INGRIS v. DREXLER et al
Filing
127
MEMORANDUM OPINION/ORDER that Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, (D.E. No. 3) is dismissed in its entirety with prejudice against Defendants DeLorenzi and Krentzlin; that Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, (D.E. No. 3) is dismissed with prejudice against all Defendants with respect to its federal claims, Counts 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9; that the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs remaining state claims, Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, and 10; that the Clerk of the Court shall mark this case CLOSED; that the Clerk of the Court is directed to accept no more filings in this action from Plaintiff without express permission by the Court. Signed by Judge Esther Salas on 3/30/15. (DD, )
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
__________________________________________
:
PETER INGRIS,
:
: Civil Action No. 14-2404 (ES)(MAH)
Plaintiff,
:
: MEMORANDUM
v.
: OPINION & ORDER
:
TATIANA DREXLER, et al.,
:
:
Defendants.
:
__________________________________________:
SALAS, DISTRICT JUDGE
I.
INTRODUCTION
Before the Court are motions to dismiss by Defendants Jennifer DeLorenzi, (D.E. No. 46
(“DeLorenzi Mov. Br.”)), and Christine Krentzlin, (D.E. No. 58 (“Krentzlin Mov. Br.”)). For the
reasons below, the court GRANTS Defendants DeLorenzi’s and Krentzlin’s motions to dismiss.
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is over 100 pages long, and contains a multitude of
allegations and defendants. (D.E. No. 3 (“Am. Compl.”)). The Court briefly reviews the factual
allegations pertaining to Defendants DeLorenzi and Krentzlin, whose motions to dismiss are
presently before the Court.
a. DeLorenzi
Plaintiff’s primary allegations against DeLorenzi may be found at paragraphs 223-41 of
the Amended Complaint. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 223-41).
Plaintiff alleges that, at all relevant times, DeLorenzi was an employee of Dancesport4You
Inc. (“DS4You”), a New Jersey Corporation located in Caldwell, New Jersey. (Am. Compl. at 55,
¶¶ 223). He alleges that while non-party Iliyana Schaaf (Plaintiff’s former fiancée and business
partner) was away and unable to teach Zumba class, DeLorenzi conspired with other Zumba
teachers and coerced them to refuse to serve as substitute teachers if requested by DS4You or
Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 225).
In addition, Plaintiff alleges DeLorenzi subsequently defamed Plaintiff and Schaaf on
DeLorenzi’s Facebook page, via email, and privately during personal conversations. (Id. ¶¶ 22632). He further alleges that DeLorenzi stole over one hundred Zumba customers from Plaintiff
and Schaaf, (id. ¶ 234), and conspired with other Zumba teachers to stifle competition for DS4You,
(id. ¶¶ 240-41).
Finally, Plaintiff alleges that though he tried to resolve his disputes with DeLorenzi in good
faith, DeLorenzi coerced Plaintiff to pay wages allegedly owed to her and filed a suit against
Plaintiff and DS4You in New Jersey Superior Court. (Id. ¶¶ 235-39).
b. Krentzlin
Plaintiff’s primary allegations against Krentzlin may be found at paragraphs 182-203 of
the Amended Complaint. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 182-203).
Plaintiff alleges that he first met Krentzlin in New Jersey in approximately 2007, when her
husband approached him about giving Krentzlin private dance lessons. (Id. ¶¶ 182-83). Plaintiff
alleges that Krentzlin began exchanging private information about the Plaintiff with others and
misrepresenting facts about Plaintiff’s private life and business activities. (Id. ¶ 185). In addition,
Plaintiff alleges that Krentzlin made comments about Plaintiff’s national and racial background,
at times in front of others, causing him to feel “very embarrassed and humiliated.” (Id. ¶¶ 18792).
