HINES v. LANIGAN et al

Filing 16

OPINION. Signed by Judge Jose L. Linares on 5/20/2015. (nr, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

ERIC HINES,
Civil Action No. 14-359 (JLL)

Plaintiff,
v.

:

OPINION

GARY M. LANIGAN, et al.,
Defendants.
LINARES, District Judge:
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs motion for a temporary
restraining order
and preliminary injunction requesting that prison officials be ordered
to accord him greater aid in
pursuing his legal claims. (ECF No. 15). Because Plaintiff cannot
show that his legal access
claim is likely to succeed on the merits, this Court will deny the motion
. The Court will grant,
however, Plaintiffs request for leave to amend his complaint within
sixty days.
I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Eric Hines, is a convicted prisoner currently confined at East
Jersey State Prison.
On January 13, 2014, Plaintiff filed a complaint against numer
ous prison officials including
corrections officers, investigatory officers, and their supervisors
pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983.

(ECF No. 1). On April 21, 2015, this Court issued an order dismis
sing all of his claims save one:
a claim for First Amendment retaliation against a John Doe S.I.D.

officer who allegedly threatened

Plaintiff in response to Plaintiffs filing of a complaint against
a corrections officer at the prison.
(ECF No. 11, 12). Plaintiff now seeks injunctive relief directing
prison personnel to accord him

greater support in making his legal claims, effectively claiming that he has
been denied access to
the courts by his current situation. (ECF No. 15 at 1-7).
Plaintiff is apparently currently housed in the prison’s medical tier
as a result of medical
issues with both his feet and spine which cause Plaintiff pain and makes

it difficult for him to walk.

(Id. at 2-5). As a result of his medical conditions, Plaintiff has been
prescribed a walker and is
unable to walk without it. (Id. at 5). Plaintiff asserts that, as a result of
this medical condition,
he is unable to visit the law library of the prison himself, and has instead
been forced to request
aid from the supervisor of the law library, Rick List. (Id. at 3-4). Plainti
ff states that he made a
request for aid through the prison’s remedy system, after which he was visited
by a paralegal who
instructed him that to receive materials from the library, Plaintiff would
have to identify which
cases or books he needed. (Id.). Plaintiff, however, insisted that he would
be unable to provide
that information without first being given access to research tools. (Id.).
After finding the response of List and the paralegal unhelpful, Plaintiff filed

another request

with Diane Patrick, the supervisor of education at the prison who is appare
ntly List’s supervisor.
(Id. at 4). Patrick, however, referred the issue back to List. (Id.). Plainti
ff asserts that, after his
remedy requests were made, he has still not been provided with adequa
te aid in his cell by a
paralegal, including research support, and as a result has been denied
meaningful access to the
courts by List and Patrick (who are not currently defendants in this matter
). (Id. at 5-6). Plaintiff
therefore requests that this Court grant him a preliminary injunction
and temporary restraining
order compelling List and Patrick to provide him with “meaningful access

” to the law library. (Id.

at 6-7).

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II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard

Injunctive relief is an “extraordinary remedy, which should be granted
only in limited
circumstances.” Novartis Consumer Health v. Johnson & Johnson

—

Merck Consumer Pharms.

Co., 290 F.3d 578, 586 (3d Cir. 2002). In order to establish that he is entitle
d to extraordinary
relief in the form of a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order,

Plaintiff must

demonstrate that “(1) he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) denial
will result in irreparable harm; (3) granting the injunction will not
result in irreparable harm to the defendants; and (4) granting the
injunction is in the public interest.” Maldonado v. Houston, 157
F.3d 179, 184 (3d Cir. 1998) (as to preliminary injunction); see also
Ballas v. Tedesco, 41 F. Supp. 2d 531, 537 (D.N.J. 1999) (as to
temporary restraining order). A plaintiffmust establish that all four
factors favor preliminary relief. Opticians Ass ‘n of America v.
Independent Opticians ofAmerica, 920 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1990).
Ward v. Aviles, No. 11-6252, 2012 WL 2341499, at *1 (D.N.J. June
18, 2012). PIaintiff, as the
party seeking a preliminary injunction, must first demonstrate a “reasonable

probability of eventual

success in the litigation.” Bennington Foods, LLC v. St. Croix Renaissance
Group, LLP, 528 F.3d
176, 179 (3d Cir. 2008). To satisfy this requirement, “[ut is not necess
ary that the moving party’s
right to a final decision after trial be wholly without doubt, rather, the burden
relief to make a prima facie case showing a reasonable probability that

is on the party seeking

it will prevail on the merits.”

