RAMIREZ v. WORLD MISSION SOCIETY, CHURCH OF GOD et al

Filing 107

OPINION AND ORDER denying Defendant's 99 Motion to Dismiss, etc. Signed by Judge John Michael Vazquez on 4/5/18. (cm, )

Not for Publication
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

MICHELLE RAMIREZ,

Plaint iff
Civil Action No. 14-1708 (JMV) (JBC)
V.

OPINION & ORDER
WORLD MISSION SOCIETY CHURCH OF
GOD, A NJ NONPROFIT CORPORATION, et
al,

Defendants.

John Michael Vazguez, U.S.D.J.

This case comes before the Court on the motion to dismiss filed by Defendants World
Mission Society Church of God, a NJ Nonprofit Corporation; Albright Electric LLC; Big Shine
Worldwide, Inc.; Tara Byrne; Bong Hee Lee; Dong Ii Lee; Lincoln Grill & Café Limited Liability
Company; Victor Lozada; and Richard Whalen (collectively, “Defendants”). D.E. 99. Plaintiff
was a member of the World Mission Society Church of God for six years. Plaintiff alleges that
during her time with the church, she was financially defrauded and subjected to psychological
harm and trauma, among other things. The Court reviewed the parties’ submissions, and decided
the motion without oral argument pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b) and L. Civ. R. 78.1(b). For the
reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion is DENIED.
I.

Background & Procedural History

The following facts are taken from the Second Amended Complaint, D.E. 49, (hereinafier
“Second Amended Complaint” or “SAC”). Plaintiff alleges that World Mission Society Church

of God New Jersey (hereinafter “World Mission New Jersey”), a not-for-profit corporation with
its principal place of business in New Jersey, coerced her into joining the organization based on
several false representations and nondisclosures. Id. at ¶J 3, 4, 7. World Mission Society
Church of God South Korea (hereinafter “World Mission South Korea”) is a for-profit
corporation based in South Korea. Id. at ¶ 8. Plaintiff brings this action against World Mission
New Jersey, World Mission South Korea, as well as several individuals and corporations who
were allegedly involved in the wrongful conduct of World Mission New Jersey and World
Mission South Korea. Id. at ¶J 7-18.
After facing significant pressure from World Mission New Jersey’s recruiters, Plaintiff
alleges that she eventually decided to join in the fall of 2006. Id. at] 55, 117. Plaintiff alleges
that during the recruitment process, the recruiters “actively concealed.. .the identity of the
church’s leader,” and that had she known the identity of the leader (Defendant Chang), she
would not have joined World Mission. Id. at ¶J111, 125. According to Plaintiff, Defendants
coerced her into donating ten percent of her income to the church based on misrepresentations
that the money would be used for charitable purposes and that none of the money would be used
to fund salaries. Id. at ¶J 8 1-88. Plaintiff alleges that the money donated to World Mission New
Jersey (a tax-exempt corporation) was transferred to World Mission South Korea (a non-taxexempt corporation), and was then used to compensate members of World Mission New Jersey.
Id. at ¶J 89-94.

Plaintiff further alleges that the donations were “used to create, train, and maintain a
slave labor force.” Id. at ¶ 156. Plaintiff claims that World Mission New Jersey
“indoctrinate[d]” its members to believe that they had to live a life of poverty, and that they
“should commit to working long hours in service to [Defendant] Chang.” Id. at ¶ 157. Rather

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than being assigned work with the church, Plaintiff alleges that World Mission New Jersey put
its members to work in for-profit companies where they made less than minimum wage. Id. at ¶
158. Plaintiff also alleges that members of the church constantly threatened her, “coerced her to
work” long hours with no pay, and “alienated her from her family and friends” in a concerted
effort to brainwash her. Id. at ¶69. Plaintiff also claims that World Mission New Jersey told its
members that they were not allowed to have children. Id. at

¶ 71. If members of World Mission

New Jersey became pregnant, the leaders of the organization would allegedly instruct the
members to get an abortion. Id, at ¶ 74. When Plaintiff got pregnant around 2010, she claims to
have gotten an abortion in fear that she would no longer be in good standing with World Mission
New Jersey. Id. at