2
At some point, Krentzlin became a communication therapist for Plaintiff and Schaaf, and
Plaintiff makes various allegations that Krentzlin “used her controlling position as Ingris’ and
Schaaf’s communication therapist, and during the communication sessions manipulated Schaaf’s
volatile emotional state, by presenting mischaracterized, distorted details about Ingris’s previous
personal life . . . to manipulate Schaaf into Schaaf’s change of heart towards Ingris.” (Id. ¶¶ 19799, 207-21). He also alleges that Krentzlin made statements and interfered with Plaintiff’s legal
dispute with the Borough of Caldwell. (Id. ¶¶ 200-03).
III.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to set forth “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that a pleader is entitled to relief.” The pleading standard
announced by Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations; however, it does demand “more
than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (citations omitted). In addition, the plaintiff’s short and plain statement of the
claim must “give the defendants fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007) (internal citation omitted).
For a complaint to survive dismissal, it “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a
‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” Id.
3
In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, a court must accept all well-pleaded factual
allegations contained in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
non-moving party. See Phillips v. Cnty. Of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008). But, “the
tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable
to legal conclusions,” and “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Furthermore, in ruling on the present motion, the Court must construe Plaintiff’s complaint
liberally. A “pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, a “litigant is not absolved from complying with Twombly
and the federal pleading requirements merely because s/he proceeds pro se.” Thakar v. Tan, 372
F. App’x 325, 328 (3d Cir. 2010). “[I]f a complaint is subject to a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a
district court must permit a curative amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable
or futile.” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 245 (citation omitted).
IV.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff alleges overlapping causes of action against Defendants DeLorenzi and Krentzlin.
Accordingly, the Court will address each cause of action in turn, and consider whether Plaintiff
has adequately pled that cause of action against either Defendant.
a. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED)
4
To state a claim for IIED in New Jersey, a plaintiff must make four showings. First, the
plaintiff must show that the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly. Drisco v. City of Elizabeth,
No. 12-2111, 2013 WL 6450221, at *9 (D.N.J. Dec. 9, 2013). Second, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct was “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in
degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly
intolerable in a civilized community.” Id. (quoting Buckley v. Trenton Saving Fund Soc'y, 11 N.J.
355, 336 (1988)). Third, the plaintiff must show that the defendant’s conduct was the cause of
plaintiff’s emotional distress. Id. Finally, the plaintiff must show that “the emotional distress
suffered by the plaintiff [was] ‘so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it.’”
Id. (quoting Buckley, 11 N.J. at 366); see also Corominas v. Oshrin, No. 13-6067, 2014 WL
4854578, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2014).
Here, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action for IIED against
either DeLorenzi or Krentzlin. Put simply, Plaintiff has not alleged any conduct that is “beyond
all possible bounds of decency” for either defendant. See Buckley, 11 N.J. at 366. “Examples of
conduct found to be extreme and outrageous by New Jersey courts include, when a physician,
knowing it to be false, told parents their son was suffering from cancer; spreading a false rumor
that plaintiff’s son had hung himself; bringing a mob to plaintiff’s door with a threat to lynch him
if he did not leave town; and wrapping up a gory dead rat inside a loaf of bread for a sensitive
person to open.” Coefield v. GPU, 125 F. App’x 445, 450 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting McConnell v.
State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 61 F. Supp. 2d 356, 363 (D.N.J. 1999)). Plaintiff’s allegations do not
rise to this level. Plaintiff also has not alleged the element of causation—while his Complaint is
brimming with allegations of wrongdoing, he has not alleged a causal link between actions by
5
DeLorenzi and Krentzlin in particular and any resulting emotional distress. See Buckley, 11 N.J.
at 366. Moreover, with respect to Defendant DeLorenzi, “conduct or decisions made in the
employment context ‘rarely rise to the level of outrageousness necessary to provide a basis for
recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress.’” Iwanicki v. Bay State Milling Co., No.
