensions of his release date violated due process (see Cplt.
330), the Supreme Court has held that “a prisoner in state custody cannot use a

§

¶

1983 action to

challenge ‘the fact or duration of his confinement.” Wilkinson v. Do/son. 544 U.S. 74,78 (2005)
(quoting Freiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973)). Jones is no longer in custody, but
beyond that, the reasoning of pp. 10—13 & n.4. supra. would call for dismissal, and is
incorporated here. Accordingly, Mr. Jones’s false-imprisonment and due-process claims must be
dismissed.
e. Equal Protection
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall
“deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend
XIV,

§

I. The Supreme Court has described this as “a direction that all persons similarly situated

15

should be treated alike.” City ofCleburne v. Cleburne Living Cm, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). An
equal-protection claim thus requires a showing that (1) the plaintiff is a member of a protected
class and (2) the plaintiff was treated differently from others similarly situated. Oliveira v.
Township ofIrvington, 41 F. App’x 555, 559 (3d Cir. 2002); see also Johnson v. Fuentes, 704 F.

App’x 61,65 (3d Cir. 2017); Kazar v. SlipperyRock Univ., 679 F. App’x 156, 162 (3d Cir.
2017); Shumcrn a rd. Shertzer v. Penn Manor Seli, Dist, 422 F.3d 141, 151 (3d Cir. 2005).
Persons are considered similarly situated when they are “alike in all relevant aspects.” Srartzell v.
City ofPhila., 533 F.3d 183, 203 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
A successful claim requires proof that the plaintiff have been subjected to intentional or
purposeful discrimination. Hassan v. City ofiV Y., 804 F.3d 277, 294 (3d Cir. 2015); Shunian.
422 F.3d at 151. A plaintiff must show discriminatory purpose by demonstrating that the

defendant took the challenged action “at least partially because the action would benefit or
burden an identifiable group.” Doe cx reL Doe v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 665 F.3d 524, 548
(3d Cir. 2011) (citing Pers. Adm r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)); see also Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676—77 (2009) (finding that stating discrimination claim requires pleading
facts that show challenged policy was adopted “not for a neutral, investigative reason but for the
purpose of discriminating”).
While Mr. Jones nominally invokes the Equal Protection Clause (Cplt.

¶ 325), he has

included no facts supporting such a claim. He has not alleged that he is a member of a protected
class; nor has he included any facts pertaining to similarly situated persons. Accordingly, any
equal-protection claim is dismissed.
f.

Retaliation

16

An incarcerated plaintiff may plead a claim for retaliation by alleging that “(1) he
engaged in constitutionally protected conduct[,] (2) he suffered an adverse action[,] and (3) the
constitutionally protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor for the adverse action.”
Brand’

i Varano,

717 F. App’x 146, 149 (3d Cir. 2017); see also Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330,

333—34 (3d Cir. 2001). “[G]ovemment actions, which standing alone do not violate the

Constitution, may nonetheless be constitutional torts if motivated in substantial part by a desire
to punish an individual for exercise of a constitutional right.” Allah

i

Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220,

224—25 (3d Cir. 2000) (alteration in original) (quoting Thaddeus-Xv. Blat/cr, 175 F.3d 378, 386
(6th Cir. 1999)); see also Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003). It is well
established that an inmate’s tiling of a grievance constitutes conduct protected by the First
Amendment. See Laurensan v. Romarowics. 528 F. App’x 136, 139 (3d Cir. 2013); Mack i’.
Yost, 427 F. App’x 70, 72 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Filing a formal prison grievance clearly constitutes
protected activity..

. .“);

see also Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 422 (3d Cir. 2076); Mitchell,

318 F.3d at 530.
An action is considered adverse if it would be “sufficient to deter a person of ordinary
firmness from exercising his constitutional rights.” Mack

&

Warden Lore/to [‘C’!, 839 F.3d 286.

297 (3d Cir. 2016); see also Watson, 834 F.3d at 422 n.6; Mitchell, 318 F,3d at 530. Whether the
action in question meets this standard “is an objective inquiry and ultimately a question of fact.”
Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 376 (3d Cir. 2012); see also Allah, 229 F.3d at 225.
Once a plaintiff has shown evidence of protected conduct and an adverse action, the
question is whether there is a causal link between the two. See Rauser, 241 F.3d at 333. At that
stage, the plaintiff first bears the burden to show that the protected conduct was a substantial or
motivating factor underlying the adverse action, and the burden then shifis to the defendant to

17

show that it would have taken the same action regardless of the plaintiffs protected conduct. Id,’
see also Watson, 834 F.3d at 831. Where a causal link cannot be shown with direct evidence, a
plaintiff may try to satis1’ the initial burden circumstantially by demonstrating “(1) an unusually
suggestive temporal proximity between the protected activity and the allegedly retaliatory action,
or (2) a pattern of antagonism coupled with timing that suggests a causal link.” [Va/son, 834 F.3d
at 422.
Mr. Jones alleges that virtually all conduct he has described by the defendants, including
failure to follow his medical directive, the allegedly false disciplinary charge, the deprivation of
wages, the theft of his personal property. and the deprivation of access to the courts, constituted
retaliation for his grievance filings and his prior lawsuits against prison defendants. (Cplt.