¶J 75-76. Plaintiff alleges that this caused her to “experience severe

emotional pain and mental anguish [which led] to a suicide attempt.” Id. at ¶ 77.
Plaintiff has brought several claims against Defendants. Count I is for fraud based on
false representations regarding the donations being used for charitable purposes. Id. at ¶78-104.
Counts II and Ill are for fraud based on nondisclosures related to World Mission South Korea’s
leadership and its use of the money to maintain “slave labor[ers].” Id. at ¶ 105-155. Count IV
is for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at ¶J 178-187. Count V is for negligence.
Id. at ¶ 188-193. Count VI is for vicarious liability against Defendants Chang, Kim, Lee, Lee,

Byrne, and Lozada. Id. at ¶ 194-195.
Plaintiff filed her initial Complaint on March 18, 2014. D.E. 1. She filed an Amended
Complaint on May 9, 2014. D.E. 7. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on June 20, 2014, that
was terminated by the Court on July 2, 2014. D.E. 11, 17. Defendants re-filed their motion to
dismiss on July 11, 2014. D.E. 20. The motion was dismissed as moot, and the Court granted
Plaintiff leave to file a Second Amended Complaint on March 23, 2015. Defendants re-filed

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their motion to dismiss on March 18,2015. D.E. 50. Plaintiff filed the Second Amended
Complaint on April 24, 2015. D.E. 49. The Court terminated the motion to dismiss on
November 13, 2015. D.E. 56. Defendants filed their Answer to the Second Amended Complaint
on January 22, 2016. D.E. 59. Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss on April 25, 2017.
D.E. 99. Plaintiff filed her opposition on May 15, 2017. D.E. 100. Defendants replied on May
22, 2017. D.E. 101. With the permission of the Court, Plaintiff filed a sur-reply on May30
2017. D.E. 102.’
II.

Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(6)2 permits a motion to dismiss “for failure to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted[.j” For a complaint to survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), it
must contain sufficient factual matter to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting BetlAti. Corp.

V.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim

is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

Further, a

plaintiff must “allege sufficient facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will uncover

‘Brief in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to FRCP 12(B)(6) for Failure to
State a Claim Upon Which Relief May Be Granted, D.E. 99, hereinafter “Defendants’ Brief’ or
“Def. Br.”, Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss on Behalf of
Plaintiff Michelle Ramirez, D.E. 100, hereinafter “Opposition” or “Opp.”, Reply Brief in Further
Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to FRCP 1 2(B)(6) for Failure to State a
Claim Upon Which Relief May Be Granted, D.E. 101, hereinafter “Reply Br.”, Plaintiffs Letter
Sur-Reply, D.E. 102, hereinafter “Sur Reply.”
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Defendants filed an Answer to Plaintiffs SAC on January 22, 2016. D.E. 59. The more
appropriate motion at this point in the case would have been for a judgment on the pleadings
pursuant to F ed R. Civ. P. 12(c). See Horizon Healthcare Services, Inc. v. Allied Nat. Inc., 2007
WL 1101435, at *3 (D.N.J. April 10, 2007) (stating that 12(c) motions are filed after the
pleadings are closed, i.e. after the complaint and answer have been filed). However, the Court’s
analysis would be no different had Defendants brought their motion under 12(c). Id. The Court
will instead cite to the 12(b)(6) standard as argued by Defendants.
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proof of her claims.” Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., $09 f.3d 780, 789 (3d Cir. 2016). In
evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, district courts must separate the factual and legal
elements. Fowler v. UFMC Shadyside, 57$ f.3d 203, 210-211 (3d Cir. 2009). Restatements of
the elements of a claim are legal conclusions, and therefore, not entitled to a presumption of truth.
Bztrtch v. Mutberg factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 224 (3d Cir. 2011). The Court, however, “must
accept all of the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true.” fowter, 578 F.3d at 210. Even if
plausibly pled, however, a complaint will not withstand a motion to dismiss if the facts alleged do
not state “a legally cognizable cause of action.” Turner v. IF. Morgan Chase & Co., No. 14-7 148,
2015 WL 12826480, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 23, 2015).
III.