11-1792, 2011 WL 6131956, at *8 (D.N.J. Dec. 7, 2011) (quoting Hillburn v. Bayonne Parking
Auth., No. 07-5211, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at 6762, at *32 (D.N.J. Jan. 29, 2009)). Though
Plaintiff was not fired by DeLorenzi, as is often the case where IIED is alleged, the rationale behind
this rule is applicable here: “the workplace has too many personal conflicts and too much behavior
that might be perceived as uncivil for the courts . . . . [C]onduct in the workplace will rarely be so
egregious as to give rise to a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Ingraham v.
Ortho-McNeil Pharm., 422 N.J. Super. 12, 23 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011). Defendants are
therefore entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s IIED claim.
b. False Light, Invasion of Privacy
In New Jersey, a defendant is subject to liability for false light invasion of privacy when
the defendant “gives publicity to a matter concerning [the plaintiff] that places the [plaintiff] before
the public in a false light [and] . . . (a) the false light in which the [plaintiff] was placed would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless
disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the [plaintiff] would
be placed.” Romaine v. Kallinger, 129 N.J. 282, 290 (N.J. 1988) (quoting Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 652E (1977)); see also Perez v. Factory Direct of Secaucus, LLC, No. 13-327, 2013 WL
5770734, at *7 (D.N.J. Oct. 23, 2013) (quoting Cibenko v. Worth Publishers, Inc., 510 F. Supp.
761, 766 (D.N.J. 1981)).
6
With respect to Krentzlin, Plaintiff has not alleged publication of any statement allegedly
placing Plaintiff in a false light. “[I]t is not an invasion of the right of privacy . . . to communicate
a fact concerning the plaintiff’s private life to a single person or even to a small group of persons.”
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D, cmt. a (1977). Plaintiff’s allegations against Krentzlin
primarily involve Krentzlin’s statements to Schaaf, which are not statements that “give publicity”
to the matter discussed. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D; 652E. Though Plaintiff makes
several allegations about statements that Krentzlin “made in public,”—for example, “that Ingris is
prosecuted by Borough of Caldwell because of Ingris’ illegal misconduct, rather than because of
Ingris’ race,” (Am. Compl. ¶ 200), and “false statements, in public distorting confidential,
privileged information, about internal corporate matters,” (id. ¶ 252)—these allegations do not
adequately state a claim for relief. Plaintiff has not allegedly with any specificity what the alleged
statements were about, when they were made, or to whom they were made. In sum, the allegations
against Krentzlin do not give rise to a cause of action for false light invasion of privacy.
With respect to DeLorenzi, Plaintiff alleges that DeLorenzi disclosed false light private
information to DS4You clients on her Facebook page and through emails. (Id. ¶ 222). However,
these allegations are not sufficient to state a claim for relief for false light invasion of privacy
because Plaintiff has not shown that (1) the alleged statements would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person, or (2) DeLorenzi recklessly disregarded the falsity of the publicized material.
See Romaine, 199 N.J. at 290 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E). First, “[t]he
publicized material in a false-light claim must constitute a ‘major misrepresentation of [plaintiff's]
character, history, activities, or beliefs.’” Id. at 295 (citation omitted). Hypersensitive persons are
not specially protected as “the material publicized ‘must be something that would be objectionable
7
to the ordinary person under the circumstances.’” Id. (citing W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and
Keeton on the Law of Torts, § 117, at 864 (5th ed. 1984)). Here, Plaintiff has not specifically
alleged any statements that an ordinary person would consider highly offensive. The only
specifically alleged statements are that DeLorenzi “published on [sic] Internet information, that
Ingris ‘closed the door behind her’ and that DS4You does not have any Zumba teachers left” and
that DeLorenzi “was mistreated by ‘condescending’ Ingris,” (Am. Compl. ¶ 229, 231). These
statements would not be “highly offensive” to the ordinary person. In any event, Plaintiff also has
not pled the “knowing or reckless” element of this claim with specificity. See Romaine, 109 N.J.
at 294. A “conclusory allegation [of reckless disregard of falsity], without more, is insufficient to
state a claim for false light.” Perez, 2013 WL 5770734, at *7. It appears that Plaintiff does not
even allege knowing or reckless disregard of falsity by DeLorenzi, and his claim fails for this
reason as well.
