MEMON v. THOMPSON et al

Filing 16

OPINION fld. Signed by Judge Jose L. Linares on 11/18/14. (sr, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

HAJI MEMON,

Civil Action No. 2:14-3671 (JLL) (JAD)

Plaintiff,
OPINION
V.

JOHN THOMPSON, Director, USCIS,
Newark, New Jersey; UNITED STATES
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
SERVICES;
Defendants.

LINARES, District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court upon the Motion of Defendants John Thompson
and
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) (collectively “Defen
dants”) to
Dismiss the Complaint of Plaintiff Haji Memon (“Plaintiff’) pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil
Procedure 1 2(b)(6), or in the alternative, for Summary Judgment Pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil
Procedure 56(a). [CM/ECF No. 4.] The Court has considered the submissions made in suppor
t of
and in opposition to Defendants’ Motion, and decides this matter without oral argument
pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78. Based on the following and for the reasons expressed herein,
Defendants’
motion is granted. Plaintifrs Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a lawful permanent resident of the United States and a native and citizen
of

India. (Compl. ¶3.) He resides in Piscataway, New Jersey. (Id.) Plaintiff obtaine
d permanent
resident status on July 1, 2007, through his employment. (Docket #4, Ex. C at 2.) Defend
ant
1

Thompson is the District Director for the Newark District of USCIS. (Id.

¶ 4.)

On September 8, 2009, Plaintiff pled guilty to committing a fraud on the IRS under 26
U.S.C. 7206(1). (Docket #4, Ex. C at 2.) Said fraud caused a loss to the Government that exceed
ed
$10,000. (id.) At the time that Plaintiff entered his guilty plea, a conviction under 26 U.S.C.

7206(1) was not an aggravated felony in the Third Circuit. In February 2012, the Supreme Court
of the United States held that a conviction under this section of the US Code is an aggrav
ated
felony. Kawashima v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1166, 1172, reh ‘g denied, 132 S. Ct. 1961 (2012)
.

On or about June 12, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Form N-400, Application for Naturalization
(“N-400”) with USCIS. (Docket #4, Ex. C at 2.) On May 18, 2013 USCIS denied Plaintiff’s N400, finding that Plaintiff’s September 8, 2009 conviction under 26 U.S.C. 7206(1) preclud him
ed
establishing eligibility to naturalize. (Id.) In this decision, the USCIS relied on Kawashima. (Id.)
Plaintiff appealed this decision, and the USCIS affirmed its denial on February 25, 2014. (Comp
i.
¶6.)

Plaintiff filed a two-count Complaint against Defendants on June 6, 2014. (Docket #1.)
Count one alleges that the denial of Plaintiff’s naturalization “was legally and factually errone
ous
in that.

.

.

[P]laintiff had actually overpaid the Internal Revenue Service [“IRS”] so that there was

no loss greater than $10,000.” (Compi. ¶8.) Count two alleges that the denial of Plainti
ff’s
naturalization “was legally and factually erroneous in the retroactive application of [Kawa
shima].”
(Id.

¶

10.) Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, for Summary Judgment
on

August 8, 2014.’ (Docket #4.) This Court has jurisdiction to conduct a de novo review
of the denial
of Plaintiff’s application for naturalization pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §1421(c).

‘Although Defendants have attached extraneous documents to its Motion, the Court will
not convert the Motion into
one for Summary Judgment because these documents are integral to Plaintiff’s Complaint.
See In re Burlington Coat
Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997) (stating that “a ‘document integralto
or explicitly relied upon
in the complaint’ may be considered ‘without converting the motion [to dismiss] into one
for summary judgment.”

2

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

For a complaint to survive dismissal, it “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (citing Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
In determining the sufficiency of a complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded
factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See Phillips v. Cnty. ofAllegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008). But, “the tenet
that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to
legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Thus, legal conclusions draped in the guise of factual
allegations may not benefit from the presumption of truthfulness. Id.
III.

DISCUSSION

A lawful permanent resident alien is eligible for naturalization as a United States Citizen
if he (i) has resided continuously in the United States for five years after being lawfully admitted
for permanent residence, (ii) “has resided continuously within the United States from the date of
the application up to the time of admission to citizenship,” and (iii) during all relevant time periods,
“has been and still is a person of good moral character.” 8 US.C.

§ 1427(a). If an individual’s

application for naturalization is denied, after a hearing before an immigration officer the applicant
can seek judicial review in the United States district court for the district in which he resides. 8
U.S.C.

§ 1421(c).
Plaintiff bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he meets the

above requirements for naturalization. 8 C.F.R.

§ 316.2(b). Under the Immigration and Nationality

(citation omitted)).

3

Act (“1NA”), “[n]o person shall be regarded as, or found to be, a person of good moral character
who, during the period for which good moral character is required to be established, is, or was.
one who at any time has been convicted of an aggravated felony.” 8 U.S.C.
8 U.S.C.

§ 1l01(f,(8). Under

§ 10l(a)(43)(M)(i), a crime under 28 U.S.C. § 7201 is an aggravated felony if the revenue

loss exceeds $10,000. In Kawashima, the United States Supreme Court confirmed that
“convictions under 26 U.S.C.

§ 7206(1) and (2) in which the revenue loss to the Government

exceeds $10,000 qualify as aggravated felonies pursuant to 8 U.S.C.

§ 1 101(a)(43)(M)(i).” 132 S.

Ct. at 1176.
A. The USCIS’s denial of Plaintiff’s application for naturalization was not factually
erroneous.
In count one of the Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that the denial of his naturalization was
erroneous because he “overpaid the [IRS] so that here was no loss greater than $10,000.” (Compi.
¶8.) However, the Plea Agreement and Judgment attached to Defendants’ Motion show that
Plaintiff owed the Government additional federal income tax in the amount of $89,026 as a result
of filing a false tax return (Docket #4, Ex. A-B), which is well above the $10,000 limit set forth in
8 U.S.C.

