RODRIGUEZ v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

Filing 11

OPINION. Signed by Judge Claire C. Cecchi on 9/30/2015. (nr, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

ANNA RODRIGUEZ,

Civil Action
(CCC)

No.:

2:14-cv-02432-

Claimant,
v.

OPINION

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

CECCHI, District Judge.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Anna Rodriguez (“Claimant”) seeks review of the final determination by the Commissioner
of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) denying Claimant disability benefits
under the Social Security Act. The issue to be decided is whether the Commissioner’s denial of
Claimant’s application for disability insurance benefits is supported by substantial evidence. This
motion has been decided without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78.1
For the reasons set forth below, this Court concludes that the decision of the Administrative Law
Judge (“AU”) is affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further consideration
consistent with this opinion.
II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Claimant was born on December 6, 1963 in Puerto Rico (R: 35, 147).2 She attended high

The Court considers any arguments not presented by the parties to be waived. See Brenner
v. Local 514, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 927 F.2d 1283, 1298 (3d Cir. 1991) (“It is well
established that failure to raise an issue in the district court constitutes a waiver of the argument.”).
2
“R” refers to the certified record of the administrative proceedings.

school in the United States until her junior year, and she reads and understands English (R: 35).
On August 5, 2010, Claimant applied for disability benefits under Title II, alleging
disability that began in December 2004 (R: 10, 147), and for supplemental security income (“S SI”)
under Title XVI, alleging disability that began in July 2009 (R: 151).

Claimant listed her

disabilities as rheumatoid arthritis, back pain, knee pain, and neck pain (R: 186).

On her

applications, Claimant reported that “I can’t sit very long maybe 5 minutes [because] my back
hurts at all times[.]” (R: 165). Claimant also reported that she last worked in September (R: 186)
or March of 2006 (R: 174), at which time she was laid off due to her condition making her late to
work(R: 186).
The record reveals that Claimant had several emergency room (“ER”) admissions between
2009 and 2011. In June 2009, she was admitted to the ER, with complaints of back pain associated
with heavy menstrual bleeding (R: 259). While there, Claimant denied any other musculoskeletal
aches and pains, stating that she ‘just wanted pain medication” (R: 259). In September 2010, she
was seen in the ER, with complaints of left-sided pain radiating from her neck to her lower left
extremity (R: 269, 272, 276). A left knee x-ray revealed tri-compartment arthrosis with moderate
to severe medial compartment changes (R: 280). Claimant was diagnosed with arthritis (R: 272272, 276). During a January 2011 admission for back pain, a physical evaluation noted “normal
strength in extension of the knees” and imaging showed a normal lumbar spine with “[n]o
degenerative changes” noted (R: 326). Last, during ER admissions in the spring of 2012 for
bilateral lower back pain, a CT scan revealed bilateral enlarged ovarian cysts (R: 345). A pelvic
ultrasound revealed several uterine fibroids (R: 347).
A state agency physician, Dr. Toros Shahinian, examined Claimant in September 2010 (R:
2

291). While in Dr. $hahinian’s office, Claimant “cried repeatedly and said she was in pain due to
the cold condition in the office” and “she was hunched over in pain.” (R: 291). Dr. Shahinian’s
primary diagnosis was degenerative joint disease in the lefi knee, and he ultimately determined
that Claimant could stand 4 hours in an 8-hour day and sit 6 hours in an 8-hour day (R: 29 1-292).
Claimant was evaluated by a psychologist, Dr. Gerard F igurelli, in October 2010, who
diagnosed her with Depression and Adjustment Disorder with Anxious Mood (R: 300). Dr.
Figurelli assessed that Claimant had mild restriction of daily living activities and maintaining
social functioning, but moderate difficulties in maintaining concertation, persistence, and/or pace
(R: 312). In October 2010, Dr. S. Bortner, a state agency psychological consultant, reviewed the
medical record and Dr. Figurrelli’s report and assessed Claimant as capable of understanding and
executing simple instructions, making work related decisions, interacting with others and adapting
to workplace changes (R: 31$).
In 2011, Dr. Mohammad Rizwan, a state agency physician, reviewed the physical and
mental residual functional capacity assessments by Drs. Shahinian, Figurelli, and Bortner, and he
affirmed their determinations (R: 331).