¶ 335.)

As already explained above, claims concerning the bulk of these events must be dismissed as
untimely. Most also lack an allegation of circumstances suggesting a causal link.
I conclude, however, that Mr. Jones has included sufficient factual allegations to support
retaliation claims against Sgt. Mercado and Lt. Flemming based upon their reassignment of Mr.
Jones to F-Unit after he complained about the failure to honor his medical pass for a groundfloor cell assignment. Among other acts, Mr. Jones’s allegations that he filed administrative
remedy forms and letters of complaint concerning the failure to reassign him to a ground-floor
cell clearly constituted conduct protected by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.
(See Cplt.

¶ 307, 309—13.) Furthermore, he alleges that Sgt.

Mercado and Lt. Flemming became

angry when he made an additional request to be moved and then reassigned him to F-Unit, which
he alleges was subject to a “higher level of security.” Those allegations, as well as the temporal
proximity of the protected acts and the alleged retaliation, could state a claim of an adverse
action and purposeful retaliation as a consequence. (See Cplt.

18

¶ 290, 3 16—17.) Accordingly,

Mr.

Jones’s retaliation claim will be permitted to proceed against Sgt. Mercado and Lt. Flemming
only.
No other defendant is adequately alleged to have been personal involved in any alleged
retaliatory acts. While he alleges that limitations on his library access were retaliatory, he has not
alleged that any particular defendant was responsible for granting library access. He contends
that the prison librarian, defendant Gillespie,7 denied a request for extended library access and
“claimed to not be familiar with any extended I OA legal access procedure.” (Cplt.

¶ 307.)

Mere

unfamiliarity with proper prison procedures does not suggest a retaliatory motive.
While Mr. Jones seems to allege that searches of his cell after he was transferred to FUnit were retaliatory, he does not identify any defendant who was responsible for these searches
or provide any facts suggesting that they were retaliatory. For these reasons, all claims for
retaliation, except those against

Sgt. Mercado and U. Flemming. must be dismissed.

g. Conspiracy
Mr. Jones frames virtually all of his claims as conspiracy claims. (See Cplt.
To state a claim for conspiracy under

§

¶flf 324—35.)

1983, a plaintiff must allege that “persons acting under

color of state law conspired to deprive him of a federally protected right.” Ridgewood Rd. of

Educ. v. N.E. cx ret. ME., 172 F.3d 238, 254 (3d Cir. 1999), superseded in part by statute on
other grounds as recognized by P. P. ex rd. Al/chad P.
727. 730 (3d Cir. 2009). A

§

i’.

W chester Area Sc/i. Dist. 585 F.3d

1983 claim for civil-rights conspiracy must show an understanding

or “meeting of the minds” with facts demonstrating agreement and concerted action. See
Siartzett, 533 F.3d at 205. If there is a lack of direct evidence, an agreement or meeting of the
minds may be established by circumstantial evidence, such as by identifying interactions
Mr. Jones does not actually list any Gillespie among the defendants in the caption of his pleading
or in the “DEFENDANTS” section. (See CpIt. at I & ¶ 6—22.)
19

between the conspirators, the approximate timing of the agreement. the parties in agreement, and
the period or object of the conspiracy. Ii
For the most part, Mr. Jones does not include any factual allegations that would support
an allegation that any defendants agreed or took concerted action to violate his rights. Reading
the complaint most favorably to Mr. Jones, however, it could be inferred that Sgt. Mercado’s and
Lt. Flemming’s actions in reassigning Mr. Jones to F-Unit in purported retaliation for his
exercise of his First Amendment rights were conceded. (See Cplt. j 316—17.) Accordingly, Mr.
Jones’s conspiracy claim against Sgt. Mercado and U. Flemming will be permitted to proceed in
relation to the cell reassignment, but all other conspiracy claims will be dismissed.
V.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, upon screening under 28 U.S.C.

§

191 5(e)(2)(B), Mr. Jones’s

claims for deliberate indifference to a medical need against sgt. Castro and Sgt. Mercado and his
claims for retaliation and conspiracy against Sgt. Mercado and Lt. Hemming will be permitted to
proceed. All other claims and defendants will be dismissed from this action.
These dismissals are without prejudice to the filing, within 30 days, of a properly
supported motion to amend the complaint to cure the deficiencies identified in this opinion. An
appropriate order follows.

DATED; February 26, 2019
KEVIN MCNULTY
United States District Judge

20