c. Interference with Contractual Relations and Economic Benefits
To state a claim for interference with contractual relations in New Jersey, a “plaintiff must
allege (1) a protectable right, i.e., a contract; (2) intentional and malicious interference with the
protectable right, (3) that causes a loss with resulting damages.” A. & M. Wholesale Hardware
Co. v. Circor Instrumentation Techs., Inc., No. 13-0475, 2014 WL 714938, at *8 (D.N.J. Feb. 24,
2014) (citing Printing Mart–Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 751-52 (1989)). To
state a claim for interference with economic benefits, a plaintiff must allege essentially the same
elements—the “only distinction is that it must allege a prospective economic advantage as the
protectable right, as opposed to a contract.” Id. (citing Macdougall v. Weichert, 144 N.J. 380, 40304 (1996)); see also Carpet Group Int'l v. Oriental Rug Importers Ass'n, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 2d.
8
249, 288 (D.N.J. 2003), aff'd, 173 F. App'x 178 (3d Cir. 2006) (“The requirements for each claim
are identical except that the tortious interference with contractual relations claim requires proof of
an existing contract.”).
Plaintiff has not stated a claim for interference with contractual relations because he has
not alleged the existence of a contract. Similarly, he has not stated a claim for interference with
an economic benefit because he has not alleged the existence of an economic benefit. A claim for
interference with an economic benefit requires that “there must be some allegations of fact giving
rise to some ‘reasonable expectation of economic advantage.’” Printing Mart-Morristown, 116
N.J. at 751 (quoting Harris v. Perl, 41 N.J. 455, 462 (1964)). Accordingly, Defendants are entitled
to dismissal on these claims.
d. Defamation
To state a claim for defamation in New Jersey, a plaintiff must allege “(1) the assertion of
a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (2) the unprivileged publication of that
statement to a third party; and (3) fault amounting at least to negligence by the publisher.” Rivera
v. Zweigle, No. 13-3024, 2014 WL 6991954, at *5 (D.N.J. Dec. 9, 2014) (quoting DeAngelis v.
Hill, 180 N.J. 1, 12 (2004)). Whether a statement is defamatory, however, depends on “its content,
verifiability, and context.” Lynch v. N.J. Educ. Ass’n., 161 N.J. 152, 167 (1999). The statement
must be factual, i.e., it must be capable of being proven true or false. Id. Accordingly, statements
of pure opinion are not defamatory because they “reflect a state of mind” and, therefore, generally
“cannot be proved true or false.” Id. For example, statements that a person “was dishonest and
lacking in integrity” is an opinion that is generally not subject to verification. Gulrajaney v.
Petricha, 381 N.J. Super. 241, 253 (App. Div. 2005).
9
Plaintiff has not stated a claim for defamation against either Defendant. First, with respect
to Krentzlin, Plaintiff has not alleged the “publication” of any statement to any third party. Plaintiff
mainly alleges that Krentzlin made remarks about Plaintiff to Plaintiff—not to anyone else. (Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 187-92). The only specifically alleged statement made by Krentzlin to a third party was
a statement by Krentzlin to her husband “that Ingris does not know how to speak to Krentzlin, in
the way, Krentzlin would understand.” (Id. ¶ 193). This statement is a non-defamatory statement
of opinion. While Plaintiff generally alleges that Krentzlin made statements “in public,” the
Amended Complaint is devoid of specific information such as when the statements were made, to
whom, and what those statements were about. (Id. ¶ 250-55). Moreover, the Court notes that
many of the statements that Krentzlin allegedly made are not about Plaintiff himself, but rather
general views about race and nationality. (Id. ¶¶ 187-92).