He also noted that despite Claimant’s allegation of

worsening work related functioning, her more recent ER visits showed normal strength and
extension in her knees and an unremarkable lumbar spine (R: 329).
Claimant was also seen by an examining physician, Dr. Hilary B. Kern, in October 2012
(R: 356). Claimant presented with a cane, reporting to Dr. Kern that the cane had been prescribed
by a doctor (R: 356). She also reported use of a self-prescribed wheelchair when outside (R: 357).
Dr. Kern’s examination revealed decreased range of motion in both knees with “[e]nhanced pain
behavior throughout all evaluation of bilateral knees.” (R: 357). Claimant was “tearful prior to
3

beginning the examination.” (R: 356). Dr. Kern’s report states, “It is difficult to assess her
function including per my medical assessment form due to enhanced pain behavior.” (R: 35$).
Dr. Kern noted the absence of diagnostic imaging on both knees, stating objective testing of
Claimant’s bilateral knees is “very important” (R: 358). Ultimately, Dr. Kern concluded that, in
an 8-hour work day, Claimant could sit 5 hours, stand 2 hours, and walk 1 hour (R: 362).
Both Claimant’s disability and S$I applications were denied initially and also upon
reconsideration (R: 10). Claimant subsequently requested a hearing, and she appeared and testified
on June 19, 2012 before Judge Richard West(R: 3 5-69). During the opening statement, Claimant’s
attorney began by explaining that her “biggest problem is that she’s married and [she is not eligible
for Medicaid because] her husband is on disability insurance benefits and makes $1,200 a month.
That’s her biggest problem.” (R: 30).
The AU noted credibility problems regarding Claimant’s sporadic prior work history
before the alleged onset of her disability and her statements about the intensity and persistence of
her symptoms which conflicted with medical evidence (R: 14, 15). For example, Claimant testified
that she stopped working after Christmas of 2004, because her legs were periodically “failing” on
her (R: 39) but later explained that she was dismissed because her employer believed she was
drinking alcohol on the job (R: 40) and that her falling did not begin until 2008 or 2009 (R: 45).
Claimant also testified that she was not drinking alcohol in 2004 but rather a homeopathic remedy
for her severe joint pain, although she later testified that the onset of her severe pain was in 2009,
before which time she was “always active” (R: 58).
Patricia Sasona, a vocational expert, also appeared and testified at the hearing, regarding
the available jobs for a sedentary, unskilled individual (R: 10, 71-76).
4

On December 6, 2012, the AU released his decision that Claimant is not disabled, finding,
inter alia, that (R: 10-17):

The claimant has the following severe impairments: degenerative
3.
disease, obesity and depression (20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).

joint

4.
The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments
that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20
CFR Part404, Appendix 1(20 CFR404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d).
416.925 and 416.926)...
5.
Afier careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigued finds that
the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work as
defined in 20 CER 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a) except the claimant is precluded
from using ladders, ropes or scaffolds; can occasionally balance or kneel; must
avoid hazards such as heights and dangerous machinery; and is limited to
understanding, remembering and calTying out simple instructions.
10.
Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual
functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy that the claimant can perform (20 CFR 404.1569. 404.1569(a), 416.969,
and 4 16.969(a)).
Claimant now seeks review of the AU’s decision. She contends that the AU’s second and
third steps were not supported by substantial evidence, because the AU did not combine
Claimant’s severe impairments and compare the joint effect of all of the impairments against the
Commissioner’s listings in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Namely, Claimant argues
that although she was found to suffer obesity, this finding was not applied in the AU’s reasoning.
Claimant also seems to contend that the Commissioner did not carry her burden at the last step,
because although there was evidence indicating the existence of non-exertional impairments, the
AU relied exclusively on the Medical-Vocational Tables for sedentary work in finding that there
exist jobs that Claimant can perform. See Claimant’s Br. at 11-20.
Additional facts will be incorporated in the discussion below.
5

III.

