WESTON v. PASSAIC COUNTY et al

Filing 26

OPINION. Signed by Judge William J. Martini on 7/7/14. (gh, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

Civ. No. 2:14-cv-00062 (WJM)

JAMES WESTON,
Plaintiff,

OPINION
v.
PASSAIC COUNTY, and the OFFICE OF
THE PASSAIC COUNTY SHERIFF, and
RICHARD H. BERDNIK, in his professional
and personal capacity, jointly and severally,
Defendants.

WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J.:
On May 20, 2014, the Court denied in part Defendant Passaic County Sheriff
Richard Berdnik’s motion to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). Sheriff Berdnik now moves for reconsideration of the Court’s May
20, 2014 decision pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7.1(i). There was no oral argument. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 78(b). For the reasons set forth below, the motion is DENIED.
On January 6, 2014, Plaintiff James Weston filed a Complaint seeking, inter alia,
to impose liability on Sheriff Berdnik and others pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section
1983”). In its May 20, 2014 opinion, the Court set forth the relevant factual allegations:
Since May 2002, Weston has served as a Sheriff’s Officer in the Passaic
County Sheriff’s Office. Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 1. In 2010, Weston was the
President of the Passaic County Sheriff’s Officers Local 286 of the
Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association (“the Local”). Id. ¶ 8. During a Local
meeting held on October 11, 2010, a motion was made to endorse two
Republican candidates for the position of Passaic County Freeholder. Id.
Weston explained the “upsides and downsides” of endorsing Republican
candidates, including Felix Garcia, who was running for Passaic County
Sheriff against the Democratic candidate, Richard Berdnik. Id. ¶¶ 10-11,
13. The Local’s membership decided to support the Republican Freeholder
candidates, but their endorsement was never formalized. Id. ¶ 15.
After the October 11, 2010 meeting, Acting Passaic County Sheriff Charles
S. Meyes sent the following email to Weston:
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You guys endorsed Garcia?? Wtf???? Berdnik and Garcia
are both PBA members! How are you going to pitch a case
for promotion if/when Berdnik wins??
Id. ¶ 17. Berdnik went on to win the 2010 race for Passaic County Sheriff.
Id. ¶ 19.
From October 2010 through September 2012, Weston was number two on a
list of three officers on the Civil Service Sheriff’s Officer eligibility list (the
“List”). Id. ¶ 21. Pursuant to the “Rule of Three,” the any of these three
people could have been promoted within the Sheriff’s Office. Id. ¶ 22
(citing N.J.A.C. 11A:4-8). Sheriff Berdnik chose not to promote any of the
three people on the List, even though the department needed the position
filled. Id. ¶¶ 22, 35-36. Rather, Sheriff Berdnik waited until the List
expired so that he would not have to promote Weston. Id. ¶ 36. After the
List expired, Sheriff Berdnik was given a new List with new names, and he
proceeded to promote individuals whose names were included on that new
List. Id. ¶ 39.
On January 23, 2012, Weston was transferred from the Detective Bureau to
probation, and his pay was decreased. Id. ¶ 24. Also in January 2012,
Weston lost his ability to train with the SWAT team and to teach firearm
classes. Id. ¶¶ 32-33. In June 2012, Weston was removed from the
Tactical Pistol Course and Armorer’s Course, even though others were
allowed to attend. Id. ¶ 34.
Weston v. Passaic County, No. 14-62, 2014 WL 2094095, at *1 (D.N.J. May 20, 2014).
On April 4, 2014, Sheriff Berdnik (as well as the other Defendants named in the
Complaint) moved to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). ECF No. 11. On May 20, 2014, the Court dismissed the Section 1983 claims
against Sheriff Berdnik in his official capacity but not in his personal capacity. The
Court explained:
To establish that Sheriff Berdnik is liable under Section 1983 in his
personal capacity, Weston must allege that Sheriff Berdnik had “personal
involvement in the alleged wrongs.” Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195,
1207 (3d Cir. 1988). “Personal involvement can be shown through
allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.”
Id. “Allegations of participation or actual knowledge and acquiescence,
however, must be made with appropriate particularity.” Id. Making all
reasonable inferences in favor of Weston, the Complaint alleges that Sheriff
Berdnik was personally involved in the alleged retaliation here.