With respect to DeLorenzi, Plaintiff does not allege the publication of any statement to a
third party with enough specificity to state a claim for defamation. Plaintiff generally alleges that
DeLorenzi “misrepresented” Plaintiff and coerced customers to stay away from him, (Id. ¶¶ 226234), but he has not identified any specific defamatory statements. Therefore, Defendants are
entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s defamation claims.
e. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”)
Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action states that “Hoppe, Drexler, Krentzlin, McDonald,
Evgamukov, Horvath, Misurenlkovas and Zaver are members/associates of NJRICO enterprise
and all participated in racketeering activities including fraud, mail fraud, wire fraud, coercion,
conversion, terroristic threats, conspiracy, defamation, and retaliation in exercise of Ingris
constitutionally protected rights [sic].” (Id. at 88). As an initial matter, Plaintiff does not allege
10
DeLorenzi’s involvement in NJRICO enterprise. (Id.). However, even if he had, the claim would
fail for the reasons discussed below with respect to Krentzlin.
To state a claim under RICO, a plaintiff must show “racketeering activity.” 18 U.S.C. §
1962(c). Racketeering activity “must be either a specified federal offense or ‘any act involving
murder, kidnaping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or
dealing in a controlled substance or listed chemical . . . chargeable under State law and punishable
by imprisonment for more than one year.” Yuhasz v. Poritz, 166 F. App’x 642, 647 (3d Cir. 2006)
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)). Plaintiff has not alleged that either Defendant engaged in any such
activity. As a result, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under RICO.
f. Lanham Act Violations
Plaintiff alleges violations of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125, for various instances of
trademark infringement. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 389-412). Though both Defendants address this claim
in their respective briefs, (Krentzlin Mov. Br. at 41; DeLorenzi Mov. Br. at 15-17), it appears that
Plaintiff does not assert this claim against these two Defendants. Rather, the claim is asserted
against “all publishers,” which include various media company Defendants, but not Krentzlin or
DeLorenzi. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 389-412). In any event, Plaintiff includes no allegations against
Krentzlin or DeLorenzi relating to this claim, so even if he had asserted claims against them, they
would be dismissed.
g. Violations of Civil Rights Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981
Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants RDC, McDonald, Evgamukov, Krentzlin, and Mallouk
Realty, and Chambers are liable for violation of Ingris’ civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981.”
(Am. Compl. ¶¶ 413-19). This claim is not asserted against DeLorenzi.
11
42 U.S.C. § 1981 “forbids discrimination on the basis of race in the making of public and
private contracts.” Petrossian v. Collins, 479 F. App’x 409, 410 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing St. Francis
Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 609 (1987)). To state a claim for violation of § 1981, “a
plaintiff must allege that (1) he is a member of a racial minority; (2) the defendant intentionally
discriminated against the plaintiff on the basis of race; and (3) the discrimination negatively
affected his ability to engage in one of the protected activities, including formation of a contract.”
Abdullah v. Small Bus. Banking Dept. of Bank of Am., 532 F. App’x 89, 90 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing
Brown v. Philip Morris, Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 797 (3d Cir. 2001)).
Here, though Plaintiff includes allegations that Krentzlin’s actions against Plaintiff were
racially motivated, (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 199, 211, 213), he has not alleged with any specificity that
Krentzlin’s actions affected his ability “to engage in one of the protected activities, including
formation of a contract.” See Abdullah, 532 F. App’x at 90. Thus, Plaintiff’s claim against
Krentzlin fails.
h. Failure to Prevent Civil Rights Conspiracy Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985
42 U.S.C. § 1985 prohibits conspiracies to deprive individuals of civil rights. To state a
claim under § 1985, a plaintiff “must allege a conspiracy, motivated by a discriminatory based
animus, for the purpose of depriving any person or class of the equal protection of the law and an
act in furtherance of the conspiracy, whereby a person is injured.” Lee-Patterson v. N.J. Transit
Bus Operations, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 1391, 1403 (D.N.J. 1997).
Plaintiff has not stated a claim for a civil rights conspiracy against either Defendant.