Ward, 2012 WL 2341499 at *2 (quoting Oburn v. Sapp, 521 F.2d 142,
148 (3d Cir. 1975)).
B. Analysis
Plaintiffs request for injunctive relief arises out of his newly asserte
d claim that he has
been unconstitutionally denied access to the courts. The right
of access to courts under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments requires that
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“adequate, effective, and meaningful” access must be provided [to)
inmates who wish to challenge their criminal charge, conviction, or
conditions of confinement. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822
(1977). In other words, prison officials must “give prisoners a
reasonably adequate opportunity to present claimed violations of
fundamental constitutional rights to the Courts.” Id. at 825.
“[T]he touchstone
is meaningful access to the courts.”
Peterkin v. Jeffes, 855 F.2d 1021, 1037 (3d Cir. 1988) (quoting
Bounds, 430 U.S. at 823) (internal quotations omitted).
.

.

.

In Bounds, the Supreme Court held that “the fundamental
constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities
to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal
papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or
adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.” The right of
access to the courts, however, is not unlimited. “The tools [that
Bounds] requires to be provided are those that the inmates need in
order to attack their sentences, directly or collaterally, and in order
to challenge the conditions of their confinement. Impairment of
any other litigating capacity is simply one of the incidental (and
perfectly constitutional) consequences of conviction and
incarceration.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 355 (1996)
(emphasis in original).
Cooperv. Sharp, No. 10-5245, 2011 WL 1045234, at *1112 (D.N.J. Mar.
23, 2011).

In order to bring a denial of access claim, however, the prisoner must show that
he suffered
a past or imminent “actual injury.” Id at *12; Lewis, 518 U.S. at 348-5 1, 354-55
. Such an injury
occurs where a plaintiff “has lost the opportunity to pursue a ‘nonfri
volous’ or ‘arguable’
underlying claim.” Aultman v. Comm. Educ. Cntrs. Inc.,

---

F. App’x

---,

2015 WL 1475861, at

*2 (3d Cir. April 2, 2015). The Court has also
suggested that such an injury occurs where “a

complaint [Plaintiff) prepared was dismissed for failure to satisfy some
technical requirement
which, because of deficiencies in the prison’s legal assistance faciliti
es, he could not have known.
Or that he had suffered arguably actionable harm that he wished to bring

before the courts, but was

so stymied by inadequacies of the law library that he was unable to file
even a complaint.” Lewis,
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518 U.S. at 351.
In his motion for a preliminary injunction, Plaintiff does no more than suggest that he may
suffer some form of injury if he does not have better support in filing an amended compl
aint. He
does not detail what claims he wishes to make, nor how his difficulties have stymie
d his ability to
make those claims. Plaintiff has, however, been able to file both his initial compl
aint and the
instant motion, which he supported with case law citations. This Court also notes
that those
claims which were dismissed during sua sponte screening were not dismissed on some

technicality

of which Plaintiff could not have been aware, but rather because they were either not
cognizable
as a matter of law (Plaintiffs respondeat superior claims) or were not supported by adequa
te facts.
(See generally ECF No. 11). As Plaintiffs issues in this case have been mostly
factual, the
dismissals of his claims during screening do not amount to an actual injury, especia
lly in light of
Plaintiffs ability to amend or supplement his complaint. Because Plaintiff does not
suggest, let
alone demonstrate, that he has lost some other cause of action or suffered any other
form of actual
injury, he has not even pled a prima facie case of denial of access, and as such cannot
show a
reasonable probability of success on the merits.

Ward, 2012 WL 2341499 at *2. As Plaintiff has

failed to make this initial showing, his motion for injunctive relief must be denied
. Id.

Because

this determination is dispositive of Plaintiffs motion for injunctive relief, this
Court will not
address the remaining factors under Maldonado, 157 F.3d at 184, or Ballas, 41 F.
Supp. 2d at 537.

C. Plaintiffs additional request for leave to amend and to compel certain
documents from
the State

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In his motion Plaintiff also requests that this Court grant him leave to amend or supple

ment

his complaint within sixty days. Because Plaintiff has not yet served his complaint
and this Court
perceives nothing in the interests of justice that would require otherwise, he
may amend it as a
matter of course. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), (d). The Court will therefore grant
Plaintiff’s request
for leave to amend his complaint within sixty days. To the extent that Plainti
ff wishes to make
certain discovery motions, such as a motion to compel discovery from the State
of New Jersey
regarding the identity of the John Doe Defendant, such motions should be directe
d to the attention
of the Magistrate Judge assigned to this case.
III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction andlor
temporary restraining order is DENIED. Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend
his complaint
within sixty days, however, is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s motion to compel the State
to produce
certain documents is DENIED without prejudice at this time. An appropriate order
follows.

s/Jose L. Linares
Hon. Jose L. Linares, U.S.D.J.

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