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Weston, 2014 WL 2094095 at *3.
On June 2, 2014, Sheriff Berdnik moved for reconsideration. ECF No. 20. On
June 23, 2014, Weston filed his opposition. ECF No. 21. On June 25, 2014, Sheriff
Berdnik filed his reply. ECF No. 22. Weston argues that Sheriff Berdnik’s reply brief
should not be considered because it was not filed with leave of the Court. Local Civil
Rule 7.1(d)(3). Since the reply brief does not affect the outcome of this motion, the
Court will consider it.
Motions for reconsideration filed in the District of New Jersey are governed by
Local Rule 7.1(i) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure, rather than Rule 59 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Byrne v. Calastro, No. 5-68, 2006 WL 2506722, at *1
(D.N.J. Aug. 28, 2006). “The purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to correct
manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.” Harsco Corp. v.
Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985). Under Local Rule 7.1(i), a motion for
reconsideration may be granted if: (1) an intervening change in the controlling law has
occurred; (2) evidence not previously available has become available; or (3) it is
necessary to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice. See North River
Insurance Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995). Local
Rule 7.1(i) does not permit a Court to rethink its previous decision; instead, the rule
permits a reconsideration only when “dispositive factual matters or controlling decisions
of law” were presented to the court but were overlooked. See Resorts Int’l v. Greate Bay
Hotel and Casino, 830 F. Supp. 826, 831 (D.N.J. 1992).
Sheriff Berdnik argues that reconsideration is warranted here based on a clear
error of law and manifest injustice. Specifically, Sheriff Berdnik argues that the Court’s
denial of Sheriff Berdnik’s motion to dismiss was predicated on a serious misreading of
Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195 (3d Cir. 1988). The Court cannot agree.
In Rode, a clerk-typist working for the Bureau of Personnel within the
Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”) brought a Section 1983 suit alleging that several
defendants, including the Governor of the State of Pennsylvania (the “Governor”)
impermissibly retaliated against Rode based on race and based on the exercise of Rode’s
First Amendment rights. Rode, 845 F.2d at 1198. Rode had three reasons for believing
the Governor personally knew about the alleged retaliation. First, newspaper articles had
appeared describing harassment at the PSP. Id. at 1208. Second, a legislative resolution
had been introduced calling for the investigation of race-based harassment in Rode’s
department. Id. Third, related grievances had been filed with the Governor’s office and
telephone calls had been placed to the Lieutenant Governor. Id. The Third Circuit was
not persuaded. It explained:
[Rode’s] allegations are simply insufficient to show that Governor
Thornburgh had actual knowledge of Rode’s alleged harassment. In a large
state employing many thousands of employees, a contrary holding would
subject the Governor to potential liability in any case in which an aggrieved
employee merely transmitted a complaint to the Governor’s office of
administration or to the Lieutenant Governor’s office.
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Id.
Sheriff Berdnik argues that under Rode, the Court was wrong to allow the Section
1983 claim against Sheriff Berdnik to survive a motion to dismiss. This argument is
unpersuasive. Unlike in Rode, there are allegations here that an Acting Sheriff warned
Weston that his political activities would block his promotion by the incoming Sheriff
(Sheriff Berdnik), and there are also allegations that this warning came true. These
allegations are a far cry from the allegations in Rode.
Next, Sheriff Berdnik makes two principal arguments for why it is implausible
under Twombly and Iqbal to think that Sheriff Berdnik was personally involved in any
retaliation against Weston. First, Sheriff Berdnik argues that it is implausible to infer
personal involvement because there are no allegations that Sheriff Berdnik knew about
the Acting Sheriff’s warning. Second, Sheriff Berdnik argues that it is implausible to
infer personal involvement because there are no allegations that Sheriff Berdnik was in
office when the Acting Sheriff’s warning was made. These arguments fail. Even if
Sherrif Berdnik knew nothing about the warning, and even if Sheriff Berdnik was not in
office when the warning was sent, the warning suggests that Sheriff Berdnik would do
what he ultimately did: refuse to promote Weston. In its May 20, 2014 decision, the
Court found that under Rode, Twombly, and Iqbal, Weston’s allegations of personal
involvement were plausible.
Ultimately, the Court did not clearly err when the Court correctly decided Sheriff
Berdnik’s motion to dismiss. Nor did the Court commit a manifest injustice when the
Court correctly decided Sheriff Berdnik’s motion to dismiss. The motion for
reconsideration is DENIED. An appropriate order follows.
/s/ William J. Martini
WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J.
Date: July 7, 2014

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