MAHOTIERE v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
Filing
20
OPINION. Signed by Judge Jose L. Linares on 7/1/15. (gh, )
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
MARIE MAHOTIERE,
Civil Action No. 1443 12 (JLL)
Plaintiff,
v.
OPINION
CAROLYN W.COLVIN
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
LINARES, District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court upon the appeal of Marie
Mahotiere (“Plaintiff’)
from the final determination by Administrative Law Judge (“AU
”) Joel H. Friedman upholding
final decision of the Commissioner denying Plaintiff’s applica
tion for Supplemental Security
Income (“SSI”) and Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under
the Social Security Act (the
“Act”). After reviewing the submissions of both parties,
for the following reasons, the final
decision of the Commissioner is affirmed.
I.
BACKGROUND’
A.
Procedural History
Plaintiff filed an application for SSI and DIB on September
21, 2009, alleging disability
as of May 1, 2007. (P1. Br. at 1). Plaintiff’s claim was denied
initially on February 2, 2010 and
on reconsideration on July 21, 2010. Id.
On appeal, Plaintiff’s claim was approved after a
hearing with an AU on October 26, 2011. Id. On Decem
ber 22, 2011, the Appeals Council
1
The facts set-forth in this Opinion are taken
transcript of the record.
from the parties’ statements in their respective moving papers and the
issued a notice on its own motion that it was reviewing the AU’s
decision and on April 26,
2012, issued an Order for remand. Id. at 1-2. Plaintiff’s claim
was denied after the second
hearing before the AU judge on January 18, 2013. Id. at 2. At
this hearing, testimony was taken
from Vocational Expert (“yE”), Dr. Pat Green. On May 9, 2014,
the Appeals Council denied
review, thereby affirming the decision of the AU as the final decisio
n of the Commissioner. id.
at 2. Subsequently, Plaintiff commenced the instant action on July
9, 2014. Id.
B.
Factual History
1.
Plaintiff’s Testimony
At the time of her initial hearing, Plaintiff was 52 years old. (P1.
Br. at 2). She alleges
that her headaches have been affecting her for two years and limit
her daily activities. j4. at 3.
She claims to suffer from these headaches up to three times a week
and claims that they can last
all day, requiring her to sleep to relieve the pain. Id. at 4. She
also claims that she has pain and
swelling in her hands and feet due to cramping and stiffhess,
which prevents her from driving,
lifting more than four pounds, or walking for more than three minute
s without stopping to rest.
Id. Plaintiff walks with a prescribed cane because she claims she
feels dizzy when she walks and
from her medications. Id. She wears prescribed hand braces due
to her carpal tunnel syndrome.
Id.
Plaintiff also suffers from asthma and experiences shortness
of breath, for which she
takes medications. Id. at 5. She reports high blood sugar, headac
hes, blurred vision, and dry
mouth as symptoms of her uncontrolled diabetes.
4. She also describes shoulder pain and
difficulty in lifting her arm. Id. At her second hearing in 2013,
Plaintiff again testified that her
diabetes were uncontrolled and continued to complain of dizzine
ss, hand cramping, headaches,
dry mouth, nausea, difficulty with balance, and blurred vision.
Id.
2.
Medical Evidence
Plaintiff first complained of mental health symptoms to her primary
health providers in
2009 and early 2010. Id. at 7. In 2011, Dr. V. Limmo at the Comm
unity Psychiatric Institute
diagnosed her with major depressive disorder.
Id. at 8.
Plaintiff was also referred to and
participated in a day program for supportive mental health five
times a week from May 2011
through January 2012 but continued to display a lack of insight into
her illness impulsivity, poor
social skills, and manic behavior. Id.
On June 6, 2012, Dr. Marc Friedman, Ph. D. performed a mental status
exam on behalf of
the Commissioner. Id. at 9. He also diagnosed her with major depres
sive disorder, with a GAF
of 55, In a medical source statement dated June 11, 2012, he
indicated that Plaintiff had
moderate limitations in understanding, remembering, and carrying
out complex instructions and
making judgments on complex decisions and in interacting approp
riately with the public,
supervisors, and co-workers. Id.
In 2007, Plaintiff received primary and endocrinology care throug
h University Hospital
Clinic.
Id. at 10.
