ANGEL et al v. TOKYO HIBACHI ASIAN CUISINE, INC. et al

Filing 55

OPINION. Signed by Magistrate Judge Leda D. Wettre on 5/14/2015. (ld, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

ISIDRO ANGEL. ADELAIDE ANGEL,
ADRIAN ANGEL.

Civil Action No. 14-00273 (MCA) (LDW)

Plaintiffs,
MEMORANDUM OPINION
V.

TOKYO HIBACHI CUISINE, INC.
d/b/a TOKYO HIBACHI ASIAN
CUISINE & BUFFET and MENG Al
CHEN,
Defendants.

LEDA DUNN WETTRE, U.S.M.J.

Before the Court is plaintiffs’ motion, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 5(a)(2), for leave
to file an Amended Complaint naming two additional defendants.’ Defendants oppose the
motion. For the reasons set forth herein, the motion is granted.
Plaintiffs commenced this action in January 2014, alleging violations of the Fair
Labor Standards Act and the New Jersey State Wage and Hour Law by their alleged former
employer, defendant Tokyo Hibachi Cuisine, Inc. (“Tokyo Hibachi”), a Japanese
restaurant, and Tokyo Hibachi’s manager, defendant Meng Ai Chen. Plaintiffs allege that
they were employed by defendants in 2013, and that defendants failed to pay them
minimum wage and overtime, as required by law. Defendants filed an Answer on April 8,
2014, generally denying the allegations. (ECF No. 8).

Defendants’ answering papers also argue that plaintiffs should not be permitted “to
certify additional plaintiffs as part of a conditional collective class.” (ECF No. 51, at 1).
The Court, however, has no application before it for class certification and will not address
that issue.
I

During a mediation session on December 18, 2014, defendants’ counsel asserted
for the first time that defendant Tokyo Hibachi was no longer the owner of the restaurant
at the time plaintiffs were employed there and in fact had been dissolved in February 2013,
prior to plaintiffs’ employment at the restaurant. On or about January 17, 2015, defendants
served responses to plaintiffs’ document requests that included a certificate of dissolution
of defendant Tokyo Hibachi, purporting to confirm what defendants’ counsel had asserted
at the mediation session on December 18. On January 22, 2015, plaintiffs’ counsel filed a
letter with the Court requesting leave to amend the Complaint to add additional defendants
whose identities had been disclosed by defendants’ recent document production.
Defendants oppose the motion, arguing that plaintiffs unduly delayed in seeking to amend
the Complaint and that they would be prejudiced by the proposed amendment.
DISCUSSION
Rule 15(a)(2) of the federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a court should
“freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Leave to
amend is liberally granted in light of “the principle that the purpose of pleading is to
facilitate a proper decision on the merits.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). The
United States Supreme Court has held that leave to amend under Rule 15 may be denied in
cases of: (1) undue delay; (2) bad faith or dilatory motive; (3) undue prejudice; or (4)
futility of amendment. See id. at 182. None of the circumstances that warrant denying
amendment exists here.
Defendants first contend that plaintiffs unduly have delayed in seeking to name the
additional defendants as parties, arguing that restaurant ownership is a matter of public
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record. Whether or not that is the case (defendants do not cite to any support for the public
nature of such records), the Court finds that plaintiffs reasonably could have expected
defendants to assert earlier in the litigation, if it was the case, that Tokyo Hibachi was not
a proper defendant because it was not plaintiffs’ employer and was in fact defunct prior to
their employment at the restaurant at issue.

But defendants’ Answer simply “denies

knowledge or information” of allegations concerning its status as an entity and its
employment of plaintiffs. (See ECF No. $

¶

11-12). There are no denials or averments

in the Answer that reasonably would have put plaintiffs on notice of Tokyo Hibachi’s
dissolution in February 2013.

It was not until defendants explicitly disclosed Tokyo

Hibachi’s dissolution at mediation in late December 2014, some eleven months after this
action was filed, and then confirmed that assertion by producing a certificate of dissolution
in January 2015 that plaintiffs were on notice of the need to amend the Complaint.
Plaintiffs then did so promptly, within

just a few

days of receiving the dissolution

certificate. Under these circumstances, the Court cannot conclude that plaintiffs unduly
delayed in seeking leave to amend the Complaint to name the two additional defendants.
Defendants further argue that they will be unfairly prejudiced by the proposed
addition of two new defendants because it may require them to defend against crossclaims
that the newly named defendants may assert against them.

The Third Circuit has

consistently recognized that “prejudice to the non-moving party is the touchstone for the
denial of an amendment.” Arthur v. Mciersk, Inc., 434 F.3d 196, 204 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting
Cornell & Co.

V.

Occupational Safety & Health Review Cornm’n, 573 F.2d $20, $23 (3d

Cir.1978)). When evaluating what constitutes prejudice, the Third Circuit considers
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whether amendment would cause the opponent to expend significant additional resources
to conduct discovery and prepare for trial, as well as whether it would significantly delay
resolution of the action. See, e.g., Cureton v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 252 F.3d 267,
273 (3d Cir. 2001); see also Marlowe Patent Holdings LLC v. Dice Electronics, LLC, 293
F.R.D. 688, 695 (D.N.J. 2013). Here, plaintiffs’ motion to amend was made several months
before the fact discovery deadline in this action, and the proposed amendment would add
no new claims against the current defendants.

The mere possibility that the existing

defendants may have to defend against a crossclaim that may or may not be asserted by the
new defendants, where there has been no undue delay or other factor that will impair the
existing defendants’ ability to defend the claim, does not constitute prejudice that would
justify denial of leave to amend under the liberal amendment standard set forth in federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 15.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is on this 14th day of May 2015, ORDERED that
Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend the Complaint is GRANTED. An appropriate form of Order
accompanies this Opinion.

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Leda Dunn Wettre, U.S.M.J.

cc: Hon. Madeline C. Arleo, U.S.D.J.

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