Specifically, Plaintiff has neither alleged facts giving rise to a conspiracy, nor has he alleged any
12
facts indicating that he was deprived of any right. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not stated a claim for
relief under § 1985.
i. Consumer Fraud and False Arrest
Plaintiff’s final cause of action states that Chambers and Mallouk Realty committed
common law legal and equitable fraud and caused Plaintiff false arrest. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 435-449).
This claim does not appear to be asserted against either DeLorenzi or Krentzlin, and therefore does
not require the Court’s attention at this time. In any event, Plaintiff includes no allegations against
Krentzlin or DeLorenzi relating to this claim, so even if he had asserted claims against them, they
would be dismissed.
V.
DISPOSITION OF REMAINING CLAIMS
Generally, a district court may sua sponte dismiss a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) after service
of process only if the plaintiff is afforded an opportunity to respond. See Oatess v. Sobolevitch,
914 F.2d 428, 430 n.5 (3d Cir. 1990). A sua sponte dismissal, however, may stand even if the
plaintiff is not provided notice and an opportunity to respond where it is clear that the plaintiff
cannot prevail and that any amendment would be futile. See Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666,
672 (3d Cir. 2010) (affirming district court’s denial of motion for reconsideration and sua sponte
dismissal of complaint on multiple grounds); see also Bethea v. Nation of Islam, 248 F. App’x
331, 333 (3d Cir. 2007). Here, while Plaintiff did not receive specific notice of the possibility of
dismissal of his federal claims as to all Defendants, Plaintiff was on notice and submitted
opposition to Defendant’s Krentzlin’s and DeLorenzi’s motions to dismiss. Plaintiff was also
previously on notice and responded to motions to dismiss by Defendants Ringier Axel Springer
and Ceska Televize, which the Court granted. (D.E. No. 114, Opinion and Order).
13
As such,
Plaintiff has had the opportunity to respond and present his arguments in response to multiple
motions to dismiss. After review of the filing, the Court has no reason to believe that Plaintiff has
any federal claim against any Defendant in this matter, and it is clear that Plaintiff cannot prevail
and any amendment would be futile. See Ingris v. Bank of Am., No. 14-3726, 2015 WL 226000,
at *4 (D.N.J. Jan. 16, 2015) (sua sponte dismissing federal claims against all defendants where
same Plaintiff would not prevail and amendment would be futile). Plaintiff’s Complaint is a series
of disjointed, conclusory allegations, none of which add up to a plausible claim under the federal
statutes cited. Consequently, Plaintiff’s federal claims must be dismissed as to all Defendants.
Having dismissed all of Plaintiff’s federal claims, the Court must determine whether to
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining state claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
When a district court dismisses all claims over which it has original jurisdiction before trial, it
cannot continue to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims “unless considerations
of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties provide an affirmative justification
for doing so.” Bright v. Westmoreland Cnty., 443 F.3d 276, 286 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal quotations
omitted); see also Rothman v. City of Northfield, 716 F. Supp. 2d 369, 373 (D.N.J. 2010) (quoting
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)). Here, the Court has determined that the federal claims against Defendants
must be dismissed with prejudice. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the Court declines
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims set forth in Counts 1, 2,
3, 4, and 10 of the Amended Complaint.
VI.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS the motions to dismiss by Defendants
DeLorenzi and Krentzlin and sua sponte dismisses Plaintiff’s federal claims against all Defendants
14
in this matter. The Court further declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s
remaining state claims. Accordingly,
IT IS on this 30th day of March 2015,
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, (D.E. No. 3) is dismissed in its entirety
with prejudice against Defendants DeLorenzi and Krentzlin; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, (D.E. No. 3) is dismissed with
prejudice against all Defendants with respect to its federal claims, Counts 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9; and it
is further
ORDERED that the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s
remaining state claims, Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, and 10; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall mark this case CLOSED; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is directed to accept no more filings in this action
from Plaintiff without express permission by the Court.
/s Esther Salas
Esther Salas, U.S.D.J.
15
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?