LEGAL STANDARD
A.

Standard of Review

This Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s decision under 42 U.S.C.

§

405(g) and 1383(c)(3). The Court is not “permitted to re-weigh the evidence or impose [its] own

factual determinations,” but must give deference to the administrative findings.
Comm’r Soc. Sec., 667 f.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir. 2011); see also 42 U.S.C.

§

Chandler v.

405(g). Nevertheless,

the Court must “scrutinize the record as a whole to determine whether the conclusions reached are
rational” and supported by substantial evidence. Gober v. Matthews, 574 F.2d 772, 776 (3d Cir.
197$) (citations omitted). Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, and is “such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Chandler, 667
F.3d at 359 (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). If the factual record is
adequately developed, substantial evidence “may be ‘something less than the weight of the
evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not
prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being supported by substantial evidence.”
Daniels v. Astrue, No. 4:08-1676, 2009 WL 1011587, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 15, 2009) (quoting
Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966)). In other words, under this deferential
standard of review, the Court may not set aside the AU’s decision merely because it would have
come to a different conclusion. Cruz v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 244 F. App’x 475, 479 (3d Cir.
2007) (citing Hartranfi v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999)).
B.

Determining Disability

Pursuant to the Social Security Act, in order to be eligible for benefits, a claimant must
show that she is disabled by demonstrating an inability to “engage in any substantial gainful
6

activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period
of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 423(d)(l)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). Taking into account

the claimant’s age, education, and work experience, disability will be evaluated by the claimant’s
ability to engage in her previous work or any other form of substantial gainful activity existing in
the national economy. 42 U.S.C.

§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B). A person is disabled for these

purposes only if her physical or mental impairments are “of such severity that [s]he is not only
unable to do [her] previous work, but cannot, considering [her] age, education, and work
experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national
economy.

..

.“

42 U.S.C.

§ l382c(a)(3)(B).

Decisions regarding disability will be made individually and will be “based on evidence
adduced at a hearing.” Sykes v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 259, 262 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Heckler v.
Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 467 (1983)). Congress has established the type of evidence necessary to
prove the existence of a disabling impairment by defining a physical or mental impairment as “an
impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are
demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 423(d)(3), 1382(a)(3)(D).
C.

Sequential Evaluation Process

The SSA follows a five-step, sequential evaluation to determine whether a claimant is
disabled within the meaning of the statute. 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520, 416.920. First, the AU must

determine whether the claimant is currently engaged in gainful activity. Sykes, 228 F.3d at 262.
Second, if she is not, the AU determines whether the claimant has an impairment that limits her
7

ability to work. Id. Third, if she has such an impairment, the AU considers the medical evidence
to determine whether the impairment is listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (the
“Listings”). If it is, this results in a presumption of disability. Id. If the impairment is not in the
Listings, the AU must determine how much residual functional capacity (“RFC”) the applicant
retains in spite of her impairment.

.

at 263.

Fourth, the AU must consider whether the

claimant’s RFC is enough to perform her past relevant work. Id. Fifth, if her RFC is not enough,
the AU must determine whether there is other work in the national economy that the claimant can
perform.

.

The evaluation continues through each step unless it is determined at any point that the
claimant is or is not disabled. 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1 520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). The claimant bears the

burden of proof at steps one, two, and four, upon which the burden shifts to the Commissioner at
step five. Sykes, 22$ F.3d at 263. Neither party bears the burden at step three. Id. at 263 n. 2.
IV.

DISCUSSION

For the reasons that follow, the AU’s decision is affirmed in part, vacated in part, and
remanded for further consideration consistent with this opinion. Because Claimant does not
dispute the AU’s decision at steps one and four, this opinion will not discuss those steps in detail
below.
A.