Endocrinologist Dr. Bleich observed poorly controlled diabete
s with
complications of retinopathy, hyperlipidemia, constipation, numbn
ess in hands and feet, and
neuropathic pain. Id. Dr. Raghuwanshi provided a diagnosis of
uncontrolled diabetes, diabetic
retinophy, hyperlipidemia, dermatopathy, and vitamin D deficie
ncy. Id. In 2009, Dr. Hidalgo
diagnosed Plaintiff with migraines, diffuse joint pain and possib
le diabetic neuropathy. Id. at 11.
Dr. Raghuwanshi also observed decreased sensation and an antalgi
c gait and prescribed a cane to
assist with ambulation.
Id.
An EMG revealed generalized length-dependent axonal
sensorimotor polyneuropathy, as well as bilateral mild carpal
tunnel syndrome.
Also in
2009, Plaintiff was diagnosed with right trochanteric bursitis and right
shoulder impingement by
Dr. Altschuler and was referred for physical therapy. Id. Despit
e physical therapy, Plaintiff
continued to complain of pain, including in her lower extremities.
She also continued to
have symptoms of neuropathy, dizziness, nocturia, and paresth
esias due to her uncontrolled
diabetes, id.
From 2008 through 2010, Dr. Daniel Penman treated
Plaintiff for asthma and
seasonal/perennial allergic rhinitis. Id. at 12. In June 2007, follow
ing a routine eye examination,
Dr. Daniel Desrivieres ruled out diabetic retinopathy, but diagno
sed Plaintiff with an astigmatism
and presbyopia. Id. at 13. In January 2010, Dr. Christina Zolli,
a consultative medical examiner
hired by the Commissioner, diagnosed Plaintiff with vision affecte
d by partial cataracts,
astigmatism and presbyopia. Id.
On July 8, 2010, Dr. Algemon Phillips, on behalf of the
Commissioner, reviewed Plaintiff’s medical record and stated
her eye impairment was not
severe. Id. at 16. Plaintiff also visited the ERs at both Univer
sity Hospital and East Orange
General Hospital several times from 2007 to 2010 for variou
s complaints and has had an
appendectomy, and an incision and drainage for cellulitis and an
abscess. j. at 13
—
14.
On January 14, 2010, Dr. Changaramk Sivadas, a consultative medica
l examiner hired by
the Commissioner, performed a physical examination on Plainti
ff and observed a normal gait and
station, normal neurological results except for impaired monof
ilament sensation over her feet,
normal reflexes, responses, and vibration sense. (Def. Br.
at 9). After reviewing the medical
record, he diagnosed Plaintiff with uncontrolled diabetes
with peripheral neuropathy, diabetic
neuropathy by history, chronic low back and right hip pain,
controlled hypertension, migraine
headaches, controlled asthma, hypercholesterolemia, and GERD
. (P1. Br. at 9). On June 6, 2010,
Dr. Rahel Eyassu, also a consultative medical examiner hired
by the Commissioner, performed a
physical examination on Plaintiff and observed a slightly wide-b
ased gait, movement at a
reasonable pace, unsteady tandem walking, full range of motion
and full strength in all
extremities, and decreased pinprick sensation over Plaintiff’s fingert
ips and alongside Plaintiff’s
right foot. (P1. Br. at 17, Def. Br. at 9). He diagnosed
Plaintiff with neuropathy, probably
diabetic; probable mild diabetic retinopathy by history, poorly contro
lled diabetes mellitus type
2, stable hypertension, and mild intermittent asthma.
(P1. Br. at 17). He also completed a
medical source statement that indicated that Plaintiff could
occasionally lift and carry up to 20
pounds, could sit 5 hours, stand 3 hours, walk 3 hours within
an 8 hour day, was limited to
frequent handling, was limited to occasional fingering, feeling, pushin
g, and pulling, and could
only occasional use her feet. Id.
