MCRAY v. WITTIG et al
Filing
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OPINION. Signed by Judge William J. Martini on 4/21/2014. (bdk, )
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
WAVERLY MCCRAY,
Civil Action No. 14-0824 (WJM)
Plaintiff,
v.
OPINION
JAMES F. WITTIG, et al.,
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
WAVERLY MCCRAY #268999
Passaic County Jail
11 Sheriffs Plaza
Paterson, NJ 07501
Plaintiff Pro Se
MARTINI, District Judge:
Waverly McCray, a pretrial detainee confined at Passaic County Jail in New Jersey, seeks
to file a Complaint asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 without prepayment of the filing fee.
This Court will grant Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis. For the reasons expressed
in this Opinion, and as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), this Court will dismiss the Complaint
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
I. BACKGROUND
Waverly McCray brings this Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against James F. Wittig,
former Paterson Police Chief; William Fraher, former Paterson Deputy Police Chief; Richard
Martinez, a detective with the Paterson Police Department; and “all of the Paterson Police
Department.” (Complaint, ECF No. 1 at 1.) He asserts the following facts, which this Court is
required to regard as true for the purposes of this review. Plaintiff asserts that on the afternoon of
Saturday, June 2, 2012, he was taken into the custody of the Paterson Police Department based on
criminal complaints. He alleges that, after processing, Detective Martinez placed him in a
holding cell, where he remained for two days.
Plaintiff alleges that the holding cell was
“freezing,” the walls and floors of the cell had spit and blood on them, the toilet and sink had urine
and feces on them, the mattress was filthy and contained holes, and he was not given soap, a sheet,
a blanket, a toothbrush, toothpaste, or cleaning supplies. He asserts that “sleep was impossible
because of [the] freezing cell and lack [of] sheets and blanket.” Id. at 7. He alleges that the food
he received over his two-day confinement consisted of a bologna sandwich and a half-pint of juice,
which he received on Sunday afternoon at 3:00 pm and again on Monday at 1:00 pm. Plaintiff
asserts that unspecified authorities ignored him, even though his wife called to complain about the
conditions of his confinement. He alleges that for years, the City of Paterson has had a policy and
practice of keeping people who were arrested during the weekend in a holding cell at the police
station until Monday, at which time the arrestee is taken before a judge, even though the Passaic
County Jail is only five blocks away from the police complex. Plaintiff maintains that the “chief
authority should have a system in place to provide the basics mandated by state and federal law.”
Id. at 8. He claims that Defendants violated his constitutional rights by “denying [him] the
minimum standards of adequate heating, sheets, blankets, adequate food, personal and general
hygienic supplies [which caused] extreme pain, suffering, and discomfort for two days.” Id. He
seeks injunctive relief and damages.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Per the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to
1321-77 (April 26, 1996) (“PLRA”), district courts must review complaints in those civil actions in
which a person is proceeding in forma pauperis, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), or a prisoner seeks
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redress against a governmental employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). The PLRA directs
district courts to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. Id. This action is subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under these statutes because
Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, he is a prisoner as defined by the Act, and he seeks redress
from governmental employees.
“[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a claim 1,
the complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is facially plausible.
Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Belmont v. MB Inv. Partners, Inc.,
708 F.3d 470, 483 n.17 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Moreover, while pro se
pleadings are liberally construed, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to
support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted) (emphasis added).
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“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Allah v.
Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)); Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F. App’x 230, 232 (3d Cir. 2012)
(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1)).
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III. DISCUSSION
A.
Federal Jurisdiction
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. See Mansfield, C. & L. M. Ry. Co. v. Swan,
111 U.S. 379, 383 (1884). “[T]hey have only the power that is authorized by Article III of the
Constitution and the statutes enacted by Congress pursuant thereto.” Bender v. Williamsport Area
School Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986). Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code provides a
cause of action for violation of constitutional rights by a person acting under color of state law. 2 To
recover under § 1983, a plaintiff must show two elements: (1) a person deprived him or caused him to
be deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) the deprivation
was done under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Detainees are protected from punishment without due process of law under the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979); Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 373-74
(3d Cir. 2012). That inquiry generally involves application of the Eighth Amendment deliberate
indifference standard, insofar as “the Fourteenth Amendment affords pretrial detainees protections ‘at
least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner.’” Natale v.
Camden County Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting City of Revere v. Mass. Gen.
2
The statute provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . . subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983)). The Third Circuit has Adistilled the Supreme Court’s teachings
in Bell into a two-part test. [A court] must ask, first, whether any legitimate purposes are served
by these conditions, and second, whether these conditions are rationally related to these purposes.@
Hubbard v. Taylor, 538 F. 3d 229, 232 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). However, “[i]n assessing whether the conditions are reasonably related to the assigned
purposes, [a court] must further inquire as to whether these conditions cause [inmates] to endure
[such] genuine privations and hardship over an extended period of time[.]” Hubbard v. Taylor,
399 F.3d at 159 (quoting Union County Jail Inmates v. DiBuono, 713 F.2d 984, 992 (3d Cir.
1983)).
“Unconstitutional punishment typically includes both objective and subjective
components.” Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62, 68 (3d Cir. 2007). The objective component
requires an inquiry into whether “the deprivation [was] sufficiently serious” and the subjective
component asks whether “the officials act[ed] with a sufficiently culpable state of mind[.]” Id.
(quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991).