The AU’s Consideration Of Claimant’s Obesity On Her Other Impairments

At step two, an ALl must determine whether a claimant’s impairments are “severe.” A
severe impairment is an impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits a
claimant’s physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. 20 C.F.R.
20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520(e); contra

§ 416.921(a); Newell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 347 F.3d 541, 546 (3d Cir. 2003).
8

Here, the AU

found that Claimant does have the following severe impairments:

degenerative joint disease, obesity, and depression (R: 12). These findings are supported by
substantial evidence (see, e.g., R: 186, 263, 291, 301). Because the AU found that Claimant has
several severe impairments, the disability analysis proceeded to the third step.
At step three, an AU considers the medical evidence to determine whether the claimant’s
impairment meets or medically exceeds the severity of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part
404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (the “Listings”).

If the impairment is listed, this results in a

presumption of disability.
Here, the AU

found that although Claimant suffers from severe impairments of

degenerative joint disease, obesity, and depression, these impairments do not meet the
requirements of an impairment in the Listings. Specifically, the AU found that “[t]he medical
evidence does not demonstrate the requisite degree of gross anatomical deformity, pain or
limitations substantiated by diagnostic imaging, and resulting in an inability to perform fine and
gross movements, under medical listing 1.02” for defining loss of function in the musculoskeletal
system(R: 12-13).
To be disabling, an impairment must meet all the criteria of a listed impairment. Sullivan
v. Zeblev, 493 U.S. 521, 530 (1996). In defining functional loss in the musculoskeletal system,
the Listings consider:
[T]he inability to ambulate effectively on a sustained basis for any reason, including
pain associated with the underlying musculoskeletal impairment, or the inability to
perform fine and gross movements effectively on a sustained basis for any reason,
including pain associated with the underlying musculoskeletal impairment. The
inability to ambulate effectively or the inability to perform fine and gross
movements effectively must have lasted, or be expected to last, for at least 12
months. For the purposes of these criteria, consideration of the ability to perform
these activities must befrom aphysical standpoint atone. When there is an inability
9

to perform these activities due to a mental impairment, the criteria in 12.00ff are to
be used. We will determine whether an individual can ambulate effectively or can
perform fine and gross movements effectively based on the medical and other
evidence in the case record, generally without developing additional evidence
about the individual’s ability to perform the specific activities listed as examples in
1.0032b(2) and 1.OOB2c. 20 C.F.R. Part 404(A)(1)(B)(2)(a) (emphasis added).
Claimant, however, seems to argue that the AU failed to compare the combined effect of
all ofher impairments—particularly, the effect ofher obesity on her knee joints—with one or more
of the Commissioner’s listings (R: 20), as required by 20 CFR 404.1526. That regulation mandates
that if a claimant has:
a combination of impairments, [none] of which meets a listing (see §
404.1525(c)(3)), we will compare your findings with those for closely analogous
listed impairments. If the findings related to your impairments are at least of equal
medical significance to those of a listed impairment, we will find that your
combination of impairments is medically equivalent to that listing. 20 CFR
404.1526.
Accordingly, Claimant argues that had the AU fully considered the effects of her obesity on her
other severe impairments, this consideration would have mandated a finding of disability. See
Claimant’s Br. at 20-26.
The ALl’s decision considered the cumulative impact of Claimant’s obesity on her
degenerative joint disease. The AU noted that Claimant’s “knees revealed moderate limitations
in range of motion as well as tenderness” (R: 14) and stated that “[e]ven considering that claimant
is 5’2” and weighs 220 pounds, there is no evidence permitting a conclusion that the combination
of her orthopedic impairment and weight would not reduce her residual functional capacity below
sedentary exertional level.” (R: 15).
In Diaz v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 577 F.3d 500, 505 (3d Cir. 2009), the AU found obesity
to be one of the claimant’s severe impairments but did not take into consideration whether her
10