On February 2, 2010, Dr. Mohammad Rizwan issued a
written function capacity
assessment on behalf of the Commissioner.
at 15. He wrote that she could lift 20 pounds
occasionally, 10 pounds frequently, could stand for 6 hours a
day, could sit for 6 hours a day, and
had no postural limitations.
at 16. Dr. A. Przybyla affirmed Dr. Rizwan’s RFC assessment
in
a case analysis based on the record. jç1
On December 26, 2012, Dr. Gerard Gaist responded to medica
l interrogatories regarding
Plaintiffs physical impairments on the basis of the medical
record. He opined that there was
little objective evidence in the record of any substantive
musculosketal or neurological
dysfunction or substantive impairment due to asthma or headac
hes, which he believed were
possibly migraines or tension headaches. (Def. Br. at 12).
He noted that Plaintiff had type 2
diabetes; mild and well-controlled hypertension; no medical
evidence of diabetic retinopathy; a
mild distal sensory impairment, possibly due to diabete
s; mild carpal tunnel syndrome, for
which Plaintiff had been prescribe night-time wrist splints; and no eviden
ce of hand weakness or
impaired dexterity apart from a mild decrease in touch sensation.
(Def. Br. at 11, P1. Br. at 18).
Finally, on May 18, 2012, Dr. Patrick Foye, on behalf of the Plainti
ff, performed a full
medical examination and completed his own medical source
statement. He diagnosed Plaintiff
with uncontrolled diabetes, mellitus, diabetic peripheral neuropathy
with balance deficits, right
shoulder pain secondary to rotator cuff tendonitis, asthma, partial
cataracts, GERD, and migraine
headaches. (P1. Br. at 18
—
19). His medical source statement reported that Plaintiff had a
normal range of motion in her spine and cervical spine, low back
pain, facet and sacroiliac pain,
a normal gait, full strength and normal reflexes in her upper and
lower extremities, and some
numbness in her extremities. (Def. Br. at 5). He also noted that
Plaintiff walked without an
assistive device.
4 He determined that Plaintiff could lift or carry 10 pounds occasionally and
less than 10 pounds frequently; that she could stand and walk
less than 2 hours a day with an
assistive device; she must alternative between sitting and standing;
that pushing and pulling was
limited; she could never perform postural activities; she had limited
reaching, fingering, feeling,
and seeing; and environmental limitations. (P1. Br. at 19).
3.
VE Testimony
The AU asked vocational expert Dr. Pat Green to consider
several hypotheticals at
Plaintiffs second hearing. (P1. Br. at 6). The first hypothetical
included, in addition Plaintiff’s
age, education, and work history, a limitation of a light exertional
level, no exposure to hazards,
fumes, odors, or respiratory irritants, avoidance of ladders, ropes,
and scaffolds, and a limitation
to simple routine jobs in a low contact setting.
Dr. Green testified that three jobs existed
within those parameters in significant numbers. Id. The second
hypothetical included the need
to avoid fine detailed work, which the AU clarified as “readin
g off a computer monitor.” Id.
Dr. Green testified that such an individual could perform the previo
usly listed jobs. The third
hypothetical included the ability to speak and understand English
but “difficulties as far as
conversation.” Id.. Dr. Green testified that the listed jobs did not
involve a significant amount of
conversation.
Id.
Fourth, the AU posed the original hypothetical, but with
a sedentary
exertional level limitation and the restriction on fine detailed work.
Id. Dr. Green testified that
two jobs existed within those parameters in significant numbers.
Id. Finally, the AU added the
limitations of managing concentration, persistence, and pace on
even a simple routine job for two
hours. Dr. Green testified that there were no jobs that the individ
ual could perform. Id at 7.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review for this Court is whether the AU’
s decision is based on
substantial evidence in the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g). Although the Social Security
Act is a remedial statute that should be broadly construed, the
“substantial evidence” standard is
a deferential one and the AU’s decision must be affirmed if
supported by “more than a mere
scintilla.
.
.
.
but less than a preponderance.” See Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d
501, 503 (3d Cir.
2004); Woody v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs.,
859 F.2d 115, 1159 (3d Cir. 1988).
Substantial evidence includes objective medical facts, diagno
ses or medical opinions based on
those facts, subjective evidence obtained or disability
testified to by the claimant, and the
claimant’s age, education and work experience. Curtin v. Harris,
508 F. Supp. 791 (D.N.J. 1981).
The AU must specifically indicate why particular evidence
was rejected.
$ Burnett v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec, 220 F.3d 112, 121 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Cotter
v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir.
1981)).
III.
