R.S. et al v. GLEN ROCK BOARD OF EDUCATION et al
Filing
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OPINION. Signed by Judge Stanley R. Chesler on 12/19/14. (DD, )
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
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R.S., D.S., and o/b/o minor child A.S.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Glen Rock Board of Education, John
Arlotta, Melissa Brinton, Joyce
Fitzmaurice, Christopher Fox, Philip
Paterno, Steve Purciello, Edward
Thompson, David Verducci, Frank
Violante, John Does (1-20) Names Being
Fictitious,
Civil Action No. 14-cv-0024 (SRC)
OPINION
Defendants.
CHESLER, District Judge
This matter comes before the Court upon the motion filed by Defendants for judgment on
the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). Plaintiffs oppose the motion.
The Court has considered the parties’ submissions. For the reasons expressed in this opinion, the
Court will grant Defendants’ motion and dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint without prejudice.
I.
BACKGROUND
A. Factual History
In this case, the parents of a special-needs student present various grievances against the
institutions and individuals responsible for educating their child. The Court takes the following
facts from Plaintiffs’ Complaint and assumes them to be true for purposes of this motion only.
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The minor at the center of this action, “A.S.,” was born in 1997. In April of 2003, when
A.S. was six years old, A.S. acted violently toward another child. Defendant Glen Rock Board
of Education (“the Board”) classified A.S. as being “other health impaired.” Around the same
time, the Glen Rock Child Study Team (“the CST”) learned that A.S. suffered from attention
deficit hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”). In 2011, when A.S. was in eighth grade, the CST
reclassified A.S. as being “emotionally disturbed,” which reflected progress in A.S.’s ability to
maintain personal relationships with his peers and teachers.
By law, these classifications entitled A.S. to special services at school. Over the course
of A.S.’s education, the Board and other school entities provided A.S. with general behavioral
intervention plans, help from a resource center, and weekly counseling sessions. A.S.’s parents,
Plaintiffs R.S. and D.S. (“Plaintiff Parents” or “Plaintiffs”), viewed these special services as
inconsistent and inadequate. They periodically sought additional services to no avail.
On January 24, 2012, a violent incident (“the Incident”) took place at Glen Rock High
School-Middle School (“the School”). A.S. was a member of the wrestling team. After classes
let out on the 24th, A.S. and other students were unsupervised on school grounds as they waited
for wrestling practice to begin. “Horseplay” broke out among the students, and afterward
authorities charged A.S. with the battery or assault of three students. The School suspended A.S.
for five days. Other students’ parents filed complaints, and the Incident received publicity.
Plaintiff Parents assert in their Complaint that after the Incident, they reached a
Settlement Agreement with the Board and other school entities, and that pursuant to the
Settlement Agreement, A.S. now attends a private, out-of-state boarding school.
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B. Procedural History and Defendants’ Motion
On January 3, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint in this Court. As a cause of action,
Plaintiffs assert that Defendants violated the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(“the IDEA”) by failing to provide A.S. with adequate education plans, failing to provide A.S.
with an appropriate education “for the school years 2003 through 2012” (Compl. ¶ 47), and
failing to supervise A.S. on the day of the Incident.
On June 30, 2014, Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). In support of their motion, Defendants make four arguments.
They first argue that Plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred by the IDEA’s two-year statute of
limitations. Second, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs’ claims are precluded by the Settlement
Agreement, in which Plaintiffs waived their rights against the School with respect to A.S.’s
education. Next, Defendants note that the IDEA does not create liability for individuals, yet
Plaintiffs improperly name various school officials as Defendants. Finally, Defendants assert
that because Plaintiffs’ IDEA claims are barred, the Court should not consider any state claims.
Plaintiffs oppose the motion. They argue that their claims are not time-barred. In
support of that contention, they cite to an extended statute of limitations for tort claims involving
minors, and they urge that Defendants continue to violate the IDEA. Plaintiffs also counter that
the Settlement Agreement does not bar this action. In their opposition brief, Plaintiffs articulate
that they are entitled to summary judgment on their failure-to-supervise claim, and that
Defendants’ motion is improper. 1
Plaintiffs did not follow the procedures for filing a summary judgment motion. Among other
deficiencies, Plaintiffs did not include a statement of undisputed material facts, which alone
warrants dismissal. Local Civil Rule 56.1 (“A motion for summary judgment unaccompanied by
a statement of material facts not in dispute shall be dismissed.”).
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II.
DISCUSSION
A. Motions to Dismiss
“The standards governing Rule 12(c) motions are the same ones that govern motions to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” Allah v. Hayman, 442 F. App’x 632, 635 (3d Cir. 2011). A court
may dismiss a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) only if, accepting all of the well-pleaded allegations in
the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the non-movant, it finds the
claims facial plausible. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007). The
complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level. Id. at 1965; Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir.
2008). The Supreme Court has made clear that “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do.” Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1964-65; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct.
1937, 1950 (2009) (“While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they
must be supported by factual allegations.”). Accordingly, the Court will identify allegations that,
“because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.”
Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680).