obesity combined with her asthma, diabetes, arthritis, back pain, and hypertension could impact
her workplace performance. The Third Circuit remanded, as it was unable to conclude that the
claimant’s “obesity had no impact, alone or in combination with her other impairments, on her
workplace performance.” Id. at 504. Rather, the court noted that “morbid obesity would seem to
have exacerbated her joint dysfunction as a matter of common sense, if not medical diagnosis. See
Clifford, 227 F.3d at 873 (noting significant relationship between obesity and severe arthritis of
the knees).” Id.
By contrast, in Rutherford v. Bamhart, 399 f.3d 546, 546 (3d Cir. 2005), neither the
claimant nor the AU mentioned obesity as a condition that contributed to the claimant’s inability
to work, notwithstanding that her height was 5’2” and weight was 245 pounds. In Rutherford, the
claimant argued that the ALl failed to consider her weight throughout the disability analysis, as
required by Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) OO—3p.

at 552. The Third Circuit concluded that

remand was not required “because it would not affect the outcome of the case.”

at 553.

Significantly, the claimant did not specify how consideration of her obesity would affect the AU’s
five-step analysis, “beyond an assertion that her weight makes it more difficult for her to stand,
walk and manipulate her hands and fingers.” Id.
Here, unlike in Rutherford, the AU determined that Claimant’s obesity constituted a severe
impairment. But, ultimately, this determination did not affect the outcome of the case, because
the AU found that Claimant’s RFC is at the sedentary exertional level.
During the hearing, Claimant testified that each time she visited the Emergency Room,
doctors told her that she needed to lose weight to alleviate her knee pain (R: 56). The Aftercare
Instructions from Jersey City Medical Center, following Claimant’s September 2010 ER
11

admission, state that “weight loss and regular exercise including low-impact activities like
biking, or walking” can help reduce joint stress and explain that “{e]xercise actually is needed to
nourish the joint cartilage and remove waste, and it helps keep the muscles around the joint strong”
(R: 263). The medical record reveals that although Claimant’s weight was noted in physicians’
records (5’2’ and 187-220 pounds [R: 41, 291]), no state agency physician discussed the
correlation between her weight and her knee joint pain. Nor did Claimant specify any particular
records or evidence relating to her obesity, which the AU purportedly omitted from his
consideration. See Neff v. Astrue, 875 F. Supp. 2d 411, 423 (D. Del. 2012) (quoting Brown v.
Astrue, 789 F.Supp.2d 470, 48 3-84).
Indicating consideration of Claimant’s obesity, the AU noted that Claimant’s “statements
concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these [pain] symptoms are not credible
to the extent they are inconsistent with the above residual functional capacity assessment.” (R: 15).
He further noted that, “Even considering that claimant is 5’2” and weighs 220 pounds, there is no
evidence permitting a conclusion that the combination of her orthopedic impairment and weight
would not reduce her residual functional capacity below sedentary exertional level.” Id. In other
words, the AU determined that Claimant would still be able to perform at the sedentary exertional
level that the examining physicians assessed as Claimant’s RFC. “Because her doctors must also
be viewed as aware of [“Claimant’s”] obvious obesity,” Rutherford, at 553, the Court finds that
the AU’s adoption of their conclusions constitutes a satisfactory if indirect consideration of that
condition. If the AU had instead independently assumed that Claimant’s obesity had a significant
detrimental effect on her RFC—such that Claimant could not function at a sedentary level—he
would have been impermissibly substituting his opinion for that of the medical experts. See Neff
12

v. Astrue, $75 F. $upp. 2d 411, 423 (D. Del. 2012). Accordingly, consistent with the medical
record and the physicians’ assessments, the AU did properly take into consideration Claimant’s
obesity, and that portion of his decision is affirmed.
B.