APPLICABLE LAW
The Social Security Administration has developed a five-step
evaluation process to
determine whether an individual is disabled. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520. The AU must consider
whether the claimant is engaged in any “substantial gainful activit
y,” whether he suffers from a
severe impairment, and whether the impairment meets or medica
lly equals the severity of a listed
impairment. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)
-
(iii), 404.1520 (d). If the impairment meets or
medically equals the severity of a listed impairment then the claima
nt automatically qualifies for
disability benefits.
20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520 (a)(4)(iii), 404.1520 (d). If not, the AU must
determine the claimant’s RFC and evaluate whether the claima
nt can return to his past relevant
work or perform any other work present in significant numbers in
the national economy.
IV.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff argues that the AU failed to properly weigh medical
opinion evidence because
he did not provide adequate reasons for rejection and favore
d the opinions of non-examining
physicians over those of treating and examining physicians.
Plaintiff also argues that the AU
erred at step four by failing to make a RFC determination
that reflected all of Plaintiff’s
limitations. Furthermore, Plaintiff asserts that the AU
erred in failing to find Plaintiff’s
neuropathy and headaches severe, committing errors at steps
two through five.
I.
THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE
AU’S
DECISION REGARDING THE APPROPRIATION OF WEIG
HT TO
MEDICAL OPINION EVIDENCE.
Medical opinions are “statements from physicians
.
.
.
.
that reflect judgments about the
nature and severity of your impairment(s), including your
symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis,
what you can still do despite impairment(s), and your physic
al or mental restrictions.” 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.927 (a) (2). The AU must consider all medical opinions in a claimant’s case record
. 20
C.F.R,
§ 416.927. Although more weight is generally given to treating sources, other factors to
consider in determining how to weigh evidence from medical source
s include (1) the examining
relationship, (2) the treatment relationship, including the length,
frequency, nature, and extent of
the treatment, (3) the supportability of the opinion, (4) its consistency
with the record as a whole,
and (5) the specialization of the individual giving the opinio
n. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(c).
Ultimately, however, it is the AU’s exclusive responsibility
to evaluate medical opinions and
judge whether they are supported by and consistent with the rest
of the record. Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 399 (1971).
Plaintiff alleges that the AU decision erred in rejecting medica
l opinions regarding
Plaintiff’s diabetic neuropathy and headaches. This Court does not
agree. For the reasons set
forth below, the court finds that the AU provided sufficient reason
ing for his discounting of Dr.
Foye’s opinion and his assignment of great weight to Drs.
Rizwan and Galst’s opinions and
properly relied and considered all other medical evidence when
making his determination.
A.
The AU
Dr. Rizwan and Dr. Gaist’s opinions were more supportable and
consistent
with the record than Dr. Foye’s opinion.
must consider, when determining the supportability of
medical opinion
evidence, the quantity of medical sources, particularly medica
l signs and laboratory findings, and
the quality of the explanation. 20 CFR
§ 404.1527 (c) (3). While Dr. Foye’s opinion did include
a physical examination of Plaintiff, it was not supported
by his own examination findings.
Specifically, the AU noted that Dr. Foye’s physical examin
ation showed normal lumbosacral
range of motion; a normal, non-limping gait, no excessive
postural shifts, no apparent distress,
normal range of motion of the cervical spine, normal
strength in all extremities, and no
neurological deficits aside from subjective decreased sensati
on. (R. at 26). The AU found these
results inconsistent with Dr. Foye’s restrictive assessment
of Plaintiff. Id. Furthermore, Dr.
Foye’ s medical source statement explained his extremely restrict
ive assessment of Plaintiffs
postural limitations with a broad statement, “Poor balance/abili
ties due to diabetic peripheral
neuropathy.” (R. at 1107). The AU noted that these explan
ations were based largely on Dr.
Foye’s interpretation of the medical record and Plaintiff’s subjec
tive complaints. (R. at 26).
To the contrary, Dr. Rizwan, the state agency physician, provid
ed specific facts from
Plaintiff’s medical record to support his assessment of Plain
tiffs light RFC with environmental
limitations, Id. Further, Plaintiff’s diabetes mellitus, paresthesia
findings in hands and feet and
history of asthma were considered by the AL
Id. Similarly, medical expert Dr. Gaist supported
his opinion with specific objective findings. Id. For examp
le, the AU noted that Dr. Galst
found that there was little objective evidence support significant
musculoskeletal or neurologic
dysfunction because her complaints of dizziness due to
high blood pressure were not
substantiated as her hypertension was well controlled. Id. at 25.