To satisfy the objective component, an inmate must show that he was subjected to privation
and hardship over an extended period of time. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 542 (confining pretrial
detainees Ain such a manner as to cause them to endure genuine privations and hardship over an
extended period of time might raise serious questions under the Due Process Clause as to whether
those conditions amounted to punishment@); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686-87 (1978) (Athe
length of confinement cannot be ignored in deciding whether the confinement meets constitutional
standards. A filthy . . . cell and a diet of >grue= might be tolerable for a few days and intolerably
cruel for weeks or months@). To satisfy the subjective component, an inmate must assert facts
showing that the person being sued was deliberately indifferent to his health or safety, i.e., plaintiff
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must Ashow that the official was subjectively aware@ of the allegedly substandard conditions and
failed to reasonably respond to the risk to the inmate’s safety or health. See Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 829 (1994).
In this case, Plaintiff complains that Detective Martinez placed him into an unsanitary
holding cell where he was confined for two days without bedding, cleaning supplies, articles pf
personal hygiene or adequate food. While this Court does not in any way condone the conditions
of confinement described by Plaintiff, this Court’s jurisdiction is limited to remedying conditions
that rise to an unconstitutional level. Because Plaintiff was confined in the holding cell under
deplorable conditions for only two days, and he did not suffer any physical injury, his allegations
do not show that he was unconstitutionally punished, i.e., the facts alleged in the Complaint do not
show that Plaintiff endured privation and hardship over an extended period of time. See Bell, 441
U.S. at 537 (“the fact that such detention interferes with a detainee’s understandable desire to live
as comfortably as possible . . . does not convert the conditions or restrictions of detention into
‘punishment’”); Brown v. Hamilton Tp. Police Dept. Mercer County, N.J., 547 F.App’x 96 (3d
Cir. 2013) (holding that, although police’s failure for a short period of time to provide adequate
sanitary conditions “may have resulted in discomfort,” it was “not sufficiently serious” to violate
arrestee’s constitutional rights); Tapp v. Proto, 404 F.App’x 563, 567 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that
detainee’s confinement for six weeks with two other people in cell where the temperature was too
high and he was given clothes that had been previously worn by other inmates did not amount to
the type of hardship that violates the Due Process Clause); Hubbard, 538 F. 3d at 235 (holding that
triple celling of detainees and use of floor mattresses did not violate Due Process because the
inmates Awere not subjected to genuine privations and hardship over an extended period of time@);
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Foreman v. Lowe, 261 F.App=x 401 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that immigration detainee=s
confinement in maximum security did not violate due process). Thus, as written, the Complaint
does not satisfy the objective component of an unconstitutional punishment claim under § 1983.
In addition, Plaintiff’s allegations do not satisfy the subjective component of an
unconstitutional conditions of confinement claim with respect to the former Police Chief and
former Deputy Police Chief. He asserts that the former Police Chief and former Deputy Police
Chief violated his constitutional rights by knowingly allowing a policy and practice that places
arrestees in unsanitary and inhumane conditions in a holding cell at the police station. But
Plaintiff does not assert facts to substantiate his conclusory allegations that the former police chief
and former deputy chief knew about the physical condition of the holding cell in which Plaintiff
was confined, or that these officials were aware that Plaintiff was not given bedding, personal
hygiene products, cleaning products, or adequate nutrition for two days. Plaintiff does not satisfy
the subjective component with respect to these defendants because he does not assert facts
showing that they were personally involved in Plaintiff’s confinement or that they were aware of
and failed to reasonably respond to the risks posed by holding Plaintiff for two days under such
conditions. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (holding that supervisors are not automatically liable under
§ 1983 for the misdeeds of their subordinates: ABecause vicarious liability is inapplicable to
Bivens and ' 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through
the official=s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution@); Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845
F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (AA defendant in a civil rights action must have personal
involvement in the alleged wrongs@).
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Plaintiff’s allegations with respect to Detective Martinez pose a closer question. Plaintiff
asserts that Detective Martinez was the police officer who actually placed him in the filthy holding
cell. Accordingly, one can infer that Martinez knew that there was spit and blood on the walls and
floor of the cell and that the toilet and sink were unsanitary. However, Plaintiff does not assert
that Martinez was at the police station over the weekend, or that Martinez even knew that, after
placing Plaintiff in the holding cell, Plaintiff was not given cleaning supplies, bedding, personal
hygiene items or adequate nutrition. Nor do Plaintiff’s allegations show that Martinez knew that
Plaintiff remained in the holding cell under these conditions for two days. Thus, as written,
Plaintiff’s allegations do not show that Martinez was deliberately indifferent to a risk to Plaintiff’s
health and safety.
Because the Complaint does not assert facts that plausibly show that
Defendants inflicted unconstitutional punishment, this Court will dismiss the Complaint for failure
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
B.
Amendment
A District Court generally grants leave to correct the deficiencies in a complaint by
amendment. See DelRio-Mocci v. Connolly Properties Inc., 672 F.3d 241, 251 (3d Cir. 2012);
Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2000). In this case, it is conceivable that Plaintiff
may be able to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by alleging additional facts to correct the
deficiencies found in the Complaint. This Court will, accordingly, grant Plaintiff leave to file an
amended complaint that is complete on its face and states a claim under § 1983 with respect to the
conditions of his confinement at the Paterson Police Station.
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III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in this Opinion, this Court will grant Plaintiff’s application to
proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted.
s/William J. Martini
WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J.
DATED: April 21, 2014
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