The AU’s Finding That Claimant Is Capable Of Other Work

Claimant argues that the Commissioner did not sustain her burden to show that jobs exist
in the national economy that Claimant can perform despite her reduced RFC. See Claimant’s Br.
at 11. Specifically, Claimant contends that although the AU found that she suffers from a non
exertional impairment (R: 12-13), he failed to rely on the vocational expert’s testimony and instead
determined for himself how Claimant’s non-exertional restrictions would affect her ability to
perform sedentary work (R: 13). cc Claimant’s Br. at 8, 12-13. Claimant also contends that the
AU improperly relied on the Medical-Vocational Guidelines in finding that there exists other work
in significant numbers in the national economy which she can perform. See Claimant’s Br. at 1415.
In step three, the AU determined that Claimant “has the residual functional capacity to
perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a) except the claimant is
precluded from using ladders, ropes or scaffolds; can occasionally balance or kneel: must avoid
hazards such as heights and dangerous machinery; and is limited to understanding, remembering
and carrying out simple instructions.” (R: 13). At step four, the AU determined that Claimant is not
able to perform any of her past relevant work (R: 15). At step five, the AU determined that “there are
jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform (20 CFR
404.1569, 404.1569(a), 416.969, and 416.969(a)).” (R: 16).

The Medical—Vocational Guidelines only take account of exertional impairments.
13

Exertional impairments are those that affect the claimant’s “ability to meet the strength demands
of jobs (sitting, standing, walking, lifling, carrying, pushing, and pulling).” 20 C.F.R.

§

404.1569(b). Non-exertional impairments are all other impairments that do not affect a claimant’s
ability to meet the strength demands ofjobs. 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1569(c)(l). As the Third Circuit

noted in Sykes v. Apfel, 228 f.3d at 270 (emphasis added):
When a claimant has an additional nonexertional impairment, the question whether
that impairment diminishes his residual functional capacity is functionally the same
as the question whether there are jobs in the national economy that he can perform
given his combination of impairments. The grids do not purport to answer this
question, and thus under [Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 103 S.Ct. 1952, 76
L.Ed.2d 66 (1983)] the practice of the AU determining without taking additional
evidence the effect of the nonexertional impairment on residual functional capacity
cannot stand.
Claimant complains that her psychiatric disturbance and pain interfere with her ability to
concentrate and thus with her capacity to be productive in competitive employment.

$

Claimant’s Br. at 19. She argues that under Sykes, the AU should have considered these non
exertional limitations in addition to the Guidelines. The AU seems to have adopted the findings
of the state agency medical consultants who determined that Claimant’s “activities of daily living
are limited mostly by pain rather than psychiatric symptoms, and further noted either no limitations
or, at best, moderate limitations in concentration and adaptation” (R: 15). Regarding Claimant’s
complaints of pain, her “statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effect of
these symptoms are not credible to the extent that they are inconsistent with the above residual
functional capacity assessment.” (R: 15). Nevertheless, the AU determined that Claimant does
not have the “cognitive functions

.

.

.

to perform past relevant work” as an accounts receivable

clerk and receptionist (R: 15). However, the ALl did not explicitly state that Claimant does not
have any non-exertional limitations. Rather, the AU found that depression constitutes one of
14

Claimant’s severe impairments (R: 12) and that she has “moderate difficulties” in concentration,
persistence, and pace (R: 13).

Although the AU did not reference the vocational expert’s

testimony, Ms. Sasona testified that the unskilled, sedentary jobs available to Claimant, as an
addresser, patcher, and assembler, would require accuracy (R: 75) and would not allow daily,
unscheduled breaks (R: 74). It is unclear whether the AU determined that Claimant has no non
exertional limitations that would otherwise erode her RFC and thus whether the AU properly
relied solely on the Medical—Vocational Guidelines in finding that there exist jobs in significant
numbers in the national economy that Claimant can perform.
V.

CONCLUSION
for the foregoing reasons, the Court will affirm in part and vacate in part the AU’s decision

that there exist jobs in significant numbers in the national economy that Claimant can perform in
conjunction with the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, and remands this case for further
administrative proceedings consistent with this Opinion. An appropriate order accompanies this
Opinion.
DATED: September 30, 2015

CLAIRE C. CECCHI, U.S.D.J.

15