Additionally, Plaintiffs assertions that Dr. Foye’s opinion is
consistent with the medical
record is unfounded. The medical record did establish that Plainti
ff had a history of headaches
and diabetic neuropathy, but other physicians, including Drs. Rizwa
n, Przybala, and Gaist, still
determined that Plaintiff could perform a limited range of
work. Moreover, state agency
physicians merit significant consideration in the disability analys
is. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527
(e) (2) (i) (stating that state agency physicians are “highly qualifi
ed” and “experts” in social
security disability evaluations). Drs. Rizwan, Przybala,
and Gaist were all state agency
physicians, while Plaintiff hired Dr. Foye as an independent consul
tant. As such, the AU was
entitled to rely heavily on Dr. Rizwan and Dr. Gaist’s opinio
ns. Accordingly, the AU provided
significant reasoning for his accordance of greater weight to
Dr. Rizwan and Dr. Gaist’s opinions
than to Dr. Foye’s opinion.
B.
The AU relied on and considered the opinions of Dr. Essayu,
Dr. Sivadas, Dr. Gaist, Dr. Khan, and the various physicians from
University Hospital; he did not reject the opinions outright.
Regarding Plaintiffs complaints of diabetic peripheral neuropathy,
the AU specifically
noted that there was evidence of a mild distal impairment in
her hands and impaired sensation
over Plaintiffs feet. (R. at 24-25). Therefore, the AU considered
the medical evidence from the
physicians at University Hospital, Dr. Essayu, Dr. Sivadas, and Dr.
Gaist and did not reject them
outright. However, the AU also reported that there was other medica
l evidence that Plaintiff had
no hand weakness or impaired dexterity, that she continued
to enjoy knitting and making
necklaces, suggesting intact finger dexterity, normal vibrati
on senses, normal deep tendon
reflexes, normal planter responses, a full range of motion in the
lower extremities and normal
strength. Id. Accordingly, the AU found that due to the aforem
entioned evidence, Plaintiffs
diabetic neuropathy did not amount to the level of a severe impair
ment.
Similarly, the AU acknowledged that Plaintiff had a history of
headaches and has been
prescribed Fioricet and therefore considered and did not reject
outright the medical opinions of
Drs. Khan, Sivadas, Gaist and the various physicians from
University Hospital regarding
Plaintiffs complaints of headaches. (R. at 25). However, substa
ntial evidence that the AU relied
on in concluding that the headaches were not severe told a
different story, including a normal
CT, no evidence of any related aura, or light sensitivity. Id.
Additionally, the AU is not required
to adopt all limitations assigned by a medical opinion,
even if the AU assigns the medical
opinion significant weight. Wilkinson v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 558 Fed. App’x 254, 2014 WL
80925, at *2 (3d Cir. March 5, 2014). Therefore, Plaintiffs
argument that by finding no severe
diabetic neuropathy or severe headaches, the AU impliedly
rejects the medical opinions of these
physicians, is erroneous because he did rely on and consid
er the medical opinions of the various
physicians when coming to his determination. It is in the purvie
w of the AU to make these
judgments and this Court cannot substitute its own conclusions for
those of the fact-finder when
the AU’s determination is supported by substantial evidence.
II.
THE AU’S RFC ASSESSMENT IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANT
IAL
EVIDENCE BECAUSE IT ADEQUATELY ACCOUNTED FOR
ALL OF
PLAiNTIFF’S CREDIBLY ESTABLISHED FUNCTIONAL LIMIT
ATIONS,
INCLUDING HER SUBJECTIVE COMPLAINTS THAT WERE
SUPPORTED
BY THE EVIDENCE.
The RFC is an administrative finding that the AU is solely respon
sible for determining,
based on consideration of the record as a whole. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(e). In determining a
claimant’s RFC, the AU must consider all medically determinable impair
ments, whether severe
or non-severe. Slaughter v. Astrue, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16954 *14
,
(D.N.J. Mar. 3, 2008).
