EL BEY v. DEPASCALE, J.S.C. et al

Filing 24

ORDER dismissing as moot pltf's 19 Motion for Default Judgment ; granting 21 Motion to Vacate entry of default as to deft. Steven J. Harbace. Signed by Judge Claire C. Cecchi on 7/20/2015. (nr, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CHESTER RAY MA’AT EL BEY,

Civil Action No.: 14-1748 (CCC)

Plaintiff,

ORDER
V.

PAUL M. DEPASCALE, J.S.C., STEVEN I.
HARBACE, THERESA BLAIR, and
PATRICIA DEFAZIO,
Defendants.
CECCHI, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court upon motion of Defendant Steven J. Harbace
(“Defendant”) that (1) opposes Plaintiff Chester Ray Ma’at El Bey’s (“Plaintiff’) motion for
default judgment [ECF. No. 21], and (2) seeks vacatur of the Clerk’s Entry of Default. [ECF No.
21.] It appearing that:
1. Plaintiff filed this suit on March 19, 2014. [ECF No. 1.]
2. Plaintiff requested Default against Defendant, an assistant prosecutor, on December 15,
2014. [ECFN0. 15.]
3. On December 17, 2014, the Clerk’s Office entered default against Defendant for failure to
plead or otherwise defend. [ECF No. 17.]
4. On December 22, 2014, Plaintiff filed a motion seeking a default judgment against
Defendant. [ECF No. 19.]
5. The next day, Defendant filed the instant motion opposing Plaintiffs request for default
judgment and seeking vacatur of the Clerk’s Entry of Default. [ECF No. 21.] Defendant

argues that: (1) Plaintiff will not be prejudiced if default is vacated, (2) default was not the
result of culpable conduct, (3) Defendant has a meritorious defense, and (4) public policy
favors courts deciding cases on the merits. Plaintiff has not opposed Defendant’s motion.
6. federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 governs default judgments. When a party fails to plead
or otherwise defend an action, Rule 55(a) explains that “the clerk must enter the party’s
default.” However, Rule 55(c) notes that “[t]he court may set aside an entry of default for
good cause”. In determining whether “good cause” exists to set aside an entry of default, the
Court should consider: (1) whether the defendant has a meritorious defense; (2) whether the
plaintiff would be prejudiced by vacating the default; (3) whether the default resulted from
the defendants culpable conduct; and (4) whether alternative sanctions would be effective.
Paris v. Pennsauken Sch. Dist., 2013 WL 404763$, at *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 9, 2013) (citing CGB
Occupational Therapy, Inc. v. RHAlPennsylvania Nursing Homes, Inc., 2001 WL 253745, at
*3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 2001)). A clerk’s entry of default “is not favored and all doubt should
be resolved in favor of setting aside default and reaching a decision on the merits.” Id.
7. Upon consideration of the factors, the Court concludes that good cause exists to vacate the
Entry of Default. First, Defendant has a meritorious defense, namely absolute prosecutorial
immunity. Such a defense would clearly “constitute a complete defense to the action”, and
therefore the first factor is satisfied. See Toy v. Hayman, 2008 WL 5046723, at *4 (D.N.J.
Nov. 20, 200$) (“A meritorious defense is one that, if established at trial, would constitute a
complete defense to the action.”). Second, Plaintiff would not be prejudiced by setting aside
the Entry of Default because there is no indication of “loss of available evidence, increased
potential for fraud or collusion, or substantial reliance upon the judgment”. See Feliciano v.
Reliant Tooling Co., 691 F.2d 653, 657 (3d Cir. 1982).
2

As such, the second factor is

satisfied.

Third, Defendant’s failure to respond or otherwise defend seems to be an

inadvertent error resulting from the complicated procedures of defending multiple state
employees by the New Jersey Attorney General. (See Def.’s Br. at 7-8.) Indeed, there is no
suggestion that Defendant acted “willfully” or in “bad faith”, and therefore the third factor is
satisfied. See id.; Paris, 2013 WL 404763$, at *4; fy, 200$ WL 5046723, at *4 Finally, as
this Court has previously explained: “[e]ntry of default and default judgments are actions that
have conclusory effects. Such actions should be a sanction of last, not first, resort, and courts
should try to find some alternative.” Paris, 2013 WL 4047638, at *5• However, there is
nothing in the record to suggest that any alternative sanctions are available in this scenario.
See id. Thus, the fourth factor is satisfied here.
Accordingly, IT IS on this

2o day of

JL)

,

2015

ORDERED that the Clerk’s Entry of Default [ECF No. 17] is hereby VACATED; and it
is further
ORDERED that Plaintiffs motion for default judgment [ECF. No. 19] is hereby
DISMISSED as moot.
SO ORDERED.

C
HON. CLAIRE C. CECCHI
United States District Judge

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