A complaint cannot survive where a court can only infer that a claim is merely possible rather
than plausible. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court may consider only the complaint,
exhibits attached to it, matters of public record, and undisputedly authentic documents. 2 See
2
The parties attached various certifications and other materials to their submissions on this
motion. With the exception of the Settlement Agreement and Administrative Order, discussed
below, the Court will not consider those papers, which fall outside the permissible record on this
motion. Because the Court has not considered those documents, and such consideration is not
needed for disposition, the Court will not convert the motion to one for summary judgment.
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Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993).
The issue before the Court boils down to “not whether plaintiff will ultimately prevail[,] but
whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence in support of the claims.” In re Burlington
Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1420 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416
U.S. 232, 236 (1974)). It is through this lens that the Court will assess Plaintiffs’ Complaint.
B. Administrative Exhaustion Under The IDEA
The IDEA guarantees special-needs students the right to a free and appropriate public
education (“FAPE”) and it “establishes an elaborate procedural mechanism to protect” that right.
Komninos by Komninos v. Upper Saddle River Bd. of Educ., 13 F.3d 775, 778 (3d Cir. 1994).
Under that procedural framework, individuals are entitled to a due process hearing in front of an
administrative official. Id. Anyone who receives an adverse decision in such an administrative
proceeding may file a lawsuit in state or federal court. Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2)).
Individuals who wish to state a claim under the IDEA, however, “must exhaust
administrative remedies” prior to initiating a lawsuit. Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767
F.3d 247, 270-71 (3d Cir. 2014) (emphasis in original) (citing Komninos, 13 F.3d at 778). The
policy requiring administrative exhaustion is “strong” and serves multiple purposes:
The advantages of awaiting completions of the administrative
hearings are particularly weighty in [IDEA] cases. That process
offers an opportunity for state and local agencies to exercise
discretion and expertise in fields in which they have substantial
experience . . . . [C]ourts should be wary of foregoing the benefits
to be derived from a thorough development of the issues in the
administrative proceeding.
[Id. at 271.]
The exhaustion requirement also reflects “Congress’ view that the needs of handicapped children
are best accommodated by having the parents and the local education agency work together[.]”
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Komninos, 13 F.3d at 778 (quoting Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1011–12 (1984)). In
addition to best serving the needs of those involved in IDEA disputes, administrative exhaustion
“provide a means to develop a complete factual record . . . . [and to] produce facts and opinions
relevant to the very same issues presented to the court by plaintiffs.” Id. at 779.
Accordingly, the role of a district court in assessing IDEA claims is limited, and it
involves reviewing, rather than replacing, an administratively developed record. Id. at 778
(noting that the Court “reviews the records of the administrative proceedings, hears additional
evidence at the request of a party, and grants such relief as may be appropriate.”). A district
court that intervenes before an agency fully weighs in would create a “duplication of effort in
evaluating the same areas of controversy” and foreclose the “active, intense participation by
parents, educational authorities, and medical personnel[.]” Id. at 779.
Once a party does exhaust its administrative remedies, there is a limited period of time to
seek judicial review. Specifically, an aggrieved party has 90 days from “the date of the decision
of the [administrative] hearing officer” to file suit. Blunt, 767 F.3d at 270 (citing 20 U.S.C. §
1415(i)(2)(B)); see also Jonathan H. v. The Souderton Area Sch. Dist., 562 F.3d 527, 530 (3d
Cir. 2009) (“Section 1415(i)(2)(B) limits a party’s right to ‘bring an action’ to within 90 days
after the final administrative decision.”).
C. Plaintiffs Have Not Exhausted Administrative Remedies
Here, Plaintiffs did not exhaust their administrative remedies before filing this lawsuit,
which undermines the important policies that exhaustion serves.
The essence of Plaintiffs’ Complaint urges that Defendants violated A.S.’s rights under
the IDEA. Plaintiffs do not, however, present to the Court an administratively developed record
which could serve as the basis for judicial review. Assessing Plaintiffs’ claims under these
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circumstances would deny administrative personnel an opportunity to exercise their expertise,
Blunt, 767 F.3d at 271, prevent Plaintiffs and Defendants from working together with agency
officials, Smith, 468 U.S. at 1011–12, and bypass the requirement that a full and meaningful
record be developed at the administrative level, Komninos, 13 F.3d at 778-79. Moreover, there
is no reason why exhaustion should be excused in this case: the claims presented are fact
sensitive, not purely legal; Plaintiffs do not cite any emergency which requires immediate
intervention, and there is no apparent reason why administrative proceedings would be futile, or
why an agency could not craft an appropriate remedy. Cf. Blunt, 767 F.3d at 271 (reviewing the
“very limited exceptions” to the exhaustion requirement).
With respect to the exhaustion requirement here, it is relevant to note that the parties
reached a Settlement Agreement, which was then approved and so-ordered by an administrative
officer. The parties cite and attach these documents to their motion papers, and the Court may
address them. Pension Ben. Guar. Corp., 998 F.2d at 1196 (holding that court deciding motion
to dismiss could consider a concededly authentic document attached as exhibit by defendant
when the plaintiff’s claims were based on it). Administrative Law Judge Carol Cohen (“the
ALJ”) issued a two-page order on June 14, 2012, which found that the parties’ settlement was
entered into voluntarily and that it was lawful. The order asserts that the “settlement fully
disposes of all issues in controversy between [the parties] and is consistent with the law,” and it
mandates compliance with the settlement’s terms. (Docket Entry 10-3). In pertinent part, the
ALJ also writes, “This decision is final pursuant to 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(i)(1)(A)[.]” (Docket
Entry 10-3).