Furthermore, the AU retains the discretion to make a credibi
lity judgment, “determining the
extent to which a claimant is accurately stating the degree of
pain or the extent to which he
is disabled by it.” kL, citing Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 362
(3d Cir.1999). A subjective
complaint alone cannot establish disability; objective medical eviden
ce must be provided. 20
C.F,R.
§ 404.1529(a). In the case of conflicting evidence, the AU may reject a claim if he
provides “explanation” for the rejection. Slaughter, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16594, at *14.
Plaintiff alleges that the AU erred in his determination that Plainti
ff retained the RFC to
perform a modified range of light, unskilled work because
he did not properly analyze the
limitations related to her symptoms from neuropathic pain, headac
hes, dizziness, and balance
difficulties. The Court finds that the AU
provided substantial evidence regarding his
determination that all of Plaintif?s complaints were not fully
credible and there is substantial
evidence that the AU’s RFC assessment adequately accounte
d for all of Plaintiff’s credibly
established functional limitations.
The AU provided extensive reasoning as to why, based on
the entirety of the medical
record, he did not find many of Plaintiff’s subjective claim
s of impairment to be credible.
Regarding Plaintiff’s headaches, the AU noted that resul
ts of a head CT were normal, there was
no evidence of any related aura, or light sensitivity.
(R. at 25).
The AU explained that
Plaintiff’s claims of dizziness and subsequent imbalance
were not also substantiated as her
hypertension was controlled.
(R. at 25).
The AU further noted that Plaintiff’s claim of
extensive neuropathic pain was not entitled to minimal weig
ht as medical examiners found that
she had full range of motion, normal strength, normal reflexes,
etc. (R. at 24
—
25). Ultimately,
the AU determined that Plaintiff’s neuropathic pain had no
more than a minimal effect on her
ability to do basic work activities. (R. at 25). According
ly, there is no merit to Plaintiff’s
contention that her symptoms were not properly evalu
ated as the AU’s determination of
Plaintiff’s RFC is supported by substantial evidence.
Finally, the AU, even after determining Plaintiff’s subjectiv
e claims were not credible in
their entirety, took into consideration all of her claim
s of impairment.
(R. at 27).
This is
evidenced by the fact that the AU limited Plaintiff’s RFC
to light work with additional postural,
environmental, and mental restrictions. (R. at 26
III.
—
27).
THE AU’S DETERMINATION THAT PLAINTIFF’S NEU
ROPATHY AND
HEADACHES ARE NOT SEVERE IS SUPPORTED BY
SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE.
Step two of the sequential evaluation process asks whet
her a claimant has a medically
determinable impairment that is “severe” or a combina
tion of impairments that is “severe.” 20
C.F.R. §404.1520 (c). In the Social Security context, “sev
ere” impairments significantly limit an
individual’s ability to perform basic work activities. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520 (c). Basic physical
work activities include walking, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, reach, carryin
g, or handling. Id.
Basic mental work activities include understanding, carrying out, and
remembering simple
instructions; using judgment; responding appropriately to supervision,
co-workers, and usual
work situations; and dealing with changes in a routine work setting. 20
C.F.R.
§ 404.1521. The
burden of proof is on the claimant to prove that her impairments are severe
. Bowen v. Yuckert,
482 U.S. 137, 146, n.5 (1987).
Plaintiff alleges that the AU erred in finding Plaintiff’s neuropathy and
headaches not
severe. As discussed at length above, the AU explained that Plaintiff was
treated conservatively,
had no hand weakness, continued to enjoy daily activities that indicated
finger dexterity, walked
with normal gait and station, had normal reflexes and responses and
strength, and that her
headaches were unsupported by specific neurological findings. (R. at 24
—
25). Accordingly,
there is substantial evidence to support the AU’s finding that Plainti
ff’s neuropathy and
headaches were non-severe.
Therefore, this Court finds that the AU’s determination that Plaintiff
is not disabled is
supported by substantial evidence. As such, the final decision of the Comm
issioner is affirmed.
V.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Commissioner is affirmed.
An appropriate
order follows this Opinion.
DATED: ofJu1y, 2015.
11
-‘
,E L. L1NARES
1A’S. DISTRICT JUDGE
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