Analysis
Defendants’ argument is essentially that this Court must follow the non-precedential

decision of the New Jersey Appellate Division in Colon v. World Mission Society Church of
God, eta!. 2016 WL 6994349 (App. Div. Nov. 29, 2016), hereinafier “Colon Decision.” Def

Br. at 8-10. That case, which arose from a complaint filed by another former member of World
Mission New Jersey for essentially the same conduct, was decided in the defendants’ favor. See
Co/On Decision at *6. Defendants argue that because the current case was brought in federal

court under the Court’s diversity jurisdiction, this Court is bound to follow New Jersey
substantive law, including the Colon decision. Def. Br. at 9. Thus, Defendants argue this
Court’s “analysis must be under State of New Jersey law relating to the Church Autonomy
Doctrine, not federal law relating to the Bill of Rights.” Reply Br. at 7 (emphasis in original).

The Appellate Division in Colon ultimately agreed with the trial court judge who dismissed
many of that plaintiffs claims under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause. U.S. Const.
amend. I, Colon Decision at *2.4

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Plaintiff argues in her Opposition that Defendants’ “church autonomy” defense is
governed by the First Amendment of the United States, not the New Jersey, Constitution.

Opp.

at 3-4. Her Opposition lays out her arguments as they pertain to the First Amendment’s
“roadmap” for analysis under the Constitution’s free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, which
the Appellate Division failed to do in Colon. Id. at 15-38. She further argues that she is entitled
to discovery on the issue of whether World Mission New Jersey and World Mission South Korea
is actually a “church” or is instead a commercial entity. Id. at 4-7.
Defendants’ argument that the ColOn decision controls is flawed. Non-precedential
decisions of the New Jersey Appellate Division are not binding precedent under New Jersey law.
See Pressler & Verniero, CttrrentN.i Court Rides, R. 1:36-3 (2018); Badiali v. New Jersey
Mfrs. Ins., 220 N.J. 544, 559 (2015); Guido v. Duane Morris LLF, 202 N.J. 79, 91 & n.4 (2010).
Moreover, even if the Appellate Division opinion were precedential, this Court is not mandated
to follow it. Polizzi Meats, Inc. v. Aetna Lfe & Cas. Co., 931 F.Supp. 328, 340 (D.N.J. 1996)
(“This court is guided, but not bound, by the rulings of the lower New Jersey appellate courts,
which may provide ‘indicia of how the state’s highest court might decide’ an issue.”)
More fundamentally, the Appellate Division in Colon based its decision on federal, not
state, constitutional law. ColOn Decision at *2.4. This Court is not bound by any state court’s
interpretation of rights under the United States Constitution. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64, 78 (1938) (ruling that in diversity jurisdiction cases, “[e]xcept in matters governed by the
Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the [substantive] law to be applied in any case is the
law of the state.” (emphasis added); United States v. Bedford, 519 F.2d 650, 654 & n. 3 (3d Cir.
1975) (“It is a recognized principle that a federal court is not bound by a state court’s
interpretation of federal laws.”); Chester v. Boston Scientflc Corp., 2017 WL 751424, at *11 &

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n.h (D.N.J. Feb. 27, 2017). Only precedential decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States and the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (and in patent cases, the Federal Circuit) are
binding on this Court. See Barna

Ba. ofSchool Dirs. ofPanther Valley School Dist., $77 F.3d

136, 142 (2017); US. v. Smiley, 40 F ed.Appx. 702, 709 (3d Cir. 2002); Chavez-Rivas v. Olsen,
207 F.Supp.2d 326, 330-3 1 (D.N.J. 2002); LGElectronics, Inc. v. first Intern. Computer, Inc.,
13$ F.Supp.2d 574, 582 (D.N.J. 2001).
Defendants’ entire legal theory is fatally flawed. This Court is not bound to follow a
New Jersey court’s interpretation of federal constitutional law. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is
therefore denied.
IV.

Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, and for good cause shown,
IT IS on this

5th

day of April, 201$,

ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to dismiss, D.E. 99, is DENIED.

C\o Q\JQ /

John Michael Vazqu,’1.S.D.J.

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