§ lOl(a)(43)(M)(i). Defendants point out that Plaintiff appears to rely on Sing/i v. An’ y

Gen. of the US., 677 F.3d 503, 512 (3d Cir. 2012), in which the Third Circuit held that in order
for a conviction to qualify as an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(43)(M), the victim

must have suffered “an actual loss.” This Court agrees with Defendants that a reliance on Singh
would be misplaced, as the Third Circuit explained:
Our holding here is a narrow one, involving an offense that at no point resulted in
an actual loss to any victim for any length of time.
It doesn’t matter how
fleetingly the person obtains control. If the person’s offense deprives the defrauded
party of property, an actual loss occurs to an actual victim under subparagraph
(M)(i).
.

.

.

Id. at 518. in Sing/i, the Court found that there was no actual loss because the offender was caught
4

by a government sting operation before the loss occurred. Id. The present case is distinguishable
because Plaintiff was not caught before filing his false tax returns, and thus the government
suffered an actual loss. The fact that Plaintiff later received a tax refund is irrelevant under the
holding in Singh. Because an actual loss occurred above the $10,000 limit set forth in 8 U.S.C.

§

lOl(a)(43)(M)(i), the USCIS’s denial of Plaintiff’s application for naturalization was not factually
erroneous.
B. The USCIS’s denial of Plaintiff’s application for naturalization was not legally erroneous.
Count 11 of Plaintiff’s Complaint argues that his denial of naturalization was legally
erroneous because the USCIS incorrectly applied the holding in Krni’ashima v. Holder, 132 S. Ct.
1166 (2012) reh ‘g denied, 132 S. Ct. 1961 (U.S. 2012) retroactively. (Compl. ¶10.) Plaintiff argues
that “the standard for whether a court decision should be applied retroactively has not been
definitively settled in the Third Circuit[,j” and asks this Court to apply the standard set forth in
Chevron Oil C. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971). (P1. Br. 5.) Plaintiff concedes, however, that the

Supreme Court, in Harper v. VA Department of Taxation, “called [the Chevron Oil test) into
question[.]” (P1. Br. 5) (citing Harper, 509 U.S. 86, 113 (1993)).
The Third Circuit has unambiguously stated that “the Supreme Court’s latest retroactivity
jurisprudence has overruled Chevron OiI equitable balancing test as the determinant of whether
a new principle of law will be applied retroactively.” At!. Coast Demolition & Recycling, Inc. v.
Bd, of Chosen Freeholders ofAti. Cntv., 112 F.3d 652, 672 (3d Cir. 1997) amended, 135 F.3d 891
(3d Cir. 1998) (citing Revnoldsviile Casket C’o. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749. 751—53 (1995); Harper,

509 U.S. at 97). Because this holding contradicts the crux of Plaintiffs argument, this Court ordered
Plaintiff to show cause why Count II of his Complaint should not be dismissed.

5

With its order to show cause, this Court gave Plaintiff “one final opportunity to argue why
his denial of naturalization was legally erroneous based on the Supreme Court’s holding in Harper
and other legal authority that is binding on this Court” (Docket #14.) Plaintiff did not do so.
Instead, Plaintiff attempted to “demonstrate [] the continued viability of [chevron Oil Co.] in this
2
case.” (Docket #15.) As such, this Court applies the Harper standard to determine whether
Kat’ashirna should be applied retroactively.

The Supreme Court in Harper held:
When th[e Supreme] Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties before

it, that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal law and must he given
flail retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct review and as to all
events, regardless of whether such events predate or postdate our
announcement of the rule.
509 U.S. at 97. Given this rule, the timing of Plaintiff’s guilty plea is irrelevant for the purpose of
USC IS’s ruling on Plaintiff’s application for naturalization. Though a conviction under 26 U.S.C.
§7206(1) was not an aggravated felony at the time Plaintiff entered his guilty plea, the Suprem
e
Court held in Kawashirna that it was an aggravated felony at the time the USCIS consid
ered

Plaintiff’s application. Once the Supreme Court decided Kawashima, it became retroactive “as
to
all events, regardless of whether such events predate or postdate [the Court’s] announcemen
t of
the rule.” Harper, 509 U.S. at 97. Under the INA, an aggravated felony conviction on or
after
November 29, 1990 precludes an applicant from ever demonstrating the “good moral charac
ter”
element required for naturalization. 8 U.S.C. §llOl(f)(8). Because the Supreme Court’s holdin
g

2

Plaintiff argues that “the most recent Third Circuit case to address [Chevron Oil Co.]
does note that there is an
issue of retroactivity in light of Harper, but resolves the issue on the assumption that [Chevron
Oil Co.] remains good
law[.]” (Id.)(citing Kolekevich v. Attorney General, 501 F.3d 323, n.9 (3d Cir. 2007)).
Plaintiff’s reliance on
Kolekevich, however, is misplaced. The Kolekevich Court concluded that it was unnecessary
to determine whether
Chevron Oil Co. was still good law because “even assuming that pure prospectivity remains
an option, application of
that doctrine to the present case would be inappropriate.” Id. Thus, the Third Circuit did
not consider the validity of
Chevron Oil C’o. in Kolekevich.
.

6

.

.

in Kawashima applies retroactively according under Haiper, USCIS’s denial of Plaintiffs
application for naturalization was not legally erroneous.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Based on the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ motion to dismiss [CM/ECF No. 4) is
granted. Plaintiffs Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.
An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.

a

Dated: November

-

Jose L Lrnares
United States District Judge
2014

7