There is some authority which might suggest that further administrative proceedings are
unnecessary if an agency has signed off on a resolution reached by the parties. See Lewis M.
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Wasserman, Delineating Administrative Exhaustion Requirements and Establishing Federal
Courts’ Jurisdiction Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: Lessons from the
Case Law and Proposals for Congressional Action, 29 J. Nat’l Ass’n Admin. L. Judiciary 349,
390 (2009) (“[W]here parties have entered into stipulations of settlement which have been ‘so
ordered’ by an IDEA hearing officer, courts have excused exhaustion on the ground of futility in
actions to enforce those orders.”) (citing Eddins v. Excelsior Indep. Sch. Dist., 1997 WL 470353,
at *6-7, 9-11 (E.D. Tex. 1997) (magistrate’s recommendation); Woods ex rel. T.W. v. N. J.
Dep’t of Educ., 796 F. Supp. 767, 775 (D.N.J. 1992)); see also Fortes-Cortes v. Dep’t of Educ.,
2013 WL 955108, at *7 (D.P.R. Mar. 12, 2013).
Yet the Court finds that the ALJ’s order in this case does not render Plaintiffs’ claims
reviewable, for three reasons. First, bypassing administrative exhaustion simply because an
agency approved of the parties’ settlement would likely cause the “serious adverse effects” that
follow whenever the requirement is bypassed. Komninos, 13 F.3d at 779. In particular, when
agency input is confined to a cursory statement that the parties’ settlement is voluntary and
lawful, judicial intervention would undermine Congressional intent that agencies first develop
their own facts and opinions on IDEA disputes. Id.
Second, Plaintiffs’ Complaint does not actually challenge nor appeal from the
administrative order, nor does it allege that Defendants breached the terms of the Settlement
Agreement. The Complaint articulates independent claims that Defendants violated the IDEA.
The Complaint is not tethered to the earlier administrative proceedings, and thus Plaintiffs are
not “aggrieved” parties seeking the kind of judicial “review” which is contemplated under the
statute. Id. at 778. Finally, even if the Court were to construe Plaintiffs’ Complaint as a plea for
judicial review of the administrative order, Plaintiffs would have had to file that claim within
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ninety days of the June 15, 2012 Order. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B). Plaintiffs did not file this
action until January of 2014, which is well beyond the permitted filing period.
In sum, in the context of IDEA, District Courts act in a quasi-appellate capacity, and their
role is to review an administratively developed factual record. Because this case asks the Court
to assess IDEA claims in the first instance, and without the aid of a record, the Court will grant
Defendants’ motion and dismiss Plaintiffs’ IDEA claims. The Court finds that Plaintiffs cannot
cure the deficiencies outlined above, and accordingly it will not grant Plaintiffs leave to amend
their IDEA claims. See Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d Cir. 2008)
(requiring district court to permit leave to amend complaint unless it would be “futile” to do so).
D. Other Deficiencies With Plaintiffs’ IDEA Claims
The Court briefly notes that there are other shortcomings in Plaintiffs’ IDEA claims. 20
USC § 1415(f)(3)(C) and 20 USC § 1415(b)(6) require that complaints alleging violations of the
IDEA be filed within two years of when the parent knew or should have known about the alleged
activity forming the basis for the Complaint. Here, again, Plaintiffs filed this suit on January 3,
2014, which would limit their recovery to any IDEA violations that took place after January 3,
2012. Additionally, Plaintiffs’ claims against the individual school officials appear to lack
authority for imposing individual liability under the IDEA. Cf. Taylor v. Altoona Area Sch.
Dist., 513 F. Supp. 2d 540, 553 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (“The United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit has recognized that Congress does not normally seek to impose liability on
individuals when it places conditions on the receipt of federal funds by entities that employ such
individuals . . . . [which] counsels against a determination that individuals can be held liable for
IDEA violations.”) (citing Emerson v. Thiel College, 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir.2002)).
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E. State Claims
Plaintiffs’ Complaint states a cause of action that appears to rest exclusively on purported
IDEA violations. Other portions of the Complaint also mention potential violations of New
Jersey statutes and tort laws. The Court having decided to dismiss Plaintiffs’ federal IDEA
claims, it will also dismiss without prejudice any state claims which may have been stated.
United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (“[I]f the federal claims are
dismissed before trial . . . the state claims should be dismissed as well.”).
III.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, the Court will grant Defendants’ motions and dismiss without
prejudice all of the claims in Plaintiffs’ Complaint. For the reasons also expressed in this
opinion, the Court will dismiss Plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion.
s/ Stanley R. Chesler
STANLEY R. CHESLER
United States District Judge
Dated: December 19, 2014
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